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Abstract  
 
This thesis explores the gendered impact of austerity, contributing to an enhanced 
understanding of women’s experiences of austerity. It approaches austerity as a set of 
coexisting ideological (moral–political–economic) discourses and policies, that construct 
gender in particular ways, and that have particular gendered social effects. This thesis 
argues that it is vital to understand the workings of the state and the wider historical 
legacies that helped to produce inequalities through material and symbolic violence, 
since it is this context which frames how austerity is lived and felt in the everyday. This 
thesis thus examines the symbiotic relationship between the states production and 
legitimisation of austerity, and the ways in which it is experienced and articulated by 
young women in their everyday lives. Exploratory and interpretative in nature, this study 
draws on interviews and group discussions with sixty-one young women from different 
classed and ‘racial’ backgrounds, aged between 18 and 35, in Leeds, London, and 
Brighton during 2014 and 2015. Through this combination of qualitative methods, the 
research highlights the multivalent ways in which difference contours women’s everyday 
lives in the current context. This study demonstrates that the ways in which women 
negotiate, navigate, speak about, question, reproduce, and resist austerity are impacted 
by these differences. 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
Everyone’s had enough. Staff are overworked, we haven’t had a 
pay rise for years, services and patients are suffering, and 
everyone wants to leave or take time off. I work at a private 
practice one evening a week to get more money, and sometimes 
work weekends at a private hospital. I’ve cut back, and I’ve 
become a lot more careful. I mean, I’m not extravagant, I never 
have been, but I do enjoy myself, I go on holiday, but I try to not 
eat out all the time, and I won’t go buy something just because I 
think it’s nice. I can’t afford to buy a house, despite the fact I’ve 
been working for almost ten years, and I don’t have a student loan 
to pay back. So I do notice it, and see that things are more 
expensive now. Living in London, and working in the NHS, it’s not 
easy.  
 
(Anna, 27, middle-class, white, physiotherapist, London, August, 
2o14, italics my emphasis). 
 
I notice it. Since the last year and half actually. I can see it. Now I’m 
working, it should be easier, right? I get Housing Benefit and Tax 
Credits and I can get credit now, I have an Argos card, which I 
couldn’t get before. But my Housing Benefits have been 
deducted. When I first started [working] I was paying something 
like £36 towards my rent and that’s now jumped to £60 per week. 
That’s doubled in a year. I get in arrears just like that [pause] I’m 
trying to keep on top of it, but it’s lot of work. Sometimes at the 
end of the month, I’m left with £30 to do shopping. I’m sweating 
to get to work, sweating to get him to school, and I’ve got £30 to 
do shopping!! And like any kid, my son wants the latest trainers. I 
do feel bad, but I just can’t do it, and I tell him, ‘I have to buy the 
bargains or it won’t work’. The only thing I spend on quality is his 
uniform. I’d love to know how others [women] do it, I really would.  
 
(Marie, 28, working-class, black, part-time waitress, London, 
March 2015, italics my emphasis).  
 
 
This thesis attempts to understand the gendered impact of austerity. It does so 
through exploring the symbiotic relationship between how austerity is produced and 
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legitimised by the state, and articulated and experienced by young women1 in their 
everyday lives. For the sixty-one young women involved in this study, aged between 18 
and 35, from diverse class and ‘racial’2 backgrounds, living in Leeds, London and Brighton 
during 2014 – 2015, austerity was not only made present in different ways, but had 
differing consequences. As I explore, these differences arise from the differing resources 
and capitals available to be mobilised by them in the present, and the historical legacies 
that structure, reproduce and legitimate inequalities produced by the current crisis of 
financial capitalism. This thesis therefore examines the particular configuration of the 
state and gender, class and ‘race’ relations, in the specific context of UK austerity.  
 
Foregrounding difference when studying women’s experience of austerity is important. 
Austerity measures, to date, have disproportionately affected women, 86 per cent of 
cuts have fallen on women, particularly those from working-class and black and minority 
ethnic (BAME) backgrounds who live in northern regions of the UK (NEWomen’s 
Network and Women’s Resource Centre (NEWN and WRC), 2012). Despite this unequal 
effect, austerity has been framed through the moral discourse of being ‘fair’ and 
‘necessary’, in which the public has repeatedly been told ‘we are all in this together’ 
(Osborne, 2009, 2012, 2015). Those most affected by austerity measures have been 
labelled as ‘undeserving’ recipients of state support and blamed for the austerity 
programme. Examples of those ‘undeserving’ include the ‘welfare mother’, the 
immigrant and the unemployed. This thesis therefore approaches austerity as a set of 
coexisting ideological (moral-political-economic) discourses and policies, which 
construct gender in particular ways, and have particular gendered social effects. This 
understanding allows us to see the commonalities in women’s experiences, but also the 
multiplicity of ways through which austerity is lived, felt and spoken about. This is clear 
                                                
1I understand that the category woman is a contested, and socially constructed category, rather than a 
biological category (see Butler, 1990). 
 
2Throughout this thesis, I put ‘race’ and ‘racial’ in speech marks, since I understand these terms as being 
relational, plural, dynamic, and socially constructed concepts, rather than biological categories (see for 
instance Alexander and Knowles, 2005).  
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in the above quotes from Marie and Anna, and is further developed throughout the pages 
of this research. Marie and Anna both notice austerity in their daily lives, yet, this is lived 
and felt differently. This is due to their differing circumstances, and the types and 
amounts of resources and capitals that they each have available to be used in the current 
context. 
 
This thesis unpacks and extends the understanding of austerity and its gendered 
impacts, through exploring the plethora of ways in which the term is produced and 
legitimised by the state, linking to wider historical legacies that helped to produce 
inequalities through material and symbolic violence. These historical processes have 
occurred both outside and within Western societies since the fifteenth-century. It is 
therefore necessary to understand how people have been constructed as ‘inferior’ and 
‘superior’, through the designation of moral differences, in order to recognise the 
nuances of the gendered austerity project and the complex ways through which austerity 
is lived and felt by women in the everyday. My thesis thus explores the historical context 
for the current climate. It is through such an analysis that we can begin to understand the 
gendered nuances of the austerity project, and the complex ways through which 
austerity is lived and felt by women in the everyday. By examining the diverse 
experiences of women amidst austerity, this study provides an in-depth qualitative 
examination of the multivalent ways in which difference contours women’s experiences 
in the current context. I explain how austerity affects women’s lives to different degrees, 
and in different ways, effects which are shaped by their class and ‘racial’ background. I 
illuminate the ways in which women negotiate, navigate, speak about, question and 
resist austerity are impacted by these differences. My research thus adds to sociological 
understandings of how power works in the present, and it helps to myth-bust and 
fracture the dominant socio-political and media discourses. 
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Understanding Austerity Policies  
 
Austerity appealed to many Eurozone politicians in the aftermath of the 2007–
2009 financial crisis, perceived by the large majority of politicians as the only possible 
response in both Europe and the US (Blyth, 2013). This view was especially prevalent in 
Britain. The UK Coalition (Conservative–Liberal Democrat) government (2010–2015) 
introduced their programme of austerity in 2010, as a means of reducing the government 
budget deficit brought about by the 2008 financial crisis. The government originally 
stated that the programme would last for a five-year period. In 2014, the Treasury 
protracted the planned period of austerity until at least 2018, to try to further stabilise 
the economy (Kirkup, 2014). In 2015, it was extended to 2020. Following the UK EU 
referendum of 2016, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne (2010–2016), 
estimated that the goal of eliminating the deficit by 2020 was no longer realistic 
(Goodman, 2016). His successor, Philip Hammond (2016–present), has since continued 
with the austerity programme, but abandoned plans to eradicate the deficit by 2020 
(Wilkinson, 2016; Parker and Jackson, 2017; Chakelian, 2017).  
Records from the House of Commons Library show that by 2020, there will have been 
approximately £90.8bn in cuts made by the austerity programme (Cracknel and Keen, 
2016). 86 per cent of these have fallen on women, 14 per cent on men (ibid). These 
translate into a range of budget cuts. Due to the expansive and complex nature of cuts 
and reforms in the UK context, it is difficult to provide a coherent account. I therefore 
focus on data detailing the real change in department budget cuts between 2010–2011 
and 2015–2016, which are likely to have the most direct impact on women (see Figure 1 
below). 
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Figure 1: HM Treasury, Public Spending Statistical Analyses 2015, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/public-expenditure-statistical-analyses-2015) 
[June, 2016] 
 
The Department of Communities and Local Government has had the largest per cent 
reduction of all government departments (51 per cent). However, as Ruth Raynor (2016a: 
20) notes, ‘the localisation of the process makes it difficult to give a standard account of 
the cuts’. For example, Leeds has been hit harder by government cuts than many other 
authorities, a 12.5 per cent cut, compared to the 10.3 per cent average for core cities. This 
has resulted in Leeds loosing £180 million of core government funding since 2010 
(Brown, 2016).  
 
The Department of Work and Pensions has been cut by 35.8 per cent – more than £21bn 
has been cut from the welfare budget. These cuts include (but are not limited to): a 1 per 
cent limit on most benefit rises, cash freezes to Child Benefit, a cap on the total amount 
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households can claim for those aged between 16 to 643, and cuts to housing benefit4. The 
removal of the spare room subsidy (known as the ‘bedroom tax’5) has meant that, 
depending on the number of rooms ‘available’ in a home, a percentage of eligible rent is 
withdrawn. The introduction of Universal Credit (a single monthly payment) has changed 
how benefits are paid. For people aged 16 to 64, the Personal Independence Payment 
(PIP) has replaced the former Disability Living Allowance (DLA). Parents with children 
are now moved from Income Support (IS) to Job Seekers Allowance (JSA) when the child 
turns five. Since 2008, this age has been reduced from twelve, ten (in 2009), and seven 
(in 2o10). Parents or carers receive the same amount of money, but must prove that they 
are actively seeking work, or face sanctions. This therefore imposes more conditionality 
on the receipt of welfare. There have also been significant cuts to legal aid, and a 
reduction in public expenditure on schools (11 per cent), further and higher education (33 
per cent), social care (23 per cent), and early childhood education (19 per cent) (WBG, 
2014a, 2014b).  
 
 
Research Questions  
 
 
The broad aims of my research are to explore the symbiotic relationship between 
the ways in which austerity is produced and legitimised by the state, and, articulated, 
and experienced by young women, in their everyday lives.  Given these aims, my research 
questions are as follows: 
 
                                                
3People living in London can receive a maximum benefit income of £23,000 per year; those outside of 
London can receive £20,000 per year. 	
4Since April 2017, people are no longer automatically entitled to Housing Benefit. This benefit can be 
claimed if you are a parent with dependent children, classed as a vulnerable adult, or if you have worked 
continuously for six months before making a claim (Money Advice Service, n.d). 
 
5People with one spare bedroom have 14 per cent of their eligible rent withdrawn, and those with two or 
more spare bedrooms lose 25 per cent of their eligible rent.  	
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1. How does the state produce and legitimate inequality in the current crisis? 
How is this connected with wider historical legacies?  
2. How do differently positioned young women live with and navigate 
through austerity? 
3. How do they talk about austerity and crisis? 
4. How do young women speak about and dialogue with issues of gender 
equality and fairness in the context of austerity? 
5. How do they think of and construct their futures in the context of 
austerity?  
 
 
This thesis takes a qualitative approach to addressing these questions. I conducted forty-
nine interviews and two group discussions (twelve women in total) with sixty-one young 
women aged between 18 and 35, from different class and ‘racial’ backgrounds. The 
interviews and group discussions were performed in Leeds, London and Brighton during 
2014 and 2015. Despite examining women’s experiences in these different cities, this 
research is not a comparative study on the effect of regional differences on young 
women’s lives, and is not set up as such. Rather, these regional differences allow for an 
understanding of the diversity of women’s experiences from different backgrounds, and 
from cities with different historical-economic processes. The use of interviews and group 
discussions allowed me to understand how austerity is lived and felt by these women. To 
understand my research questions, I have drawn on a wide range of feminist theories 
around gender, class, ‘race’, the state, and austerity. I also draw on the work of Pierre 
Bourdieu (2014, 1986) when discussing the state and the mobilisation of capital. 
However, my approach to his work takes a flexible and feminist approach. The next 
section outlines the theoretical tools used in this thesis, including austerity, 
neoliberalism, the state, and the mobilisation of capital.  
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Theoretical Frameworks 
 
Framing Neoliberalism  
 
The term ‘neoliberalism’ is believed to have originated in the 1930s with the work 
of Arthur Rüstow and the Walter Lippmann Colloquium – an international meeting of 
liberal theorists including Friedrich Hayek and Ludwig von Mises (Gilbert, 2013:7, also see 
Anderson, 2016; Davies, 2014; Gane, 2014; Mirowski and Plehwe, 2009; Foucault, 2008). 
While the term itself was rarely used in the decades that followed, succeeding the crisis 
of Keynesian policy-making during the early 1970s, neoliberal ideas quickly gained 
greater intellectual and political legitimacy, especially in the US and Britain (Davies, 
2014). Although it is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the long history of 
neoliberalism, it is important to define the term itself. To date, as Terry Flew (2015) 
rightly observes, ‘neoliberalism has become an explanatory term to define almost 
everything, albeit from a certain critical angle’ (2015: no pagination, also see Gamble, 
2001). This results in neoliberalism tending to become, in Bob Jessop’s terms, a ‘chaotic 
concept’ (2014). Aihwa Ong states that ‘neoliberalism seems to mean many different 
things depending on one’s vantage point’ (2006: 1). For example, Elizabeth Bernstein and 
Janet Jakobsen (2013) point out that neoliberalism can be understood as a set of 
economic policies, as a political project, or as a time period that frames both economics 
and politics covering the last decades of the twentieth and first decades of the twenty-
first centuries.  
Although periodisations vary6, many scholars locate the beginning of neoliberalism in 
the 1970s. However, the major schools of thought debating neoliberalism tend to 
reinforce divisions, rather than make connections. The emphases of theories of 
neoliberalism also differ. For neo-Marxists, such as David Harvey (2005), neoliberalism is 
                                                
6David Harvey (2005) locates the manifestation of neoliberalism in the US and Britain during 1978-1980. 
Other theorists, such as Marcus Taylor (2006) and Naomi Klein (2007), locate the advent of neoliberalism 
earlier, with the overthrow of Salvador Allende as president of Chile in 1973, and the imposition of new 
economic policies promoted by the Chicago School of economic thought (Bernstein and Jakobsen, 2013). 
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understood as an agenda of upward economic redistribution. One that is characterised 
by structural adjustment policies, enforced by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
the World Bank, which have targeted the economies of countries within Latin America, 
Asia, and, since 2008, Europe. For neo-Foucaultians, such as Wendy Brown (2005) and 
Nikolas Rose (1999), neoliberalism has been imagined as a cultural project, premised 
upon a shift toward governmentalities that merge market and state imperatives, and 
which produce self-regulating ‘good subjects’ that embody ideals of individual 
responsibility (also see Dardot and Laval, 2013). For Loïc Wacquant (2010, 2012), who 
draws on the work of Pierre Bourdieu (1994), neoliberalism is invoked as a new mode of 
‘statecraft’, in which he sees the privatisation of formerly public goods and services, the 
shift from the welfare state to a carceral state7, and the attendant rise of new governing 
institutions (including NGOs and corporate entities) as core features. Teresa Gowan 
(2012) highlights the contradictory uses of the term ‘neoliberalism’ itself, noting how 
different theoretical lineages, ‘based on fundamentally different ideas about the nature 
of political power, barely speak to each other’ (no pagination). She suggests that some 
of these contradictions might be usefully resolved by bringing these theoretical 
frameworks into relation with each other, through close investigation of substantive 
issues. With this in mind, I argue that neoliberalism can be seen not only as a form of 
macro-political economy that helps to redistribute wealth upward (Harvey, 2005), but 
also as a cultural project, creating new self-responsible subjects (Foucault, 2008) or what 
Bourdieu (1994) would call ‘doxa’8, resulting in a punishing, punitive state. 
As Dardot and Laval (2013) have discussed, many in Europe and the US thought that the 
financial crisis had sounded the ‘death knell of neoliberalism’ and that the new epoch 
would see the ‘return of the state’ and ‘market regulation’ (1: 2013, also see Davies, 2013; 
Mirowski, 2013). The 2007 US housing bubble collapse and the fall of Lehman Brothers 
                                                
7A ‘carceral state’ is a state modeled on the idea of a prison. It employs physical boundaries in order to gain 
control of urban space. 
 
8‘Doxa’ is a term used by Bourdieu (1994) to denote what is taken for granted. For Bourdieu, it is when ‘the 
natural and social world appears as self-evident’ (1994: 160). 
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Bank in 2008 caused the near collapse of the global financial system and triggered the 
deepest and most protracted economic crisis after 1929 (Rubery and Rafferty, 2014). The 
UK financial crisis began comparatively early in the summer of 2007, and, as with the 
economic crisis of the 1970s, the global financial meltdown cast into question the 
political–economic thought that had produced it. Joseph Stiglitz, a heterodox US 
economist, was quoted in Berliner Zeitung in October 2008, as saying ‘neoliberalism, like 
the Washington Consensus, is dead in most Western countries’. ‘Wakes for 
neoliberalism’ were posted all about the Internet in 2008–2009 (Mirowski, 2013:33), with 
leading political figures jumping on the bandwagon. The then French President Nicolas 
Sarkozy announced the rehabilitation of government interventionism in the economy. I 
argue that this observation – that the crisis marked the end of neoliberalism – both 
underestimates, and fails to understand the characteristics of neoliberalism. As Dardot 
and Laval (2013: 1) argue, ‘to get the character of neoliberalism wrong, to ignore its 
history, and miss its profound social and subjective springs, was to condemn oneself to 
blindness and impotence in the face of developments that soon ensued’. They go on to 
argue, such thinking was premature: ‘far from impairing neoliberal policies, the crisis led 
to their dramatic reinforcement in the shape of austerity plans put in place by states that 
were increasingly active in promoting the logic of competition in financial markets’ (ibid). 
 
Framing Austerity: (Gendered) Moral–Political–Economy 
 
There are clear links between neoliberalism and austerity, since the ‘objectives of 
austerity align neatly with those of neo-liberalism’ (De Benedictis and Gill, 2016: no 
pagination; Jensen, 2012; Allen et al., 2015). This thesis speaks to the growing literature 
that explores austerity as a moral–political–economic project, highlighting the 
gendered, classed and racialised9 construction of its claims and processes. It is by 
                                                
9When I use the terms racialised and racialisation, I note that racism cannot be seen as derivative of ethnic 
phenomena, but needs to be understood with reference to the discourses and practices by which ethnic 
groups (through their ‘culture’) are inferiorised, excluded, and subordinated. These processes cannot be 
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understanding austerity in this way that this thesis conveys how austerity is made 
possible by the state through a set of discursive formations, and how these are 
materialised in, and impact upon, women’s everyday lives.  
The framework of austerity that I have described is different from the dominant critical 
conception of austerity by political elites and economists as an economic programme of 
fiscal management. As Rebecca Bramall (2013: vii) notes, for some, austerity is ‘first and 
foremost, and sometimes exclusively, an economic procedure’. In the economic sense, 
austerity is understood as a ‘form of voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts 
through the reduction of wages, prices, and public spending to restore competitiveness, 
which is (supposedly) best achieved by cutting the state’s budget, debts and deficits’ 
(Blyth, 2013:2). This has translated into a range of budget cuts in the UK since 2010, 
across government departments. As discussed above (and as will be explored more fully 
in Chapters 3, 5 and 6), this has included changes to welfare provisions such as the 
‘bedroom tax’, punitive sanctions, and cuts to state-led services. These cuts have 
targeted already marginalised groups, and have aggravated existing divides of class, 
gender, ‘race’, sexuality, and disability at local, regional, and global levels (see for 
example, Dorling and Ballas, 2008; Hall, Massey and Rustin, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; 
Mendoza 2015). I argue that austerity cannot be simply understood as solely an economic 
programme of fiscal cuts and reforms. Austerity is more complex. To fully understand 
the different aspects and features of austerity, it is imperative to move beyond this one-
dimensional understanding. 
Scholars have written extensively on the different aspects and features of austerity. Sara 
De Benedictis and Rosalind Gill (2016) describe austerity as ‘a site of ideological and 
“discursive struggle”, enacted and played out by the State and in public sites and popular 
culture in particular ways, with material outcomes’ (no pagination). Therefore, austerity 
policy has an ideological dimension. Labelled as a ‘dangerous idea’, which has been 
                                                
understood without considering their interconnections with ethnicity, nationalism, class, gender, and the 
state (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992; Martins Jr, 2016: 10-11).  
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deployed at different times and in different contexts, Mark Blyth (2013) argues that 
austerity is a means of providing political elites with a ready-made platform to execute 
their political will. John Clarke and Janet Newman (2012: 2) focus particularly on the 
current context, and go further into the specificities of this argument describing the 
‘alchemy of austerity’ and its ‘shape-changing’ nature. They note that austerity can be 
understood as an idea, due to the way in which it has been constructed and re-worked, 
by so-called ‘political and financial wizards’. They argue that the locus of the crisis has 
been moved from the private to the public sector, transformed from a financial crisis to 
a fiscal crisis, and shifted from a crisis located in the banking and financial sectors, to that 
of a global crisis. The crisis, they argue, has thus been ‘ideologically reworked from an 
economic problem (how to rescue banks and restore market responsibility) to a political 
problem (how to allocate blame and responsibility)’ (ibid; also see Krugman, 2012, 2015; 
Jensen, 2014; Blyth, 2013; Piketty, 2013; Graeber, 2013). Austerity, as an economic 
policy, is therefore produced by the state. 
 
As I discuss more fully in Chapters 3 and 4, austerity has been constructed as the 
common-sense solution to the issue of debt. Austerity is enacted through moral 
imperatives, which emphasise the disastrous consequences of failing to reduce the 
deficit, frame the out-of-control welfare system as the cause of the crisis in need of being 
dismantled, and represent austerity as the only viable response. The question of welfare 
has always been a contentious issue – by no means has this anti-welfare discussion been 
brought about by austerity. However, it has intensified with the austerity project, since 
austerity has become firmly entrenched across mainstream economics as the only 
answer to the question of welfare (Jensen, 2012, 2013b, 2014). This is despite the fallacies 
inherent in such discussions, which, for example, claim that welfare spending led to 
recession and debt (Krugman, 2015, Blyth 2013; Kotz, 2015; Stiglitz, 2012; Graeber, 2013; 
Arthur and Inman, 2013; Elliot, 2013). The closing down of alternatives can therefore be 
understood to be a key ideological mechanism, since it establishes a singular view of 
economic circumstances, and solutions, and renders contrary positions illegitimate 
(Jarrett, 2014: 145). 
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The legitimation of austerity by the state has been done in gendered moral terms. As 
Clarke and Newman (2012: 11) note, ‘the contemporary politics of austerity combines an 
economic logic with a particular moral appeal (shared sacrifice and suffering, to fairness, 
freedom, to a sense of collective obligation)’ (also see Morris, 2016; Harvie and Milburn, 
2013). When making the case for austerity, Liam Stanley (2013) argues that politicians 
liken the capacity and finances of the state to a household. When the state is likened to 
a household, it appears that we are all to blame for the crisis. Reducing debt is therefore 
experienced as a moral imperative, since we all need to live within our means (also see 
Forkert, 2014). However, the idea of the ‘household’ has a specifically gendered 
connotation. It puts the onus on citizens - specifically women - to ‘help the nation’ 
recover from the crisis. The role of (female) citizens is therefore to conduct themselves 
in accordance with the values of enterprise, resilience, thrift, hard work, and economic 
productivity at home and in the workplace (see Allen et al, 2015; Jensen, 2012, 2013a; 
Evans, 2015, 2016, 2017). 
 
This sense of collective guilt and obligation is not the only use of (gendered) moral 
economy. The programme also produces and reinforces divisions and blame inside of the 
population, through the binary figures of ‘skiver’ and ‘striver’. As will be discussed in 
further detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the ‘skiver’ (the unemployed, single mother, 
immigrant, sick and disabled) is understood as economically unproductive (unpaid 
labour and forms of care are not recognised) and lacking in norms of good behaviour 
(undisciplined, chaotic, and irresponsible). This form of austerity moralism (as will be 
discussed below and in more detail in Chapter 4) shares similarities with earlier forms of 
moralism, principally the observation that specific groups in society take advantage of 
the hard-work of the majority (Forkert, 2014: 43; Hall et al., 1978; Hancock, 2004; Tyler, 
2008; Todd, 2014). These (gendered, classed and racialised) binaries are, as Tracey 
Jensen (2013b: no pagination) argues, ‘polarising, designed to censure, accuse and 
condemn, to de-contextualise and individualise blame for stagnant social mobility and 
the conditions of poverty and worklessness – rather than structural inequalities 
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systematically produced by neoliberal economies’. They are also ‘designed to produce or 
procure a consensus for welfare rollback and the reasons for deepening inequalities’ 
(ibid; also see Montgomerie and Tepe-Belfrage, 2016).  
 
Such sensibilities and subject positions are also symbolically legitimised within the 
cultural sphere (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Jensen, 2014). As Raynor highlights, ‘exceptional 
cases are made grotesque, in order to stereotype benefits claimants, and produce and/or 
feed public appetite for what has been described as “poverty porn”’10 (Raynor, 2016a: 
28). This, she continues, demonstrates how ‘a blurring of the cultural and political 
discourses of austerity hold together both a sense that a) we are “all in it together” and 
therefore all collectively responsible for taking control of excess and b) that responsibility 
can and should be taken by somebody or something elsewhere (most commonly those 
undeserving excessive figures)’ (ibid). 
I therefore frame austerity, in this thesis, as an economic policy with unequally 
distributed effects, as a complex set of political-moral ideologies (Bramall, 2013: 3) and 
as a cultural tool that works in part to sustain those political–economic strategies 
(Jensen, 2013b; 2014). It is by framing austerity in these ways that this thesis is able to 
convey how austerity is made possible through a set of discursive formations, and how 
these are materialised in, and impact upon different women.  
 
Framing the Gendered State  
 
 
 
As discussed above, the state and social institutions play an important role in the 
(re)production of difference and inequality. This thesis moves away from social, Marxist 
and liberal feminist positions on the state, which understand the state as either a neutral 
                                                
10As Jensen (2014) notes despite being a highly contested term, 'poverty porn' ‘has been used to critique 
documentary television in post-recession Britain which focuses on people in poverty as a-political 
diversionary entertainment’ (no pagination). 
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arbiter, as solely patriarchal or as essentially capitalist (see for example, MacKinnon, 
1983, 1989; McIntosh, 1978). This is despite the importance of these analyses, specifically 
Mary McIntosh’s analysis, which highlights the strategic convolution of state action in 
gender politics, noting how state agencies act under contradictory pressures to yield 
ambivalent policies (also see Barrett, 1980; Eisenstein, 1979). Yet, such theorisations 
suffer from a lack of complexity. For instance, as Sophie Watson (1990: 4) notes, despite 
Marxist and socialist feminist emphases on the state not just as an institution, but as a 
form of social relations, the state still appears to be an ‘entity which limits and 
determines our lives’. She goes on to argue that the state is also understood to ‘act in the 
interests of capital, which defines who we are and what we need, which deflects class 
conflict and which obscures class divisions’ (ibid).  
 
Despite the state being understood as a site of conflict and contestation, and as an arena 
of struggle, as Watson posits, feminist have nevertheless tended to ‘imply a relative 
coherence to the state’ (1990: 7). The state is thus assumed to be a homogeneous entity 
that lies almost outside of society, rather than being something which is created in part 
because of interactions with different groups (ibid). The state should instead be 
understood as a complex arena, consisting of complex structures and complex actors 
(Connell, 1990). Sonia Alvarez, for instance, has taken issue with the state being 
understood as a homogenous entity. In her study of transition politics in Brazil (1990: 271) 
she suggests ‘a need for a more complex, less Manichean perspective on gender and the 
state’, emphasising the importance of looking at different conjunctures and periods. 
Rosemary Pringle and Sophie Watson (1992: 54) reconsider the state in the light of post-
structuralist theory, which they argue, is ‘accorded no unity, individuality or rigorous 
functionality, but is nevertheless recognised as an important focus of power’. Despite 
understanding the multifaceted complexity of the state which does not lie outside of 
society, unlike post-structuralist feminists I do not abandon the concept of ‘the state’ as 
such. I see the importance of conceptualising the state as an entity and as a central 
feature of society.  
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Bourdieu (2014) is useful for understanding the state and its complexities, but does not 
consider how it relates to women. For Bourdieu, the state is a social field – ‘a set of 
objective and historical relations between positions of social actors and institutions who 
struggle over the appropriation of symbolic power’ (2014: 4). In other words, he sees the 
state as a space organised around the conversion of direct conflict and struggles between 
parties, professionals, and groups, over the power to impose a legitimate vision of the 
social world. In this sense, the state has the power to create social divisions and to 
reproduce social identities through its dominant discourse, categorisations and 
judgments. In the words of Mauricio García Villegas (2004: 60), ‘the state has the power 
to (re)make reality by establishing, preserving, or altering the binary categories through 
which agents comprehend and construct that world’, such as moral/immoral and 
good/bad. Consequently, the state becomes ‘centrally involved in the (re)production of 
symbolic domination and symbolic violence’, in which arbitrary relations of power are 
masked by the naturalised process of naming and categorising (Loyal, 2014: 3; Bourdieu, 
1987). For example, drawing on Bourdieu’s argument in ‘Social Space and Symbolic 
Power’ (1989), Stephen Crossley summarises that discourses produced by the state carry 
more weight than others because they are official, and are viewed and often accepted as 
being authorised and legitimate accounts (2016:2). They have, Bourdieu argues:  
the power to impose and to inculcate a vision of divisions, that is, the power to 
make visible and explicit social divisions that are implicit, is political power par 
excellence. It is the power to make groups, to manipulate the objective structure 
of society. (1989: 23) 
 
 
As Bourdieu wrote, the ultimate objective of a discourse is the ‘recognition of legitimacy 
through the misrecognition of arbitrariness’ (2014: 163). Through the proliferation of 
discourse, beliefs and ideas that are actually socially and historically specific, discourses 
that emanate from the state are legitimised by their seemingly universal and natural 
appearance. For Tyler (2013a: 46), this naturalising state discourse results in the 
production of abject figures, ‘adjudicating on who is expendable and who is of worth’.  
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Adding to this analysis, I argue that it is necessary to further unpack the historical and 
objective relations of the state, through its gendered, classed, and racialised 
components. For instance, feminist scholars point to the importance of not only 
understanding the structure, but also the history of the gendered state. As Carole 
Pateman (1988) argues, the fraternal ‘social contract’ was based on an implicit sexual 
contract requiring the subordination of women and regulating men's sexual access to 
women. The state subject therefore becomes an individual male – citizen, worker – a 
reasonable man (Pettman, 1996). Women are constructed as not only different, but 
defined in relation to men, and given inferior value. This involves a gendered dichotomy 
of ‘active/’passive’, ‘mind’/’body’, ‘independent/’dependent’. As will be explored in more 
detail in Chapter 4, the state has crafted and shaped gender, class and ‘race’ in particular 
ways, throughout history, which are continually re-crafted to suit the needs of the 
specific timeframe. Therefore, as Connell notes; ‘gender dynamics are a major force 
constructing the state, both in the historical creation of state structures and in 
contemporary politics’ (1990:519). Agreeing with Georgina Waylen, ‘gender (and racial 
and class) inequalities are buried within the state, but through part of the same dynamic 
process, gender relations are partly constituted through the state’. The state therefore 
‘partly reflects and partly helps to create particular forms of gender relations and gender 
inequality’ (1998: 7).  
 
It is by understanding the state as a social field, in which different actors struggle and 
compete for power in their daily lives, which allows this thesis to explore the gendered 
impact of austerity. Firstly, this allows for a consideration of the particular configurations 
of gender, class and ‘race’ that are shaped in different ways, and in different historical 
periods, as well as the particular configuration of state and gender relations in the 
context of austerity. Secondly, understanding the state in this way allows for an analysis 
which considers the material and symbolic consequences of such a configuration on 
women’s everyday lives. The ways in which austerity is produced and legitimised affect 
how women experience and navigate through austerity.   
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Framing Metaphors of Capital to Understand Women’s Differing Experiences of 
Austerity 
 
 
In this period of growing social inequality, it is necessary to perform analyses that 
allow us to understand how women's differential access to economic, social, and cultural 
resources affect their lives on a daily basis (Oppenheim and Harker, 1996). Although 
Bourdieu has been critiqued for failing to fully develop the role of women in his work, his 
concepts have been used, adapted and ‘appropriated’ (Moi, 1991: 1018) by feminist 
scholars concerned with the intersection of class with gender and ‘race’ (for a more 
comprehensive discussion see for instance, Moi, 1991; McCall, 1992; McNay, 1999, 2004; 
Skeggs, 1997, 2004; Fowler, 1997; Adkins and Skeggs, 2004; McLeod, 2005). Bourdieu’s 
definitions of social class and his metaphors of capital (1979, 1986, 1989, 1991) are also 
applicable to this thesis – they provide the greatest explicatory power to understand how 
differences of gender, class, and ‘race’ affect women’s experience of austerity and how 
they are able to navigate, speak about, and imagine their futures within such a context. 
It is this general theoretical framework that informs each empirical chapter of this thesis, 
and which will be modified based on the specificity of the analysis. It is important to note 
that my analysis will focus more particularly on the impact of class on women’s 
experiences, rather than that of ‘race’. This is despite my thesis demonstrating the 
interrelationship of class and ‘race’ in shaping their everyday experiences of austerity. 
 
For Bourdieu (1979, 1986, 1989, 1991), social classes do not exist; what exists is a social 
space – a space of differences, in which classes occur in a virtual state, not as a given, but 
as something that comes to be constructed (Bourdieu, 1991). The concept of capital is 
central to Bourdieu’s constructions of social space; in which the social space is structured 
by principles of variation. Understanding society is therefore based on the movement of 
capital through social spaces as it is accumulated or lost by individuals (Skeggs, 1997: 8). 
Bourdieu regards capital as ‘the set of actually usable resources and powers’ (1984: 114). 
As Elliot Weininger (2005: 87) notes, Bourdieu describes multiple species of capital which 
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cannot be subsumed under a single generic concept. These different kinds of capital 
mark out different dimensions in the socio-economic field.  
 
Bourdieu operates with three main forms of capital (economic, cultural, social) – which 
together, provide individuals with advantage and disadvantage in society. Economic 
capital is about material conditions: wealth, income, financial inheritance, and monetary 
assets, which are ‘immediately and directly convertible into money’ (Bourdieu, 1986: 
243). Cultural and social capitals contain cultural information based resources that can 
be measured by education and social relations (Bourdieu, 1979). For example, cultural 
capital can exist in three forms – the embodied (in the form of long-lasting dispositions 
of the mind and body: 'masculinity' and 'femininity'), the objectified (in the form of 
cultural goods), and the institutionalised state (resulting in, for example, educational 
qualifications). Social capital is the accumulation of resources, both potential and actual, 
generated through relationships. These are based on connections and group 
membership (such as family, work, and other institutions). Symbolic capital is the form 
in which the different capitals take once they are ‘perceived and recognised as legitimate’ 
(Skeggs, 1997: 8). These capitals may be accumulated, lost, invested, distributed, and 
traded within a particular social field. Crucially, because all forms of capital are context 
specific, they must be perceived as legitimate before being converted. Only legitimate 
capital accrues value and holds power. It is here, Skeggs notes, that ‘the symbolic system 
creates, circulates and maintains distinctions from the perspective and interests of those 
with power (symbolic power) enabling them to accrue value to themselves whilst 
keeping others contained’ (2010: 271). Individuals are thus distributed in the overall social 
space according to: the global volume of capital they possess, the composition of their 
capital (the relative weight in their overall capital of the various forms of capital) and 
evolution of the volume and composition according to their trajectory in social space 
(ibid). The trajectories differently position the agents in the social space within class 
fractions (Bourdieu, 1984).  
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Such an understanding of capital is important to this thesis, to emphasise not only how 
and why women are not ‘all in this together’ (Osborne, 2009, 2012, 2015), but also why 
they have differing abilities to navigate within the context. For example, as argued 
throughout this thesis, the way in which austerity materialises itself in women’s lives is 
dependent on the volume, composition and trajectory of capital (see Chapter 5). Those 
with a lower volume and composition of capital will be ‘closer to necessity’ as opposed to 
those who are ‘further from necessity’ whom have higher volumes and different types of 
capital. In addition, austerity may affect women in similar ways (because they are in 
some ways adjacent to each other in social space), but due to their different ratios of 
economic to cultural capital, their experience will be different. As Diane Reay (2004) 
notes, these differences are a consequence of complex relationships between individual 
and class trajectories.  
 
How one accumulates capital makes an important difference to its capacity to be 
converted. Therefore, it is not just the volume and composition of capital, but how it is 
accumulated, which affects the ability to navigate through austerity. Access and accrual 
of capital (their composition and volume) depends on particular social inheritances and 
embodiments, and involves generational transmission. The historically generated social 
space therefore becomes important here, since ‘we enter an inherited social space from 
which comes access and acquisition of differential amounts of capital assets’ (Skeggs, 
1997: 8-9). This is not a level playing field. For Bourdieu in Distinction (1984), the factors 
deriving from location in the social space (class) are identified as ‘primary’, and the 
demographic characteristics (including gender, age, region, ‘race’ and ethnicity) are 
designated as ‘secondary’ factors (Bourdieu, 1984)11. However, in his later work Bourdieu 
abandoned this assumption:  
Whatever their position in social space, women have in common the fact that 
                                                
11In his early work, Bourdieu (1984) suggests that ethnicity and gender have different functions. Ethnicity, 
he argues, ‘distributes its members into social classes according to its location in the hierarchy of ethnic 
group whereas gender acts as a distributing mechanism within the social group. Gender by this 
formulation, is thus a secondary characteristic and capita remains neutral’ (Skeggs, 1997: 16). 
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they are separated from men by a negative symbolic coefficient which, like skin 
colour for blacks, or any other sign of membership in a stigmatised group, 
negatively affects everything that they are and do, and which is the source of a 
systematic set of homologous differences: despite the vast distance between 
them, there is something in common between a woman managing director ... and 
the woman production line worker. (2001: 93; also see Weininger, 2005) 
 
This understanding results in a revision of ‘the existence and mode of existence of 
collectives’, since ‘social class, as a symbolic principle of vision and division’ has to 
compete with ‘other principles (including gender) in the classificatory struggle through 
which collectivities are constituted’ (Weininger, 2005: 112-13). It is this approach that 
feminist and other scholars have been theoretically developing and empirically applying 
(Reay, 1997; Skeggs, 1997; McCall, 1992; Moi, 1991; Wacquant, 2016). For example, as 
Skeggs notes, born into gender, class and ‘race’ relations, we occupy the associated 
positions of ‘woman’, ‘black’ ‘working-class’ and inherit ways of understanding, 
meanings, and positions in knowledge (1997: 9, 2004; also, see Moi, 1991). Therefore, 
different forms of capital can only exist in the interrelationships of social positions. These 
positions bring with them access to, or limitations on what capitals are available to 
certain positions. As Skeggs (ibid) says,  
 
they become gendered through being lived, through circulation, just as they 
become classed, raced and sexed: they become simultaneously processed. The 
social relations of capitals into which we are born and move have been 
constructed historically through struggles over assets and space. 
 
Gender, ‘race’, and class are not capitals as such (Moi, 1991), but they provide the 
relations in which capitals come to be organised and valued. For example, ‘femininity’, 
Skeggs (1997) argues, can be seen as a valued and legitimate form of cultural capital. 
However, this is only so when it is analysed through a version of middle-class femininity 
which is associated with morality, and only then in comparison to working-class 
femininity and masculinity in general. Therefore, our social locations influence our 
movement and relations to other social positions, and hence our ability to capitalise 
further on the assets we already have. Those who do not have access to legitimate 
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capital, then struggle for legitimate capital (McKenzie, 2010). As will be shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6, it is this struggle that alters women’s abilities to convert, accrue, or 
generate capital in this current context. Hence Bourdieu’s economic metaphors are 
useful to understand women’s differing experiences of austerity. More specifically, they 
allow for an understanding of how their capital shapes the ways they deal with changes 
in the current austerity context, and how much they are affected by the measures within 
their everyday lives. This thesis shows that the volume, composition and trajectory of 
their capital shapes not only how much they are affected by austerity, but also how they 
navigate through this context. 
 
Bourdieu’s metaphors of capital are also useful, Toril Moi (1991) notes, because they 
enable us to identify the interests and benefits of particular groups. It is, as Skeggs (1997) 
argues, these symbolic struggles that enable inequalities in capital to be reproduced. 
Weininger (2005:98) describes the purpose of these struggles as being to impose the 
superiority of the dominant group’s worldview and lifestyle as hegemonic, valued or ‘the 
norm’. This is especially pertinent in the current context of austerity, where morality and 
lifestyle have been used as a way to produce, legitimate, and sustain the austerity 
programme (also see Chapters 4, 7 and 8). In Distinction (1984) Bourdieu showed how 
tastes and lifestyle are ways in which agents symbolise their social similarity and 
differences with/from one another (also see Weininger, 2005). Dominant groups 
generally succeed in legitimising their own culture (lifestyles/tastes) as superior. For 
example, the working-class are symbolically represented and constructed as the 
antithesis of dominant middle and upper classes, through oppositions such as 
distinguished/vulgar, aesthetic/practical, pure/impure, quality/quantity, and 
manners/matter (Bourdieu, 1984: 245; Lamont and Molnár, 2002). In such binary 
constructions, aesthetics are translated into morality. Those positioned as lacking ‘taste’ 
are also positioned as morally lacking (Bourdieu, 1984; Lawler, 2005). The discussion 
made throughout Chapter 4, 7 and 8, demonstrates how representations of black and 
white working-class women as excessive, fecund, animalistic and un-modern, have, 
throughout history, been used to legitimate the reproduction of inequality and symbolic 
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violence12 (see for instance Hancock, 2004; Tyler, 2008; Todd, 2014).  
Such representations therefore contribute to devaluing and delegitimising women’s 
already meagre capitals. If one’s cultural capital is delegitimised, then it cannot be traded 
as an asset, it cannot be capitalised on, and its power is limited. When conversion is 
blocked, positions of inequality are maintained, and systematic disempowerment 
engendered (Skeggs, 1997: 10). Thus, ‘taste/lifestyle and morality work as important 
markers in constructing objective ties of solidarity, on the one hand, and prejudice and 
symbolic violence on the other’ (Martins Jr, 2016: 25). This does not mean that de-
legitimacy cannot be contested or resisted: the space for contestation occurs at local, 
national, and global levels, as can be seen in the work of Skeggs and Vik Loveday (2012) 
who argue that those positioned as already marginal to the dominant symbolic, generate 
alternative ways for making value (also see Lawler, 2005; Reay, 2004)13. However, the 
different arenas where capital can be traded, and, or blocked, have different powers 
(Wacquant, 1993). As an example, ‘the media as an institutional site of symbolic power is 
able to legitimate the symbolic power of the middle-classes’ (Skeggs, 1997: 7) and 
produce symbolic violence against others. It is these more powerful fields that are put to 
use in the context of austerity. The state itself, as Wacquant (1993)  argues, is the greatest 
reservoir of symbolic power and the central bank of symbolic credit.  
 
Chapter Outlines  
 
 
This thesis not only seeks to discover, but, also extend, the understanding of 
austerity and its gendered impacts, through exploring the role of the state in shaping 
                                                
12Domination is articulated and experienced through the use of symbolic violence, which is exercised 
through the articulation of economic, social, and cultural capital. This articulation operates in such a way 
that the symbolic systems – through which we establish classifications and determine the essential 
categories of social inclusion and exclusion – have both a cognitive/social organisation function and also a 
political function of domination. Language is a main tool of the symbolic system in the classification of the 
social world. It is not only a means of communication but also a medium of power, providing symbolic 
power (and violence) through legitimate discourse (Bourdieu, 1991, 1984; Villegas, 2004). 
 
13Despite not expanding further on the discussion of value here, I develop the argument in Chapter 7. 
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young women’s experiences of austerity. It is divided into ten chapters. This initial 
chapter has presented an overview of the study and context, and framed the theoretical 
perspectives upon which it draws. Chapter 2: ‘Researching the lived experiences of 
austerity’ outlines the methodological and ethical dimensions of the research process. 
The chapter describes how the research came into being, the methodology used, and 
gives a description of participants and the cities chosen. It also exposes the messy and 
untidy nature of the research process. It argues that such ‘messiness’ arises from the 
complexity of austerity. The ‘messiness’ of the research process mirrors the ‘messiness’ 
of the concept of austerity, and the ways in which it unfolds in, and affects, young 
women’s lives. 
 
Chapter 3: ‘Literature Review’ reviews the key empirical literature and theoretical 
approaches to the themes investigated in this thesis. This chapter examines the gap 
existing in current studies, and argues that although contemporary literature offers in-
depth analyses of the lived experiences of austerity, a fuller gendered empirical analysis 
is necessary, which considers women’s different social positioning. In addition, I note 
that, to fully understand these differences, and how austerity is lived and felt by young 
women, a connection needs to be made with workings of the state in the current context 
and its wider historical legacies which (re)produce and legitimate inequality, and material 
and symbolic violence.  
 
Chapter 4: ‘The Role of the State in Shaping Gender, Class, and ‘Race’ draws on arguments 
made in the previous chapter. Situating the crisis within its historical legacies, this 
chapter explores the ways in which the state has been put to use during different times 
of crisis. It reveals how the state has crafted and shaped gender, class and ‘race’ relations 
within such regimes. Showing how austerity therefore builds on a previous history, it 
explores the ways in which austerity is produced, legitimised and made present by the 
state in the current context.  
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This understanding makes it is possible to analyse how young women experience, 
navigate, speak about, resist, and contest austerity in nuanced, complex and 
contradictory ways in the following empirical chapters. Chapter 5: ‘Living with Austerity’ 
and Chapter 6: ‘Navigating through Austerity’ discuss how austerity, as an economic 
programme of fiscal management, is lived with, and navigated through. Chapter 5 
explores how differences of class and ‘race’ affect the diversity of women’s lived 
experiences, and the different ways in which austerity manifests and materialises itself 
in their everyday lives. Chapter 6 then explains how these differences affect the way 
women respond to and navigate through the effects of austerity.   
 
Chapter 7: ‘Austerity-Talk’ and Chapter 8: ‘Austerity-Bourgeois Feminism: Legitimising 
Austerity’s Moral Project’ explores how the symbolic nature of austerity, as a moral–
political project, is played out in women’s everyday lives. Chapter 7: Austerity Talk 
explores the complex, contradictory, and nuanced ways in which young women are 
dialoguing with state discourse. It shows that women simultaneously reproduce and 
reinforce moralistic narratives of economic productivity and aspiration, and, at the same 
time, question and talk back to existing discourses through processes of distancing, 
blame, and boundary formation. Chapter 8: ‘Austerity-Bourgeois Feminism: Legitimising 
Austerity’s Moral Project’ draws on feminist identification to further examine austerity’s 
moral discourse. An analysis of middle-class young women’s understandings of, 
affiliations with, and positionings within feminism illustrates how there is a convergence 
of austerity discourse and feminism. This is articulated through narratives of morality 
and distinction. I argue that this convergence is crucial to understand how contemporary 
forms of inequality are produced and justified though the production of the ‘good’, ‘bad’ 
and ‘indifferent’ (gendered, classed and racialised) subject positions and sensibilities.  
 
Chapter 9: Austerity Future(s) provides a nuanced analysis of how class differently affects 
the ways in which young women can speak about and imagine their futures, in the 
context of austerity. Chapter 10, the concluding chapter, returns to the empirical 
questions, and considers the main findings of this thesis. It reviews the empirical and 
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theoretical contributions of the study, and briefly outlines how some of the main findings 
of the study can be taken forward in future research. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Researching the Lived Experiences of Austerity 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to expose the ‘messiness’ of my research process 
(Letherby, 2003). Instead of trying to clean up or conceal the untidiness of the 
development of the research, this methodological chapter lays bare the many issues that 
I encountered during different stages of my research. Such ‘messiness’ in the research 
practice arises from the complexity and multiplicity of austerity itself (as discussed in 
Chapter 1). The ‘messiness’ of the research process, I argue, therefore mirrors the 
‘messiness’ of the concept of austerity and the ways in which it unfolds in, and affects, 
young women’s lives. The first section of this chapter describes the research process, 
explaining why and how at different stages, there was a need to adapt, adjust, or change 
direction. The second section of this chapter discusses the ethical dimensions of the 
research, using encounters within the field to illustrate such concerns. In particular, this 
section focuses on not only understanding the complex ethical issues involved in 
speaking for and across difference, but also the specific significance of this for the 
context of austerity and in these specific fieldwork sites. 
 
Research Beginnings   
 
 
My own experience of working in the women’s sector (part of the charity sector, 
directed towards meeting the needs of women) fostered my development of a 
‘sociological imagination’ (Mills, 1959), inspiring me to undertake this research. As 
Charles Wright Mills argues in the appendix of The Sociological Imagination, ‘On 
Intellectual Craftsmanship’: ‘[t]he most admirable thinkers … do not split their work from 
their lives. They seem to not allow such dissociation, and they want to use each for the 
enrichment of the other’ (2000: 195). After finishing my master’s degree in the autumn 
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of 2010, I spent four years working in various roles within this sector. Over the years, I 
witnessed the gradual implementation of austerity measures, with the onset of 
redundancies, resulting in decreased funding and diminished state recognition and 
support for both the sector and women in general (see Fawcett Society, 2012; Pratten, 
2014). Within the sector, organisations have been struggling, concerned about their 
future sustainability. A large number of organisations have had to either reduce their 
number of staff or close due to the loss of funding (Pratten, 2014). As discussed in 
Chapter 1, as austerity continues, the impact on women’s life conditions in general, has 
also worsened. Women, it has been reported, are facing a ‘triple jeopardy’ of benefit cuts, 
job losses and reduced services (Fawcett Society, 2012), which are further impacted by 
differences such as class, ‘race’, sexuality, age, disability, immigration status, and region 
(NEWN and WRC, 2012; O’Hara, 2014). 
 
Conversely, at the same time, I witnessed both a public and national disavowal of 
feminism and gender equality, and a renewed localised interest in, and commitment to, 
gender equality. I had seen how such measures by the government added impetus to 
feminist politics and campaigning throughout the UK, largely facilitated by online social 
media14. Many women had been politicised and influenced by other movements, 
particularly the 2010 student campaign against university fees, but also wider campaigns 
against austerity measures and the Occupy movement. This made me interested in 
understanding how women were living and experiencing austerity, their feelings towards 
austerity measures, and how this corresponded with their relationships with feminism. 
From my own individual experience, and hearing other conflictual relationships with the 
movement, I was curious as to whether there might be a relationship between women’s 
experiences of austerity and their feeling towards equality and feminism. I sought to 
understand how feminism is lived by young women, focusing on the reasons for their 
distance or closeness to the movement. Reading around the topic – with my questions in 
                                                
14Groups such as UK Uncut, Black Activists Rising Against the Cuts (BARAC), UK Feminista, and The 
Fawcett Society. The campaign group Focus E15 has become active since 2013. 	
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mind – I found that previous studies on young women’s relationships with feminism 
discovered feminism to be an unpopular term, in which explanations either fall within an 
understanding of fierce repudiation or that of irrelevance (Gill, 2007; McRobbie, 2009; 
Scharff, 2012). The rise of neoliberalism and individualisation contextualised such 
repudiation, whereby it has been argued that young women have entered an age of 
‘post-feminism’, in which feminism is taken into account, whilst also forcefully 
repudiated (McRobbie, 2004a; 2004b; 2009, also see Scharff, 2012). Therefore, by 
integrating the analysis of women’s negotiations with feminism within a framework of 
socio-cultural change, I wanted to understand the disjuncture between the current 
affirmation of, and the resistance to, feminism, within the UK. Concerned primarily with 
the way different axes of power and differentiation impact these negotiations, the 
central aim of my research was to understand how social class and geographical location 
played a role in mediating young women’s relationships with feminism and gender 
(in)equality. With this in mind, I wanted to understand and tell this narrative within the 
context of austerity. Thus, I sought to apply my ‘life experiences’ to my ‘intellectual work’ 
(Mills, 1959: 196).  
 
 
Initial Fieldwork  
 
I decided to use semi-structured interviews as a means of understanding the 
relationship between feminist dis/identification and the context of austerity amongst a 
diverse group of women in London and Leeds. The research questions were piloted in 
Leeds from January to February 2014 with eight young women aged between 18 and 27. 
While these encounters were revealing, they were so in a different way than I had first 
anticipated. The transition of my research questions from the page to the field did not 
go as I had planned. Interviews would become built around experiences in the present, 
which would not necessarily lead to questions surrounding feminism and equality; or 
feminism and equality would be spoken about in addition to the young women’s 
discussions about their everyday lives. Hearing about their experiences allowed me to 
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understand the ways in which austerity was being lived and felt in the everyday. It was 
this that I became aware needed specific attention and should not be ignored, 
overlooked or given less consideration. In the novel If nobody speaks of remarkable things 
Jon McGregor (2002) writes about a man with scarred hands telling his daughter about 
the world. The man says to his daughter: ‘this is a very big world and there are many, 
many things you could miss if you are not careful … there are remarkable things all the 
time, right in front of us’. He then says ‘if nobody speaks of remarkable things, how can 
they be called remarkable?’ (239). The man signifies that the ordinary events of the world 
and the ordinary people who inhabit it are themselves worthy of attention and 
observation. They are, in this sense, remarkable. Similarly, Kathleen Stewart (2007), in 
her book Ordinary Affects, discusses the seemingly trivial experiences of everyday life, to 
bring attention to the ordinary as an integral site of cultural politics. In her writing, 
Stewart brings the reader to the realisation that in order to even begin understanding 
what is going on, we must first simply take notice (Eichhorn, 2009).  
I therefore began to take notice of young women’s experiences of everyday life. As 
opposed to the dominant austerity discourse, in which we were being told ‘we are all in 
this together’ (Osborne, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2015; Cameron, 2010), such discussions 
enabled me to ‘read against the grain’ (Pearce, 1991; Mills, 1997) and listen to the 
alternative stories that tend to not feature within dominant narratives (Back, 2007). It 
was during these encounters that I realised the significance of letting people express and 
raise issues that were important to them in relation to their everyday experience of 
austerity: hearing the feelings that could be generated by a brown letter coming through 
the door from the DWP; being told about the tactics of Sunday discount shopping; or 
having one woman explain to me why she was wearing her staff lanyard on her day off 
(to stop the verbal harassment she faced on the street for being in a wheelchair). The 
situations that I have described above led me to redefine my research questions, listening 
to the narratives of the young women and hearing what spoke to me from the field. This 
has involved foregrounding the everyday lived experiences of young women in the 
context of austerity rather than focusing on feminism, as I had initially planned. This 
 39 
study therefore investigates how young women, aged 18–35 years, from different 
classed and ‘racial’ backgrounds, experience, understand, and speak about the impacts 
of austerity on their everyday lives. Like Lynne Pearce (1991; also see Mills, 1997) who 
places the importance of focusing on ‘gaps’ and ‘absences’ within conventional texts, I 
place importance on focusing on the gaps and absences within the dominant austerity 
discourse. It is by reading against the grain, connecting these stories with more orthodox 
narratives (see Back, 2007), that I hope to shed light on some of the less-dominant and 
more complex accounts that are weaving their way in, around and through the state (and 
media) discourse that position austerity as necessary, fair and leading towards a better 
future. 
 
Interviewing Young Women in Leeds, London and Brighton 
 
 
My fieldwork began in March 2014 and ended in May 2015 (fourteen months in 
total). I interviewed forty-nine women and conducted two group discussions with twelve 
women (sixty-one women in total) living in Leeds (from March 2014 – September 2014), 
London (from October 2014 – March 2015) and Brighton (from January – May 2015). I 
initially decided to interview women in Leeds and London (cities in the North and South 
of the country); this was then expanded to include interviews with women in Brighton 
(Southeast). These cities were chosen since they have been differentially affected by the 
cuts to public spending. Despite the importance of examining the diversity of women’s 
experiences in these different cities, as noted in Chapter 1, this is not a comparative study 
on the effect of regional differences on young women’s lives. Yet, it is important to give 
an overview of the impact of austerity on these cities, and to understand how women’s 
experiences in the present are linked to the wider political, economic and social context.  
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Leeds, London, and Brighton Past and Present  
 
Since the 1970s, gradual economic, political, and social restructuring has occurred 
within cities in the UK (including deindustrialisation and social decline, countered by 
efforts at regeneration and image-building) (Hollands et al., 2001). As Robert Hollands, 
Paul Chatterton, Bernie Byrnes and Cait Read note, since the Thatcher years, ‘this has 
eroded the established labourist city that is strongly connected to its manufacturing and 
industrial past in favour of private or corporate capital, knowledge-based activities, 
middle-class consumption and an entrepreneurial turn in urban governance aimed at 
attracting and satisfying the demands of highly mobile global capital’ (2001: 4, also see 
Jessop, 1997). Although this has been done to differing degrees within each city studied, 
all have passed through this political project.  
 
Essential to understanding the context of Leeds is its dramatic economic change over 
the last two decades. Primarily a textile industry between 1780 – 1850, the decline of the 
textile and flax industries in the mid to late nineteenth-century became diversified with 
printing, engineering, chemicals and clothing manufacture (Fraser, 1982). By the 1970s, 
the clothing industry was in irreversible decline due to foreign competition. Despite this, 
the Leeds city region still retains larger role in the UK’s manufacturing base, with Leeds 
having the third largest concentration of manufacturing jobs by local authority area 
(BRES, 2013). With a population of 781,700 (comprising of 397,900 females) and 
increasing, Leeds is one of the largest city in the UK (NOMIS, 2016). The city has now 
developed into a telephone-banking centre, connected to the electronic infrastructure 
of the modern global economy. Recognised as a national centre for financial and 
business services, Leeds is the UK's second largest financial and legal centre after 
London, which amounts for 38 per cent of the total output (Leeds City Council, 2015). At 
the same time, Leeds has one of the highest ratios of private to public sector jobs of all 
major UK cities -  for instance, Leeds City Council and the NHS employ over 100,000 
people (Leeds City Council, 2015). 
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In contrast, London has a population of 8,787,900 (4,408,600 are female) (NOMIS, 2017). 
Known as the world's leading financial centre for international business and commerce, 
London is one of the ‘command centres’ for the global economy (Roberts, 2008). For the 
nineteenth and much of the twentieth centuries London was a major manufacturing 
centre. However, manufacturing declined dramatically from the 1960s onwards: entire 
industries such as shipbuilding and most of the vehicle construction industry were lost. 
This trend continues, with the decline of the pharmaceutical manufacturing sites. 
London is now mostly a service-based economy, with over 85 per cent of the currently 
employed population of Greater London working in the service industries (UNCSBRP, 
2016).  
In comparison, Brighton has a smaller population of 289,200 (comprising of 143,800 
females) (NOMIS, 2017). The Brighton and Hove economy has evolved from a low wage 
traditional costal and manufacturing based economy into a more balanced and 
technologically advanced economy (Whitehead et al., 2006). Becoming the third fastest 
‘recovering city’ from the recession in the country, the economy is driven by the tourism, 
culture, creative industries and digital media sectors (Centre for Cities, 2015). Business 
and financial services employs 30 per cent of people in Brighton and Hove, tourism, 
hospitality and retail counts for 20 per cent, and creative industries, including digital 
media, another 11 per cent (Brighton and Hove Council, 2014). The city also has a strong 
service sector economy, through the public services, education, health and financial 
sectors.  
The effects of the crisis have had different impacts on these cities15. Research has 
demonstrated huge regional disparities in the effects of the recession between the North 
and South (Centre for Cites, 2013, 2014, 2015). According to the Cities Outlook report 
(2015), despite a consistent political commitment to improve the relative economic 
                                                
15It is important to point out, that statistics used to explain the impact of the recession/austerity measures 
on the cities chosen, best reflect the effects on these cities during the times of the interviews and group 
discussions with my participants (2014-2015).  
 
 42 
performance of places outside of the South, the difference between cities in the South 
and cities in the rest of the UK has increased, not diminished, particularly in the North 
East and North West. However, when comparing Leeds, London and Brighton, it is too 
simplistic to conclude that Leeds, situated in the North of England, has been affected 
more than southern areas. For example, both Leeds and Brighton during 2008 and 2009 
saw a large contraction in GDP (of four per cent) and a sharp increase in unemployment 
(Centre for Cites, 2013: 29). Hit hard in the first period of the recession, these cities have 
staged a recovery in the second period (2009–2012) and it was reported that they were 
benefitting from slightly better economic prospects (Centre for Cites, 2013). London, by 
contrast, had little or no change in performance. 
However, there are still major disparities between their experiences of recession. 
Between 2004-2014, Brighton created the fourth highest growth in net jobs and the third 
highest level of growth in private sector jobs out of all sixty-four UK cities (Centre for 
Cities, 2015). Brighton also had one of the highest levels of employment in the UK (75.5 
per cent) in 2014–2015 (3.6 per cent increase from the previous year) (ONS, 2015). 
Relatively worse off, Leeds' economy remained 2.6 per cent behind its peak output by 
the end of 2012 (ONS, 2014). Despite being in a stronger position than most other 
northern cities, employment in Leeds was 68.9 per cent in the period January 2014 to 
December 2014 in which women’s employment was 65.6 percent (also lower than the 
national average and lower than both London and Brighton) (ONS, 2014). Yet, it is 
important to bear in mind that although for some areas there has been a rise in 
employment; the type of job creation has been dominated by rising self-employment 
and part-time work (TUC, 2014). Therefore, although overall levels of employment have 
increased, only a small proportion of those jobs are full-time employee roles (1 in 40). 
Within this wave of increased employment are those who are employed on zero-hour 
contracts.  
In Leeds, unemployment was also higher than the national average at 8.4 per cent (ONS, 
2014). According to the Joseph Rowntree report (2014), this figure rises to more than 20 
 43 
per cent in some local areas (2014: 19). In terms of the real value of earnings, there is a 
discrepancy between northern cities and the Southeast. According to figures from the 
GMB Union (2013), the real value of average earnings of all employees resident in 
Yorkshire has dropped by 13.3 per cent between April 2008 and November 2012. For 
employees resident in Leeds, the drop has been 19.2 per cent, compared to the UK 
average of 12.8 per cent (ibid). Wages in Brighton and London are higher than this 
average figure. In Leeds, 14.1–29.4 per cent of people earn less than the living wage, in 
comparison with Brighton (16.1 per cent) and London (18.3 per cent) (ONS, 2014). Leeds 
also has a larger majority of JSA claimants (2.8 per cent compared to 2 per cent in London 
and 1.6 per cent in Brighton) and a larger percentage of claimants who have been 
unemployed for more than a year (ONS, 2015).  
Despite higher levels of employment and earnings, during this same period, Brighton’s 
housing affordability ratio has declined. In 2004, the average cost of a house was 9.4 
times the average income, but by 2014 this had risen to 12.2 times the average income 
(Centre for Cities, 2015: 21). Brighton, alongside London, saw house prices rise by more 
than 10 per cent in a single year – more than twice the national average. Overall, London 
experienced the greatest increase in its affordability ratio. By 2014, the average house 
was almost sixteen times average earnings, up from 9.5 in 2004. The average house price 
in London (£501,500) was almost three times higher than that in Leeds (£174,500), which 
had a 1.6 per cent growth (Centre for Cities, 2015: 22). Both London and Brighton saw 
few houses built in 2004–2013 (in Brighton for instance, only 6,260 new homes built). It 
is not surprising these cities are witnessing a housing crisis.  
Both London and Leeds have some of the largest levels of inequality in the UK (Centre 
for Cities, 2015). For example, there remain areas of Leeds where economic inactivity is 
more than double the city rate – 150,000 people (around 20 per cent of the population) 
live in areas ranked in the top 10 per cent most deprived nationally (ibid). In many cases, 
the same neighbourhoods experience severe and persistent deprivation, even during 
periods of growth. The financial impact of the welfare reforms will therefore have an 
 44 
affect on these areas. According to Christina Beatty and Steven Fothergill (2013), at the 
extremes, the worst-hit local authority areas lose around four times as much, per adult 
of working age, as the authorities least affected by the reforms. Welfare reforms 
therefore hit hardest in the places where welfare claimants are concentrated, which in 
turn tend to be the most deprived areas. Although the Leeds district had the third largest 
absolute loss attributable to welfare reform (a £232 million loss/ £460 per head per 
annum) (Beatty, 2013), some London boroughs (alongside other older industrial areas, 
largely in the North East and North West) have been most affected by the welfare 
reforms (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013). This, according to Beatty and Fothergill (2013), is 
primarily because Housing Benefit reforms (affecting tenants in the private rented 
sector), plus the household benefit cap, greatly impact London boroughs. For example, 
the new Household benefit cap impacts overwhelmingly on London; all the worst 
affected twenty local authorities in Britain are London boroughs. The benefit cap mostly 
comes into play for households that have been claiming large sums in Housing Benefit, 
claimants in London are therefore hard-hit due to the exceptionally high rent levels in 
the capital. The reforms to Housing Benefit have also had a substantial impact on 
Brighton due to the cities large private rented sector and higher rent levels (Beatty, 
2014). By contrast, Britain’s older industrial areas, hit hard by many of the other welfare 
changes, are less acutely affected by the Local Housing Allowance reforms (and 
subsequently the ‘bedroom tax’) because a higher proportion of their low-income 
households live in the social rented sector (council and housing association) or in lower-
price owner-occupied property (Beatty and Fothergill, 2013). The above discussion 
therefore demonstrates how these cities share some similarities in their experiences of 
recession and welfare reform, yet due to their specific political, economic and social 
contexts, they have also been impacted in different ways. 
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Identification, Access and Ethics 
 
Interviews and group discussions took place with sixty-one, middle and working-
class, white, black, Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi women, who were residents of, or 
recently settled in, London, Leeds or Brighton, and aged between 18 and 35 years. Fifty-
six out of sixty-one respondents were born in the UK, with five research participants 
having multi-national backgrounds: Benin, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Romania, and Sierra 
Leone. Likewise, I interviewed a diverse group of women in each area since different 
social positions affect the ways in which austerity impacts their lives (see Figure 2 for 
more details). Of the two group discussions conducted, the social make up of each group 
was quite different; the first group was comprised of white British working-class women; 
the second consisted of British south Asian working and middle-class women (see Figure 
3 for more details). All the groups were self-selecting and each group discussion lasted 
between two to three hours.  
Figure 2: Table of interview participants (for more detail on each participant see Appendix A) 
 
Interview 
Location  
Total 
out 
of 49  
Class 
background  
‘Race’ and 
Ethnic 
background 
Nationality   Mothers  Occupation16  
Brighton 15 12 Middle-
class   
3 Working-
class  
 
14 White 
1 Pakistani 
14 British  
1 Romanian  
6 
Mothers 
9 Non-
mothers 
2 Income 
Support 
1 Support 
Worker/ DLA 
1 Complaints 
Mediation 
Officer 
1 Debt and 
Benefits Adviser  
2 Teachers 
1 PhD Student  
1 DLA 
                                                
16It is important to note here that women who are reliant on state support often receive several different 
benefits at one time. For the purposes of this thesis, I cite the primary benefit women relayed to me that 
they received during the interview. If these women did not specifically cite the benefits they received, I will 
note that they were generally ‘reliant on state support’. 
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1 Advocacy 
Support 
Worker/Dog 
Walker 
1 Volunteer   
1 Account 
Manger  
1 Doctor 
2 BA Students  
Leeds 14 8 Middle-
class 
6 Working-
class 
 
10 White  
2 Black  
1 Indian  
1 Mixed 
other   
14 British  3 
Mothers 
11 Non-
mothers 
2 Occupational 
Therapists 
1 Marketing 
Manager 
1 Teacher  
1 Teacher/MA 
Student 
2 BA Students  
1 Marketing 
Officer  
1 Factory worker  
2 Income 
Support 
1 JSA 
1 Accountant  
1 DLA 
London 19 12 Middle-
class  
7 working-
class  
 
9 White  
7 Black 
1 Indian 
1 Pakistani  
1 Anglo-
Indian  
16 British  
1 Pakistani  
1 Sierra 
Leonean  
1 Beninese  
6 
Mothers  
13 Non-
mothers 
1 Payroll Trainer  
1Physiotherapist  
1 Doctor  
1 Account 
Manager 
1 Recruitment 
Consultant 
1 Shop Assistant  
3 Income 
Support 
1 Content 
Producer 
1 HR manager  
1 Head of 
Training 
2 Unemployed  
1 Waitress/State 
Support 
1 Cleaner  
1 Stewardess 
1 Nursery 
Nurse/State 
Support 
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1 Events 
Assistant  
 
Figure 3: Table of group discussion participants (for more detail on each participant see 
Appendix A) 
 
Group 
discussion 
Total 
out 
of 12 
Class 
Background  
‘Race’ and 
ethnic 
background  
Nationality  Children  Occupation17  
1 6  6 Working-
class  
6 White  6 British  5 
Mothers  
1 Non-
mother  
3 Income 
Support 
1 State Support  
2 JSA 
2 6 1 Middle-
class 
5 Working-
class 
6 
Bangladeshi 
 
6 British 
 
3 
Mothers 
3 Non-
mothers  
1 Income 
Support 
3 JSA   
1 Volunteer 
1 Charity 
worker 
 
 
I began each interview and group discussion by asking questions about the women’s 
family background, employment, level of education, and type of housing. Throughout 
the interview, I discussed these questions further, as well as asking about women’s social 
position, living conditions, leisure and social activities, domestic and cultural habits and 
taste. These questions allowed me to gain a sense of the capitals these women had 
access to, and the different social fields they occupied (Bourdieu, 1979, 1986, 1989, 
1991). When asking questions about whether and how they would identify themselves in 
class and ‘race’ terms, compared to ‘racial’ orientations, discussing class was sometimes 
problematic. Middle-class women would often name themselves as such and claimed 
this valued position. For example, in discussions throughout the interview, middle-class 
                                                
17As above.  
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women would often say, ‘that’s just from my middle-class perspective’. Other middle-
class women, when discussing their class positioning would draw attention to their 
economic and cultural capital; for example, Nina, a 27-year-old, white woman, living in 
Brighton and working as a teacher replied, ‘I have a university degree, a permanent job, 
security, I couldn’t not be [middle-class]’. Similar to previous research (Skeggs, 1997; 
Skeggs, Thumim and Wood, 2008) there was an unwillingness by my working-class 
groups to directly answer questions about class. Respondents often avoided or rejected 
classed categorisations or reiterated that they were just 'getting by', a ‘hardworking 
parent’ or 'normal'. Like the work Skeggs, Thumim and Wood (2008) who when faced 
with this disinclination and vagueness, asked participants further questions such as, ‘do 
you think you get a fair deal in life?’, I asked similar questions, to focus discussions more 
easily around the subject, such as their opinions on the fairness of austerity and the 
impact it had on their lives. Such questions did allow for some women who had avoided 
initial classification to make distinctions away from, or towards, certain classed groups. 
For example, Marie, a 28-year-old, black woman from London, when asked about her 
class position answered ‘I’m just a hardworking parent’. Then when I asked her if she felt 
the current context was having an effect on everyone, she replied;  
Not everyone. I think some people are too bitter and don’t know how good they 
have it. I open a café at 10am and someone will come in … Swiss Cottage is quite 
posh, full of professional people, they come and I’m like ‘morning’ and they are 
so rude and I think to myself, you’ve come out of your nice expensive house, and 
you’re like this! It’s a brand-new day, I’m going to give you nice coffee, just be 
happy. I run there to make their coffee, having dropped my son off and rushed 
here, maybe I’m not the same level as them but I smile, unlike them. What do 
they have to frown about?  
 
This quote shows, through the discussion of the effects of austerity, that Marie saw 
herself distinct from those who had ‘nice’, ‘expensive’ homes and who were ‘professional 
people’. Others had difficulty discussing class due to their trans-national experience. For 
example, Marta, a 35-year-old, white woman from Romania, who lived in Brighton, did 
not know how to place herself in class terms, simply replying ‘I have no idea here’. Again, 
following the work of Skeggs, Thumim and Wood (2008: 5-6, also see Hage, 1998; Ong, 
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1999), class was thus translated through women’s movement from one national 
classification system to another. Some forms of capital travel and convert whilst others 
do not (for example, education, occupational knowledge, religion).  
 
My social position also helped to make class visible in the research encounter. As will be 
noted below, participants interpreted me differently: as an equal, as a representative of 
the state, someone they could help or who could help them. Therefore, on the basis of 
the information above, I made the decision to define these women as middle and 
working-class using the framework developed from Bourdieu's (1979, 1986, 1989, 1991) 
description of four different types of capital – economic, symbolic, social and cultural – 
which were attached to my research participants in different volumes and compositions, 
convertible into value depending upon the fields in which they are exchanged (also see 
Skeggs, 1997, 2004, 2008). As per Skeggs, Thumim and Wood (2008), this allowed me to 
understand how gender, class and ‘race’ come together over space and time to generate 
a person’s overall value.  
 
 Recruitment  
 
In order to obtain a diverse sample, I spent time identifying and accessing suitable 
participants. Snowballing was used to contact women in the areas chosen. I also used 
Facebook in an attempt to drum up interest. However, such methods did not produce a 
diverse enough sample to fully understand the lived experience of young women in the 
context of austerity. I therefore approached thirty-five different organisations18 within 
these areas, and sought to contact women that had used their services. However, after 
initial enthusiasm, my requests for assistance were often met with reluctance; a large 
number of organisations did not answer my enquiry. Of the thirty-five organisations that 
I approached, only six maintained contact: an independent food bank, an advice centre, 
                                                
18These organisations consisted of food banks, mother and baby groups, housing organisations, Citizens 
Advice Bureaus, women’s sector organisations and local charities. 
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a housing organisation, two women’s sector organisations and a local charity. After face-
to-face meetings, phone/email conversations and the exchange of research outlines and 
consent forms, I was granted access to women who used their services through these 
organisations. This was either by putting me in contact with young women via email or 
by allowing me to ‘hang around’ their organisations, doing as Chicago School sociologist 
Robert Park calls ‘shoe leather ethnography’ (1925 in Shildrick et al., 2012: 56). For 
instance, I was permitted to ‘hang around’ a food bank and an advice centre one day per 
week. During this time, I approached women using the services to see if they were willing 
to participate (providing they met the recruitment criteria of the study). During my time 
at the organisations, I spoke to a number of women who did not meet the criteria. 
Despite these discussions not featuring in the thesis itself, these conversations provided 
valuable insights for ideas about further research projects on the lived experiences of 
austerity (this will be further discussed in Chapter 10). During my time at the food bank, 
I also gained important insights, observations and details into and about the inner 
workings of the organisation. Such details feature in Chapter 6. My request for 
participants was also shared on websites or distributed through the newsletters of six 
organisations, through which eight women made contact with me, six of whom agreed 
to be interviewed. 
 
Incentivisation  
 
When contacting these different organisations, some employees advised that 
offering ‘an incentive’ might help with the recruitment process, as calls for participants 
from previous researchers had often been met with reluctance. ‘Ethical guidelines for 
social scientists often warn that financial rewards should not be used to incentivise or 
coerce participants’ (Hall, 2015b: 4), yet, the question of if financial reward should be 
used to incentivise participants procure a renewed significance in austerity, especially 
when asking participants to speak about their experience of financial hardship. Sarah 
Marie Hall (2015b), during her ethnography on the everyday experiences of austerity in 
Greater Manchester, decided against offering an incentive. This was due to payment for 
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participation in long-term ethnography being uncommon. Scholars who have also 
conducted research in austere contexts have proposed participants ﬁnancial or material 
support as part of a research project (McDowell, 2001; Meth and McClymont, 2009; 
Hammett and Sporton, 2012; Shildrick et al., 2012). Therefore, when advised by the 
organisations, I did offer £15 ‘out of pocket expenses’ to those who wanted to participate. 
Yet, employees at several of these organisations told me that despite the incentive, there 
was an unusually large uptake from service users wanting to take part in the research.  
 
Informed Consent  
 
Whilst I informally told the participants about my project when first establishing 
contact, I provided detailed information about the study at the beginning of each 
interview and group discussion in order to obtain oral consent (see Appendix B). 
However, it is impossible for interviewees to give their fully informed consent as the 
direction of the interview cannot be anticipated (Scharff, 2012). Despite these 
difficulties, informed consent was as an essential tool with which to establish some of 
the basic principles of confidentiality, anonymity, voluntary participation and the 
opportunity to withdraw, and to encourage participants to view the interview as a 
‘guided conversation’ (Rubin and Rubin, 1995). The research was planned to ensure 
integrity, transparency and confidentiality following the British Sociological Association 
and the Economic and Social Research Council ethical guidelines, which were approved 
by Goldsmiths College’s Research Ethics Committee. All interviews were recorded with 
permission and then transcribed by me, using pseudonyms to protect the interviewees’ 
anonymity. All data collected was secured on a password-protected server. The data, 
which emerged from the field, was then coded and analysed. 
 
Un-structuring the Research Process  
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               Moving Away from A Semi-Structured Approach: Learning to Listen  
 
Early feminist researchers (Roberts, 1981; McRobbie, 1982; Stanley and Wise, 
1983) argued for feminist research to be based on women, for women. Research, they 
argued, should alleviate the conditions of oppression and attempt to break down 
traditional male-centred research agendas that make women invisible and normalise the 
male gender. One of the initial arguments of these feminist researchers was that all 
research is carried out in the interests of particular people/groups and thus the resultant 
knowledge cannot be value-free or objective (Roberts, 1981; Stanley and Wise, 1983). As 
Skeggs (2007: 429) notes, ‘these different debates provided the impetus for feminist 
researchers to concentrate on qualitative research, to focus on women’s experience, and 
to listen and explore the shared meanings between women with an aim to reformulate 
traditional research agendas’. Therefore, rather than focusing on broader social trends 
by using quantitative methods, like the feminist researchers above, I am interested in 
understanding the diversity of young women’s experiences within the current context, 
which can often lie hidden and unarticulated. Hence, I argue that the use of the 
qualitative in-depth interview as a method is well suited to provide insights into such 
experiences (Rubin and Rubin, 1995; Hesse-Biber, 2014). According to Herbert Rubin and 
Irene Rubin, ‘qualitative interviewing is a way of finding out what others feel and think 
about their worlds’ (1995: 1 in Scharff, 2009: 333). Interviewing allows researchers to 
listen to context-specific thoughts and enables the research participants to tell their 
story in their own words (Anderson and Jack, 1991: 11). With this in mind, instead of 
finding 'true' descriptions, I treat interview accounts ‘as moral tales that are interesting 
regardless of whether they are lies or simply wrong’ (Back, 2007: 164). I am less 
concerned about getting the ‘facts’ correct, but instead interpret the narratives of my 
participants as stories and tales, which are interesting regardless of ‘truth’.  
 
More specifically, the interview consisted of open questions based around four main 
themes: 1) the respondents’ family background; 2) their lives in the present; 3) their 
discussions of the future; 4) perceptions of and opinions about the crisis/austerity 
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measures. As discussed earlier, the first theme aimed to recover the life story of the 
participants. I asked them to tell me about their life growing up (family background; 
mobility of the family, occupation of parents and level of education). I then asked them 
to describe their everyday lives (their occupation, where they lived, with who and their 
leisure activities). These questions were important tools to give contrast to, and 
sometimes challenge, established discourses and representations revealing, for 
instance, how social differences of class and ‘race’ differentiate young women’s 
experiences. My interviews permitted me to see, firstly, how these young women’s social 
trajectories differently position them in social space (Bourdieu, 1977, 1989), and, 
secondly, how their position in social space shapes how austerity is experienced and 
negotiated. Moreover, the last two themes present in my interview – respondents’ 
discussions about their future, and perceptions of, and opinions about, the 
crisis/austerity measures – also permitted me to further understand how austerity is lived 
and felt by young women. For example, such questions allowed for an understanding of 
how austerity works as a series of moral–political discourses and how these discourses 
are taken up and challenged. These questions enabled an analysis of how austerity (in its 
different forms; as a gendered moral–political–economic project) affects women’s 
everyday lives.  
 
Initially, I decided to have ‘semi-structured’ conversations with the young women. I felt 
that asking different interviewees the same questions would allow comparison of their 
experiences of austerity. Interviews lasted roughly one to two hours and would take 
place in women’s homes, in cafes or restaurants, or in the meeting rooms of participating 
organisations. Children were often present during the interview, necessitating frequent 
breaks to care for them. Over time and on reflection, the interview process changed. As 
Sharlene Hesse-Biber (2014) notes, ‘the researcher must stay on his or her toes and listen 
intently to what the interviewee has to say, for the researcher should be prepared to drop 
his or her agenda and follow the pace of the interview’ (203). My original research plan 
did not permit such flexibility. Using my judgement, I decided it would be more fruitful 
to allow for a more unstructured agenda, to let the women lead me to the topic of 
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conversation they felt most important to them in the context of austerity. After all, I was 
interested in the lived experiences of the young women and the various ways austerity 
affects women’s lives. Therefore, it was vital that I did not dictate the route I felt was 
most important. Kathryn Anderson serves as a cautionary tale when she discusses how 
her constant preoccupation with producing material for her exhibition became a lost 
opportunity. She notes: ‘I am painfully aware of lost opportunities for women to reflect 
on the activities and events they described and to explain their terms more fully in their 
own words’ (Anderson and Jack, 1991: 13). I did not want to displace the attitudes and 
experience of the women in my study with my own agenda, and look back on the 
research process as lost opportunities of reflection from the women I was interviewing. 
 
Facilitating (Unexpected) Group Discussions 
 
Methodologies do not innocently discover pre-existing information or uncover a 
world beyond us, but create and provide different means through which participants can 
articulate themselves (Jackson, 2010). Once again, like the change in research focus and 
the move from a semi-structured to a more unstructured interview technique, I also 
discovered that the type of methodology that I felt would be most appropriate, seemed 
unfitting at times, and thus, also needed to change. As noted above, having contacted 
organisations in an attempt to interview women who used their services, I was granted 
access by different organisations, two of which were in Leeds. One was an organisation 
providing housing support that worked with single young people, single parent families, 
young people leaving care, and victims of domestic violence. The other delivered a wide 
range of services to local women and their families. On both occasions, despite women 
agreeing to take part in an interview prior to the scheduled time, some women preferred 
to conduct a group conversation rather than a one-to-one interview.  
 
Although unexpected, the group discussions provided an invaluable space for exploring 
how the women talked about and experienced austerity, as well as giving space to listen 
to their opinions, beliefs, wishes and concerns. Young women spoke about their 
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individual biographies (marriage breakdown, mental health problems, parents’ drug 
problems, instances of domestic violence); issues which may or may not have been 
shared during a one on one interview. The group discussion also enabled the women to 
generate their own questions and pursue their own priorities in their own terms. 
Listening to the many different forms of communication that the young women used in 
day-to-day interaction – including jokes, anecdotes, teasing, and arguing – was also 
useful because as Jenny Kitzinger notes ‘everyday forms of communication may tell us 
as much, if not more, about what people know or experience’ (2005: 56). In this sense, 
the group discussion reached topics that the interviews I had conducted did not: 
revealing dimensions of understanding that often remain untapped by more 
conventional data collection techniques. 
 
It has been argued that the collective nature of focus groups or group discussions makes 
them particularly useful for research on sensitive topics (Kitzinger, 2005). This was 
particularly true in my case. Each group consisted of women who relied heavily on state 
support, some of who were survivors of domestic violence and who had experienced 
mental health problems in the past. However, unlike most focus group research, my 
group discussions were self-assembling – as discussed above, the participants had opted 
to take part in a group discussion rather than an individual interview. Therefore, instead 
of following a prescribed procedure, the shape and analytical status given to the 
interview process should reflect the researcher’s theoretical position. In the case of the 
group discussion as an emergent encounter, it opened up the possibility of ongoing 
dialogue; the women were willing to talk to me but on their own terms.  
 
Knowledge Production and Reflexivity  
 
As demonstrated in the section above, it is important to remember from where 
the knowledge within this thesis has arisen. As Skeggs (1997: 17) notes, drawing on the 
work of Donna Haraway (1991) and Nancy Hartsock (1983): ‘to assume that knowledge 
comes from nowhere allows some to abdicate responsibility for their productions and 
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the representations’. It is important then, to explain not only how I have chosen my 
participants, and thus the methods I have used, but also how their stories have been 
analysed, written and interpreted. Discussions surrounding the position of the researcher 
within the research process is then, very important in giving such an account. In the 
previous section, I spoke of how my social and cultural position has shaped my 
positioning within the research process. I described how such a position, in the first 
instance, caused me to foreground issues of gender and feminism when considering how 
aspects of inequality may affect women within the context of austerity. However, it is 
not enough to state my position. It is also important to articulate how such a position of 
difference may lead to further bias within the research.  
 
One of the main questions surrounding position and knowledge production is how white 
scholars can study those who have been historically subordinated without further 
producing sociological accounts distorted by the political economy of ‘race’, class and 
gender (Anderson, 1993: 41 in Gunaratnam, 2003). In her famous article ‘Can the 
subaltern speak?’ Gayatri Spivak (1988) highlights such risks when members of a 
privileged group, for example intellectuals, make political claims on behalf of oppressed 
groups. Scholars can patronise, or essentialise, the researched group and also reinforce 
the oppression of the group spoken for (Alcoff, 1995; Scharff, 2009). On the other hand, 
limiting research to relationships between those who share as much as possible does not 
necessarily resolve the problem of ‘representation’, since ‘sameness’ within research can 
'blur the vision' of researchers, preventing them from conducting a critical analysis (Hurd 
and McIntyre, 1996).  
 
Reflexivity can be the first step to obtaining further insights into how both the position 
of the researcher, and the researched, impact on the production of knowledge (Scharff, 
2009). As Skeggs writes; ‘we must recognise the partial, situated nature of all knowledge 
production, whilst also recognising our own position as mediators in knowledge 
production where power relations are unavoidable’ (1994: 73). As described above, I 
recognise that my position or approach affects the work I produce, but I have no interest 
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in indulging in a reflexivity that places myself at the core of the research by making my 
voice become more visible than those I am researching. To quote Audrey Kobayashi, 
‘while reflexivity is an important, and some may say essential aspect of recognising the 
difference between the studier and the studied and even in some cases of taking moral 
responsibility for that difference, indulgence in reflexivity is ironically the very act that 
sets us apart’ (2003: 348). Drawing attention to another way in which reflexivity may 
contribute to reinforcing differences, Skeggs points out that the ability to be reflexive is 
a privilege, representing a position of mobility and power. ‘Reflexivity is made possible 
through access to resources, and the technique of telling for the middle-class depends 
on accruing the stories of others, of those less privileged’ (2004: 129). By advocating 
reflexivity, researchers engage in a classed practice and potentially reinforce unequal 
power relationships. Therefore, merely writing myself into this research and claiming 
reflexivity cannot eradicate the issues of power and knowledge claims and can thus 
reinforce and contribute to reinforcing the differences that I am trying to avoid.  
 
Issues of Power 
 
Power Balance Between the Researcher and the Researched  
 
As argued above, the un-structuring of the interview process was used to explore 
the specificity of individual women’s understandings, emotions and actions, allowing 
women to lead the conversation to the topic they felt most important. However, within 
such an attempt, the research process itself is not an equal encounter, regardless of the 
type of method used. It is characterised by power imbalances (Cotterill, 1992; Opie, 1992; 
Phoenix, 1995; Wolf, 1996; Luff, 1999; Grenz, 2005). Feminists have become increasingly 
aware that the feminist in-depth interview can be used clumsily and even exploitatively 
and carries the risk of doing rapport ‘too effectively’ (Duncombe and Jessop, 2002: 111 in 
Scharff, 2009: 73). Janet Finch (1995) for example, holds that trust is easily established 
between women and has an exploitative potential. Participants may disclose information 
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that they potentially regret having shared and which carries the risk of later being used 
against them. The high degree of interaction between the researcher and the participant 
may reveal ‘deeply personal, emotionally charged information’ (Kirsch, 2005: 2163), 
placing research subjects at grave risk of manipulation and betrayal (Stacey, 1991).  
 
Nevertheless, I would caution against claiming that the research process can only be seen 
as causing objectification and exploitation. As Gayle Letherby argues, ‘it is important not 
to over-pacify respondents within the research situation’ (2003: 116). Research 
participants, for instance, have the power to deny or gratify access, they can exert power 
by not ‘telling the truth’, refusing to answer and decide what it is that they want to talk 
about (Olsen and Shopes, 1991: 196; Phoenix, 1995). Power relations do not remain fixed, 
but as Ann Phoenix (1995: 55) writes; ‘shift over the course of a study’. It is important 
then, to see power as not being static, but as constantly changing (ibid). During my 
interviews, power was in a constant process of negotiation, however, power dynamics of 
class and ‘race’ were still extremely evident. For example, at times I was seen as an 
expert, where the gendered knowledge of authority became present. I was often asked 
questions such as ‘was that right?’, ‘did I answer correctly’ and ‘how did I do?’ Polly, a 27-
year-old, middle-class, white woman, working as an occupational therapist in Leeds, 
discussed at length who she thought was to blame for the current austerity cuts. I sat 
back and listened. Once she had finished, she turned to me and said ‘is that right?’ This 
happened in subsequent interviews, in which people apologised to me for ‘not being up-
to-date on this’, ‘not knowing about politics’ or that they thought they had been 
‘unhelpful or not of much use’. Once they had finished their discussions, some would also 
say that they would go and read up on the current changes because they felt 
embarrassed that they didn’t know about the topic. As the interview questions moved 
along and changed, sometimes my position as the ‘expert’ was relinquished and the 
power of the respondent was exercised. This was often since topics were raised about 
which I had no prior knowledge, and I asked for further information and clarification to 
make social issues visible (also see Opie, 1992). Often terms and acronyms had to be 
explained to me.  
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On occasion, the women would move the conversation on when they wanted to, thus 
having the power to set an alternative agenda or resist the ‘expert knowledge’ of the 
researcher. Lauren, a 33-year-old, working-class, white woman from Leeds, who at the 
time of the interview was receiving JSA, began to talk about a job interview she had later 
that afternoon, and asked if we could go over the interview questions she had rehearsed. 
Setting the agenda for the remainder of the interview, the research interview then 
became a mock job interview. Nadia, a 32-year-old, middle-class teacher from Leeds 
who described herself as ‘mixed other,’ exercised power in a different way. Before we 
began the interview, Nadia told me that she was starting a master’s degree in 
September, which heavily focused on research methods. She then began to grill me 
about my choice of methods and how I was going to interview her, reminding me about 
the way I should and should not conduct an interview. This put me on edge and I began 
to get apprehensive about the interview process. After discussing interviewer bias, 
leading questions and interviewer effect, I then felt that she was grading my technique 
throughout the interview, which I found extremely off-putting. Thus, on both occasions, 
Nadia and Lauren were able to resist the ‘expert knowledge’ of the researcher and 
exercise a degree of power. However, it is important to note the significance of the class 
position of these two respondents. Power, was being resisted or recast differently; in 
Lauren’s case, I was still seen as an ‘expert’ in some ways, in which I took on the role of 
the ‘job interviewer’, a different but equally powerful position. Whereas my ‘expertise’ 
was unsettled by Nadia’s comments and questions. 
 
I explained previously that some women felt various topics to be onerous and depressing. 
However, some interviewees saw the experience as being mutually beneficial (if, for 
example, their participation could be added to their CV). The Jobcentre in their area had 
advised that taking part in voluntary work would be helpful for their future job prospects 
and their attendance at the interview would be deemed as voluntary participation 
working in the local community. Women often told me that they experienced the 
interviews as therapeutic, where they were able in some cases to air grievances and seek 
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reassurances (also see Olsen and Shopes, 1991; Phoenix, 1995). Women used the 
interview to talk over issues they were having, especially for those who felt the strain of 
unemployment, money worries and ill health. However, despite conceiving such 
examples as being mutually beneficial, it is impossible to ignore the fact that these 
conversations would be used to generate material that I would broker to try to inhabit 
the academy, thus demonstrating the power play with the field itself. As Diane Wolf 
states; ‘the crises and tragedies occurring to our respondents or study population may 
enhance our own research’ (1996: 20).  
 
Deciding to be silent, or acting in order to silence others, can also be seen as a way in 
which power is enabled. On many occasions, I heard xenophobic, racist, and classist 
prejudices. Eastern European immigrants were often blamed for the lack of employment 
opportunities; working-class women were described as lazy and uneducated; Muslim 
women were described as oppressed and un-modern, needing help and guidance; and 
northern women as having undesirable accents. Pragmatically, Phoenix (1995: 56) claims 
that such voiced prejudices in the interview can produce interesting data, emphasising 
that the whole point of conducting interviews is to evoke respondent’s accounts. While 
this might pertain to the subsequent interpretation of data, at the time, such voiced 
prejudices made me feel uncomfortable and unsure about how to react. In such 
circumstances, to quote Ann Gray, ‘it was impossible for me to keep nodding along in 
encouragement but at the same time, to interject and enter into an argument would also 
be problematic for the interview’ (1995: 163). Many feminist researchers have written 
about the messy relationship between maintaining rapport whilst pointing out prejudice. 
Some have instinctively remained silent. For instance, Christina Scharff (2009) discusses 
how during an interview with one of her research participants she was shocked to hear a 
xenophobic remark. Unsure how to react, Scharff writes that she did not challenge the 
remark because she felt she could not criticise her interviewees view since it could have 
negativity impacted on their rapport and did not want to present herself as someone who 
knew better, ‘occupying the moral high ground’ (2009: 91). Others such as Christine 
Griffin (1991) have encouraged researchers to care more about wider inequalities and 
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less for the researched. In her study of racism, Griffin argued that researchers should ‘talk 
back’ when respondents are reproducing damaging and prejudiced ideas, ‘to not do so, 
(the ethical prescription of care, for instance) would reproduce, legitimate and collude in 
the ideas being articulated’ (cited in Skeggs 2007: 434).  
 
In my experience, there is ‘no clear course of action in these situations’ (Becker, 2000 in 
Scharff, 2009) and I responded in different ways throughout my different interactions 
within the interview process19. When I did ‘talk back’, I did so in different ways, all of 
which produced different outcomes. When I was asked my opinion, I would mostly 
respond honestly, which on occasion caused slight offence or increased silence, but in 
general, generated further discussion. For example, on one occasion I was asked my 
opinion about whether I agreed that Somalians were taking all the council properties in 
North London. I disagreed. After a brief silence, the respondent then said ‘well, maybe 
it’s not Somalians but it’s definitely Muslims’. When presented with these prejudiced 
stereotypes I would challenge them, asking respondents to generate examples of such 
things. A few times I openly disagreed and called respondents out on what they had said. 
On occasion, this did alter the rapport between the interviewee and myself, but it also 
produced some interesting responses. During my interview with Celia, a 27-year-old, 
middle-class, white woman, living and working in London as a HR manager, I disagreed 
with her over a comment she had made about ‘black women not being able to talk as 
well as white women’; I pointed out that she was being racist. The day after the interview 
she re-contacted me, giving me the names of two friends of hers (both non-white) whom 
she knew would like to do the interview. I found this very interesting; as she had made it 
explicitly clear to me, when I called her out on her comment, that she was in fact not 
racist as she had ‘loads of different friends’. She endeavoured to reinforce this statement 
by her further contact, in which she passed on the contact details of her ‘different 
friends’.  
                                                
19I should also point out that my ability to not remain silent became easier over the course of the fieldwork, 
where I became increasingly more comfortable in calling out such prejudice. 
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Within the above section, I have described how power is constantly negotiated, using 
illustrative encounters within the field. I am not advocating that power relations within 
the research process are equal in any way. However, from the discussion above, I would 
caution against claiming that such a process can only be seen as objectification and 
exploitation (Patai 1991; Stacey, 1991). The research process can never be perfect; we 
need to be cautious and vigilant in not oversimplifying the ethical dilemmas within 
feminist research, but we should not see the women in our studies solely as victims with 
no power. The research process may never be completely equal and ethical, however to 
deny a lack of agency is also unethical. Yet, as touched upon briefly above, the dynamics 
of class and ‘race’ are important factors in the research process. These issues will now be 
discussed below. 
 
‘Race’ and Class based Power Dynamics 
Lauren walked into the meeting room at organisation X, ‘I’ve been waiting for 15 
minutes, they wouldn’t let me come in. Sarah [her support worker] said to come 
for 10 am but you had someone in here already’. I apologised and asked if she still 
had time to do the interview, she said yes and we sat down. She then turned to 
me and said ‘so what is this all about then?’ I explained about the nature of my 
research, that I was a PhD student at a university in London, and asked her if I was 
able to record the interview. She agreed and we began. Midway through the 
interview, she told me that she had been sanctioned20 for six weeks and she had 
been told to come to the organisation by a friend who said that they would be 
able to help her. I asked her how the organisation had been useful to her during 
this time. She said, ‘without them [organisation] I wouldn’t have known where to 
start, they [Jobcentre] just leave you, but they shouldn’t be able to, yeah my son 
might be able to live on his money but what about his food and that?’ She paused 
for a second, turned to me and asked, ‘so who are you with then? Jobcentre or 
part of the organisation?’ I replied saying, ‘neither’, reminding her that I was here 
to ask questions for my research project. She responded, ‘I just don’t want to be 
sanctioned again, do you hear me?’ I tried to carry on the conversation, back 
                                                
20Sanctioning is when benefit payments to the recipient are stopped. There are three sanction levels; 
lower, intermediate or higher. The level and length of sanctioning depends on: the reason for claiming JSA, 
whether the recipient received an earlier sanction in the last year, or if the claim has been ended. 
Sanctioning can last between 4 weeks to 156 weeks (DWP, 2016). 	
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tracking to ask how the organisation had helped her whilst she had been 
sanctioned. She told me that she could understand how people get sick because 
of stress, offering an example of how she had been having to use food banks 
whilst waiting for her sanctioning to end. Before continuing, she paused for a 
second, turned towards me and said ‘you know, I’m telling you all this and you’re 
just sat there and there’s nothing that you can say. You just sit there, nod along 
or smile because you can’t say nought, you really have no idea, do you? (Field 
note: Thursday 28th August 2014) 
 
The interview itself has a history, where, as can be demonstrated above, power dynamics 
of ‘race’ and class are inevitably at play. During my interview with Lauren she highlighted 
my position as an inquirer in a position of power when asking, ‘so who are you with then? 
Jobcentre or part of the organisation?’ Although she did not refuse to answer my 
questions, despite telling me that she ‘didn’t want to get sanctioned’, she highlighted my 
positionality within the process by saying that I had ‘no idea’ about her situation. Skeggs 
(2004, 2015) argues that class is made through methodologies, since middle-class 
participants generally find the interview a more comfortable process, positioned as 
fellow professionals and thus social equals to their interviewers. Working-class 
participants, she argues, ‘often find the interview a more laborious affair, offering only 
curt responses’ (2015: 215). As Carolyn Steedman (2000) describes in the history of the 
English administrative state, the working-class were demanded to repetitively tell the 
self. For example: 
  
the 1834 Poor Law gave middle-class legal professionals the ability to make 
judgments of the habits of the poor, especially of mothers. It enabled middle-
class women to enter public space as evangelical social workers in the name of 
saving the deserving working-class woman. By claiming the right to judge 
standards of health and care, a whole professional classed group has now been 
institutionalized via welfare, law and education, who put into effect classed moral 
judgments, such as whether your child is taken into care, whether you get access 
to housing, what sort of sentence you will receive if you riot, etc. (Skeggs, 2015: 
215) 
 
As the above field note shows, these orientations were present in my research. Some 
young women would describe the comfortable process of the interview and the interest 
they had in the questions. On several occasions, I received Facebook messages and 
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emails from women that I had interviewed thanking me for the interview, often 
describing how ‘lucky’ they felt about their own position after reflecting on the interview 
and the comments they had made. The affective response of young women who were 
significantly affected by welfare changes and public sector cuts was drastically different. 
Both during and after interviews and group discussions, I would hear women saying that 
they ‘felt depressed’ talking about the subject or that they ‘wouldn’t have come if they 
knew they were going to get depressed’. On other occasions, other methods were 
favoured instead of the one-on-one setting. The encounter below illustrates this: 
 
The group had already started eating as I walked in; I sat down at the end of the 
table. ‘This is Vicki, she is the woman I was telling you all about last week, the one 
who wants to talk to you about the cuts and that’. After going round and 
introducing themselves, Scarlett, one of the women attending the group held up 
a plastic plate gesturing me to help myself to the food. This group meets once a 
week, it is a support group for women who have suffered domestic violence, in 
which they come here one afternoon per week to do an activity. Today was glass-
painting day. There was a knock at the door and a policewoman entered. 
‘Charlotte, can you come and have a word with Marion about the incident the 
other day?’ Charlotte got up and left. ‘Sorry Vicki, just to let you know that some 
people will be in and out because they have things to sort out, so sorry for the 
intrusions … so how do you want to do the interviews?’ I replied that whoever 
wanted to talk to me could let me know and we could go in another room and 
talk. ‘The room that we were going to use is now taken up with Charlotte, so there 
is one next door that you can go in, how does that sound?’  I replied ‘that’s fine 
with me’, however, everybody went quiet. Scarlett then said that she didn’t feel 
like ‘talking today’. Instead she offered to talk to me during the glass painting in 
a group. Everyone else agreed that they would also be happier to do that and so 
we began the group discussion. (Field note: Thursday 28th August 2014) 
 
In the above encounter, I had made an error. I had suggested going to another room 
within the building, which would enable us to have privacy, and which, I thought, would 
make the women feel more comfortable. However, when I suggested this, the women 
looked unsettled, hesitant and uncomfortable. This room was often used for discussions 
with the police, social services and government officials, in which women were 
compelled to give accounts of themselves on a regular basis. As discussed by Emma 
Jackson (2010: 50) in her work with homeless people in London, I had accidentally 
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proposed to replicate what she calls the ‘frightening interview setting’, which was not 
conducive for expressing comfortably their views and opinions. As argued above, asking 
women to ‘speak’ about their experiences, has, for some, been tied to domination and 
techniques of surveillance. This is particularly significant in context of austerity and in 
this specific fieldwork site. Scarlett, (a 23-year-old, working-class, white woman on 
Income Support) had expressed that she didn’t feel like ‘talking’ on that occasion, but on 
reflection that meant in the setting that I had suggested. Instead of shutting down the 
possibility of the interview, the women suggested an alternative, and were happy to sit 
and talk to me as a group in the communal room on their terms. The non-hierarchical 
interview setting that I aimed for was fraught with power dynamics. It is important to 
consider what it means for people to give an account of themselves in a specific context, 
especially those who are already required to do so within systems of governance. The 
above example shows that when we ask people to give accounts of themselves and their 
lives, we need to be aware and open to the other ways of working and be reflexive 
enough to amend and shape our practices as necessary. Yet as my encounter with Lauren 
illustrates, listening cannot always alleviate or compensate for difference. 
 
Power Dynamics During Interpretation and Analysis: Speaking for Others 
 
So, what’s this research going to do? Help squeeze us further? 
(Priya, 35, middle-class, Pakistani, Brighton, on DLA, February 2015) 
 
 
The issue of power changes once you leave the setting of the interview and begin 
to interpret and represent the people who have been active in the process. The discourse 
around these challenges typically focuses on exploitation, inequality, misrepresentation, 
and betrayal. As Letherby (2003) notes, after leaving the field, the researcher has 
ultimate control over the material. She has the power to organise and present the data 
as well as turn people’s lives into an authoritative text (Ramazanoglu and Holland, 2002: 
113). This begs the question, can, as Gesa Kirsch (1999: ix) asks, ‘researchers represent 
the experiences of others without misrepresenting, misappropriating, or distorting their 
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realities?’ Questioning the ethics involved in speaking for, and describing, others, this 
final section, describes how I negotiated these ethical issues within this specific fieldwork 
site, in order to avoid as Priya said, helping ‘to squeeze us further.’  
 
According to Les Back, ‘thinking, talking and description is always a betrayal – albeit a 
necessary one – of either the person whom one is speaking or the things that we know 
about them that remain unsaid’ (2007:4). Taking the act of description as the initial 
starting point, I want to think through the dilemmas of such description. Due to the 
relationship between knowledge and power, researchers have been cautious with 
regards to describing ‘others’. Jo Armstrong (2010: 237), for instance, discusses how, by 
embarking on a project that foregrounded gender and class, she was aware ‘that an 
author’s words continue to signify in spite of, and sometimes against, her intensions’. 
She therefore feared that such detailed representation may be used against the 
researcher’s own aims and may ‘provide ammunition to those who would choose to 
employ it in way with which I disagree’ (ibid). This is especially the case in my fieldwork 
site, since representations of certain women as ‘undeserving,’ ‘work-shy,’ and 
‘irresponsible’ are being used to further the government’s austerity agenda of cutting 
public spending. However, while such a discussion demonstrates the inevitable 
difficulties in writing about research participants, ‘if the texture of the lives is lost where 
excerpts of quotations are expected to speak for themselves, the words of respondents 
will not carry vivid portrayals of their lives (Back, 2007: 17). I therefore agree with Skeggs 
(2004) in her belief that we need to think about ‘how we do the research’ itself. As she 
notes: 
 
We need to ask, if the subaltern speaks, how is it that we hear her? Can the 
subaltern authorize herself if she cannot speak or only be heard through the 
self/words of others? Gayatri Spivak (2000) argues no. But unless researchers … 
make subaltern stories available, how would most people know about the 
subaltern at all? If subaltern groups have no access to the mechanisms and 
circuits for telling and distributing their knowledge, how do others even know 
they exist? It is surely a matter of how we do the research rather than abdicate 
responsibility entirely. (130, italics my emphasis) 
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When conducting research, we therefore need to think about, and consider, ‘the 
relations of production’, ‘the possibilities of appropriation’ and the ‘constraints of 
disciplinary techniques and the power relations of location and position’ (Skeggs, 2004: 
131). It is this type of research Skeggs continues, which does not ‘reify and reproduce the 
categorisations of exploitation and symbolic violence’ (ibid). Following this important 
discussion, I argue that the question made by Priya, in the beginning of this section, 
should not, as some advocate, cause me to abdicate responsibility for telling the story. 
However, when researching experiences of austerity, researchers need to think what the 
research might do, as well as how we, as researchers, avoid reproducing and 
perpetuating such exploitation and symbolic violence. As Armstrong (2010: 237) notes, 
researchers should stay alert to possible points of ambiguity, but also acknowledge the 
limits that the researcher has over how the research could be interpreted by others. I 
therefore used the same tactic as Armstrong, approaching the research with care, 
caution and understanding, aware of the ways in which some of my participants’ 
responses could be used and interpreted by others. As can be seen throughout this 
chapter, this care, caution, and understanding is of special importance within the context 
of austerity.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has mapped the methodological dimensions of researching the lived 
experiences of young women - through the outlined fieldwork and methods employed, 
and the politics surrounding knowledge making - exposing its ‘messy’ and untidy nature. 
It is therefore necessary to close this chapter by reiterating how profoundly the complex 
nature of austerity (as a gendered moral–political–economic project with differing social 
effects) commanded the shape of the research process. The ‘messiness’ and untidy 
nature of austerity and its differing impacts on young women’s lives meant that there 
had to be continuous changes of direction, adaptation, negotiation and adjustment, 
which took place at every stage of the research’s production. However, I argue that such 
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processes did not impinge on the research but, in contrast, became necessary in order to 
effectively research austerity and its impacts.  
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Chapter 3 
 
Literature Review 
 
In this chapter, I review the key literature of the themes investigated in this thesis. 
I outline how my study critically engages with research on the lived experiences of 
austerity, as well as the contribution my study offers to this scholarship. In what follows, 
I examine the gap existing in current studies, arguing that, despite contemporary 
literature contributing in-depth analyses of the lived experiences of austerity, there is a 
lack of research which analyses the relationship between the state’s production and 
legitimisation of austerity, and women’s everyday experience(s) (especially analyses that 
focus specifically on difference, primarily how gender, class, and ‘race’ affect experience 
of austerity). Documenting such a gap throughout this literature review, I argue that a 
fuller gendered empirical analysis is thus necessary since austerity itself, is a gendered 
state project, with gendered social outcomes, which are affected by social markers of 
class and ‘race’. In the final section of this review, I make a brief discussion (which will be 
taken up in the following chapter) arguing that we also need to consider the historical 
legacies that have shaped gender, class and ‘race’ in particular ways, in order to fully 
understand austerity and its gendered impacts. 
 
Austerity Policy and its Gendered Impacts   
 
Since the implementation of austerity measures in 2010, a large quantity of 
research has documented how neoliberal restructuring, the economic crisis, and 
austerity measures have led to increasing inequality, social polarisation and societal 
disintegration. Scholars have examined how cuts and reforms have targeted already 
marginalised groups, and have aggravated existing divides of class, gender, ‘race’, 
ethnicity, sexuality, and disability at local, regional, and global levels (see for example, 
Dorling and Ballas, 2008; Atkinson, 2013; Hall, Massey and Rustin, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; 
Mendoza, 2015). In the current crisis, feminist economists and women’s sector 
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organisations have written extensively on the gendered impact of austerity (Walby, 
2009; MacLeavy, 2011; Fawcett Society, 2012, 2013, 2015; WBG, 2014b, 2016; NEWN and 
WRC, 2012; Karamessini and Rubery, 2013; O’Hara, 2014; Pashkoff, 2014; TUC, 2012, 
2015; Pearson and Elson, 2015; Brah, Szemen and Gedalof, 2015). As Hall (2017: no 
pagination) notes, women bear the brunt of economic crises with research showing that 
recessions, downturns, austerity and economic changes imposed from above are not 
evenly felt or distributed across society; an analysis backed up by the House of Commons 
Library (2016). This analysis has revealed that since 2010, 86 per cent of the burden of 
austerity has fallen on women (Cracknel and Keen, 2016). Therefore, in this current 
context, the work of feminist economists and women’s sector organisations have made 
a distinctive contribution to our overall understanding of the effects of austerity on 
women in general, as well as highlighting the disproportionate impact such measures 
have had on certain groups of women. Much of this research draws on large-scale surveys 
and census data, or analyses austerity budgets according to their financial costs.  
 
Reports and analyses have published detailed evaluations of the gendered impact of 
austerity measures. One of the most exhaustive summaries of the cumulative impact of 
such policies has been written by Ruth Pearson and Diane Elson (2015). They 
demonstrate, drawing on a wide range of evidence (from WBG, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 
2014b, 2016; Rubery, 2014; TUC, 2012, 2015), how women have borne the brunt of these 
policies and the disparate effect such policies have had on the spheres of finance, 
production21 and reproduction22. The equality campaigner, The Fawcett Society (2012), 
                                                
21Elson and Pearson (2015) note that the impact on the productive sphere is demonstrated by the changes 
in women’s employment and earnings. For instance, public sector employment has fallen, and since 
women make up about two-thirds of the public-sector workforce, this has had a greater impact on women 
(Women’s Budget Group, 2013a).  	
22Public expenditure in social care has been reduced by 23 per cent; investment in social housing has gone 
down by 34 per cent, while the ‘bedroom tax’ has inevitably increased the rental cost to social tenants. 
Significant cuts in public expenditure on schools (11 per cent), further and higher education (33 per cent), 
as well as social care (23 per cent) and early childhood education (19 per cent), reflect further areas where 
public policy has affected social reproductive activities by reducing public provision, generally relying on 
women’s unpaid labour to fill the gap. Many women working in these sectors have either lost their jobs 
entirely or seen hours and earnings reduced (WBG, 2014a, 2014b). 
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labels this a ‘triple jeopardy’, since the current austerity programme of deep spending 
cuts has left women facing cuts to jobs, benefits and vital services. The austerity agenda 
is therefore particularly damaging to women – they typically use state services more than 
men, they are typically employed at a higher rate in the public sector than men, and they 
rely more on benefits and tax credits than men (due to their caring responsibilities and 
their relative economic inequality and poverty). The described research is helpful for this 
thesis, since it not only explains the ways in which women are ‘bearing the brunt’ of the 
deficit reduction strategy, but also documents the extent to which women are 
increasingly disproportionately disadvantaged. As my analysis shows in Chapter 5, 
women spoke of how austerity measures were impacting their daily lives in different 
ways, especially in relation to the changes made to their experience of employment, 
access to welfare benefits and state-funded services. The referenced research above is 
therefore important in showing how and why austerity’s effects are inherently gendered. 
 
Literature has also highlighted the disproportionate impact of austerity on particular 
groups of women – single mothers and single women who are unemployed or in low 
income employment23 (Pearson and Elson, 2015), those from working-class and BAME 
backgrounds (TUC, 2012, 2015; Sandhu and Stevenson, 2015; WBG and Runnymede 
Trust, 2017)24, young women and older women (WBG, 2012, 2013, TUC, 2015)25, women 
with disabilities (Wood, Cheetman and Gregory, 2012)26, and women in northern regions 
                                                	
23For instance, these ‘disadvantaged groups’ have experienced the biggest fall in disposable income 
because of austerity policies (Elson and Pearson, 2015). 
  
24Most recently, a report from WBG and Runnymede Trust (2017) has indicated that low-income black and 
Asian women are paying the highest price for austerity. The analysis shows that by 2020, individuals in the 
poorest households lose most from tax and benefit changes, but in every income group BAME women will 
lose the greatest proportion of their individual income.  
 
25According to the TUC (2015) young women’s employment which fell furthest in the recession years, has 
still not recovered. 
  
26A report by Claudia Wood, Philida Cheetman and Thomas Gregory (2013) has shown that disabled and 
chronically ill women – many of whom are carers themselves – face huge and continuing cuts to disability 
support, from fit-for-work tests to the latest changes to personal independence payments. 	
 72 
of the UK (NEWN and WRC, 2012)27. For example, the Women’s Budget Group and 
Runnymede Trust (2017) performed a cumulative distributional analysis of tax and 
benefit changes since 2010 and found that women are hit harder than men across all 
incomes groups, with BAME women particularly hard hit. By 2020, Asian women in some 
of the poorest families will be £2,247 worse off. Black and Asian lone mothers stand to 
lose £3,996 and £4,214, respectively, from the changes, about 15 and 17 per cent of their 
net income. This illustrates that austerity is not only distinctly and inherently gendered, 
but is also a socially uneven condition which exacerbate pre-existing social and economic 
inequalities. As Kalwinder Sandhu and Mary-Ann Stevenson note in their article ‘Layers 
of inequality’ (2015), one of the key features of women’s experience of austerity is that 
they often face several cuts simultaneously. Women’s experiences, they note, are made 
worse by the simultaneous operations of the social divisions of gender, ‘race’, ethnicity, 
class and disability. Like the research above, this thesis explores how these differences 
affect women’s material experience of austerity. It helps to explain the gendering of 
austerity in economic terms – as an economic programme of ‘fiscal management, 
revealing how austerity policies have produced and enabled gendered, classed, and 
racialised material exclusions.  
 
Austerity Discourse and its Gendered Impacts  
 
As outlined in detail in Chapter 1, austerity is more than just a programme of fiscal 
management. It is also a moral–political gendered project, and a cultural tool which, as 
feminist scholars have examined, has facilitated the production of certain gendered 
(classed and ‘racial’) subject-positions. These subject-positions are played out, circulated 
and reinforced, in particular ways, by the state, in public sites, and through popular 
culture (Allen et al., 2015: 908; also see for instance, Jensen and Tyler, 2012; Bramall, 
                                                
27For example, the TUC (2012: 4) documented the ‘increasingly perilous position of women’ in northern 
areas and predicted much worse to come when further welfare reforms hit. Research on women in the 
North East has since proved this; 46 per cent of all women working in the area have jobs in the public sector 
compared with 18 per cent of working males in the region (North East Women’s Network and Women’s 
Resource Centre, 2012). 
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2013; Tyler, 2013a, 2015; Littler, 2013; McRobbie, 2013; Negra, 2013; Allen, Tyler, and De 
Benedictis, 2014; Griffin, 2015; Orgad and De Benedictis, 2015; Evans, 2013, 2015, 2016, 
2017; De Benedictis and Gill, 2016).  
 
Austerity discourse, Orgad and De Benedictis (2015: 420) note, often casts women as 
passive and personal respondents to the economic downturn, while simultaneously 
stressing their responsibility and need for positive thinking (also see Negra and Tasker, 
2014). Austerity discourse, scholars argue, thus privilege certain practices (middle-class), 
while vilifying others (working-class), and creates connections between those practices 
and specific subject positions. For instance, the ideal female citizen is congratulated for 
being a future-orientated, self-regulating, economically active, and consumer driven 
(labelled as a ‘yummy mummy’, ‘happy housewife’, ‘striver’, or part of the ‘hardworking 
family’). This figure ‘fits’ into contemporary economic and social formations and helps 
the ‘nation’ recover. Others (‘ghetto trash’, ‘chavs’, ‘feral parents’, ‘riotous mothers’ or 
‘skivers’) are condemned as excessive and destructive, and blamed for the crisis of 
capitalism (Jensen, 2012, 2014; Allen et al., 2015; McRobbie, 2013; Allen, Tyler, and De 
Benedictis, 2014; Griffin, 2015; Orgad and De Benedictis, 2015; Evans, 2013, 2015, 2016, 
2017). 
 
Scholars have noted how the gendered dimension of austerity can be seen through the 
emergence of thrift, nostalgia and gendered domestic entrepreneurship (Jensen, 2012, 
2013a; Bramall, 2013; Biressi and Nunn, 2013; Negra, 2013) – ideals which fit with the 
austerity agenda. Female thrift, Diane Negra writes, ‘works for an era of adjusted 
economic realities ... with female consumer resourcefulness becoming a new theme on 
many fronts’ (2013: 124). Similarly, the ‘domestic ideal’ has also been a focal point of 
austere values and subjectivities. As Allen et al. (2015) argue, the benchmark of 
successful femininity in the context of austerity has been coded around homemaking and 
childcare, which are seen as sites of happiness and moral worth (also see Littler, 2013; 
McRobbie, 2013). This domestic ideal, as these feminist scholars highlight, is a distinctly 
middle-class and heterosexual (planned) family unit, which does considerable cultural 
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work for a government determined to revive ‘traditional’ family values and cut public 
spending (Allen et al., 2015).  
 
Yet, the focus on homemaking, thrift and domesticity cannot be seen as a ‘return 
narrative’. Such a description, Evans (2015: 150) notes, is at odds with the modernising 
aspirations of contemporary neo-liberalism: women need to work and consume. Thus, 
‘as far as the purposes of present-day capitalism are concerned, that women continue to 
spend money as active consumers is crucial. Far from saving the string, we are now 
exhorted to buy new string as often as possible’ (Evans, 2013: 839). Feminist scholars 
have highlighted how the ‘good mother’ - the responsible, resilient, middle-class mother 
– thus reflects the norms of contemporary citizenship (Allen and Taylor, 2012: 5). As Allen 
and Taylor explain, the ‘good’ mother not only withstands the consequences of the 
recession, but, at the same time, helps to reinvigorate the economy and society by 
governing themselves and their children in the ‘right’ ways. This normative view of ‘good 
parenting’ Orgad and De Benedicitis (2015: 421) stress, is ‘predicated on self-governance 
of certain gendered selves and interlinked with the economy is intimately connected to 
the intensifying entanglement of mothering and neoliberalism’. Female labour power is 
‘far too important to the post-industrial economy for any [government] to be an 
advocate of long-term stay-at-home wives and mothers’ (McRobbie, 2013: 121), 
especially a government determined to reduce the cost of welfare. Thus, austerity’s ideal 
mother must not fully retreat, but carefully balance her career with childcare. The ideal 
female citizen – ‘mother and carer or not’ – is an economically active citizen (Evans, 2016: 
449). It is this figure, the female worker, Evans argues, that women’s ‘respectability’ is 
now become clearly associated with. Yet, as Orgad and De Benedictis note, stay-at-
home mothers (SAHM) are gaining renewed status. Providing she is upper-middle class 
the SAHM validates ‘a retreat from the idea of combining full-time successful careers 
with motherhood’ and ‘gives new, more professional status to full-time mothers’ 
(McRobbie, 2013: 301, in Orgad and De Benedictis, 2015: 624). 
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In contrast to the ideal figure above, the described values have also facilitated the 
emergence of other figures, subjected to the disproval of others. The ‘welfare mother’, 
Evans writes (2016: 439), ‘is a new character on a political stage that has long included 
individuals apparently dangerous to the nation’ (also see De Benedictis, 2012, Tyler, 
2013a; Allen, Tyler, and De Benedictis, 2014; McKenzie, 2014; Allen et al., 2015; Casey, 
2015). Met with various kinds of contempt, the ‘welfare mother’ is held up in contrast to 
the ‘good mother’. With citizenship being framed around work, the shaming of the so-
called ‘welfare mother’ can be understood through their absence in the workforce and 
thus the inability to provide for their children (Evans, 2017; Tyler, 2013a; Casey, 2015). 
Scholars have therefore examined the ways in which these figures of disapproval are 
circulating within political and media discourse. De Benedictis (2012) for instance, has 
unpacked the transcendence of the ‘feral’ parent discourse (infused with classed and 
racialised undertones) through British media commentary via public political statements 
before and after the 2011 UK riots. She argues that ‘the discourse of the “feral” parent 
emerged to position the blame for the riots on a class of “feral” children borne of “feral” 
parents’ (1). Blame was thus centred upon the lone, working-class mother, ‘imbued with 
unique meaning to aid socio-economic and political incentives under austerity’ (ibid). 
 
 Most notably there has been the shaming and blaming of these figures across RTV 
shows about welfare recipients (this will be discussed in more detail below) (see Jensen, 
2014; Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Allen, Tyler and De Benedictis, 2014; Allen et al., 2015). 
Described as ‘poverty porn’, these shows are frequently mobilised by politicians as 
evidence of a society plagued by welfare dependency and moral breakdown (Allen, Tyler, 
and De Benedictis, 2014; Jensen 2014). The production and circulation of these subject 
positions across political and media discourse demonstrates, as Allen et al. argue, ‘how 
austerity has afforded opportunities to reboot classed and racialised discourses that have 
historically positioned black and working-class mothers outside of the hegemonic ideal 
of white, middle-class maternity (Gillies, 2007; Phoenix, 1991)’ (2015: 918). 
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In Chapter 4, I return to this analysis. I further examine austerity discourses circulating 
within the political register, not only highlighting in detail why and how austerity has 
been produced and legitimised by the state, but how these discourses interlock and 
contradict each other. Drawing on the work above, I also show how these discourses 
discursively and affectively shape which groups are ‘deserving’ of spending cuts, as well 
as how spending cuts are made present and actionable. Exploring the circulating 
contradictory discourses helps to understand how austerity is put to use by the state and 
the particular ways in which austerity shapes gender, class and ‘race’ relations.   
 
In addition, it is also important to understand how such sensibilities are taken up and 
lived out in the everyday. As my analysis shows in Chapter 7, women dialogued with 
these ‘good’ and ‘bad’ gendered, classed and racialised subject positons and sensibilities, 
drawing on the discussions of hard-work and responsibility. The research discussed 
above is therefore important since it demonstrates how certain kinds of subject positions 
and sensibilities have been produced within the moral landscape of austerity, and also 
highlights austerity’s specifically gendered, classed, and racialised dimensions.  
 
Austerity, however, (as briefly touched on above) has real outcomes and social effects. It 
is this symbiotic relationship, between austerity as a state project and its social effects, 
that this thesis is interested in understanding. As Georgina Waylen notes, ‘it is important 
to remember that actions cannot be understood outside of the structures which 
constrain them, just as those structures cannot be understood without some 
consideration of the impact of the choices made by actors both in and outside of them in 
creating and changing those structures’ (1998: 2). Therefore, this analysis is 
supplemented with empirical research on the everyday lives of women. 
 
Everyday Experiences of Austerity  
 
The following sections in this chapter will describe the empirical research that has 
been undertaken to date on the lived experiences of austerity and highlight some of the 
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limitations and gaps within this literature. In doing so, I will show how my research 
dialogues with and extends these discussions. By reviewing literature that explores the 
material and symbolic effects of austerity in the everyday, I highlight how these 
discussions often focus on particular groups of women and their specific experiences. In 
contrast, my study demonstrates that to fully understand the experiences of women in 
the context of austerity, it is important to foreground difference. I argue that studies on 
austerity can produce fuller and more complex accounts of the gendered impacts by 
examining how difference and processes of differentiation interact with these 
experiences. As I discuss in this section, literature has considered how austerity affects 
people in different ways due to the multiplicity of austerity itself. However, an 
examination of such multiplicity, I argue, must also take into account the ways in which 
different social markers shape women’s experience, as well as the ways austerity 
intensifies and extends existing social and economic inequalities.  
  
 
Living with Austerity 
 
The majority of the empirical research on the impact of austerity focuses on 
understanding the effects brought about by such measures (Shildrick et al., 2012; 
O’Hara, 2014; Valentine, 2014; Pemberton et al., 2014; Hitchen, 2014, 2016; Patrick, 
2014, 2o16, 2017). Polly Toynbee, in her book Hard Work (2003) argues that ‘ordinary 
people’ who do ordinary, necessary, but underpaid and undervalued jobs at the bottom 
of the labour market ‘do not figure on the national landscape at all. They are the 
forgotten, the invisible’ (149). However, empirical studies on the everyday experiences 
of austerity counter such an argument, making the lives of those ‘ordinary people’ visible. 
These studies have been conducted by scholars across geographical areas, disciplinary 
spaces and theoretical approaches. 
One of the most comprehensive and compelling accounts of the social effects of 
austerity is the work of Mary O’Hara in her book Austerity Bites. Based on a series of 
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interviews conducted throughout England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland during 
2012 and 2013, O’Hara examines the lives of everyday people, through their own words, 
who have been adversely affected by austerity measures. O’Hara’s research maps out 
the different (but often intersecting) effects felt in the everyday through the 
implementation of austerity measures: the rise in food poverty, the consequences of 
welfare reform (especially sanctioning and the ‘bedroom tax’), increased levels of debt, 
increased pressure on household income and wages, and changes to employment. More 
specifically, O’Hara also focuses on the disproportionate impact that such measures have 
had on people with disabilities and women and children. Her book exposes the material, 
psychological, and symbolic effects of the austerity programme. It supplements 
discussions from ‘ordinary people’ with an extensive body of research and reports from 
statisticians, journalists, academics and politicians and paints an overall picture of the 
landscape of austerity for those ‘at the sharp end of the cuts.’ O’Hara’s book is extremely 
important in documenting the different ways in which austerity impacts different lives in 
different ways.  
Scholarship has also focused on specific areas through which austerity has materialised 
within (for example welfare reform and employment). The large majority has 
concentrated specifically on the impact of welfare reform; assessing the experiences of 
those who are reliant on welfare benefits (for instance, Gathwaite, 2014; Patrick, 2016, 
2017; Manji, 2017). Through understanding the daily life of those accessing welfare 
benefits, the research examines the extent of the disjunction between citizenship as 
conceptualised from above and citizenship as lived and experienced from below. In 
addition, studies have also looked at the lived experiences of those moving between 
unemployment and insecure work. Research conducted in Teesside by Tracey Shildrick, 
Robert MacDonald, Colin Webster and Kayleigh Garthwaite (2012) for instance, not only 
shows the lived experiences of those in precarious employment but also contests the 
myth that work is ‘the best route out of poverty’. Other investigations have considered 
the lived experience of low-income groups (Valentine, 2014; Pemberton et al., 2014), 
people and families with disabilities (Hitchen, 2014, 2016) and BAME groups (Netto and 
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Fraser, 2009; Sosenko et al., 2013). Scholars have also looked at how the material effects 
of austerity have complicated the ways in which the future is being imagined (Roberts 
and Evans, 2013; Bradley and Ingram, 2013; Hitchen, 2014, 2016). Their research furthers 
our understanding of the experiences of specific groups and the specific impacts of 
austerity on employment and benefits and highlights the difference between 
government rhetoric and lived reality. However, these studies have not specifically 
focused their attention on the experiences of women or how difference comes to matter 
in their daily lives. 
 
As I examined, in the first section of this literature review, women bear the brunt of 
austerity measures. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of these social effects on the lives of 
women is not only important, but is necessary to fully understand the current context of 
austerity. To date, there is an emerging body of feminist research detailing such 
experiences (Lonergan, 2015; Hall, 2015a, 2017; Raynor, 2016a, 2016b; Bassel and 
Emejulu, 2015, 2017; Poovey, 2017). These feminist scholars examine how austerity is 
experienced in the lives of women, highlighting the importance of women’s experiences 
and the intersection of difference. Ruth Raynor (2016a, 2016b), for example, documents 
the lives of a group of women who attend a family support centre in the North East of 
England to understand how they encountered austerity. Raynor notes that within this 
group, austerity touched ‘women’s lives in different ways, at different times and in 
different places’ (2016b: 3). For the women in her study ‘micro-situational differences 
mattered to the effects of austerity’, concluding that ‘specific cuts or reforms should be 
understood in relation to one another as well as in context as they intensified the 
precaritisation of already economically marginalised lives’ (ibid). Raynor’s research is 
therefore helpful, since it provides an intimate view of the experiences of these women, 
and demonstrates how austerity impacted these women’s lives (with this shared 
demographic) in different ways.  
Research has also focused on minority ethnic women’s experiences of austerity 
(Lonergan, 2015; Bassel and Emejulu, 2015, 2017). Leah Bassel and Akwugo Emejulu 
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(2015, 2017), for example, taking an intersectional approach (focusing on gender, class, 
‘race’ and immigration status) documenting minority women’s experiences of, and 
activism within, the austerity regimes of France and Britain. Their research focuses on 
the ways in which minority women are negotiating material and discursive crises that 
undermine and problematise their activism. Their research highlights how the crisis has 
affected the everyday life. As Bassel and Emejulu (2015: 87) note;  
some minority women are particularly disadvantaged due to precarious 
employment, legal status and/or greater reliance on dwindling public services. 
The seemingly prosaic and routine hardships that some women experience have 
profound impacts on their activism – for instance, a lack of affordable childcare; 
diminished core funding for minority women-led organisations; the withdrawal 
of funding for transport costs to attend meetings in rooms that are no longer 
freely provided.  
 
Gwyneth Lonergan (2015) similarly discussed the effects of the austerity regime on 
migrant women, albeit through a different focus. Lonergan demonstrates how the cuts 
to English as a Second Language or Other Language (ESOL) classes challenged migrant 
women’s social reproductive activities and their attempts to find paid work. Such 
research from these different scholars gives a more detailed and nuanced understanding 
of how austerity impacts women between and within certain groups in messy and 
multiple ways. However, I argue that what is lacking in furthering our understanding of 
the gendered austerity project, is a comprehension of how young women from different 
backgrounds are living with austerity. How are women from different social classes and 
‘racial’ backgrounds experiencing austerity? How might these differences materialise in 
the everyday? For instance, as Hall (2015a: 1) notes, conducting research in the context 
of austerity involves people who are affected in different ways, ‘those already living in or 
close to poverty; those witnessing or knowing others struggling and offering support; 
those largely insulated from the consequences’. These differences are important to 
understand. Hall continues: 
 
the realities of austerity are, for some, intrinsically connected to experiences of 
poverty, precarity and insecurity (see Jupp 2013), and many of the cuts to welfare 
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will have a disproportionate impact on those in already difficult situations (JRF 
2015). However, it is possible to be impacted by austerity but not necessarily be 
(or define oneself as) living in poverty or a personal condition of austerity (see Hall 
2015a; Waite 2009), or to be living in poverty in a period of economic prosperity 
(see Smith 2005). While there is no generalised personal condition of austerity, 
austerity as a socio-economic condition is nonetheless a point of commonality 
and mutuality, something that many people may be ‘living in’ but not ‘living with’. 
(2015a: 1-2) 
 
Therefore, I argue that in order to fully understand austerity and the impact it has on 
women’s lives, difference needs to be at the forefront of such work. I hence extend and 
deepen previous analyses by undertaking interviews and group discussions with a diverse 
group of women in three cities of the UK (Leeds, London and Brighton) to consider how 
class and ‘race’ affect the experience of austerity. I use Bourdieu’s theory of capital (1979, 
1986, 1989, 1991) to specifically show how young women differently navigate through 
austerity according to their economic, cultural, social capital and other resources. My 
data reveals the multifaceted ways austerity is experienced through different social 
markers at a material level, research which has not yet been done to date. 
 
Navigating through Austerity  
 
Empirical research on the lived experiences of austerity has been supplemented 
with literature discussing how people are ‘managing’ or ‘coping’ within the landscape of 
austerity outside of the UK. There is a wealth of literature documenting how those living 
precarious lives ‘manage’ and ‘navigate’ through contexts of insecurity. For example, 
Barbara Ehrenreich’s (2001) Nickled and Dimed, Jennifer Johnson’s (2002) Getting by on 
the Minimum and most recently Linda Tirado’s (2014) Hand to Mouth, are all examples of 
research that documents the ways in which people not only experience, but also navigate 
through times of precarity and insecurity. This research is extremely important for 
understanding the current context. These studies, in different ways, detail how people 
‘get by’; through the use of food stamps (if eligible), discount food and clothes shopping, 
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‘going without’, the help of partners, family networks and friends and the use of outside 
agencies.  
 
These tactics are not dissimilar to the ones discussed by work highlighting the coping 
strategies of individuals in the context of austerity. For example, Shildrick et al. (2012), 
O’Hara (2014), Pemberton et al. (2014), Ruth Patrick (2014, 2016, 2017), Hall (2015a, 
2017), Esther Hitchen (2014, 2016) and Kayleigh Garthwaite (2016) discuss the different 
tactics and strategies that are being implemented in people’s daily lives. Yet, this recent 
research shows how such tactics have been further compromised by external factors, such 
as cuts to services, reduction in benefits, rise in the cost of living, and the scarcity of 
credit.  
 
These current studies have focused in detail on the different ways in which individuals 
have been ‘getting by’: investigating the rise of food poverty and foodbank use 
(Gathwaite, 2016; Lambie-Mumford, 2017), use of credit (Deville, 2015), use of voluntary 
services and charitable organisations (Vacchelli, Kathrecha and Gyte, 2015), through 
family networks (Hitchen, 2015, 2016), using time-intensive strategies and practices, 
such as low-cost supermarket shopping (Patrick, 2014, Hitchen 2015), and through the 
strategy of ‘heat or eat’ (Lambie-Mumford and Snell, 2015). Scholars has also 
concentrated their attention on the multiple tactics and strategies used by specific groups 
(see Patrick, 2014; 2016; 2017 and Hitchen, 2016 on benefit claimants; see O’Hara, 2014 
and Pemberton et al., 2014 on those at the ‘sharp end of the cuts’ and Shildrick et al., 
2012 for those in ‘low-pay-no-pay cycle’/ experiencing ‘in work poverty’). All studies 
found that people showed compromise, ingenuity and resourcefulness, despite 
hardship, increased pressure and struggle in their everyday lives.  
 
Overall, the body of research has helped to further understand the complex social reality 
of those living on a low income, as well as the complexities of these different practices. 
It points to commonalities experienced by those on a low income: increasing pressure 
makes lives far more difficult (and busy) than suggested by political discourse. To a 
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certain extent, the research also highlights the divergence in resources and social capital 
that influences the coping strategies selected. Understanding the commonalities and 
divergences is of central importance to my research. Foregrounding gender within such 
an analysis, I argue, allows for a more nuanced understanding. It is through such a 
nuanced analysis that we can further understand both the commonalities and 
divergences of women most affected by austerity in the context of austerity.  
 
In addition, as I demonstrate in Chapter 6, it is not only women who are living ‘precarious 
lives’ that are ‘navigating’ through the context of precarity and insecurity; cutting back 
and budgeting were strategies also used by middle-class women. Therefore, despite 
paying close attention to how people live and navigate as other scholars have done, I am 
interested in difference. My data shows how middle-class and working-class women’s 
navigation strategies were based on material concerns, but commonalities and 
divergences were shaped by different capitals (economic, cultural and social) and 
resources. Research to date has not provided such an in-depth gendered analysis and, as 
I show in Chapter 6, this research thus further explains how difference comes to matter 
in women’s experiences of austerity. Through an understanding of austerity as, in part, 
an economic programme, this thesis will discuss how austerity is materialised in (Chapter 
5) and navigated through the everyday (Chapter 6) as well as how such experiences affect 
how women’s future imaginaries are felt in the present (Chapter 9). 
 
Speaking about Austerity  
 
As noted in the earlier section of this review, scholars have discussed the symbolic 
nature of austerity; highlighting how ideological and discursive struggle is played out 
within the political, social and cultural spheres (see for instance Jensen and Tyler, 2015; 
Tyler, 2015; Allen et al., 2015; De Benedictis and Gill, 2016). This symbolic campaign, 
Imogen Tyler (2015: 506) notes, is ‘ruthlessly employed to divide people along a vampiric 
axis of blame for diminishing social resources’: the ‘skiver’ is contrasted against the ‘hard 
working family’. Scholars have explored how consent for austerity and the dismantling 
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of the welfare state has been achieved and legitimised in micro-level everyday 
discussions (Stanley, 2014; Valentine, 2014; Patrick, 2014; Pemberton et al., 2014; 
Garthwaite, 2016a). Such research has specifically focused on the different ways in which 
austerity is discussed across and within different groups; through processes of othering, 
distinction-making, distancing and boundary formation (Stanley, 2014; Valentine, 2014; 
Jackson and Benson, 2014) and through forms of disaffection and opposition circulating 
in reference to the extremes of austerity (Carastathis, 2015; Bassel and Emejulu, 2017). 
In addition, research has also highlighted how consent and resistance have been 
reinforced and evidenced through the cultural sphere (Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Allen, 
Tyler and De Benedictis, 2014; Allen et al., 2015).  
 
To understand the politics of austerity, scholars have focused on understanding how 
those labelled as ‘hard working’ by the government discuss, think and feel about 
austerity measures; specifically, in relation to their consent for or dissatisfaction towards 
the welfare state. Research has shown that in respondent’s discussions there is often a 
process of boundary making between themselves and ‘Others’. Liam Stanley (2014, 
2016; also see Edmiston, 2016; Bramall, 2016b), for example, explored how members of 
the public make sense of the fairness of austerity, undertaking focus groups with ‘tax 
payers’28 during 2012. Examining the micro-level dynamics of such legitimisation, his 
research offers unique insights into the politics of austerity. The morally ‘undeserving 
poor’ were the focus of such debates – the participants debated the unfair redistribution 
to supposed ‘undeserving groups’ and made moral distinctions between the ‘squeezed 
hardworking middle’ and the ‘undeserving other’. Gill Valentine (2014) noted similar 
behaviour. When discussing austerity, middle-class respondents tended to identify and 
condemn ‘chav’ culture, reinforcing individualised, less compassionate attitudes towards 
such groups. This research showed the construction of boundaries between ‘us’ and 
‘them’ through the use of ‘national abject subjects’ (Tyler, 2013a: 4) – in this case the 
‘chav’ and the ‘undeserving other’. Describing the use of such boundary making 
                                                
28Comprising of middle-income homeowners or community volunteers. 
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language, Tyler, drawing on the work of Joe Rigby (2014), has argued that when ‘the 
precarity effected by neoliberalism is not confined to those living with poverty, the 
antagonism between capital and living labour is no longer concentrated in specific places 
of work, but traverses the whole of society (Rigby, 2014: 87)’ (2015: 506). Therefore, she 
goes on to argue, for the middle-classes, it becomes even more important to set 
boundaries separating ‘us’ from ‘them’. The research of Emma Jackson and Michaela 
Benson (2014: 506), despite not focusing specifically on the politics of austerity, is 
applicable here. Their ethnographic study of middle-class residents of an inner-London 
neighbourhood demonstrates how the urban middle-class try to find new ways to 
protect and differentiate themselves. Like the research of Valentine (2014) and Stanley 
(2014), differentiation was done through symbolic and spatial articulations of class 
difference – in part, through ‘violent intolerance’ for racialised and classed ‘Others’.  
 
Research has also been undertaken which not only evidences the transformation of 
public opinion, but also shows the mechanisms through which it is sustained and 
produced. Jensen and Tyler (2015), for instance, use a ‘cultural political economy’ 
approach towards the medium of reality television (RTV), to document the ways in which 
this cultural mechanism helps to solidify consent for welfare reform and the 
representation of those reliant on the welfare state as ‘undeserving’. In their article 
‘“Benefits brood”: The cultural and political crafting of anti-welfare common-sense’ 
(2015), they argue that anti-welfare common-sense is reproduced, mediated and 
legitimated through media representations of people on welfare, generating ‘welfare 
disgust’. They draw special attention to ‘benefits brood’ families, arguing that such 
figures ‘not only help manage precariat populations (as technologies of control) but also 
as technologies of consent, through which a wider and deeper anti-welfare common-
sense is affected’ (475). Furthering this research, Kim Allen, Imogen Tyler and Sara De 
Benedictis (2014) unpack the TV participant ‘White Dee’ from the RTV show Benefits 
Street29. These scholars highlight how the figure of ‘White Dee’, both within the show 
                                                
29Benefits Street was a RTV series broadcast on Channel 4, first airing in January 2014. The show 
‘documented’ the lives of several residents of James Turner Street in Birmingham. A second series was 
 86 
and in audience responses to it, is made abject, the ‘other’ of the “‘good’, ‘hard-working’ 
future-oriented, individualistic and entrepreneurial neoliberal citizen” (2014:6, also see 
Allen and Taylor, 2012; Jensen, 2014; Jensen and Tyler, 2015; Allen et al., 2015). ‘White 
Dee’ (marked as feckless, lazy and ‘undeserving’), they argue, generates public consent 
for welfare reform. However, she is also positioned on the programme and in audience 
responses as ‘a hero’ – a community worker, campaigner, and a resilient caring mother. 
‘White Dee’, they argue, to an extent, also muddies and fractures such an understanding. 
These different depictions inform analysis of consent for welfare reform and the 
representation of those in poverty.  
Taking into account such discussions, data from narratives of middle-class women in my 
sample showed how consent for austerity was shaped through the use of moral (classed 
and racialised) distinction. These distinctions were informed and reinforced by examples 
from cultural mechanisms such as RTV (see Chapter 8). My data also showed that 
austerity policy was questioned by women, in which they displayed care and empathy 
for those at the sharp end of the cuts. These discussions were affected by young women’s 
proximity to the effects of austerity. Furthermore, I argue that to build on the research 
above and consider how austerity affects young women socially, it is important to find 
other avenues to examine how austerity is produced and sustained. What are the other 
ways in which women can assert their class and ‘race’ position and legitimate austerity? 
How might these discussions also rupture and create new configurations? In Chapter 8, I 
draw on narratives from middle-class women speaking about the importance of 
feminism in the context of austerity. I argue that feminism is a productive site through 
which we can understand these different configurations. Dialoguing with and drawing on 
feminist analyses (see Fraser, 2013; Rottenberg, 2014; Evans, 2015, 2016), I demonstrate 
how the moral project of austerity is reproduced and legitimised though processes of 
                                                
filmed in Kingston Road, Stockton-On-Tees in 2015. As will be discussed in Chapter 4, the series was 
mentioned in the House of Commons, and prompted political debate on the topic of welfare. 
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boundary making between those in need of feminism (working-class and BAME women) 
and themselves (the self-sufficient, individualised, feminist woman).  
 
Navigating Symbolic Injury 
 
 
In contexts of precarity and insecurity, scholars have researched the ‘symbolic 
injury’ experienced by those most affected by hardship and inequality. For example, Lois 
Weis’ (2004) and Jennifer Silva’s (2013) differing analyses are situated within the context 
of contemporary neoliberal transformations (in the US), demonstrating the different 
ways in which people live out such changes. For example, while scholars have shown that 
neoliberalism demands ‘de-raced, de-classed and de-gendered’ individuals (Apple, 2001) 
Weis’ study demonstrates that the working-classes were insisting, on some level, being 
classed, and certainly raced, in spite of the fact that they increasingly entered and 
remained attached to the economy as individuals. Such allegiances created a new ‘white 
working-class fraction’ in which men and women acted together as a racialised class 
fraction to sustain ‘the white community’ against perceived racial competitors. In a 
somewhat different and more recent analysis, Silva’s (2013) research shows how 
political, economic and social changes split individuals, families and communities apart. 
These changes created the belief that personal responsibility, via a therapeutic narrative, 
was the key to meaning, security and freedom. Working-class men and women drew 
boundaries between the ‘worthy’ and ‘unworthy’, ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, using 
the narrative of ‘self-help and self-transformation’. Those who were seen to not be able 
to make it on their own were seen to be undeserving and objects of scorn. As Silva points 
out, even though individuals named their problems through the therapeutic narrative, 
and despite struggling with similar and structurally rooted problems, there is no sense of 
‘we’. In contrast to Weis, Silva observes, ‘the possibility of collective politicisation 
through naming one’s suffering is easily subsumed within these large structures of 
domination because others who struggle are seen not as fellow sufferers but as objects 
of scorn’ (2013:142). 
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Focusing specifically on the context of austerity, research exploring the experience of 
those at the sharp end of the cuts shows both similarities to and differences from the 
studies above. For example, research has highlighted that participants were ‘talking 
back’ to the government rhetoric that says that benefits and welfare is a lifestyle choice 
(Shildrick et al., 2012; Patrick, 2014). Research has also explored the everyday 
experiences of those deemed ‘abject’ (Soldatic and Meekosha, 2012; Baumberg, Bell and 
Gaffney, 2012) as well as the ways in which those who face insecurity and hardship 
discussed themselves and others (Shildrick et al., 2012). For example, Patrick (2014) 
argued that her participants challenged the idea of welfare as a lifestyle choice, 
commonly employing strong negative language to describe the reality of life on benefits. 
Like the women in this thesis, participants questioned how it was possible to have a ‘life’ 
on benefits.  
 
Research has also considered the role of disgust and stigma in mediating the lives of 
those most affected by the austerity programme. In her book Revolting Subjects (2013a), 
Tyler discusses the politics of disgust, arguing that while disgust is experienced 
physically, quoting Ngai (2005: 11) it is ‘saturated with socially stigmatised meanings and 
values’ (21). As Mary Douglas (1966: 2) highlights, disgust is not an intrinsic feature of the 
‘disgusting’ object - there is no such thing ‘as absolute dirt’ – ‘it exists in the eye of the 
beholder’. In this sense, disgust (the feeling produced by dirt, for instance) is a ‘byproduct 
of a systematic ordering and classification of matter’ (36). Therefore, as Tyler (2013a: 24) 
notes, ‘disgust is political’, used throughout history ‘as a powerful weapon in social 
efforts to exclude certain groups and persons (Nussbaum, 2004:107)’ (25). Yet, ‘disgust is 
not just enacted by subjects and groups in the process of othering, distinction-making, 
distancing and boundary formation, but it is also experienced and lived by those 
constituted as disgusting in their experiences of displacement and abandon’ (Tyler, 
2013a: 26). Thus, drawing on this discussion, research has explored the experience of 
those deemed disgusting in the context of austerity, for instance, the experiences of 
disabled women in the Australian welfare state (Soldatic and Meekosha, 2012) and 
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people’s experiences of food bank use (Gathwaite, 2016; also see Tyler, 2013a). Karen 
Soldatic and Helen Meekosha’s (2012) research shows how the reconfiguration of the 
disabled women in the public image from ‘victims’ to parasitical welfare scroungers has 
affected women’s interactions with official state actors and other citizens (in Tyler, 
2013a: 26). This process of stigmatisation towards single mothers, migrant women and 
women with disabilities, in relation to my work, resulted in feelings of shame, 
embarrassment, and even fear (see Chapter 7 and 8). 
 
In addition, empirical research has shown how there is also a tendency amongst those 
living in poverty and/or reliant on benefits to simultaneously characterise themselves as 
‘deserving’ and identify other claimants as less deserving, who perhaps should not be 
entitled to state support (Shildrick et al., 2012) through the mechanisms of distancing, 
blame, dis-identification and dissociation. As Shildrick and MacDonald (2013: 300) note, 
ideological discourses about the ‘undeserving poor’ are not simply the ‘top down’ 
rhetoric of the powerful (or the ‘non’ poor) but are shared and enacted by those at the 
bottom, skewed downwards towards others, objectively, like them’. For example, 
Patrick (2014) demonstrated that her out-of-work participants often gave anecdotes and 
examples of ‘other’ benefit claimants who saw benefits as a ‘lifestyle choice’, who 
claimed fraudulently, or received more than that to which they should be entitled. 
Documenting a similar process, Shildrick et al. (2012) argues, that the use of ‘them’ and 
‘us’, ‘we’ and ‘them’, is perhaps part of an attempt to distance themselves from the 
stigma and shame associated with welfare ‘dependency’ and poverty by deflecting it 
onto other people.  
In Chapter 7, my data builds upon previous research, showing that young women not only 
took part in a process of distancing and othering, but that they also produced values that 
counter the predominance of moralistic narratives of economic productivity and 
aspiration. Similarly, the literature from Sukhwant Dhaliwal and Kirsten Forkert (2015) 
on ethnic minority British citizens and recent immigrants, and Raynor’s (2016a, 2016b) 
and Hitchen’s (2014) research discussed above, highlights this behaviour. Dhaliwal and 
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Forkert note that the tendency of both recent migrants and people from established 
ethnic minorities to make this distinction between ‘deserving’ and ‘undeserving’, or 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ migrants and citizens is a central feature of their own bid for recognition 
and legitimacy. However, they also found that people produce values that counter the 
predominance of moralistic narratives – they resist a dominant discourse that seeks to 
intensify hostility towards migrants and instead assert other values, such as compassion, 
empathy, and solidarity. Likewise, Raynor (2016a, 2016b) explained how in her research 
with a group of working-class women forms of stigmatisation and discrimination played 
out in nuanced and complex ways. For example, within women’s narratives, instances of 
‘micro-othering’ circulated alongside persistent expressions of ‘micro-care’.  
Like the research cited above, my data explores the messiness of austerity, in which 
women discuss austerity in contrasting and contradictory ways. My data shows that 
young women’s discussions are narrated through contradictory dialogues of negotiation 
and distancing towards and away from the figures of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizen. 
However, their narratives are also loaded with expressions of care and empathy (see 
Chapter 7 and 8).  
 
(Briefly) Situating the State within its Current Context and Historical Legacies   
 
 Not only is it important to understand that women are constantly negotiating 
their positioning in relation to austerity, but also it is necessary to see how historical 
categories of the state shape young women’s experiences. As noted in the previous 
sections of this chapter, and as will be shown throughout this thesis, austerity intensifies 
existing inequality in both the material and symbolic sense. Research to date has not 
spent enough time thinking through the ways in which gender, class and ‘race’ have been 
shaped by the state in different ways throughout history, and how this has affected 
women to different ways and to differing degrees in the present. As Gargi Bhattacharyya 
(2015: 155) notes, ‘austerity relies on histories and practices of gendered exploitation’. 
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These are both material and symbolic, classed and racialised. Feminist studies have 
argued that analyses need to take into account the histories of gendered, class and 
racialised inequality produced and legitimised by the state (Skeggs, 1997, 2004; Farris, 
2015; Tyler, 2013a, 2013b). They have also pointed to the ways in which austerity 
discourse has recycled and drawn on previous historical figures of contempt, or adapted 
gendered ideas from previous historical contexts (Evans, 2017, 2016, 2015; 
Montgomerie, 2016; Jensen, 2012, 2013a, 2014; Bramall, 2013; Tyler, 2013a, 2013b; De 
Benedictis, 2012). Drawing on and further mobilising these insights, I argue that we 
cannot properly understand how austerity affects the lives of young women without 
considering how women have been constructed in terms of moral differences 
throughout history. Thus, to fully comprehend the relationship between the state’s 
production of, and women’s navigation through austerity, it is important to unpack how 
the state has historically shaped gender relations. Therefore, in the following chapter (4), 
I draw on feminist discussions of the state to examine how social markers have been 
hierarchically produced and re-signified since the fifteenth century within the Western 
world and beyond. This discussion informs a more nuanced understanding of austerity in 
the present, beyond its generic typology, as well as how class, gender and ‘race’ have 
been shaped by the state in different state formations.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Drawing on an extensive body of literature, this chapter mapped the different 
approaches to the lived experiences of austerity. The first section of the review reflected 
on scholarship that has assessed the gendered impact of austerity on women through 
economic policy and gendered discourse. I highlighted the usefulness of such research 
for explaining how austerity is inherently gendered and reproduces classed and racialised 
material and symbolic exclusions. I then noted that I will draw and build upon this 
research to further unpack the role of the state in producing and legitimising these 
exclusions. I then moved onto examine empirical research which has studied the effects 
of austerity on people’s everyday lives. Describing the various ways through which 
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austerity has been empirically analysed, I drew attention to the lack of research which 
provides an in-depth gendered examination. By foregrounding gender, class and ‘race’, I 
showed how my research thus opens room to further understand how and where 
difference comes to matter in women’s experiences of austerity. Situating this analysis 
within its historical legacies, I argued further allows me to discover how austerity 
differently affects and impacts young women’s lives. This analysis will therefore be 
undertaken in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 4 
 
The Role of the State in Shaping Gender, Class, and ‘Race’ 
 
 
Situating the present context of austerity within its historical legacies, this 
chapter not only explores the ways in which the state has been put to use during different 
times of crisis, but also, how the state has crafted and shaped gender, class, and ‘race’ 
relations as a result. My argument throughout this chapter is as follows: while class, 
gender, and ‘race’ relations have clearly been reconfigured through different historical 
periods and crises, certain central features remain. Working-class women are repeatedly 
used (seen as a solution) and blamed (labelled as the problem) by the state in the 
interests of capitalism. As discussed in Chapter 3, an understanding of these legacies is 
therefore important for this thesis, since they shape discussions in the present. By 
understanding the role of the state in making gender, class and ‘race’, and producing 
difference and inequality in these different periods, we see how the workings of the state 
in the current context affect young women’s everyday lives. Such legacies impact how 
austerity affects the everyday experiences of young women according to their social 
positioning, and how they navigate and negotiate this context in different ways. 
Historical configurations not only structure such debates, but also help to reproduce and 
legitimate the inequality produced by the current crisis of capitalism. Therefore, in this 
chapter, I describe the historical unfolding in the key phases of capitalist development 
and crisis, moving from the fifteenth century and the enclosure movement, to the New 
Labour government. The final section of the chapter I discuss how the state, in the 
current context, is producing and legitimising austerity, briefly, pointing to the ways in 
which it shapes gender, class and ‘race’ relations.  
 
The Transition to Capitalism  
 
It was during the transition to capitalism that the state began shaping gender, 
class and ‘race’ relations. This was, in part, through the coercive force, discipline, and 
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violence of the witch-trails. Feminist scholarship (Federici, 2004, 2012; Merchant, 1980; 
Mies, 1986; Silverblatt, 1987) has described how the production of the female subject 
was not one which occurred through random elongated historical shifts, but was the 
outcome of a historical imperative – enforced by the state and others who benefited from 
such economic arrangements – to produce untenable situations for females who did not 
fit with the needs of the state, persecuting them as witches30. As Federici writes, it is no 
accident that ‘the witch-hunt occurred simultaneously with the colonisation and 
extermination of the populations of the New World, the English enclosures, [or] the 
beginning of the slave trade, the enactment of "bloody laws" against vagabonds and 
beggars’ (2004: 164). These seemingly unrelated tragedies were initiated by the same 
European ruling elite during the formation of capitalism. Contrary to ‘laissez-faire’ 
orthodoxy, which holds that capitalism functions best without state intervention, 
Federici posits that it was precisely the state violence of these campaigns that laid the 
foundation for capitalist economics. However, the importance of the witch-hunt to the 
development of capitalism has been largely missing from mainstream discussions (see 
the work of Marx, 1909). As will be shown below, the changing role of proletariat women 
across Europe and the Americas was a vital part of the process of primitive accumulation 
(Federici, 2012; Merchant, 1980; Mies, 1986; Silverblatt, 1987). Therefore, agreeing with 
Federici, we must ‘re-imagine the process that led to the development of capitalism … 
and the extent to which it was premised on the relentless destruction of the social/gender 
relations that have characterised the social world’ (2012: 7). 
 
There is an important connection between the rise of the witch-hunt and the developing 
concern about reproduction and population size. Women’s bodies were necessary for the 
reproduction of the workforce, both at home and in the newly colonised areas. The 
                                                
30‘Witches’, Federici notes, were from the lower classes; midwives who passed down knowledge of 
reproductive medicine, women who avoided maternity, the beggar, the prostitute, adulteress, and 
generally, the woman who exercised her sexuality outside the bonds of marriage and procreation. The 
witch was also the rebel woman at forefront of the heretical movements, often organising in female 
associations, posing a growing challenge to male authority and the Church (2004: 184).  	
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witch-hunt thus finds its historical origin in a post-Black Death era where the decimation 
of working populations made labour extremely scarce, critically increased its cost, and 
strengthened resolve to break feudal rule (Federici, 2004: 44). With a major shift in power 
relations between the land-owning classes and serfs during the fifteenth and sixteenth 
century, the feudal economy faced an accumulation crisis. In an attempt to remedy the 
situation, various efforts were made by those in power to increase the rate of 
exploitation, either through forced labour service restoration, or through the 
introduction of slavery (Federici, 2004: 45). However, such measures tended towards 
sharpening class conflict, and further encouraging peasant rebellions. It was in response 
to this crisis that the European ruling class launched a global offensive, ‘laying the 
foundations of a capitalist world-system, in the relentless attempt to appropriate new 
sources of wealth, expand its economic basis, and bring new workers under its command’ 
(Federici, 2004: 62). This ‘counter-revolution’ created a new system of production based 
on a different conception of work, value and wealth. People were systematically divorced 
from their means of production, their land, and were forced to choose between a life of 
vagabondage, or one of wage dependency. Vagrancy and pauperism were criminalised, 
with laws prescribing cruel punishments for those accused. Vagrants were also morally 
classified and labelled (with the help of the media of the period), Skeggs notes, as ‘a 
monstrous and dangerous group, likely to threaten the propriety and order of the nation’ 
(2014b: no pagination). It was also during this period that idleness was defined as a sin 
(following the Calvinist logic), and ‘idle’ persons were held up as the constitutive limit to 
propriety. Although such measures could not prevent the growth of vagrancy and 
pauperism, Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker (2000) argue that it allowed for the 
legitimisation of the stealing of common land and broke the resistance of the 
dispossessed, forcing them to accept hired work in the worst conditions. It also created 
moral legislation for controlling and forcing people into labour, and was central in 
shaping gendered, classed and racialised ideas about what constituted a ‘proper’ person 
(Skeggs, 2014b). For instance, colonisation was proposed as a solution in response to the 
unrest created by the surplus population, who had been thrown off common land. The 
Virginia Company for instance, whose lead organiser was the Lord Chief Justice of the 
 96 
Kings bench (1592-1604), ‘legitimated their colonization of the Americas by claiming 
they were offering a public service by removing the "swarms of idle persons" by setting 
them to work (building the first American slave colonies)’ (Skeggs, 2014b: no 
pagination). 
During this context, women can be understood as direct targets in the process of 
primitive accumulation, singled out as subjects whose biological capacities were of more 
importance than their ability to work. The goal was therefore not just the ‘transformation 
of the body into a work-machine’ but also ‘the subjugation of women to the reproduction 
of the workforce’ (Federici, 2004: 63, also see Mies, 1986). Skeggs (2014b) notes that 
reproducing the 'right' type of labour has always been a concern to capitalists, the state 
and those who work for their interests. Therefore, as Maria Mies argues, ‘the proletarian 
woman had to be housewifized’ (1986: 105). However, restriction from the realm of 
industry was not enough to cause women to actively subsume themselves into this ‘new 
sexual contract’ (Pateman, 1988). Women resisted these constraints. Authorities, and 
individuals who were part of the local power structures and had close ties with the central 
state, used witch-hunts as a means of controlling and regulating reproduction, surplus 
labour and potential rebellion31 (see Larner, 1983). For example, sexuality and 
reproduction (especially termination or avoidance of pregnancy, and women’s 
independent or non-procreative sexuality) were issues central to the destruction of so-
called witches. This provided the construct for the development of the ideal of the 
nuclear family. As Federici (2004: 194) states: 
 
the witch-hunt condemned female sexuality as the source of every evil, but it was 
also the main vehicle of a broad reconstruction of sexual life that, conforming 
with the new capitalist work-discipline, criminalised any sexual activity that 
threatened procreation, the transmission of property within the family, or took 
time and energy away from work’. 
 
                                                
31Authorities publicly expressed anxiety about witches, and ‘travelled from village to village in order to 
teach people how to recognise them, in some cases carrying with them lists with the names of suspected 
witches and threatening to punish those who hid them or came to their assistance’ (Larner, 1983: 2 in 
Federici, 2004: 93). Mass propaganda was also used to generate mass psychosis among the population. 
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Prostitution also became illegal for the first time during this period, and many prostitutes 
were burned as witches. These women were economically and sexually independent and 
did not fit the new model of femininity. Women who were also on public assistance, or 
who survived by going from house to house, were also labelled as witches. The regulation 
and destruction of women’s bodies, also meant the destruction of an intense history of 
reproductive knowledge, methods and controls. When discussing the genocides and 
epistemicides in Europe, Africa and the Americas from the sixteenth century, 
(de)colonial scholars have argued that such methods aimed to racialise all other forms of 
existence that did not fit with the European universal man, destroying the ‘lifestyle’ and 
culture of the populations32 (Grosfoguel, 2013). The burning of bodies and the erasure of 
knowledge in the context of the witch-hunts similarly contributed to a specific way of 
defining women and making gender. Through propaganda, authorities successfully 
divided women from men, erasing class-based solidarity. Men who had been 
expropriated, pauperised and criminalised were prompted to blame their personal 
misfortunes on the ‘castrating witch’ (Federici, 2004: 190).  
 
The witch-hunt was therefore a major political initiative instituting, as Federici (2012: 13) 
writes, 
 
a regime of terror on all women, from which emerged the new model of 
femininity to which women had to conform to be socially accepted in the 
developing capitalist society: sexless, obedient, submissive, resigned to 
subordination to the male world, accepting as natural their confinement to a 
sphere of reproductive activities that in capitalism have been completely 
devalued.  
 
                                                
32As Souza Santos (2010) argues, colonialism was a process of racialisation that happened through the 
creation of dichotomy between European (mind) and non-European (body). This was possible due to the 
processes of homogenisation of heterogeneous groups: Incas, Aztecs, Mayas, all became known to be 
American Indians, such as ethnic groups in different African countries becoming known as black (in Martins 
Jr, 2016).  	
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Primitive accumulation was therefore ‘not simply an accumulation and concentration of 
exploitable workers and capital. It was also an accumulation of differences and divisions 
within the working-class, whereby hierarchies built upon gender, as well as ‘race’ and 
age, became constitutive of class rule and the formation of the modern proletariat’ 
(Federici, 2004: 64). It destroyed a universe of practices, beliefs, and social subjects 
whose existence was incompatible with the capitalist work discipline, thus redefining the 
main elements of social reproduction. The shaping of class, ‘race’ and gender relations 
by the state (with the help of the media, gentry and the Church) in part, through force 
and violence, allowed for the development of a specific way of defining women and 
making gender with the needs of the government - women who exhibited the ideals of 
womanhood and domesticity. Those women who did not take on this new model of 
femininity, or who did not fit with the model, were scapegoated, blamed, and/or 
executed.  
 
Liberal Capitalism: The Creation of the Family   
 
 
During the nineteenth-century, in the era of Liberal capitalism33, gender, class 
and ‘race’ relations were again, shaped by the state in the interests of capitalism. 
Proletariat women, through legislation and social policy, were used as one of the means 
to maintain social order: understood as figures through which such crises could be 
displaced onto and obverted. As Nancy Fraser (2016: 105) notes, ‘in the early 
manufacturing centres of the capitalist core, industrialists dragooned women and 
children into factories and mines, eager for their cheap labour and reputed docility’. The 
result, Fraser goes on to argue, was a crisis on at least two levels – ‘a crisis of social 
reproduction among the poor and working classes, whose capacities for sustenance and 
replenishment were stretched to breaking point; on the other, a moral panic among the 
                                                
33Used to designate the ideology advocating private property, an unhampered market economy, the rule 
of law, constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and of the press, and international peace based 
on free trade. 	
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middle classes, who were scandalized by what they understood as the “destruction of 
the family” and the “de-sexing” of proletarian women’ (ibid). Such a contradiction was 
managed by creating ‘the family’ in its modern restricted form, by inventing new, 
intensified meanings of gender difference; and by modernising male domination (ibid). 
In the UK, this began with protective Labour legislation (Factory Acts beginning in 1844), 
which placed restrictions on women’s labour, reduced women’s hours of labour, and 
unified the laws regulating the work of women and children in factories and workshop, 
which helped the movement of women to the home. It also reinforced the idea that 
‘individual men were responsible for the economic welfare of their families, and that 
women were fully responsible for the health and well-being of their children’ (Rose, 1992: 
73). However, such arrangements did not necessarily satisfy workers – they formed trade 
unions, joined labour and socialist parties, which increased sharp, broad-based class 
conflict.  
 
It was also during this time that conflict between groups was remade and understood as 
a problem of morality, rather than structural inequality. As Skeggs notes, ‘battles over 
morality and access to the dominant symbolic were central to the formation of the 
English bourgeoisie, who, from the seventeenth century onwards were trying to position 
themselves as a superior class in order to access state power and resources. Their first 
struggle in their own legitimation was against the decadent aristocracy and the decadent 
working-class. In these battles, they placed themselves firmly on the moral high ground 
as the source of moral authority’34 (2014b, no pagination; also see 1997: 46). As Anne 
McClintock (1995) and Ann Laura Stoler (1995) state, the relationship between ‘race’, 
sexuality and gender generated particular class formations (also see Finch, 1993). For 
instance, in her detailed historical analysis of British imperial discourse, McClintock 
(1995: 46) writes that the concept of degeneracy was applied as much to classifying types 
as to the urban poor: 
                                                
34As Skeggs (2014b: no pagination) notes, ‘this led to many contradictions in their own practice made 
apparent in the struggles over the abolition of slavery’. 
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the degenerate classes, defined as departures from the normal human type, were 
as necessary to self-definition of the middle-class as the idea of degeneration was 
to the idea of progress, for the distance along the path of progress travelled by 
some proportions of humanity could be measured only by the distance others 
lagged behind. 
 
 
‘Race’, class and gender, McClintock (1995: 5) argues, are therefore not distinct realms of 
experience, existing in splendid isolation from each other ... rather they come into 
existence in and through relation to each other – if in contradictory and conflictual ways'. 
‘Dirt and waste, sexuality and contagion, danger and disorder, degeneracy and 
pathology, became the moral evaluation by which the working-class were coded and 
became known’ (Skeggs, 2004: 4, also see Gilman, 1990). Respectability, for example, 
was a central mechanism through which division emerged, a way middle-class women 
defined themselves against the ‘rough’ working-class and in opposition to the imagined 
excess passion and sexual deviancy of the women of the ‘undeserving poor’ (Skeggs, 
1997: 46). This merging of ‘race’, gender and class through discourses of degeneracy, 
shows how these categories enabled, legitimated and were mapped onto material 
inequalities.  
 
Colonial expansion was also validated by moral values, in which the ‘backward, 
patriarchal’ state of pre-capitalist indigenous kinship arrangements was used as 
rationalisations (Fraser, 2016). Racism, which had developed as a justification for slavery, 
continued, expanded, and mutated to justify empire (Fryer, 1984). Native children, for 
instance, were forced into missionary schools, and subjected to coercive disciplines of 
assimilation (Adams, 1995). Moral classifications were also used to justify the 
transportation of the ‘undeserving poor’ put to work as servant labour, in the name of 
the empire. However, as Cecily Forde-Jones (1998) details, certain classifications were 
conveniently removed, when the white plantation ownership class became depleted 
through illness and failure to reproduce themselves. Stoler's (1995) research on 
nineteenth century European colonialism suggested that the policing of interracial 
sexuality to maintain ‘racial purity’ was intimately bound up with constructing and 
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maintaining white supremacy. Despite moral fears about working-class women 
contaminating the proper through their sexuality and reproduction, the ‘monstrous 
immoral white woman’ had to be re-valuated and re-coded in order to be used for 
breeding during a white governing crisis. As Skeggs (2014b: no pagination) notes, ‘the 
dirty white woman was cleansed and transformed – for a short period’. 
 
By 1910, the working-class had generally become consolidated by upper-class 
commentators and the state as a problem in two senses: first, as a potential revolutionary 
force; second, as social diluters of civilization and respectability (Skeggs, 1997:43, also 
see Stedman Jones, 1971; Dyhouse, 1997; Bruley, 1999). To alleviate these threats, 
working-class women, through the use of legislation and social policy, were used to 
maintain social order. They were understood as figures through which such crises could 
be displaced onto and obverted. Social stability was assumed to be dependent upon 
moral purity; the moral condition of the nation was seen to derive from the moral 
standards of women. They were also seen as potentially dangerous if not self-regulated. 
One of the perceived solutions to the problem of social order was familiar regulation of 
the working-classes (Finn et al., 1977), primarily through the mother via gender-specific 
welfare provision and education reform. As Skeggs notes, ‘working-class women, 
especially (potential) mothers’, in this context, were seen as ‘both the problem and 
solution to national ills’ – they were used and they were blamed (1997: 48). For example, 
the development of educational provision alongside labour market restructuring 
indirectly influenced family duties, commitment and responsibility and gave these 
responsibilities to the mother (David, 1980; Skeggs, 1997). Early school provision for the 
working- classes was seen as a way to compensate for a morally deficient family, acting 
as a stabilising force to impose middle-class values. It was hoped, by the government at 
the time, that education would form a new generation of parents whose children were 
dependable and amendable (Johnson, 1979). The dangerous, polluting, working-class 
were resolvable if mothers were educated to civilise – control and discipline their sons 
and husbands, perceived as likely to cause anticipated problems (Skeggs, 1997: 43; 
Donzelot, 1979).  
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Despite women being seen as possessing the ability to ‘civilise’ (through childrearing), 
their sexuality, childcare approaches, and domestic orderliness, was scrutinised (Skeggs, 
1997: 47). Infant death was seen largely as a matter of maternal irresponsibility. 'Feckless 
mothers' were blamed for their sickly children, whilst virtually no recognition was given 
to the fact that mothers had to raise their infants in circumstances over which they had 
no control. Legislation was therefore put into effect to monitor and regulate specific 
mothering practice. For example, the Maternity and Child Welfare Act (1918) 
empowered local authorities to provide new services such as day nurseries, health 
visitors and child welfare clinics. It was not aimed at helping mothers themselves, but at 
monitoring them to ensure they did their job of bearing and raising children correctly. 
The status of midwifery was raised and from 1904, local authorities introduced health-
visiting schemes. Taking advice from traditional sources (grandmothers or neighbours, 
for example), was now viewed as irresponsible – women were encouraged to follow 
'expert opinion' (Bruley, 1999:12). As Sue Bruley (1999) notes, if national decline was to 
be reversed, the mothers of the labouring classes had to be taught mother-craft by the 
authorities and respectable middle-class women who were thought to know better35.  
 
Therefore, as can be seen from this discussion, during the crisis of nation and social order, 
the state shaped class, ‘race’ and gender relations in particular ways. Conflict between 
social classes was remade as a problem of morality, and ‘the family’ in its modern, 
restricted form helped to invent new, intensified meanings of gender difference. Gender, 
class, ‘race’ relations were molded by the state, and through such actions, developed a 
specific way of defining women and making gender, casting social reproduction as the 
province of women within the private family. This regime elaborated the ideal of 
‘separate spheres’, even as it deprived most people of the conditions needed to realise it. 
Those who did not take on this new model of femininity or who did not fit with the model 
                                                
35This has a long tradition, in which ‘middle-class professionals have been created to enable them to 
define, quantify, observe and control and reform those who are so different from themselves (Hughes et 
al. 2001)’ (Skeggs, 2004: 88). 
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(Black, Irish, Jewish, and white, working-class women) were blamed and used to signal 
the constitutive limit to national propriety. As Skeggs notes, ‘if women refused to take 
responsibility for social order, they were blamed for its disruption’ (1997:42). The 
regulation of moral behavior was therefore part of the wider formation of class identity, 
nation and empire and provides a discursive legacy to understand the shaping of 
gendered relations, as will be shown through the following sections of this chapter.  
 
The Crisis of 1929, Depression and Austerity  
 
During the Depression, world wars and implementation of austerity policy, the 
state once again shaped class, ‘race’ and gender relations in particular ways. After World 
War I, states assumed a growing role in economies. However, the treasury’s response to 
the crises of the 1920s (triggered by the collapse of the post-war economic boom in 1921, 
increased competition from abroad, the disaster of the General Strike of 1926 and the 
decline in the mining and steel industries) remained liberal and austere. During this time, 
austerity as a policy appeared in its own right. The role of austerity in responding to the 
crisis was enhanced in the 1930s by attempts to solve the catastrophic economic crisis of 
the UK Great Depression36 (Evans and Sewell Jr, 2013:8). The Treasury, which up to that 
point had continued with the laissez-faire approach, proposed a series of temporary work 
programmes to help alleviate mass unemployment. However, although the state 
seemed to be in a position to salvage the economic and social situation, the government 
retained the central role of reducing spending and monetary contraction. As Bill Janeway 
argues, ‘the constraining power of austerity ideas persisted: fear of loss of confidence, 
still limited action by a government exempt from external financial and political change’ 
(2012: 248 in Blyth, 2013: 125).  
                                                
36This lasted from 1929 to 1939, and was the worst economic downturn in the history of the industrialised 
world. It began after the stock market crash of October 1929 in the US. 
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The iconic image of the Depression is ‘The Forgotten Man’: the newly poor, downwardly 
mobile, unemployed worker, often standing in a breadline. However, the crisis of 1929, 
the recession, and the subsequent depression had a more significant impact on women. 
By 1931, unemployment reached nearly 3 million – 23 per cent of male workers and 20 
per cent of women workers were out of work (Todd, 2014: 6-7). The industrial and mining 
areas in the North of England, Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales were particularly 
hard hit by economic problems. By 1938, the unemployment rate in each of the basic 
heavy industries of coal, cotton, shipbuilding and steel was twice what it was in other 
forms of employment. In these areas, and in these industries, unemployment became an 
unavoidable way of life.  
Although the crisis triggered mass unemployment, the government’s response to the 
crisis was to cut costs. The first target of these cuts was the benefits paid to the 
unemployed37, making it harder for individuals to ride the storm of the Depression. The 
cuts to unemployment benefit were accompanied with a means test (Turvey, 2008). The 
introduction of such a measure helped to suggest and reinforce the idea that individuals 
were culpable for their own poverty. Not dissimilar to the current context of austerity, 
Selina Todd notes that there 'was a persistent assumption made by the powerful and 
privileged that the willful idleness of the poor caused poverty' (2014: 62). Families in 
receipt of such benefit were labelled as a ‘heavy burden’, in which it was said that the 
‘workless breed’ and that receiving the dole was the reason for their ‘fecklessness’ (Todd, 
2014: 68). The moral standards of women were specifically judged. For example, in the 
middle of the century, due to the denigration of living standards, working-class areas 
recorded ten maternal deaths per 1000 live births (Todd, 2014: 85). It should be noted 
that the usual rate for the dole was 75p per week for man and wife and about 25p for each 
child. However, the British Medical Association estimated that a family of two adults and 
three children needed at least £1.12 for food for a week. In 1931 the dole was cut by 10 
                                                
37A man without work was entitled to benefits under the unemployment insurance scheme, known as the 
‘dole’, which was paid for the first six months. 
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per cent (Turvey, 2008: no pagination). Characteristically, the response of the 
government and the media to this crisis was to blame the victims. Todd (2014: 86) cites 
a Times Newspaper editorial from 1934, which blamed ‘the ignorance of many young 
mothers' for their increased risk of death during childbirth.  
 
Women were also blamed for the mass unemployment created by the Depression in 
industry and manufacturing – reinforcing the pressure to eradicate women from the 
workforce38. Single women were especially vilified in the media. During this period, the 
government set the unemployment benefit for women at a lower rate than that for men. 
As Bruley (1999) notes, working-class women therefore either unwillingly returned to 
unpopular and badly paid jobs such as domestic service, or were placed there by Labour 
Exchanges. The alternative was starvation, as women were denied unemployment 
benefit if they refused to undertake such work. Middle-class women, however, benefited 
from increased opportunities in the labour market, in which women accounted for about 
a quarter of posts in the civil service by 1935. These were mostly at clerical and 
administrative grades, rather than the technical and professional jobs, which were still 
dominated by men. As with the return of working-class women to domestic roles, 
middle-class women’s employment also helped to reinforce traditional stereotypes of 
what constituted women’s work (Ware, 1981). A revived ‘cult of domesticity’ also 
emerged during the 1930s, in keeping with the dominant (but contradictory) ideology of 
the times, dictating that the ideal housewife’s place was in the home (ibid). Women in 
their role as housewives and mothers were forced to ‘make ends meet’ by maintaining 
the home on a limited budget (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2000: 99), required to take on 
even more important roles in their homes, and were given extra obligations through the 
state transfer of responsibility. Women thus played often-unrecognised roles in helping 
the country through the Depression.  
 
                                                
38Women were being forced to leave employment before the crisis of the 1920s due to the 1919 Restoration 
of Pre-war Practices Act. However, its application went far beyond the original agreement, and was often 
used to dismiss women in firms that did not exist before 1914 (Bruley, 1999: 61). 
 
 106 
During World War II and the 1940s, there was still class prejudice and inequality. Todd 
notes that ‘the myth that the war was characterised by the elision of class distinctions as 
all strata of British society pulled together in the face of a common foe is false’ (2014: 
140). The heroic evaluations that were necessary to incite nationalistic eagerness and 
enthusiasm, would often slip into devaluations of working-class soldiers as ‘unhygienic 
cannon fodder’ (Skeggs, 2014b). However, the war did have a progressive impact on 
British society. This was primarily through the generation of a meaningful 
conceptualisation of ‘the people' as a source of identity and allegiance (Todd, 2014). The 
necessity of enrolling the physical and emotional support of millions of workers in the 
cause of total war led the state to condone the inculcation of a sense of the greater good 
to justify the sacrifice of lives and conditions. As Todd puts it,  
 
the legitimacy of social inequality was constantly, if subtly challenged by the war 
effort … in view of the increasingly heroic positions that working-class soldiers, 
munitions workers and thrifty housewives assumed in both press and 
propaganda, it was no longer tenable after 1945 to argue that the lower orders 
should know their place. (2014: 140) 
 
Housewifery and motherhood acquired an enhanced sense of national importance. The 
successful implementation of rationing and other economy measures was vital in 
maintaining public health and morale, and so housewifery, no longer regarded as a 
private concern, became a central component of the war effort and post-war 
reconstruction (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2000). Despite reinforcing traditional gender 
roles, the housewife’s battle on the kitchen front was understood to be as critical to 
victory as that of the soldier or the worker in essential industry. However, this sense of 
importance also came with judgement when working-class women were seen as not 
‘producing their menfolk as quality artillery’ (Skeggs, 2014b). 
 
Women had to adjust their housewifery skills and child-rearing techniques to the altered 
circumstances. However, the idea of a ‘common purpose’ and ‘shared sacrifice’ across 
the nation was not actually a reality for women. As Ina Zweiniger-Bargielowska writes, 
‘this disproportionate sacrifice frequently shielded men as well as children from the full 
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impact of the reduction in consumption’ (2000: 149). Despite the fact that rationing 
reduced income differentials in consumption standards, these were by no means 
eliminated and class differences in vital statistics persisted virtually unchanged. Historian 
David Kynaston (2007) draws on mass observation diaries and interviews to discuss the 
hunger, dirt, damp and sacrifice, which was indicative of working-class women’s 
experiences during this period. The reality of many working-class women's lives at that 
time was of queues, shortages, and the struggle to combine domestic responsibilities 
with some form of paid work (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 2000: 149-150).  
 
Women in their role as housewives and mothers became central to the policy of 
austerity, since they were responsible for putting it into effect on a daily basis. The 
government had to muster housewives’ and mothers’ co-operation to implement the 
austerity policy successfully. The importance of female contribution was highlighted 
through the unprecedented outpouring of propaganda reinforcing the idea that 
women’s housewifery skills and child-rearing techniques were extremely important to 
the wartime conditions, national identity and citizenship (Zweiniger-Bargielowska, 
2000: 99)39. For instance, in 1943, the Board of Trade urged Britons to ‘Make Do and 
Mend’. The leaflets and posters reminded housewives that ‘a neatly patched garment is 
something to be proud of nowadays’, rather than a shameful sign of poverty. ‘Making do’ 
was no novelty for working-class women, but it was a novelty to be praised, rather than 
vilified, for their initiative (Todd, 2014: 140).  
 
Although praised, expressions of anxiety about women's sexual morality were framed by 
constructions of national identity and the ideals of citizenship. As Rose (1998: 1147) 
                                                
39As Zweiniger-Bargielowska (2000: 99-100) writes, ‘women were not passive recipients of government 
policy and propaganda, attitudes varied depending on the policy as well as the income group. Moreover, 
women’s attitudes towards austerity changed over time and wartime patriotic acceptance gave way to 
disillusionment and discontent among many housewives during the late	1940s’. ‘Women’s principal role in 
the austerity policy domesticity became a site of political and economic power and a basis of female 
citizenship. Housewives became a major political force after the war and their discontent with the 
continuation of austerity had important political and electoral consequences’. 
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notes, there was an upsurge of public concern about immorality on the part of women, 
with ‘talk about young women whose behavior was threatening to populate the country 
with illegitimate babies, some of whom could well be black’. As discussed in the previous 
section, fears of sex and interracial marriage between black men and white women has 
a long cultural history. Rose (1998) drawing on the work of Stoler (1995) argues that 
rather than maintaining the boundaries of empire, in this context, the empire ‘came 
home’ when nonwhite colonial troops were stationed in Britain. A national fantasy was 
therefore constructed by the government, propagated in newspapers across the country, 
which depicted some women as ‘antithetical to the nation, especially those women 
whose amorous escapades were so perverse as to jeopardize the nation's racial 
homogeneity. It simultaneously incorporated virtuous women and all men as comrades 
in struggle’ (Rose, 1998: 1176). Rose continues, ‘although class differentiated which 
women were made the targets of overt policies of social control, public expressions of 
apprehension about women who frolicked with soldiers constituted a normalizing 
discourse that had as its goal the making of female moral citizens appropriate to fighting 
a "people's war," and building a "new Britain" when it was over’ (ibid). This was in contrast 
to ‘internal others’ (or ‘anti-citizens’) which the nation defined itself against.  
 
Class, ‘race’ and gender was therefore once again, shaped to meet the needs of the state. 
The working-class (specifically working-class women) were mobilised during the period 
of depression, austerity, and war in a different way. Up to this point, as we can see 
through the discussion in the previous two sections, the working-class (especially 
women) has largely been understood as a problem of the nation, assumed as needing to 
be controlled and regulated. The crisis for instance, reinforced class division, in which 
working-class men and women were not only affected by the Depression, but were 
blamed for their situation. However, in the 1940s, the working-class became seen as 
heroic and authentic. Although these terms were usually attributed to working-class 
men, in the period of austerity, working-class women assumed a central role. 
Nevertheless, despite symbolically receiving praise (if they upheld the national moral 
code), the material experience of austerity landed on working-class women’s shoulders.  
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State-managed Capitalism and the Family Wage  
 
State-managed capitalism emerged from the Great Depression and World War II, 
in which there were both continuities and changes in how the regime shaped class, ‘race’ 
and gender relations. Named by its original architects as a ‘cradle-to-grave’ safety net for 
citizens, the welfare state was understood to protect citizens from the risks of the 
markets, while supplying welfare-enhancing collective goods – diffusing the 
contradiction between economic production and social reproduction. As Fraser (2016: 
109) notes, ‘the creation of the state-managed regime was a matter of saving the 
capitalist system from its own self-destabilizing propensities – as well as from the spectre 
of revolution in an era of mass mobilization’. She goes on to explain: 
 
productivity and profitability required the ‘biopolitical’ cultivation of a healthy, 
educated workforce with a stake in the system, as opposed to a ragged 
revolutionary rabble. Public investment in health care, schooling, childcare, and 
old-age pensions, supplemented by corporate provision, was perceived as a 
necessity in an era in which capitalist relations had penetrated social life to such 
an extent that the working classes no longer possessed the means to reproduce 
themselves on their own. In this situation, social reproduction had to be 
internalized, brought within the officially managed domain of the capitalist order. 
(ibid) 
 
Accepting unionisation, which brought higher wages, and public-sector spending, which 
created jobs, policy-makers reinvented the household as a private space for the domestic 
consumption of mass-produced objects of daily use. As Fraser explains, ‘linking the 
assembly line with working-class familial consumerism, on the one hand, and with state-
supported reproduction, on the other, this Fordist model forged a novel synthesis of 
marketization and social protection’ (ibid). However, it was, above all, the working 
classes – both women and men – who led the struggle for public provision, wanting full 
membership in society as democratic citizens. Therefore ‘unlike the protective 
legislation of the liberal regime, the state-capitalist settlement resulted from a class 
compromise and represented a democratic advance. Unlike its predecessor, too, the new 
 110 
arrangements served, at least for some and for a while, to stabilize social reproduction’ 
(ibid).  
 
However, gender and racial hierarchy was not absent from these arrangements. Unequal 
gender relations (as well as ‘race’, disability, age and sexuality) underpin ‘welfare 
regimes, their outcomes, the organisation of labour [...] the delivery of services, political 
pressures and ideologies and patterns of consumption’ (Williams, 1994: 50 in Jensen and 
Tyler, 2015: 3). It is therefore, as Fraser notes, ‘important to register the constitutive 
exclusions that made these achievements possible. Such a regime financed social 
entitlements in part by ongoing expropriation from the periphery’ (2016: 110). As in 
earlier regimes, the defense of social reproduction in the core was entangled with 
(neo)imperialism. Explaining one example of expropriation, Skeggs states that ‘it was the 
brutal British colonization of Malaysia and the $118 million dollars made through 
indentured Chinese and Indian labour that provided the money for the development of 
the UK welfare state’ (2014b: no pagination).  
In addition, the accommodation of a class compromise benefited only certain sections of 
the working-class, particularly skilled white men, in which its ‘racialised and gendered 
character generated a hierarchy of oppression’ (Bakshi et al., 1995: 1548). As Amina 
Mama describes:  
the history of the development of welfare and the circumscribed nature of access 
to it demonstrates that provision has always been constituted along social 
divisions. Class, race and gender discrimination have often operated through 
notions and judgements about who are 'really deserving' and who are 
'undeserving'. In short, the welfare state has never existed universally for the 
public, but has operated to exclude minorities and uphold dominant ideologies 
about the family, motherhood and sexuality, often behaving punitively and 
coercively towards ... marginalised groups through various ideological 
mechanisms and administrative practices. (1992: 86) 
 
 
In the US, for example, the welfare system took a dualised form. On one hand, it was 
divided into stigmatised poor relief for (‘white’) women and children lacking access to a 
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male wage; on the other, respectable social insurance for those constructed as ‘workers’ 
(see Fraser, 1989; Brenner and Laslett, 1991). By contrast, in the UK, benefits were 
available to individuals as ‘public’ persons by virtue of their participation – usually 
claimed by men, and benefits claimed by dependents of ‘public persons’ (also known as 
‘private persons’) – usually women (Pateman, 1988). This was further compounded by 
‘race’ and immigration status. As Mama notes, the discriminatory nature of the welfare 
state is perhaps most clearly felt by black women. As citizens and consumers, they have 
experienced most keenly the fact that ‘healthcare, education, housing, social security 
and social services have been differentially delivered’ (1992: 86, also see Misra and Akins, 
1998). Thus, the broad tendency of state-managed capitalism was to ‘valorise the 
heteronormative, male-breadwinner, female-homemaker model of the gendered 
family’ (Fraser, 2016: 111). These norms are reinforced by public investment in social 
reproduction (ibid, also see Fraser, 2009; Wilson, 1977). However, the gendered, classed, 
and ‘racial’ order of state-managed capitalism also contributed to its contradictions and 
its breakdown.  
Despite the prosperity created by the welfare state, a cultural and political crisis in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s marked a period of disillusionment with the status quo. The 
so-called ‘capitalist–citizen accord’ broke down in the 1960s. Mass social movements – 
civil rights, women’s liberation and anti-war movements – were part of this change. In 
addition, as Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval (2013: 152) note, the ‘virtuous’ model of 
Fordist growth came up against its endogenous limits, with the slowdown in productivity 
as a result of the balance of industrial power and subsequent high unemployment. The 
coexistence of the two phenomena – high inflation and high unemployment – seemed to 
discredit the tools of economic policy, in particular, the positive impact of public 
expenditure on the level of demand and the level of activity, starting with the level of 
employment (Dardot and Laval, 2013). Stagflation40 seemed to sign the death certificate 
of the Keynesian art of ‘managing the conjuncture’, which assumed a trade-off between 
                                                
40High inflation combined with high unemployment and stagnant demand in a country's economy. 
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inflation and recession (Evans and Sewell, 2013). The 1973 Arab oil embargo, precipitated 
by pro-Israeli US involvement in the Yom Kippur war and the extended stagflation 
following Richard Nixon’s withdrawal from the Bretton Woods accord41 led to a stock 
market crash and a deep recession from late 1973 to 1975. The states of advanced 
capitalist countries initially responded to the economic crisis of the 1970s with initiatives 
that were variants of existing state-centric policies – for example, fiscal stimulus 
programs, extension of social spending, or income policies. When the cultural and 
political crisis was compounded by an economic crisis in the early 1970s, the state-
centred synthesis of the post-war political and economic world began to come apart 
(Evans and Sewell, 2013). The individualist and anti-state bias offered fruitful ground for 
a renewal of a wide variety of liberal political ideas, and enabled the move away from 
Keynesianism, shattering the belief in the capacity of government regulation of markets.  
 
The Neoliberal State and Financialised Capitalism 
 
Class, ‘race’ and gender relations were radically shaped by the state in the context 
of neoliberalism. Like the Liberal regime before it, the state-managed capitalist order 
dissolved in the course of a protracted crisis during the 197os. Neoliberalism entered the 
political field in the UK, ‘on the one hand via the budgetary constraints imposed on by a 
reluctant Labour government by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as a condition of 
assistance with the funding chaos of the 1970s, and, on the other hand, through 
upheavals within the Conservative party in opposition wherein the perceptual schemes 
of the future Prime Minister, Margaret Thatcher, were consolidated and triumphant’ 
(Atkinson, 2013:3).  
 
                                                
41In the summer of 1944, delegates from forty-four countries met to reshape the world's international 
financial system in Bretton Woods. The delegates focused on how to establish a stable system of exchange 
rates, and how to pay for rebuilding the war-damaged economies of Europe.  
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‘Thatcherism’ (1979-1990), Stuart Hall argued, employed the ideology of ‘authoritarian 
populism’, to reach out to big and small businesses, the middle-class, and parts of the 
working-class, drawing on racialised nationalist spirit and advocating a return to 
Victorian values of discipline, restraint and morality. This was accompanied with the 
slogan of ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA). The agenda’s distinctive elements, as Satnam 
Virdee (2014: 147-148) notes, ‘emphasised self-reliance over government intervention, 
of individualism over collectivism, and a racializing nationalism underpinned by shared 
allegiance to cultural homogeneity’. This vision, Virdee continues, ‘was counterposed by 
Thatcher to the unassimilable, the enemy within, made up variously of racialized 
minorities, trade unions, socialists, feminists and other alleged “social deviants” (148, 
also see Hall and Jacques, 1983). It was in this context, that the ‘underclass’, irredeemable 
‘other’ re-appeared. 
 
Law-and-order politics were used as the ‘legal apparatus’ for ‘containing social and 
industrial conflict’ (Hall, 1988a: 136), which helped to dismantle the trade unions when 
working-class men became the ‘enemy within’. Law-and-order politics were also 
employed to combat the alleged increase of ‘mugging’ and street crime. As Stuart Hall, 
Chas Critcher, Tony Jefferson, John Clarke and Brian Roberts (1987) note, mugging was 
presented as a key element in the moral panic over the breakdown of law and order, and 
it was the ‘black mugger’ who was used to symbolise the threat of violence. As Virdee 
argues, ‘such state racism was a crucial ingredient in the toxic cocktail that Thatcherism 
was constructing around its authoritarian populist agenda, a racism where blackness and 
Britishness were reproduced as mutually exclusive categories’ (149, also see Gilroy, 
1987). Violence and crime thus became synonymous with ‘un-British’, ‘alien cultures’, 
committed by ‘outsiders’. In this way, the public could be persuaded that ‘immigrants’ 
rather than the capitalist system, caused society’s problems of high unemployment and 
crippling recession. The working-class thus became effectively divided on racial grounds 
– the white working-class was encouraged to direct its frustrations towards the black 
working-class for ‘taking’ their jobs, housing, and public services. 
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However, despite its importance in understanding the climate of Thatcherism and 
austerity, the 'Thatcherism' thesis, as noted by Jean Gardiner (1983) and Elizabeth Wilson 
(1987), was vulnerable in relation to women. The thesis argued that the coherence of 
'Thatcherism' rests on its creation of a seamless repressive ideology that placed women 
firmly in the home. However, it is not as simple as this suggests. The Thatcher 
government used women in complex ways. It cannot therefore be suggested that during 
the crisis and era of Thatcherism, women were placed back in the home. As Evans (2016: 
443) notes, ‘Thatcher, and the neoliberal resistance to extensive welfare provision by the 
state, brought into a central political focus two pictures of womanhood’. This, Evans goes 
on to say, was on the one hand, the affluent, ‘emancipated’ woman, and on the other, 
the ‘thrifty housewife’. Women were therefore being asked to ‘spend liberally’ and 
‘provide for themselves’, ‘supporting the two central tenets of the neo-liberal state’ 
(ibid). 
 
 However, during this context, some women were more able to take on these roles than 
others. Policies pursued by the Conservative government did not affect women 
uniformly. Instead, policies widened the gap between better-off women and those at the 
bottom of the employment hierarchy, especially BAME women (Wilson, 1987). This was, 
in large part, due to the loss of women’s jobs in the manufacturing sector. For instance, 
as Angela Weir and Elizabeth Wilson (1984: 93) note, ‘decline in manufacturing meant 
that there were fewer jobs for the poorest women, which was not offset by the increasing 
size of the service sector. It was also in manufacturing that relative pay declined most 
rapidly’. For black working-class women, racism and, for some, their immigrant status 
made them even more vulnerable. Privatisation and pauperisation accelerated and 
intensified during the crisis as a result of the government's general economic strategy 
and policies pursued in order to create a low-wage economy. However, the government 
defended part-time work as a solution for women, arguing that such work was what the 
women of Britain wanted, since it fitted in with their domestic responsibilities. The 
rhetoric of choice and freedom was used to mask the reality of super-exploitation and 
falling real incomes (Wilson, 1987). 
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Alongside the discussion of choice and freedom, the rhetoric of 'the family' was also used 
to provide an ideological legitimation for the recession and austerity policies (Gardiner, 
1983: 7). For instance, the philosophy stressed the need to return responsibility and 
choice to the family, both of which it claimed had been eroded by the growth of the 
welfare state. However, the practical effects of austerity policies associated with the 
philosophy were, for example, lowering the real value of benefits and privatising services. 
Women were disproportionately affected by these cuts in health, education, housing, 
and social services. Therefore, as Wilson summarises, the Thatcher welfare picture was, 
broadly speaking, similar to the situation found in women's employment:  
 
while the underlying imperative of Tory policies is the desire to cut back public 
spending, to privatise and to increase productivity, the results bear 
disproportionately upon women. Women are less likely – particularly if they have 
young children – to be earning a full-time wage, and their consequent poverty 
makes them both more dependent on state welfare and more exposed to its 
growing deficiencies. (1987: 222) 
 
 
Emphasis was laid more on the parental control of children, and on the family as the 
central institution in an individualistic and competitive society, which, at times, called for 
a return to patriarchal values. Lone mothers were understood as a social threat, cast ‘as 
a drain on public expenditure and as a threat to the stability and order associated with 
the traditional two-parent family’ (Lister, 2002: 115). The media became increasingly 
hostile to lone mothers, exemplified by headlines such as ‘Wedded to Welfare’ and ‘Do 
They Want to Marry a Man or the State’ (Sunday Times, July, 11th 1993). Afro-Caribbean 
single mothers were especially vilified, ‘being linked to the welfare bill’ (Lister: 2002: 115). 
This demonstrates a direct attack on the working-class, in which the Thatcher 
government shaped class relations in the interests of the free market. The unemployed 
were blamed for their situation, and collectivism was replaced with individualism. 
Despite the contradictory and ambiguous nature of the state in relation to women, 
Thatcherism helped to facilitate and intensify women’s exploitation in the worst-paid 
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and least-protected jobs and increased their unpaid labour in the home, due to the 
eroding of the welfare state, as well as blaming parents, especially working-class single 
mothers, for juvenile delinquency and the decay of morals.  
 
New Labour State  
 
Although Bill Clinton and Tony Blair were critical of the excesses of Reagan and 
Thatcher, it was during the peak of their leadership, in the late 1990s–2000s, that a 
thoroughgoing neoliberal international policy regime was codified and organisationally 
instantiated in bodies like the World Trade Organization (Brenner, Peck and Theodore, 
2010). Although the material, symbolic and political landscapes changed very little, 
during this period, there were certain contradictions in regards to the shaping of gender, 
class and ‘race’ relations.  
Citizenship became redesigned around work and worklessness, and inclusion and 
exclusion. Paid work was regarded as a moral duty, an important component of good 
citizenship in an advanced, globalised, multicultural, liberal, modern society. In 
particular, paid work and the ability to consume became traits of the ideal subject: the 
autonomous, independent, self-regulating individual who takes responsibility for 
managing his or her own risks and those of their family (Cameron et al., 2002: 574). This, 
as Linda McDowell (2008: 155-156) notes, radically changed the meaning of 
motherhood. While femininity, domesticity, and mothering used to be inextricably 
intertwined, the ‘good mother’ transitioned into a mother who entered the labour 
market to raise her income for the benefit of her children, and who no longer occupied 
the home as a continuous presence. This was accompanied with the introduction of 
active labour market policies that combined ideas about national competitiveness with 
policies to challenge social exclusion (McDowell et al., 2005b). In addition, this has also 
been supplemented by the filling of the ‘care gap’, by typically racialised migrant workers 
(Fraser, 2016).  
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It is in the context of New Labour (1997-2010) that the white working-class were 
characterised as an obstruction to what Chris Haylett (2001) terms 'multicultural 
modernisation’, labelled as ‘poor abject whites’, reproducing the historical division of 
respectable and abject within the working-class (Levitas, 1998; Morris, 2004; Skeggs, 
2004). Socially excluded individuals were perceived as needing to be ‘helped or coerced 
to become included citizens’ (Gillies, 2005: 838). Both national and local government 
policies emphasised cultural changes through policies of re-education, parenting classes, 
and even lessons in dress codes, to facilitate their re-inclusion in ‘normal’ (for which read 
middle-class) society (Haylett, 2001). For instance, the Sure Start programme, which 
provided child-care and other forms of support to parents, (especially single women in 
cities identified as disadvantaged), working-class women were discursively defined as 
inadequate, as socially excluded, because of their social and cultural attitudes, rather 
than by poverty (McDowell, 2004). This rhetoric, Skeggs (2005: 972) notes,  
 
reveals that whiteness does not naturally predispose people to social privilege 
and success while making the figural association between black and working class 
disappear (Haylett, 2001). This unhinging, as Hall (1996) demonstrates, enables 
culture to become the defining feature of race. 
 
This demonstrates ‘a shift from naming the working-class as “underclass”, a racialised 
and irredeemable “other”, to naming them “the excluded”, a culturally determined but 
recuperable “other”’, which, as Haylett argues, ‘was pivotal to the recasting of Britain as 
a post-imperial, modern nation’ (2001:351). This shift, Christy Kulz (2013: 156) notes 
shows how ‘categorisation can temporally shift and do different work’.  
 
The government also deployed punitive policies to manage these citizens, by ‘limiting 
financial or material aid in order to make citizens take responsibility for their own 
welfare’ (Tyler, 2013a: 161). This was done, in part, through civil orders such as Anti-
Social Behaviour Orders (ASBO’s), Parental Orders (POs), and Individual Behaviour 
Orders (ISOs), which treated working-class cultures as both lacking and pathological 
(Skeggs, 2009: 38; Haylett, 2001; Tyler, 2013a). Such punitive and disciplinary orders 
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reinforced the myth that poverty could be reduced, and social equality improved, by 
changing attitudes and behavior of the ‘workless’ (Todd, 2014: 340). Loïc Wacquant, who 
identified the spread of what he calls the new penal or ‘carceral state’, argues that liberal 
democracies of the global North have transformed into authoritarian ‘Daddy States’, 
characterised in policy by ‘the new priority given to duties over rights, sanction over 
support [and] the stern rhetoric of the “obligations of citizenship”’ (2010: 201). In the US, 
he says, this is done through the process of incarceration, which developed initially as a 
backlash against the social advances made by the black and white working-class. He 
argues that it offers a new meaning to poor relief, ‘not to the poor, but from the poor, by 
forcibly "disappearing" the most disruptive of them' (204).  
 
Therefore, although social reforms were aimed at women and employment 
opportunities, New Labour amplified the shaping of class, ‘race’ and gender relations 
through disciplinary moral ‘cultural’ reform. Women were brought forward in their 
capacity as independent citizen workers in the interests of global capitalism. Racialised 
neoliberal state regulation enabled class to take new shapes and form new relationships 
via culture, representing (white) working-class women as having nothing to offer, as 
being un-modern, with a valueless culture, at the edges of the nation (Skeggs, 2004). 
 
Up to this point, this chapter has analysed how the state has shaped gender, class and 
‘race’ relations in the last centuries. This analysis shows that certain dominant features 
remain: black and white working-class women have been interchangeably used, and/or 
blamed, in the interests of the state. They have been given the task of helping the nation, 
by being placed into the home and given the un-doable duty of becoming ‘respectable’. 
They have had to successfully carry the impact of austerity and government reform, and 
have needed to juggle paid employment and childcare, as state services were withdrawn. 
The same working-class figure has also been continually blamed and shamed for the lack 
of social order. These women have come to be known as carriers of immorality, 
degeneracy, and danger, as witches being removed from the land and burned alive, as 
the ‘undeserving poor’ sent to the work-house or shipped off as servant labour, as the 
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‘anti-citizen’ endangering the ‘natural’ racial harmony, and as the black and/or (dirty) 
white welfare mother. They are perceived as exhausting national resources (welfare), 
and as being in need of confinement, instruction, or moral reform. Therefore, the state 
in different forms, at different times, and through particular configurations, not only 
controlled and disciplined women for the things that they have ‘done’, but also used and 
mobilised them in the interests of capital. 
 
Understanding the Present State of Austerity  
 
These historical legacies inform the present era of austerity. In this final section, I 
show how austerity, as a moral-political-economic gendered project, is produced and 
legitimised by the state (shaping gender, class, and ‘race’ relations). As noted in Chapter 
3, feminist scholars have explored the different gendered, classed, and ‘raced’ subject 
positions that are presently being played out within the political, social and cultural 
spheres. Drawing on, and building upon this research, I argue that to fully understand the 
relationship between the state’s production and legitimisation of austerity, and women’s 
experiences in the everyday, a more detailed analysis needs to be undertaken – one 
which studies the state and its shaping of social relations in detail. The remainder of this 
chapter does just that, examining how moral discourses that emanate from the state, 
both justify changes to the welfare system, and shape and reinforce (gendered, classed 
and ‘racial’) divisions inside of the population. This section does not exhaustively review 
all recent governmental discourses (2010-2017). Instead, it focuses on those that are 
most helpful in understanding the overarching goals of the austerity programme. These 
discourses contextualise subsequent empirical chapters in this thesis, and provide a 
framework for critical dialogue.  
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Producing Austerity through State Discourse 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: ‘I Doubled the National Debt Vote for Me’, Conservative Party Poster 2010. Image by 
Political Advertising, available at: https://politicaladvertising.co.uk/2010/05/12/the-guardians-
pick-of-general-election-2010/ [12th May, 2010] 
 
In 2010, Prime Minister David Cameron argued that Britain’s ‘massive deficit’ and 
‘growing debt’ was ‘the most urgent issue facing Britain today’ (2010: no pagination). 
This issue, he argued, threatened to loom over the economy and society for a generation 
– a threat to the nation, and the future of the country. He claimed that disastrous 
eventualities would occur, if the debt and deficit was not resolved ‘decisively and quickly’. 
For instance, he argued that failing to get ‘a grip on our public finances’ would result in 
investors raising ‘doubt [about] Britain’s ability to pay its way’, resulting in a rise in 
interest rates and a fall in investments. Cameron claimed that this outcome would mean 
that ‘no real recovery’ could take place, and that Britain’s economy would begin an 
inevitable slide into decline (ibid). He raised the idea that cutting government spending 
will lead to renewed confidence and economic recovery – what Paul Krugman (2012) calls 
the ‘confidence fairy’. This idea holds that suffering will occur if government spending is 
not cut, not that suffering is a consequence of acting to cut spending and reduce the 
deficit (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 304). This future threat supports the notion that a 
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short period of austerity is better than a long painful decline to help the nation recover. 
 
This discourse frames the cutting of public spending as both necessary and urgent – since 
the core element of the austerity story is that state spending led to debt and deficit. 
Discussing the crisis in 2011, Germany’s Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble wrote in 
the Financial Times that it was ‘an undisputable fact that excessive state spending has led 
to unsustainable levels of debt and deficits’ (2011: no pagination, italics my emphasis). 
The root cause of the crisis has, therefore, been constructed as the result of an expensive 
welfare state and public sector, rather than the high-risk strategies of banks (Clarke and 
Newman, 2012: 300). This approach constructed austerity as the ‘common-sense’ 
solution to debt (Blyth, 2013). For instance, when discussing the reasons for the ‘deficit’, 
Cameron (2010: no pagination) said, ‘much of the deficit is structural. A problem built up 
before the recession, caused by government spending and planning to spend more than 
we could afford. It had nothing to do with the recession’. Failing to reference the high-
risk banking strategies, blame is instead placed upon irresponsible government 
spending. This discourse thus constructs the idea that the country – especially the 
previous Labour government – has overspent, and become heavily in debt. Debt is thus 
constructed as a national issue and is framed in political terms. This has significant 
political consequences: it not only allows, but legitimises, the government’s targeting of 
public spending in the austerity programme.  
The welfare system has become a specific target for spending cuts. Yet, for these specific 
cuts to become framed as the solution to ‘irresponsible spending’, a discourse was 
required that naturalises the idea of the welfare system as being ‘too expensive’, ‘out of 
control’, and having a stagnating effect on growth and prosperity. As noted previously, 
the framing of the welfare state through a ‘crisis lens’ has not arisen in the current 
context. This discourse has been circulating for the last few decades (most notably during 
the Thatcher years). However, within the context of austerity, these discourses have 
intensified, framing welfare as helping to cause the ‘crisis of capitalism’, as George 
Osborne (2010: no pagination) states: 
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The explosion in welfare costs contributed to the growing structural budget 
deficit. Total welfare spending has increased from £132 billion ten years ago to 
£192 billion today. That represents a real terms increase of a staggering 45 per 
cent. It’s one reason why there is no money left.  
 
The assertions above have implications for how welfare can be regarded in a time of 
financial strain. Claiming that welfare costs are ‘one reason why there is no money left’ 
suppresses discourses that emphasise the necessity of welfare spending. This 
subsequently further helps to legitimate the discourse that welfare-spending cuts are the 
‘common sense’ solution for financing the public debt (Blyth, 2010). The programme of 
austerity becomes framed as the saviour to the nation’s problems, seen as necessary in 
both economic and moral terms.  
 
The term ‘age of austerity’ was first popularised by Cameron in his keynote speech at the 
Conservative Party forum in April 2009. In 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat 
government implemented the programme of austerity as the way to ‘cure’ the deficit 
and clear Britain’s debt. Framed within the moral discourse of ‘virtuous necessity’; ‘we 
are making tough choices … if there was another way, some easier way, I would take it’ 
(Cameron, 2013: no pagination), austerity was constructed as the ‘only option,’ with ‘no 
alternative’. As with Thatcher and the rhetoric of ‘there is no alternative’ (TINA) to 
neoliberal policies, this emphasis that ‘there is no alternative’ to austerity closes down 
the notion that there are other ways in to decrease the deficit (see for instance Piketty, 
2013; Carmel, 2015; Jarrett, 2014). TINA is therefore central to the politics of austerity.  
 
Consequently, questioning austerity is seen as irrational, since the ‘austere’ response to 
the deficit is backed up using economic research. In 2010 Osborne, Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, gave a speech laying out his plan to eliminate the deficit. He cited Carmen 
Rogoff, former chief economist at the IMF and his colleague, Kenneth Reinhart directly, 
drawing on findings from their paper ‘Growth in a Time of Debt’ (2010). The paper argues 
that, once debt reaches more than 90 per cent of GDP, the risks of a large negative 
impact on long-term growth become highly significant. However, the economic research 
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that allegedly supported the austerity push has since been discredited (Krugman, 2015; 
Blyth 2013; Stiglitz, 2012). These results were based on highly dubious assumptions and 
procedures – plus a few outright mistakes – which should have evaporated under closer 
scrutiny. The data showed that there was no such link between high debt and low 
growth, but their conclusions were based on a spreadsheet error (Graeber, 2013). The 
Chancellor admitted he knew this when questioned. Economists revealed that causality 
lies in the opposite direction: low growth leads to high levels of debt (Elliot, 2013). In 
2014, Reinhart and Rogoff authored a new working paper, shifting their arguments away 
from favouring austerity. The premise behind the cuts therefore turns out to be faulty –
there is no proof that high levels of debt necessarily lead to recession. The IMF has since 
concluded that austerity policies can do more harm than good, resulting in increased 
inequality and stunted economic growth (Ostry et al., 2016). Therefore, as Krugman 
(2015) has argued, the economic intellectual explanation for austerity is bankrupt.  
Despite this, fiscal probity has been championed as the only way of fixing the economy, 
restoring market confidence and helping Britain’s future. As Gavan Titley (2013) 
describes, ‘dissent or the proposition of alternatives is constructed as taboo, for it is seen 
to dent market confidence, raise spectres of unrest and show a limited grasp of reality’ 
(in Jarrett, 2014: 144-145). For example, countries running significant budget deficits in 
the aftermath of the crisis were deemed at imminent risk of ‘becoming Greece’, unless 
they immediately began to implement austerity (Krugman, 2015). At this point, Greece 
was using Keynesian policies to better their situation. Advocates for a policy of austerity 
zoned in on this, and Greece became an example of how Keynesian policy did not work. 
During this period, Osborne made repeated comparisons to the fiscal situation of Greece 
and the UK, ‘you can see, in Greece, an example of a country that didn’t face up to its 
problems, and that is the fate that I want to avoid’ (Reuters, 2010 in Blyth 2013: 73). The 
IMF has since admitted it had failed to realise the damage austerity would do to Greece 
during the bailout (Elliot, Inman and Smith, 2013).  
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Legitimating Austerity through State Discourse 
 
This final section will explore how austerity is legitimised through state discourse. 
Focusing on the key themes of ‘we’ and ‘us and them’, I demonstrate how austerity has 
been justified through different gendered, classed and ‘racial’ discourses, which 
discursively and affectively shape which groups are ‘deserving’ of spending cuts, and 
which are not. I will show how these sometimes-contradictory discourses are enacted to 
suit the needs of the particular moment.  
 
‘All in this together’: The unity of ‘we’ 
 
 
 
Figure 5: ‘We are all in this together’, Conservative Party poster, London, 2010. Photograph by 
Perfect Day, available at: https://www.creativereview.co.uk/politics-political-design/ [2nd 
February, 2016] 
 
As discussed in the previous section, not only is the deficit engineered as being 
the fault of the ‘nation’ (public debt), but also it becomes ‘our’ responsibility to help 
dissolve the debt. To enact this agenda, the Coalition government employ the discourse 
of ‘we are all in this together’ (Cameron, 2010; Osborne, 2009, 2010, 2012, 2015), aimed 
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at generating feelings of collective pain sharing. This strengthens the idea of ‘one nation 
united in the face of adversity’ (Clarke and Newman, 2012: 303), and moves beyond 
something that is purely a concern of the state (Lazzarato, 2011: 38, in Hitchen, 2014: 
25). Austerity, thus, involves every individual in the responsibility of ‘balancing the 
books’. Individuals are called upon to be frugal, productive, and responsible (Tasker and 
Negra, 2013:183, also see Bramall, 2013). Not only is it his or her individual responsibility 
to help the nation, but, by doing so ‘together’, everyone helps recovery by sharing the 
pain. Similar to the post-war austerity discourse discussed in a previous section, this 
‘unity’ solicits consensus and cross-class cooperation and aims to head off resistance and 
complaint. It is also arguably used to appease opposition, to manage dissent and to blur 
inequalities of resources of all kinds (Tasker and Negra, 2013). This is even though we are 
not all in this together, due to the unequal distribution of spending cuts. 
 
The ‘Striver’ and ‘Skiver’: The Language of Welfare Debate  
 
 
 
Figure 6: ‘Let’s Cut Benefits For Those Who Refuse Work’, Conservative Party poster 2010. Image 
by Political Advertising, https://politicaladvertising.co.uk/2010/04/21/conservative-poster-cut-
benefits-for-those-who-refuse-work/ [21st April, 2010] 
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In the re-writing of the reasons for the crisis, binary imaginaries have been used 
to discuss the welfare state, and show why the benefits system should be reformed (also 
see Chapters 1 and 3). Binary divisions, as emphasised in this chapter, have a long history, 
and as Jensen (2014:2.3) argues, ‘are complex and multiple – some recycled and 
reanimated from the zombie category of the “underclass” (so-called because despite 
sociological attempts to “kill it off” with evidence, it keeps returning: see MacDonald, 
Shildrick, and Furlong 2014), while other terms are relatively new’. The figure of crisis in 
the current welfare debate is 'the skiver', gaining traction because of its connotations 
with criminality, fraud and worklessness (ibid). Inheriting the ideological baggage of 
preceding abject figures, the ‘skiver’ has become a catchall term for figures of social 
disgust (the single mother, the immigrant, the unemployed, and most recently, the sick 
and disabled) imagined in opposition to the ‘striver’ – the hard-working citizen. Osborne 
(2012: no pagination) exemplifies this binary when he says: 
 
Where is the fairness … for the shift worker, leaving home in the dark hours of the 
early morning, who looks up at the closed blinds of their next-door neighbour 
sleeping off a life on benefits. When we say we’re all in this together, we speak for 
that worker. We speak of all those who want to work hard and get on ... They 
strive for a better life. We strive to help them. 
 
The ‘skiver’/’striver’ binary therefore creates two types of people, one that ‘strives for a 
better life’ and one that ‘sleep[s] off a life on benefits’. These figures, Jensen argues, are 
‘re-imagined as static testimony to a perverse welfare system that rewards 
irresponsibility and punishes commitment’ (2014: 2.5). Despite the repeated claim that 
‘we are all in this together,’ the notion of togetherness becomes conditional upon being 
in paid employment. 
 
The obligations of citizenship, which, as demonstrated above, have always been open 
for contestation, intensify in this context around work and worklessness. ‘Good citizens’ 
are held up as helping the nation recover from the crisis by being autonomous, 
individualised, economically productive, and fitting with conservative social norms of 
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good behaviour (which are highly gendered). For instance, Osborne (2011: no pagination) 
states, ‘it is the strivers, the entrepreneurs, the engineers, the innovators, the savers, 
who create growth’. Employed ‘strivers’ contribute towards the economic recovery. They 
go beyond what is required, since the striver ‘innovates, engineers and saves’. In moral 
terms they ‘play by the rules’ (Cameron, 2012b: no pagination). The cutting of welfare is 
thus framed in relation to the ‘striver’. It is done to help the ‘hard-working people’, since 
as Cameron notes, ‘dealing with the deficit, getting our economy moving, increasing the 
level of responsibility in our society and getting on the side of hard-working people’ 
becomes what ‘matters the most’ (ibid) to the government. Unity does not include 
individuals that are described as ‘sleeping off a life on benefits’ (the ‘skiver’) and who, it 
is implied, are neither playing by the rules or matching up to what is required by the 
government and the nation. 
Within this context, benefit use is constructed as a matter of choice. For instance, 
Cameron (2011: no pagination) argues, ‘if the State is paying them more not to work, it 
becomes a rational choice to sit at home on the sofa’. This constructs individuals who rely 
on benefits as being inherently lazy, compared to the ‘strivers’ in work ‘who want to work 
hard and get on’ (Osborne, 2010: no pagination). In addition, the emphasis on 
‘something-for-nothing culture’ (Duncan-Smith, 2011), constructs the notion that 
individuals claiming benefits ‘take out’ and do not contribute to society. Such ‘bad 
citizens’ are therefore not seen as playing a full part in society, since they are not in paid 
work. This further constructs the idea that the number of benefits claimants is not due to 
Britain’s economic situation, but to a ‘culture’ in which individuals choose not to work. It 
suggests that unemployment is a matter of personal choice: the fault of the ‘skiver’. 
Binary thinking therefore invades the discourse of ‘we are all in this together’ and results 
in the discourse of ‘striver’ versus ‘skiver’ becoming central to furthering the austerity 
programme. The distinctions help to legitimate the uneven distribution of spending cuts, 
and win approval for otherwise unpopular economic policies, such as punitive welfare-
to-work policies. As Jensen (2014: 2.3) argues, ‘it is through imagining or inventing 
anxieties about the scheming deceits of those entitled to social protection, that such 
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entitlements become easier to undermine and dismantle’. 
A Revolution in Responsibility  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: 'Strong Families, Strong Society’, Conservative Party poster, London, available at: 
https://www.creativereview.co.uk/politics-political-design/ [2nd February, 2017] 
 
Furthering the previous argument, welfare has been framed within two different 
state discourses. First, individuals are understood as rational economic actors, who 
choose to be workless, and second, they are represented as ‘passive victims’ of a 
dysfunctional welfare system. These discourses effect the powerful narrative of state 
and personal failure around welfare, which is re-cast as an expensive, lumbering and 
ineffective system that rewards wilful worklessness and generates dependency. In 2011, 
Cameron discussed the need for ‘a social recovery’ in Britain:  
 
my mission in politics – the thing I am really passionate about – is fixing the 
responsibility deficit. That means building a stronger society, in which more 
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people understand their obligations, and more take control over their own lives 
and actions. (no pagination) 
 
Supplanted with moral rhetoric about conduct and behaviour (Jensen and Tyler, 2012), 
the ‘responsibility deficit’ suggests, for instance, that people are unemployed because of 
their own 'welfare dependence', 'culture of entitlement', and 'irresponsibility’, rather 
than unemployment due to a range of external factors such as redundancies, high job 
competition and a lack of jobs. As in other times of crisis, ‘individual behaviours’ are thus 
imagined as the problem of political and economic crisis (Dowling and Harvie, 2014) and 
these ‘bad/failed’ subjects are projected as a sinister threat to civility that must be 
controlled, corrected, or kept at bay (Tyler, 2013b). This diminishes sympathy towards 
the victims of spending cuts, as they become positioned as the ‘undeserving poor’, 
undeserving of welfare support. This discourse suppresses the moral question of unfairly 
targeting people in need of social security, and justifies the notion that the welfare 
system is ‘morally indefensible’ without reform (Osborne, 2010). To restore this lack of 
responsibility, there is an emphasis on the need for ‘a massive step change’ and a 
‘revolution in (personal, parental, social, and civic) responsibility’ (Cameron, 2011: no 
pagination). The family, once again, becomes one of the central means by which this 
‘revolution in responsibility’ can be implemented. As Cameron (2011b: no pagination) 
notes: 
 
Strong families are where children learn to become responsible people. When 
you grow up in a strong family, you learn how to behave, you learn about give 
and take. You learn about responsibility.  
 
The ‘strong family’ (read nuclear family) is envisioned to be able to instil responsibility, 
morals and values needed for social harmony to fix ‘Broken Britain’. This ideal is placed 
in opposition to the ‘broken family’ (read lone parent), which is shaped in heavily 
gendered, classed and racialised terms. The mother of the ‘broken family’ is regarded as 
an inevitable failure, marked with negative value, who has not fulfilled the new social 
contract of the government. This relationship between responsibility, motherhood, and 
society can be seen through the depiction of the ‘feral’ parent - a figure which gained 
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traction in the aftermath of the 2011 riots, combining discourses surrounding dirty 
whiteness, ‘gang’ culture and black families. Discussing this figure, De Benedictis (2012: 
1) highlights how austerity discourse positioned the ‘feral’ parent as being to blame for 
the riots, having failed her children, herself and Britain through her parenting decisions. 
Deemed as a ‘counterpoint to ‘ordinary’ (and middle) whiteness’ (Lawler, 2012: 2), the 
discourses of the ‘strong family’ and the ‘broken family’/ ‘feral’ parent work alongside 
each other to implicitly and oppositionally inscribe the strong family with ‘ordinary’, 
middle-class whiteness (De Benedictis, 2012). 
 
The ‘broken family’/’feral’ parent is therefore held up as a justification for cuts and 
welfare reform, since it is her lack of responsibly fostered by the welfare state, that has 
resulted in her inability to care/provide for her children. Reliance on welfare becomes 
synonymous with failure, irresponsibility, laziness, and unemployment. The RTV series, 
Benefits Street, especially the central protagonist in the show ‘White Dee’, have been 
used as further 'evidence' for the need of such reforms by MP’s. As Conservative MP 
Phillip Davies (2014: no pagination) argued:  
 
Every time people look at White Dee … it will serve as a reminder to people of the 
mess the benefits system is in and how badly Iain Duncan Smith’s reforms are 
needed. White Dee is bone idle and doesn’t want to work another day in her life 
and has no intention of finding a job.  
 
Labelled as ‘bone idle’, the figure of ‘White Dee’ not only serves to justify the need to 
reform the system, but also ‘acts to dichotomously inscribe cultural, economic and moral 
value with the middle-class, white, heterosexual, married, responsible parent’ (De 
Benedictis, 2012: 16; Allen, Tyler and De Benedictis, 2014; Jensen and Tyler, 2012; Allen 
and Taylor, 2012).  
 
The discourse of ‘a responsibility deficit’ occurs alongside the discourse that individuals 
are ‘passive victims’ of a dysfunctional welfare system; which ‘traps’ people in ‘welfare 
dependency’. For instance, in January 2014, Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, 
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Iain Duncan-Smith used the RTV show Benefits Street to also justify his series of reforms. 
Yet, in contrast to the discussion from Philip Davies MP above, Duncan-Smith argued 
that the show exposed 'the hidden reality' of the lives of people 'trapped' on state-
benefits (2014). The welfare system, the 2010 White Paper argued, ‘can act to entrench, 
rather than solve the problems of poverty and social exclusion’ as opposed to the 
negative behaviour of individuals. The welfare system has also been blamed for allowing 
migrants to ‘fill the gap in the labour market left wide open by a welfare system’ 
(Cameron, 2011: no pagination). Thus, it is claimed that reforming the ‘woeful welfare 
system [will] end welfare as a trap’ (Duncan-Smith, 2011: no pagination) and will also 
help to control immigration. The Welfare Reform Bill (2011) represents the 
implementation of such reforms as helping to end ‘wasted lives, wasted money, the end 
of a system, which keeps people in poverty and dependency’ (Duncan-Smith, 2011: no 
pagination). Benefit claimants are therefore constructed as both rational economic 
actors able to ‘play the system’ and shirk their responsibility to work, and ‘victims’ 
‘trapped’ in welfare dependency. Both discourses, however, legitimate the same action: 
the uneven distribution of cuts. The former discourse justifies spending cuts to 
reintroduce responsibility into the ‘dysfunctional’ lives of those reliant on benefit income, 
the latter discourse justifies the same spending cuts to prevent welfare becoming a ‘trap’.  
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Fairness for the Job Seeker; Fairness for the Taxpayer 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: ‘Get Britain Working’, Conservative Party Poster 2010. Image by Perfect Day, 
available at: https://www.creativereview.co.uk/politics-political-design/ [2nd February, 2017] 
 
Welfare reform, it is also argued, establishes a fairer relationship between those 
who ‘take benefits’ and those who ‘pay for them’. The state discourse of ‘fairness’ 
therefore not only strengthens the legitimacy of the uneven distribution of cuts, but also 
helps to further the inequality of the austerity programme. According to Cameron 
(2012c: no pagination), there is a ‘welfare gap in this country between those living long-
term in the welfare system and those outside it’: 
 
Take two young women living on the same street in London. One studied hard at 
college for three years and found herself a full-time job – say as a receptionist – 
on £18,000 a year, or about £1200 take-home pay a month. She’d love to get her 
own place with a friend – but with high rents in her area, the petrol to get to work 
and all the bills, she just can’t afford it. So, she’s living at home with her mum and 
dad and is saving up desperately to move out. Then there’s another woman living 
down the street. She’s 19 years old and doesn’t have a job but is already living in 
a house with her friends. How? Because when she left college and went down to 
the Jobcentre to sign on for Job Seeker’s Allowance, she found out that if she 
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moved out of her parents’ place, she was automatically entitled to Housing 
Benefit. So, that’s exactly what she did. Again, is this really fair?  
 
Discussing the (gendered) figures of the ‘welfare claimant’ and the ‘worker’, the issue of 
fairness is brought to the fore by telling their respective stories and asking ‘is this really 
fair’. Welfare, it is argued, has led to ‘huge resentment amongst those who pay into the 
system, because they feel that what they’re having to work hard for, others are getting 
without having to put in the effort’.  Such a discussion indicates that it is ‘unjust’ for the 
taxpayer to pay for other people to ‘sit on benefits’ and that the government needs to 
reform welfare in the interest of the hard-working ‘good citizen’. Generating feelings of 
injustice and unfairness, legitimises spending cuts targeted at those receiving welfare 
payments (understood to be ‘undeserving’ of them). Reforming the welfare system and 
introducing ‘benefits with conditions’ (in the form of sanctioning and back-to-work 
policies) therefore re-establishes ‘fairness’ – ‘fairness for the job seeker’ and ‘fairness for 
the taxpayer’ (Duncan-Smith, 2011b: no pagination). As Cameron says: 
 
the system is saying to these people, can’t afford to have another child? Tough, 
save up. Can’t afford a home of your own? Tough, live with your parents. Don’t 
like the hours you’re working? Tough, that’s just life. (Cameron, 2012c: no 
pagination) 
 
Sanctions are positioned as being ‘fairly applied’ since it is argued, ‘it shouldn't be a 
lifestyle choice and if people can work, they should work’. That's why we have a sanctions 
system and I believe that sanctions system is fairly applied’ (Cameron, 2016: no 
pagination).  
The combination of the discourse of fairness with previous discourses explored, including 
the ‘striver’/skiver’ binary and the ‘responsibility deficit’, allows for the possibility of 
creating multiple negative feelings towards those reliant on benefit payments. This 
further intensifies feelings of injustice. For instance, the figure of the ‘undeserving skiver’ 
being sanctioned due to their failure to seek work becomes more affective, since the 
feeling of injustice towards those ‘bad citizens’ has been continually reproduced by 
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differing, but complementary state discourses. The greater the feeling of injustice, the 
more effective the discourses of fairness will therefore be. Subsequently, the uneven 
distribution of spending cuts becomes a just and fair action towards the public deficit, 
strengthening the legitimacy of the cuts. 
Groups formally regarded as ‘deserving’ and ‘off limits’ (Garthwaite, 2011) – because of 
ill health or disability – are now targets for welfare reform. It has been argued that some 
receiving DLA are ‘fit to work’ since the allowance ‘appears to have some disincentive 
effect on employment’ (DWP, 2010: 12). This discourse suppresses the notion that 
individuals may receive DLA because they are unable to work because of their disability. 
Rather, it naturalises the notion that DLA benefits claimants ‘shirk’ their responsibility to 
seek work and that benefits contribute towards welfare dependency. Consequently, this 
has enabled the discourse of ‘greatest need’ to emerge, suggesting that support will only 
be available for individuals with more severe disabilities. This implies that of those 
previously entitled to state provision, not all were in need and deserving of support.  
 
Conclusion  
This chapter has explored how historical legacies inform the present, since, as 
Skeggs notes (2004, 1997) such legacies are recycled and repeated. Having shown the 
historical constructions of the state, demonstrating how black and white working-class 
women have been repeatedly used (as the solution) and blamed (as the problem) by the 
state during different times and state configurations, the final section addressed how 
state discourse is shaping gender, class and ‘race’ in the present context, through the 
production and legitimisation of austerity. I argued that austerity has been understood 
and (ideologically) promoted by the state as the only viable solution to the ‘crisis’. This 
was done through the threat of debt, deficit and the consequences of failing to act, and 
the need to enact fiscal responsibility on an ‘out of control’ welfare system. Such 
discourses suppressed the view of welfare as being an important part of social security, 
narrowing the possibility for other ideas about the necessity of the welfare system and 
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of alternative ways to cut the deficit. The UK Coalition and Conservative governments 
have continued these discourses ‘in order to impose their own vision of the world’ 
(Bourdieu, 1991:234) which justifies the course of action that they intend to/have taken.  
Austerity is also legitimised, I argued, through contradictory discourses of ‘we’ and ‘us 
and them’, which are enacted to suit the needs of the particular moment. The discourse 
of ‘we are all in this together’ is constructed through the idea of ‘one nation united in the 
face of adversity’ (Clark and Newman, 2012: 303). The ‘striver’ versus the ‘skiver’ is then 
used to blame certain sections of the population for the need to cut spending (single 
mothers, immigrants, the unemployed and the sick and disabled). This binary allows 
other discourses to emerge, which helps to further legitimise the uneven distribution of 
austerity measures and the need for welfare reform. Although the discourses that coexist 
can be seen as contradictory, they legitimise the same action: the uneven distribution of 
spending cuts. It is by understanding how austerity is produced, legitimised and made 
present by the state and connected to historical legacies, that it is possible to analyse 
how young women live with, and navigate through austerity’s polices and (moral and 
ideological) discourses. This will be analysed in the following chapters of this thesis. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Living with Austerity 
 
 
The first analytical chapter of the thesis complicates George Osborne’s infamous 
phrase, ‘we are all in this together’ (2009, 2010, 2012, 2015), a phrase used to legitimate 
the uneven distribution of austerity measures. In order to show how we are in fact, not 
‘all in this together’, this chapter discusses the ways in which austerity manifests and 
materialises itself in young women’s everyday lives. It is important to remember, as was 
shown in Chapter 2, that the impact of the austerity measures on the cities chosen 
(Leeds, London and Brighton) vary. Austerity has made an impact on each area to 
different degrees and in different ways, which is linked to discussions of the wider 
political, economic and social context. However, this does not mean that those women 
in each area experience austerity in the same ways. Gender is not a unified category and 
the effects of the recession have impacted upon women to differing degrees. It is 
therefore important to challenge representations of the crisis as being affective to 
women in equal measure (Fakuda-Parr, Heintz and Seguino, 2013). Such a 
misrepresentation can be seen, on the one hand, in the use of the phrase ‘we are all in 
this together’, and on the other, with the assumption that women as a group are 
suffering disproportionately from austerity measures.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1, Bourdieu’s metaphors of capital (1979, 1986, 1989, 1991) is a 
useful tool to understand how women’s differential access to economic, social and 
cultural capital and other resources shape the way in which they are effected by austerity 
in their everyday lives. As discussed in Chapters 1 and 4, conditions of existence are not 
undermined, but exacerbated in the current context, imposing greater hardship (Evans, 
2015), ‘reconﬁguring the value of one’s capital, the range of possibilities open and, 
ultimately, the degree to which economic necessity presses on the senses’ (Atkinson, 
2013: 14). Therefore, despite austerity decreasing the ‘space of possibilities’ (Bourdieu, 
2014) for women in general, the volume, composition and trajectory of their capital shape 
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their experience. Therefore, Bourdieu’s metaphors of capital, is used to show why it is 
not only important to observe the way women are experiencing and living austerity, but 
also to be mindful of how differences of gender, class and ‘race’ affect and shape their 
experiences of austerity.  
 
In the first instance, due to austerity being, in part, an economic programme, it is thus 
important to understand in depth, how women have been affected by austerity in terms 
of employment and general living standards. To understand the points raised above, this 
chapter is divided into two sections: (i) the affect of austerity on employment and (ii) on 
living standards. Women’s experiences of employment in the context of austerity are 
firstly analysed, focusing on how women discuss changes to the sectors they work in, the 
trend towards casualisation and unemployment. Issues related to living standards are 
then assessed, such as changes to state support, housing, and leisure and consumption 
practices. It should be noted that it is only for the purpose of this chapter that I have made 
a decision to split the analysis in this way, since it is important to understand how the 
fields of production and reproduction are affected in detail. This however does not mean, 
as is seen below, that such issues are not interlinked. The following sections not only 
show the impacts of austerity on a material level, but also complicate the understanding 
of who has been affected.  
 
This chapter is not intended to be a comprehensive guide to or overview of austerity in 
the UK or elsewhere, and neither is it a macro-economic analysis of the changes since 
2008. Rather, this chapter is concerned with the direct impact and ramifications of 
austerity policies on young women’s lives. It therefore addresses some of the most 
prominent discussions from the sixty-one women I spoke to, and is restricted to the 
issues repeatedly raised by them. 
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Working with Austerity   
 
As discussed in Chapters 1 and 3, the recession that followed the financial crash of 
2008 triggered major changes to the labour market. A report by the TUC (2015: 1) on the 
changes to women’s employment during the context of austerity found that: (i) young 
women’s employment, which fell furthest in the recession years, has still not recovered; 
(ii) there has been a rise in the number of women on zero-hours and short-hours 
contracts; (iii) pay in real terms has fallen for women in contrast to men’s; (iv) women 
working full-time earn approximately nine per cent less per hour than men but 
women working part-time earn nearly 38 per cent less; (v) women still make up the 
majority of those paid less than the living wage; (vi) more women than ever before are in 
part-time work. These findings show that austerity has had a large effect on women’s 
lives. In what follows, I draw on the most discussed topics in relation to work and 
austerity - namely, changes within certain sectors, unemployment and the trend towards 
casualisation – to explore how their experience of employment manifests itself within 
their lives. However, as will be shown below, class and ‘race’ come to matter in such 
manifestations. 
 
    Changes to the Public Sector   
 
Current austerity policies have focused on cuts to public spending, and so the 
public sector workforce has been subjected to major changes (TUC, 2015). This has 
included widespread job losses in addition to pay restraints, significant changes to 
pensions, and a range of other revisions to the terms and conditions of employment. 
With 65 per cent of public service workers being women, this means that they have been 
disproportionately affected. Women are more likely to be employed by local authorities 
and in the public sector more generally. They are also more likely to be subcontracted to 
the state via private-sector organisations (Seguino, 2010; Taylor-Gooby and Stoeker, 
2010; Theodoropoulou and Watt, 2011). Fifteen of the women that I interviewed worked 
in the public sector, twelve in full-time positions and three in part-time roles. However, 
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their experiences of the sector were very different. Not all of those women experienced 
redundancies or pay cuts, but spoke about the changes at a more general level. Yet, this 
was due, in part, to the type of jobs they performed within the sector (some were more 
secure), but also the duration of public sector employment.  
 
‘Everyone’s had enough,’ Anna told me, when discussing the NHS. Having worked in the 
sector as a physiotherapist since 2008, Anna, a 27-year-old, middle-class, white woman 
living in London, described the transformation she had seen the NHS go through in 
recent years - witnessing redundancies, the reduction of funding, increased waiting lists, 
fewer resources and low staff morale. This, she said, had made many staff move to the 
private sector, or take leave from the NHS. Likewise, in the Education sector, Nadia, a 
32-year-old, middle-class teacher from Leeds who described herself as ‘mixed other’, 
who had been employed in the sector since 2010, called the changes to her sector 
‘significant’. Like other teachers I interviewed, Nadia explained how cuts were being 
made in the ‘wrong places’. For example, the reduction of support staff for children with 
increased needs meant that some children were no longer getting sufficient help and 
encouragement.  
 
Nadia likened the public sector itself to being ‘run like a business’. Discussing the 
introduction of performance related pay and Academies42, Nadia felt these shared 
similarities with the private sector. Kate, a 30-year-old, middle-class, white woman, 
living in Leeds, who also worked as a teacher, described her school in a similar manner. 
Working in an Academy, she told me that although the school had received more 
government funding in recent years, the ethos of the school was changing. Reflecting on 
this, Kate explained that the school had become more like a ‘private company’ – the 
school itself had more power to make decisions and had implemented performance-
related pay (which had made so teaching professionals fearful of missing their targets). 
                                                
42Academies are independent schools receiving funding directly from central government, rather than 
through a local authority.  
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Trisha, a 34-year-old, middle-class, white woman, working as an advocacy support 
worker in the charity sector in Brighton, also labelled the sector in ‘business’ terms. She 
said:  
 
We’ve had a series of managers and we’ve ended up with a woman who is a robot. 
She doesn’t care about the service users but she’s great at writing reports and 
making stuff up, manipulating figures, finding ways to look like we provide this 
great service that’s reaching everyone.  
 
With the change in focus from service to results, Trisha felt the work suffered under this 
type of ‘corporate management’. The discussions above therefore illustrate the way in 
which the public sector has and continues to transform under the current context of 
public sector cuts. Those working in the sector mentioned the effects on both the users 
of the services and those in public sector employment, especially those in less secure or 
part-time positions (such as school support staff). Characterising the sector as being ‘run 
like a business’ highlights the change to a generalised managerial/performance culture 
employed to regulate and discipline the workforce in line with features of the private 
sector. 
 
Yet, these changes have affected women differently depending on when they entered 
the labour market. Several young women stated that, if they had graduated a few years 
later, their experience would have been different; timing therefore generated more or 
less security and an increased or reduced level of opportunity. Sophie, for example, a 25-
year-old, middle-class, white woman working in the NHS as a marketing officer in Leeds, 
said that she would most likely not have got a job in her area if she had applied a few 
years later, due to the effects that the crisis and recession had on the public sector. 
Likewise, Mia, a 27-year-old, middle-class, Anglo-Indian, doctor working in London had 
managed to avoid the junior doctors’ pay freeze43 since she graduated in 2010 and would 
                                                
43The Department of Health has rewritten the employment contracts of all new doctors below consultant 
level in England, who started employment from August 2016. The contract affects the amount that junior 
doctors get paid, and their decisions surrounding which specialties they choose to train in. 
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qualify as a GP in the summer of 2016. It should also be noted that although women were 
aware of the changes to their chosen careers and sectors, they did not think that these 
changes had or would negatively affect their personal trajectories. Sophie, for instance, 
described herself as being ‘incredibly fortunate’ getting a full-time job within a few 
months of finishing university. She told me that three months into her employment, 
there was a large reshuffle in her department and many people were asked to take 
voluntary redundancy. This meant that Sophie was able to move up the ladder faster, 
taking on work that she was not necessarily qualified to do, gaining more responsibility, 
working with senior members of the team, and having the opportunity to undertake 
further training courses (opportunities which would have not been available to in her in 
her previous role). Although the effect of the recession was largely positive for young 
graduates, Sophie and others said that, despite promotions and increased responsibility, 
they had only recently received a pay rise. These women noted that this had not 
negatively affected their lifestyle, as they had only just left full-time education. 
Nevertheless, the low pay tempers the positive effect of increased employment 
opportunities. This demonstrates one of the mechanisms in which labour costs are 
consistently reduced across different sectors. However, for the majority of these women, 
despite not increasing their economic capital in terms of income, their employment was 
relatively stable and secure and provided the space to accrue both social and cultural 
capital, which may be converted into economic capital in the future.  
 
Witnessing the Trend Towards Casualisation  
 
As previously mentioned in Chapter 4, the quality of employment in the UK has 
also been declining in the last few decades. Yet, as shown above, in the context of 
austerity, this deterioration has intensified. According to the TUC (2015: 7) there has 
been a persistent and worrying trend towards the normalisation of less secure, part-time 
work. By 2014, more than 1.7 million workers were in some form of temporary work. This 
trend has forced many women to accept reduced working hours as well as lower wages, 
resulting in a significant increase in the precariousness of their situation. For example, 
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the proportion of women in temporary work has increased from a quarter to nearly a 
third since 2008 (ibid). Such precariousness was also found in full-time and part-time 
work as well as within different sectors. In spite of this, the degree of precariousness 
women experienced within their jobs was dependant on and affected by the volume, 
composition, and trajectory of capital they possessed – those with greater 
amounts/types of capital had a different experience of the present than those who 
possessed less.  
 
Trisha felt the impact of austerity in terms of the trend towards less-secure part-time 
work. Having been moved from full-time to part-time hours, Trisha had been working 
fifteen hours per week since December 2014. She told me, ‘it was either stay full-time 
but work evenings and weekends or go part-time’. Being a single mother with a 16-year-
old son about to take his GCSEs, working evenings and weekends would not have suited 
her lifestyle. Having worked at her organisation for the last six years, Trisha explained 
that the alteration in her circumstance was due to changes in the ways in which projects 
were being commissioned. The increased competition for project-funded work forced 
organisations to bid lower than they usually would, affecting the amount they can pay 
their staff. Once again, this is another example of how labour costs are consistently being 
reduced across different sectors by different mechanisms. Trisha explained to me that, 
despite being disappointed at having to go part-time, she counted herself as ‘one of the 
lucky ones’ – she had not had to take voluntary redundancy. Despite the change to her 
stable position, Trisha did not take the full-time role that was offered, as she thought 
that she would be able to find another job if she needed to. With both economic capital 
– savings and owning her own home – and cultural and social capital – in the form of a 
master’s degree, years of experience and networks within and outside the sector – Trisha 
was positive that should the situation stop suiting her needs, she would be able to find 
another job. Since going part-time, Trisha had taken up dog walking to ‘fill the time’ she 
had. This, she said, was more because she ‘loved dogs’ than because she ‘needed the 
money’.  
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Rebecca, a 28-year-old, middle-class, white woman also working in the charity sector as 
a debt and benefit adviser in Brighton, discussed the trend towards casualisation in a 
different way. For her, the increase in short-term precarious contracts had a major 
impact on her standard of living. Rebecca found it extremely difficult to find employment 
after completing her master’s degree in 2013. Eventually finding employment in the 
charity sector, Rebecca had been on short-term six month contracts for the last eighteen 
months. Having recently been promoted, Rebecca described the contact as ‘the holy 
grail’: ‘given the industry I’m in, it’s all short-term contracts, I’ve just been offered a year’s 
contract but a lot of people are existing on month to month or three month contracts 
and you can’t make commitments with that’. In the current context, with the trend to 
casualisation, this type of short-term contract is becoming the norm in certain industries 
since contracts are based on securing project funding. This situation is having a second-
hand impact on employees, since they are unable to ‘make commitments’. For instance, 
Rebecca told me that even if she had a deposit for a mortgage, her lack of a permanent 
contract would count against her. She therefore felt she was being made to live ‘project 
by project’. This type of lifestyle, she said, is typical of her group of friends living in the 
Brighton area: 
 
We are all at the stage now when we’re all employed, we can afford to live. 
Nobody’s living back with mum and dad because they can’t get a job. But it’s the 
first time ever. I think Brighton’s particularly bad for it because it is its own little 
bubble and it’s easy to avoid that transition to get a job and house, because it is 
impossible. It’s left a lot of people in the transitional, not sure what they’re doing, 
in low paid employment, living project by project. 
 
In this sense, ‘living project by project’, jumping from one unsecured job to another, 
Rebecca and her middle-class friends have their space of possibilities (Bourdieu, 1983) 
decreased. 
 
However, this decreased space of possibilities, which is connected to the insecurity of 
employment, is even more embodied by the increase of zero-hour contracts. Not only 
do these contracts give fewer guarantees for employees, but those employed on these 
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contracts earn, on average, 40 per cent less than those with part-time and full-time 
contracts (Resolution Foundation, 2013). Hannah, a 23-year-old, working-class, white 
woman was one of those employed on a zero-hour contract. Graduating from university 
in July 2014, and unable to find full-time employment, Hannah had been working in two 
zero-hour contract jobs, doing concession work at a football stadium and stewarding at 
various music venues in London for the last six months. Describing zero-hour contracts 
as a ‘pain’, Hannah told me, ‘the problem that I have at the minute with my two casual 
jobs is that I’m working in four different places. It’s hard to remember where you need to 
be’. With no ‘basic workers rights’44, working odd shifts, with no set timetable, Hannah 
described herself as not knowing whether she was ‘coming or going’. She said: 
 
You never get set days, I’ve worked fifteen or sixteen days this month so I have 
done quite a few shifts, whereas next month I’m looking at five or six, that’s the 
problem, especially working in music venues, they’ve had quite a few shows this 
month, whereas next month they’ve only got seven. Lucky enough I’ve been 
given four out of seven.  
 
Although having only been given four days work in the next month, Hannah favoured her 
current employer compared to her previous one. In her former job (a zero-hour contract 
on a kiosk at another football stadium), she only earned on average £30 per fortnight.  
 
Molly, a 26-year-old, middle-class, black woman, was also a university graduate and had 
experienced life on a zero-hour contract. Having been born in the UK to Nigerian parents, 
Molly moved to Nigeria with her parents at a young age. However, wanting to pursue a 
career in fashion, Molly decided to move back to London in 2012 after finishing her 
degree. After living there for six months unemployed and staying on a friend’s sofa in the 
affluent area of West London – living off money she had saved whilst working in Nigeria 
– Molly began looking for work in the fashion industry. However, she described her job 
search as ‘next to impossible:’ 
                                                
44Such as the right to know what hours you were going to work in a week, the right to know what you could 
expect to be paid and the allied right to sick pay and holiday pay.  
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It was next to impossible, it was difficult. It was humble beginnings. I kind of knew 
it was going to be hard, but I didn’t know how hard it was. So, I said OK, I’ll work 
my way up, you know … so I was looking for retail jobs, something in fashion, but I 
started getting worried and I was searching, searching, searching.  
 
Despite having previously worked in the fashion industry in Lagos, Molly spoke of the 
lack of recognition of her experience and transferability in the current context, which 
became a barrier to her finding employment. This lack of appreciation of non-UK 
experiences (as well as qualifications) is cited by other studies researching experiences of 
BAME background people in the current period of austerity (Sosenko et al., 2013; Bassel 
et al., 2013; Netto and Fraser, 2009). Bassel et al. (2013) for instance, in their study on the 
views and experiences of Glasgow residents from BAME backgrounds, highlighted how 
the lack of recognition of their overseas qualifications and their shortage of UK work 
experience became a barrier to their employment. Thus, unable to find work in the retail 
sector – one of the hardest hit areas for job losses during the recession (TUC, 2015) – 
Molly took a job in sales, working as a door-to-door salesperson, on commission in a zero-
hour contract. However, unlike Hannah, Molly quit the job after a few weeks:  
I was cold calling. I had to knock on people’s doors. It was the worst. There was a 
point when I said, I can’t do this again, this is not my life, I’m not broke, I’m not 
hungry, I don’t know why I’m suffering because I am scared that I’m not going to 
get a job. So I quit. It was hard-core, it kind of showed me like … some people hustle 
hard and it’s terrible … I thought, this is just too much for me; I can’t handle this 
crap. It’s not like I’m weak minded, it’s just that I choose not to do this kind of job 
because I know I’m better than this (laughs), it was too much stress for me. 
 
Despite both finding the work frustrating and having similar experiences of zero-hour 
contracts, Molly and Hannah’s outcomes differed due to their different volume of 
capitals. Molly could quit her job, since she knew that she was able to live off her savings 
and did not have to pay rent, since she was staying in her friend’s apartment. Describing 
herself as ‘not broke’, ‘not hungry’ and ‘better than this’, her economic and social capital 
allowed her to leave the job. Hannah, on the other hand, was living at home with her 
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parents, struggled for money, and needed to work in her current job to be able to help 
with utilities and rent. Faced with the current context and her ‘under-employment’, she 
spoke of wanting to invest her time in undertaking an internship to improve her CV and 
chances of being eligible for a ‘graduate’ job. However, needing a regular income, 
Hannah felt she would not be able to take on this step, unless she could find an internship 
that paid the living wage. Such an investment was not possible without a wage, due to 
Hannah and her family being closer to material necessity. 
 
In contrast, Molly was offered an unpaid internship with a bespoke designer. She was 
able to invest her time and take the position since she saw her ‘passion’ for design as 
being more important than receiving a monthly wage. In other words, her relative 
distance from material necessity allowed her to take the internship and accrue further 
social and cultural capital. McRobbie in her book Be Creative (2015) discusses the rise of 
unpaid internships within the fashion industry (as well as within the wider field of the 
cultural and creative industries) in the last few decades. She notes that despite ‘creatives’ 
being aware of the long hours and low returns of these unpaid positions, that ‘passionate 
work’ or ‘pleasure at work’ (Donzelot, 1991), – in which work is seen as a passionate 
attachment – compensates for their lack of security and protection. Molly’s declaration 
of this work being her ‘passion’ demonstrates such compensation. However, a few weeks 
into the internship, Molly was ‘let go’, ‘it got cancelled because the government said that 
it isn’t fair on interns to be working for free and not getting paid. She [the designer] said 
if you aren’t a student you can’t intern anymore’. Having found out later that government 
policy made it mandatory for interns to receive a minimum wage if an individual was not 
a student, the designer decided from that point on, to only take on students. A few weeks 
later, Molly, due to her social capital, was offered a job in her friend’s father’s 
organisation, working as a payroll trainer. Although this was in an area that she had not 
envisaged working, the full-time contract and prospect of job progression meant that, 
for the foreseeable future, Molly felt happy in her current job.  
 
 147 
The above narratives demonstrate that despite the trend towards casualisation and its 
impacts on women’s employment as a whole, women’s experiences differed 
considerably. The trend towards less-secure, low-paid work can be seen in the narratives 
of all the women above. Middle-class women, such as Trisha and Rebecca, felt the effects 
of this on their employment, with changes to their circumstances and the decrease in the 
space of possibilities (Bourdieu, 1983, 2014): having to take part-time employment 
(losing economic capital); or existing on short-term contracts which affected the ability 
to plan long term (and the ability to accumulate economic capital in the form of a 
property). However, to some extent, they are shielded by the stability, volume and 
composition of their capital. Likewise, although Molly’s experience in the Lagos fashion 
industry did not translate to the London context, having to take a job in an area she had 
not previous envisaged, Molly could avoid having to take on a zero-hour contract since 
her economic and social capital allowed a degree of movement away from such 
necessity. Hannah, on the other hand, did not have as much choice; time was spent trying 
to halt any potential economic losses, rather than trading up or accruing extra value. 
Hannah was therefore situated closer to such necessity.  
 
Unemployment and ‘Back to Work’ Schemes  
 
Despite changes to certain sectors and the increase in casualisation, nowhere was 
austerity measures manifested more than through unemployment and punitive ‘back-
to-work policies’. Sixteen women I interviewed had experienced life on JSA between 
2008 and 2015, and the changes brought about by the Coalition government. For these 
sixteen women, despite all feeling the negative changes to welfare reform, it was white 
and BAME working-class single mothers, who were most affected.  
 
In the first instance, most women described their experience with the Jobcentre as 
‘frustrating’ and ‘demoralising’. These feelings were said to have increased in recent 
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years with the introduction of the Coalition’s Universal Jobsmatch in November 201245. 
Ila, for example, a 35-year-old, working-class, Bangladeshi, single mother of three, was 
looking for part-time work whilst receiving JSA in Leeds at the time of the interview. 
Labelling the current system as being ‘very difficult’, she told me that she had to apply 
for over ten jobs a week that she felt would not suit her needs. Lacking in economic and 
cultural capital (Ila had no previous employment experience or qualifications), she knew 
the jobs that she was being told to apply for by Jobcentre advisors were not suitable. She 
explained: 
 
I’m supposed to find ten jobs per week, but you can’t. It’s impossible. I went with 
five or six jobs that I found and she [the advisor] looked at me and said that’s no 
good. But I could find one-hundred jobs but if they’re not suitable what’s the point 
in writing them down? She wants me to apply for anything but you can’t apply for 
anything if it doesn’t suit, am I going to apply for a manager’s job when I have no 
experience with that? I can’t apply for a manager’s job straight away; I need to 
work towards it … and they should understand that. 
 
Having moved to Pakistan when she was fourteen, Ila told me that as a result, her written 
English ‘was not very good’, which affected her ability to apply for jobs. Ila did not 
possess the type of cultural capital which could be converted and traded into symbolic 
capital and economic reward. Others also felt such unsuitability in the jobs available on 
the Universal Jobsmatch system. Rebecca, who was now working in the charity sector in 
Brighton, discussed her experience in a similar way. However, she also described how her 
social and cultural capital (having a master’s degree and previous work experience) 
worked in her favour. She told me that because the Jobcentre knew she had a master’s 
degree, she felt that they ‘left her alone’ to look for work. This contrasted with the 
experience described by Ila, whose advisor was ‘constantly on my back’. Rebecca said 
that despite experiencing pressure from Jobcentre advisors to find a job, now working in 
                                                
45Universal Jobsmatch ‘is an online jobs search system designed to monitor Jobseeker’s Allowance 
claimants’ online job search activity to confirm claimants comply with the requirement to do a minimum 
of three job-searching activities per week. Registration with Universal Jobsmatch can be made mandatory 
for receipt of benefit, and sanctions applied if the jobseeker does not comply’ (O’Hara, 2014: 115). 
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debt advise, and hearing many stories from users of the service of their experiences, she 
felt her own experience paled in comparison.  
 
Many women who had found work using the online job system, tended to end up in what 
Shildrick et al. (2012) call the ‘low pay, no pay cycle’ – a cycle of having low-paying 
temporary work and then being reliant on welfare. Amira, a 25-year-old, working-class, 
black woman from Ethiopia, is illustrative of this cycle. Amira had recently been given 
her British Citizenship after coming to the UK on her own as an asylum seeker in 2004. 
Now living alone in social housing in the outskirts of Leeds city centre, Amira was working 
on a zero-hour contract for a multinational consumer goods company in the packing 
department. Discussing how her current job was much better than her previous one, she 
said, ‘I worked at a bread factory it was cold freezing, I will cry there, I couldn’t, it was four 
months over Christmas. I was wearing three or four layers and two socks, I had pain in 
my hand, when I see my hand I cry, very difficult life.’ Comparing this to her current job 
she explained, ‘it’s good, standing for twelve hours and packing, but winter its cold’. 
 
Amira described her life in the UK as ‘difficult’ despite the fact that she told me that she 
was ‘British now’. Having her papers, she was able to work ‘properly’; but said that the 
system was not working for her. Having been claiming JSA on and off for two years, in 
between low-paid, short-term contracts, she had incurred debts and arrears. She 
explained, ‘if I am working I will pay everything for my council tax, my rent, everything I 
will pay. If I am not working I will go in the Jobcentre and they will pay it for me’. However, 
since she had been in and out of precarious work, her benefits were often paid 
incorrectly. She said; ‘I might work for one month, I stop, then I need to wait two weeks 
to get JSA’. During this time, she was often left with no money – living on minimum wage 
did not allow her to save up money for such occasions. Despite meeting all her 
appointments for fear of sanctioning, Amira incurred an £800 over-payment debt, since 
there was a miscommunication regarding the amount of benefits that she should have 
received over the last two years. Additionally, Amira often found the technical language 
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of the correspondence between her and various arms of the DWP and Jobcentre difficult 
to understand.  
 
Similarly, Lauren, a 33-year-old, working-class, white woman, also living in Leeds, 
experienced the ‘low-pay no-pay’ cycle. Having been made redundant from a part-time 
job in retail, and having been looking for work since 2011, Lauren was now again claiming 
JSA. Unlike Amira, Lauren was a single mother, which made her experience of the system 
far worse. A recent independent inquiry co-ordinated by the Fawcett Society (2015), 
raised serious concerns about how single parents (92 per cent of whom are women), were 
being treated in the welfare system. It found that Jobcentre staff and work programme 
providers were not aware of the flexibilities that single parents were entitled to, such as 
being able to restrict their availability for work to fit around school hours. As has been 
illustrated above, since 2008 there has been a big rise in sanctions against single parents 
– in 2014 an increase from under 200 sanctions a month to 5,000 a month, resulting in 
their day-to-day living being most severely affected (Fawcett Society, 2015; 
Rabindrakumar, 2017). This is not surprising since a report by the PSC Union (2015) noted 
how Jobcentre managers are putting pressure on staff to impose financial penalties on 
benefit claimants; staff who fail to make sufficient sanctions referrals are placed on 
Performance Improvement Plans, which can result in them losing out on annual pay 
awards. 
 
The Jobcentre had recently sanctioned Lauren for six weeks (she had missed an 
appointment because she needed look after her son) – two weeks longer than expected. 
During that time, Lauren had to wait for her ‘hardship money’ (£50), which took four 
weeks. Likewise, Leoni, a 26-year-old, working-class black single mother from London 
currently receiving Income Support, also experienced sanctioning. Sanctioned during 
pregnancy, she told me:  
 
I was pregnant and getting JSA. I was sick one time so I didn’t go to the work 
placement. I was six months pregnant bearing that in mind so the guy knew I had 
very bad morning sickness. But he decided to tell the Jobcentre I was not 
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attending and I was sanctioned for a month, bearing in mind I was six months 
pregnant.  
 
This shows that, despite women’s experiences of unemployment being described by the 
majority as frustrating and demoralizing, for some, the experience is slightly easier than 
for others. Those with a higher volume of social, economic and cultural capital and 
resources – qualifications or with work experience – which can be capitalised on, are, in 
the words of Rebecca ‘left alone’. For others, their ability to convert, accrue, or generate 
capital is impinged by the lack of suitable employment, and system which does not 
recognise their needs. For example, Amira was in and out of paid work, often left with no 
income during times of unemployment. Despite not missing an appointment for fear of 
sanctioning, the language barrier led to debt and arrears due to administrative errors in 
the over-payment of her benefits. Leoni and Lauren, single mothers who found it more 
difficult to take precarious jobs due to family commitments, were also sanctioned due to 
caring responsibilities or pregnancy. Therefore, not only does unemployment and 
precarious employment situate these women closer to necessity, but the system itself 
brings them even closer. 
 
Living with Austerity   
 
 Having discussed the effects of employment above, living standards are equally 
important in showing how austerity manifests itself in women’s lives. Since 2010, the UK 
government has reduced spending on welfare and made large reductions in local 
government budgets (JRF, 2015). At the same time, the cost of living continues to rise. 
Research has suggested that certain groups are particularly affected, particularly single 
parents and those reliant on welfare (WBG, 2012; WRC, 2012; Fawcett Society, 2012, 
2013, 2015).  
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Day-to-Day Living  
 
 Similar to other times of economic crisis (as discussed in Chapter 4), one of the 
most significant ways in which austerity had manifested itself into the lives of young 
women was through the changes to their day-to-day living. For example, ‘The financial 
capability of the UK’ report, published by the Money Advice Service in 2013, concluded 
that a fifth of people had experienced ‘a large drop in income’ since 2010, and that 42 per 
cent of people would ‘have to think’ about how to cover an unexpected bill of as little as 
£300. This drop-in income, coupled with a rise in the cost of living, has meant that living 
standards have fallen significantly (in O’Hara, 2014: 99). In addition, the ‘Impoverishment 
of the UK’ report, on poverty and social exclusion funded by the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC) published in 2013, found that a quarter of the UK population 
had an unacceptably low standard of living: around 5 million adults were going without 
essential clothing; 4 million children and adults were not being properly fed; and roughly 
14 million people could not afford one or more essential household item (O’Hara, 2014: 
58-59). This is set to rise by another 3 per cent by 2018 (Forbes, 2016). Food poverty has 
also been reported to be on the rise. A study conducted by the Centre for Economic and 
Business research, published in March 2013, found that people in the UK were spending 
20 per cent more on food but eating less, with the poorest in society cutting down on 
fresh food to make ends meet. The report estimated that 4.7 million people in the UK 
lived in food poverty and projected the average annual UK household food bill was set to 
rise by £357 over the five years from 2013–2018 (in O’Hara, 2014: 27). However, this 
research does not seem representative of every woman that I spoke to. Although many 
discussed some of the issues above, such as increases in the price of food and the sharp 
rise of the cost of utilities, their experiences differed according to the amount and type 
of capital that they possessed. 
 
Fifty-six of the women mentioned the rising cost of living. Those who did not mention it 
lived with their parents or grandparents, and did not contribute to the household 
finances. Women who did recognise the changes spoke of how goods and services have 
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become more expensive in recent years, especially in relation to utilities. This is not 
surprising – the cost of fuel and electricity has more than doubled since 2000 (O’Hara, 
2014). Nevertheless, these changes were not discussed in the same terms; austerity was 
materialised differently and to differing degrees. Women whose standard of living had 
been significantly affected would discuss in detail the changes they faced, talking about 
the monetary value of items, specifically which items had become more expensive and 
their opinions about this. For others, the rise was acknowledged, but they did not go into 
detail about their spending practices. 
 
For example, although Celia knew about the recent decline in the standard of living, the 
impact on her day-to-day life was insignificant. Celia, a 27-year-old, middle-class, white 
woman, worked full-time in an architecture firm as a HR manager, and owned a flat with 
her partner in North London. She described the inconsequential impact the recession 
had on her employment. Having mused that she was aware that things had generally got 
‘a bit more expensive’, Celia then joked that the only affect the recession had had on her 
living standards was that she ‘had seen and enjoyed all the restaurant vouchers’ that had 
been on offer since the crash of 2008: 
 
I lived the same lifestyle in 2008 that I did in 2009 and 2010 … yeah people became 
far more money conscious, sure I didn’t get a big salary rise but I worked my way 
up and got a few promotions. I think for the most part I just saw and enjoyed all 
the restaurant vouchers, buy one get one free, the recession started that trend 
and now we are all voucher conscious, I got loads of vouchers! 
 
In less jovial terms, Mia, who was working towards qualifying as a GP and owned a flat in 
London, told me that she could feel the difference in living standards. However, unlike 
Celia, she felt that she had changed her behaviour in the last few years. When I asked her 
to elaborate, she said, ‘I’ve noticed things are far more expensive, I would never do a 
massive shop in Waitrose anymore … I’m personally now more aware of money’. Instead, 
Mia said she would drive further and go to Sainsbury’s or ASDA to do her weekly shop. 
Despite Mia’s admission that she had changed her shopping behaviour, both women 
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were in full-time employment, with a stable income and could not be characterised by 
the findings in the research reports above. Other middle-class women had 
characteristically similar responses to Mia and Celia. Polly, a 27-year-old, middle-class, 
white, occupational therapist living in Leeds, reacted to the increase in the cost of living 
by changing supermarkets. She said that instead of going to Sainsbury’s, she might go 
to LIDL (a lower cost supermarket), but would also go to a health foods shop for her 
‘essentials for the week’ (like chia seeds and almond milk). Essentially, Polly was still able 
to live comfortably – she told me that she had been on numerous holidays abroad during 
that year. These women were all in full-time employment (albeit with differing income, 
amount, and type of capital), had not been significantly affected by the rising cost of 
living, and would be able to cope with an unexpected bill (unlike those described above 
by the Money Advice Service). Austerity was materialised in the form of an increase in 
living costs; however, these women coped by minorly altering their shopping habits. 
 
For other women, the increased cost of living was felt significantly more and was 
discussed in different ways. Trisha, for example (mentioned in the previous section), had 
recently had her hours reduced because of organisational restructuring. Describing 
herself as being part of the ‘squeezed middle’ she said, ‘I know it affects me … there is an 
element of it where people like me feel it … I guess I’m somewhere around the squeezed 
middle-class’. Asking her to elaborate on what she meant by ‘people like me’, she said 
that, although she considered herself to be ‘quite comfortable’ as opposed to others in 
the current context, the increase in the cost of living had affected her to some degree. 
Despite this, she was quick to note; ‘I’m still able to buy my organic veg box and all those 
things,’ and ‘I can get by and have a holiday’. Although this sounds somewhat 
contradictory, her narrative can be read differently from the women such as Mia, Celia 
and Polly above. As research, has suggested, single mothers are being affected more by 
austerity in general (Fawcett Society, 2013; WBG, 2014a, 2014b; Rabindrakumar, 2017) 
and so it is not surprising that Trisha’s experience does not mirror that of the women 
above. However, we cannot take Trisha’s experience as representative of all single 
mothers. Trisha, despite losing economic capital and having to take a part-time position, 
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was in a well-paid managerial position. She had previously accumulated larger amounts 
of capital (property, networks and a master’s degree), which allowed her to ‘get by’, as 
she says, more easily than other women with fewer resources.  
 
Marie, a 28-year-old, working-class, black woman, lived in London, and like Trisha, also 
worked part-time in the public sector. However, unlike Trisha, Marie spoke of the 
constant strain she felt on her day-to-day finances, since being on a low-income salary 
made sustaining her household finances more difficult with the increasing cost of living. 
Also a single parent, Marie worked as a waitress in a café library in North London, and 
rented privately through a housing association. Finding it a challenge to pay the bills and 
‘fill the cupboards’ with the ongoing rise in the cost of living, she openly told me, 
‘sometimes I can’t fill the cupboards, I get paid and finish all the bills and I can’t fill them, 
things are getting so expensive’. With £30 per month to do her household shopping, she 
told me that she worried about being able to keep up with her son’s needs.  
 
However, Marie felt that she was able to ‘breathe more’ since coming off state benefits 
since she was able to get store credit. In a sense, this newfound access to credit had 
broadened Marie’s horizon of possibilities. She then wondered how those who are not 
currently working, reliant on state support or who have more than one child, were coping 
within the current context. Lucy, a 21-year-old, white, working-class woman from 
Brighton was such a woman. Feeling the greatest impact of the crisis, Lucy explained; ‘I 
survive but I’m not living. Bills, rent, clothes for my daughter, food, trying to get a good 
meal everyday, I manage but it’s not easy’. A single mother with one young daughter, 
Lucy was struggling on Income Support. She told me that, for example, if a utility bill 
came in which was not accounted for, ‘it will mess me up for weeks’. Other women who 
were also dependent on state support equally felt the strain. This is not unexpected – it 
has been widely reported that since 2010, social security benefits have been tightened 
and payments reduced (WBG, 2012; WRC, 2012).  
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As we can therefore see from the narratives above, women’s experiences of the rise in 
living cost vary considerably. Whilst those middle-class women above no longer did ‘a 
massive shop’, for those women at the other end of the spectrum, what to buy, where to 
buy from and whether they are able to buy was of equal importance. Discussions 
surrounding the topic often took place in monetary terms, describing their outgoings 
month by month. With a small amount of money to spend, their budget only allowed for 
essentials and therefore sacrifices had to be made. However, proximity to necessity was 
further affected by reliance on state support, those women who were in some form of 
employment described feeling more able to ‘breathe’. Therefore, although austerity 
manifests itself within day-to-day consumption practices, not all women interviewed felt 
the strain to the same degrees. This was therefore heavily dependent on the amount and 
different types of capital they possessed. 
 
Changes to State Support  
 
As described by Lucy above, the changes to state support unsurprisingly affected 
those who had or were (wholly or partially) reliant on receiving state support. The 
reduction in monetary payments in the form of caps and the changes to the way 
payments were allocated and administered (resulting in delays and sanctions) 
substantially affected their day-to-day living. Those who received more than one form 
of benefit discussed how the multiple caps and cuts had affected them. Marie, for 
instance, received Working Tax Credits, and Housing Benefit. Struggling economically 
with the rising cost of living, as noted above, she found it hard to manage – although her 
hourly rate had increased, her annual benefit increases were restricted and her housing 
benefit had been cut. Nevertheless, as she was not wholly reliant on state support, she 
was still ‘able to breathe.’ Similarly, Elaine, a 27-year-old, middle-class, white woman, 
working part-time as a welfare support officer in a High School in Brighton, had faced 
considerable difficulties over the last few years as the cost of living outstripped her 
benefits. At the hardest point, relying solely on Employment Support Allowance (ESA), 
she found herself living on £5,000 per year, spending approximately £10 per fortnight on 
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groceries. Now living with her partner, working part-time, and with the addition of her 
DLA, she also described herself as also being able to ‘breathe’. However, both these 
women were adamant that if their circumstances were to change, for example, if they 
lost their jobs, having to rely on welfare for their only source of income would be a great 
struggle. Women whose sole income came from welfare felt this increased strain. 
Heather, a 26-year-old, working-class, black single mother of four from London, was 
solely reliant on state benefit. She told me how the value of her benefits had reduced 
substantially since 2010, ‘yeah it’s gone down, no question. I don’t really see where it 
goes, I don’t really have money for anything, you know what I mean, I’m not saying that 
it doesn’t help but it doesn’t make ends meet’. With the cost of living outstripping benefit 
payments, those who relied solely on this as a means of income, are tremendously 
affected.  
 
It was not only the change in monetary amount, but also the changes in administration 
of benefits and increase in penalties, which made life harder. The introduction of 
Universal Credit was conceived to simplify the system by replacing tax credits, and 
merging six existing separate means-tested benefits – JSA, ESA, Income Support, 
Working Tax Credit, Child Tax Credit and Housing Benefit –into one monthly payment. 
Yet, these women cited this as an ‘unhelpful change’. Adele, a 23-year-old, working-
class, white single mother with a daughter under the age of three, from Leeds reliant on 
state support, told me that the changes to the way her Housing and Income Support have 
been paid had put her in an increasingly precarious position:  
 
I used to get paid weekly, and then my Income Support would come every two 
weeks and that suited me because I could pay things each week. Now that’s 
completely changed with the one payment and I find it really hard to cope 
because I don’t get that much … I’m struggling sort of thing, with my rent and so 
on.  
 
Faced with the prospect of one larger lump sum in her account each month, she told me 
that the new scheme was difficult as she tended to organise her household budget from 
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week to week, making it much harder to manage her finances. Faye, a 23-year-old, 
working-class, white single mother from Leeds, who was receiving Housing Benefit and 
Income Support, also mentioned Universal Credit. She was waiting for the change to 
take place46, and echoed Adele’s discussion above, ‘apparently, they are going to start 
paying everyone monthly … it’s stupid though because if you have kids and you’re skint 
and you know that money is in the bank you will dip into, just to get ends meet, that’s 
just stupid, well your baby is more important isn’t it, it’s stupid’. Labelling the 
introduction of Universal Credit as ‘stupid’, Faye knew, like Adele, that the new proposal 
would not suit her needs due to being proximate to necessity.  
 
For those with a disability or a serious health condition, changes to specific benefits 
generated unease, insecurity, stress and for some, great financial difficulties. Elaine was 
registered as disabled after becoming ill during her gap year. She finished university in 
2010 and was placed on ESA and Incapacity Benefit. In 2012, Elaine then did some 
permitted work, in which she was able to work up to 16 hours per week whilst being on 
ESA at a 6th form college. Coming off ESA in December 2013, having been offered a part-
time job at the college as a welfare coordinator, Elaine still received DLA47. Having spent 
five years on means-tested benefits, Elaine described her anxiety about the use of 
companies such as ATOS in the delivery of services. As part of the government’s ‘back to 
work’ scheme, ATOS introduced a test to gauge whether a claimant with an illness or 
disability was fit to work. This ‘test’ was not performed by the claimant’s doctor as before 
(doctors who were well versed in their patient’s medical history). The government 
contracted out the task of assessing the claimant’s ability to carry out certain functions 
to ATOS. If during the test the claimant was awarded enough points, they qualified for 
ESA. Elaine said, ’before ATOS, in my assessments I had to describe my symptoms and 
                                                
46The introduction of Universal Credit is has been delayed for all claimants due to issues with government 
administration. Records suggest that by December 2013, only 2,000 claimants with the least complicated 
benefits were on Universal Credit. It was then confirmed that the transfer of all claimants to Universal 
Credit would not make its 2017 target for implantation. 
 
47It should be noted that at the time of the interview DLA had not yet changed to PIP.	
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it wasn’t very confrontational. ATOS is a much more confrontational situation’. She said 
that she found the assessment staff ‘indifferent’ and ‘dismissive’ of her condition, and 
she suffered stress and humiliation from having to pander to their ‘points’ system.  
 
Likewise, Louise, a 35-year-old, white, working-class woman living in Leeds, diagnosed 
with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome ten years ago and unable to work, also described how 
her benefit changes had had a major effect on her standard of living. Since the 
introduction of stringent checks and cuts to benefits, Louise’s Mobility Allowance, (which 
she used to help her get around and travel to hospital appointments), has been stopped. 
Having to pay for her transport herself, without her allowance, she told me that she was 
having difficulty managing financially and was having to sacrifice her treatments and 
appointments as she couldn’t afford the transport. She explained the impact on her day-
to-day living:  
 
If I come in and out of hospital and I get too faint, I can’t just go running on buses, 
I can collapse, so I need a taxi. But because they’ve stopped this allowance, I can’t 
afford to go in taxis so I haven’t been going to the treatment. Some days I feel so 
ill I just can’t get about, so you can’t go to get your shopping, your prescriptions 
and things like that. So really your quality of life rests in their hands, my recovery 
is in their hands.  
 
Having appealed at a tribunal against the decision to stop her Mobility Allowance, Louise 
was waiting for the decision. However, she felt the appeal had caused her increased 
stress and affected her condition. Her doctor advised her not to attend the hearing to 
avoid the stress. Louise said: ‘it’s been nearly fourteen months, our illness is affect by 
induced stress, I was throwing up, crying all the time, I can’t sleep, it’s awful. It’s like 
they’re sending you to death row, that’s what it feels like, sending you to kill you, its 
horrendous’. If the appeal is granted, she would receive fourteen months’ worth of 
backdated allowance. If the appeal is rejected, Louise is not sure how she would manage. 
Although she had spoken many times to doctors, medical staff and her local council 
about her situation, she felt ‘kept in the dark’ most of the time. She explained that this 
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was due to changes being implemented without consultation and the fact that she was 
unable to understand the technical language used to discuss such changes. 
 
Mirroring the above, Elaine also felt unable to keep up with the changes to state support. 
However, unlike Louise, she had been employed to give benefit advice for a number of 
years. She told me: 
 
There are so many different systems and calling the Jobcentre or the local council 
they will usually give you the wrong advice. I now go and look up the big DWP 
handbook and try to find the latest PDF copy but it’s not useful for many people 
because it’s written in a very technical, legal way and often takes a lot of cross 
referencing different documents to figure out what the amendments mean … 
yeah there are a lot of good sites out there that give a lot of information but again 
they get out of date very quickly.  
 
Despite her knowledge and experience of the system, Elaine said that she worried about 
having to renew her benefits. Confused about the latest change to her benefits (the 
change from DLA to PIP which was supposed to be implemented in 2014), she felt she 
was being kept on her toes ‘trying to figure it all out’. Summarising her experience of the 
current social support system, Elaine said; ‘I have the perpetual feeling that everything is 
about to come crashing down around me because somebody, some faceless person, can 
just take away your support systems, very stressful’. For those who do not have 
knowledge and experience of how to understand the system, the anxiety is likely worse.  
 
The discussion above demonstrates that, despite the overall level declining, women’s 
experience of state support is dependent on several factors. Those who received more 
than one form of benefit, or who are wholly reliant on the state, suffered more as the 
caps and cuts affected them in several ways. Welfare reform leads to precarious lives, 
even for those whose lives are less reliant on welfare, such as Marie and Elaine, who have 
varying amounts of economic and social capital that allow a degree of movement away 
from such necessity. For those women, such as Louise, Heather, Faye and Adele who are 
entirely dependent on such support, this precariousness intensifies due to their proximity 
to necessity. 
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Housing  
 
Women’s experience of housing varied just as much as their living standards and 
experiences of employment. This is not surprising since changes to housing benefits, 
council tax benefits, the introduction of the ‘bedroom tax’ as well as soaring rents, have 
had a huge impact on housing security. The financial pressures on households have led 
some to struggle to pay rent, fall into arrears or even face eviction. At the same time, the 
residential property market remains a productive field of investment and wealth 
generation for many. Despite record high housing prices, eight of the women I 
interviewed owned their own property, which they had bought in the last few years. Four 
of these women had bought in London or Greater London and were all middle-class. 
Those who were renting spoke of the increase in rent over the last few years, none more 
so than those renting in the capital, who discussed the lack of affordable housing. Nine 
women spoke of either having to moving home, to save money or being unable to leave 
their parents’ homes. 
 
Those on lower incomes, from minority backgrounds and with children, suffered 
considerably more from this ‘housing crisis’. Many women who were renting wanted to 
move to social housing, but the lack of affordable social housing meant that they had 
remained on the waiting list for some time. Marta, a 35-year-old, working-class, white 
woman from Romania living in Brighton, discussed housing as one of the main issues she 
was having and the affect it was having on her family’s living standards. Marta moved to 
Brighton in 2007 from Romania as a student. She began working in a hotel in the South-
East of England, and after meeting her husband, became pregnant in 2011. Marta had 
since left her job as a hotel supervisor and moved back to Brighton. She rented a room 
from a private landlord with the knowledge that they were on a short-term contact. 
However, they were assured by him that they would be able renew the contract after the 
initial six months. Three weeks after giving birth, Marta and her family received notice 
that they were being evicted:  
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In that time I got frustrated and stressed and almost lost my milk. I went to ask 
for help at the council and try to get council house, I didn’t get any help, they told 
me I needed to rent privately because they didn’t have any houses … I didn’t know 
where to go or what to do, the only idea that came to my mind was to kill myself 
because I have a small baby. 
 
Having appealed to the landlord about their situation, the landlord agreed to let them 
rent another room in the same house but for an increased price – £750 instead of £650. 
Living only on her husband’s income (working as an assistant manager at a discount 
store), this increase in rent significantly affected their monthly budget. Marta hoped the 
situation would get better once they moved from private rented accommodation to 
social housing; however, having been on the waiting list for almost two years, Marta was 
unsure when or if this might come to fruition.  
 
Despite this, it was those who relied on housing benefit who felt the greatest impact of 
the housing crisis. Fifteen women received Housing Benefit, three living in privately 
rented housing and twelve in social housing. It was not only the capping of housing 
benefits coupled with the surge in rent that was discussed, but also the planned changes 
in the way payments from the government to the recipient would be administered. For 
the first time, Housing Benefit would be paid to the recipient, who would then be 
expected to pay their landlord rather than the government directly paying landlords. 
Among the primary concerns was the shift to a single monthly payment. As discussed 
above, women were concerned about the effect of a larger monthly lump sum, as they 
budgeted from week to week. Since having her daughter, Lucy’s housing benefit had 
been lowered by £75 per month. She explained: ‘I just get letters saying we’ve reassessed 
your claim, well clearly you haven’t, why would you, it’s gone down from £600 to £525’. 
With changes to her Income Support, in which she was £40 worse off per month and the 
continuing decrease in her Housing Benefit, Lucy was worried about how this might 
affect her current housing situation if she got into arrears or if her rent continued to 
increase over the next year. Other women also felt such anxiety, especially those living 
in London. Since the capital is becoming increasingly unaffordable for people on low 
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incomes or who rely solely on benefits, some women feared that they would have to 
move out of the area (see for example, the experiences of the women in the campaigns 
group Focus E15). 
 
In addition, it was discussed that cuts to Housing Benefit had made an impact on family 
structure within BAME ‘communities’. Ila, specifically discussing the effect of Housing 
Benefit on extended Asian families said: 
 
Within Asian families there are a lot of extended family members so not only have 
you got children and cousins, you’ve got grandparents. But now you’ve got to a 
point that you can’t even have your parents with you because financially now, the 
fact that they’re living with you, you’re worse off actually, they are worse off, so 
you are forced to live apart and when you’re forced to live apart, obviously their 
mental and physical state is affected, I find that instead of keeping families 
together, they [the government] are intent on splitting families.  
 
Research has shown that the government's Housing Benefit reforms have affected 
aspects of multigenerational living for families. According to a briefing by the Chartered 
Institute of Housing (2012), rather than encouraging potentially beneficial ways of living 
for low income families, benefit caps and ‘non-dependent’ deduction increases for 
housing benefit recipients have essentially been a disincentive to voluntary sharing. For 
Ila and other women from minority backgrounds who had previously lived with their 
extended family, benefit reform caps therefore worked against multigenerational living. 
As Ila noted, in the context of welfare reform, ‘you are forced to live apart’. They said that 
such changes were making families become more individualistic and made an impact on 
caring responsibilities, since extended family members looked after children when 
necessary. Now with families living apart, sometimes in other areas of the city, this was 
no longer possible. 
  
The ‘bedroom tax’ was also discussed. The policy, which came into force in April 2013, 
introduced financial penalties for anyone of working age living in rented social housing 
who was in receipt of Housing Benefit and deemed to be ‘over-occupying’ – according to 
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a set of criteria set out by the government. The new rules meant that ‘each single adult 
or couple should occupy one room while two children under 16 of the same gender were 
expected to share a bedroom and two siblings under 10 of different sexes must share’ 
(O’Hara, 2014: 76). Having experienced cuts to other benefits they received, the 
‘bedroom tax’ made an enormous difference to some young women’s standard of living. 
Of all the changes in recent years, Priya, a 35-year-old, Pakistani, middle-class, single 
mother, reliant on state support, who lived in in Brighton, found that this change affected 
her most. Priya moved to Brighton in 2005 with her son, after experiencing domestic 
abuse from her partner. Having suffered a breakdown a few years ago, Priya was getting 
treatment and counselling for severe depression and anxiety – but was paying for her 
counselling because of the increasingly long NHS waiting lists for mental health 
treatment. Since her son, who until recently lived with Priya on a full-time basis, left 
home to attend private school in Kent (paid for by his father), his room became 
temporarily unoccupied. Priya had been told that she would have to pay the ‘bedroom 
tax’ on this room, since her son was no longer living at her flat permanently. Not being 
able to cope with the reduction (according to O’Hara (2014), an average 14 per cent of a 
person’s benefits would be taken away), Priya told me that she was thinking of moving 
to a one-bedroom flat. However, this would mean that her son would not have a 
bedroom when he stayed with her at weekends, and would not be able to move back in 
if he wanted to live with her permanently again. 
 
Louise faced a similar situation. Diagnosed with a genetic condition in which she was 
unable to work, as discussed above, she had ongoing issues with her DLA and 
reassessments. In addition, Louise was made to leave her property due to the ‘bedroom 
tax’ the previous year. She said, ‘I had to move out because you can’t be in a property 
bigger than your needs, I wasn’t allowed a second bedroom’. However, Louise’s 
condition, in which she had part-time carers who used the second bedroom, was not 
taken into consideration. She could not pay for the second bedroom as her mobility 
benefits being in dispute (for the last fourteen months). Louise was moved from the city 
centre (where she lived for six years) to an area further away. Describing the area as 
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‘rough’, she told me she missed the convenience of being in the centre, near to her 
friends, and often felt unsafe in the new area. 
 
Housing therefore represents an area in which austerity is materialised within women’s 
lives. Some middle-class women (those who can buy houses in London, for example), 
despite the current context, can invest, accumulating capital through property. For those 
who can live with family members, the impact of austerity was less. For those who do not 
have the economic and social capital to avoid the ‘housing crisis’, the impact was felt 
more considerably, especially for those on low incomes and those from white and BAME 
working-class backgrounds. Although housing benefit is meant to alleviate housing 
problems, caps on the amount of benefit paid coupled with the increase in rents and the 
changes to the administration of payment, meant that women who relied on housing 
benefit often found themselves in arrears. The introduction of the ‘bedroom tax’ made 
already unstable positions even worse, as women needed to pay more or move property. 
Those women with some level of protection from parents or partners, are able to survive 
the economic onslaught. Those without are laid bare to real precarity.  
 
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has shown how austerity has manifested itself in women’s lives 
through employment and living standards: through general changes to employment, 
casualisation, unemployment, rise in cost of living, changes to and loss of benefits, and 
housing. The degree to which these changes affect women’s lives can be minimal, 
significant or extreme, which I demonstrated was affected by women’s differing position 
in the social space. We are therefore, not ‘all in this together’. I revealed how the volume, 
composition and trajectory of young women’s capital and resources differently position 
women in social space, opening up and/or closing down the degree to which austerity 
impacts their daily lives. Women with a higher volume of capital and resources, had 
relative distance from material necessary, since they possessed multiple forms of capital 
that enabled protection, security and distance from such effects. Yet, this does not mean 
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that women who are adjacent to each other in the social space experience austerity in 
the same ways. Due to women’s different ratios of economic and cultural capital and 
resources their experiences of the rising cost of living, changes to employment and trend 
to casulisation meant that their experiences were different. In some cases, young women 
were able to accrue capital (such as property and additional qualifications) within the 
context due to their particular social inheritances and embodiments, from which they 
had access to and acquisition of differential amounts of capital assets (Skeggs, 1997).  
 
As in other times of crisis, austerity (in the form of employment changes, the trend to 
casualisation, changes to ‘back to work’ policies and the rise in living costs) had a greater 
effect on white and BAME working-class women. They possessed less amounts and 
types of legitimate capital and resources, or found it harder to convert their capital to a 
different form. This placed them closer to necessity and made their experience of 
austerity being more extreme. Women who were solely reliant on state support and who 
had dependent children suffered most – their space of possibilities was therefore further 
diminished by the lack of protection, security, resources and capital. Cultural 
(qualifications) and social capital (networks and family/partner support) therefore 
becomes extremely important for young women in the context of austerity, since they 
help in placing women at a distance from material necessity. Such an analysis, which 
observes the ways women are experiencing and living austerity at a material level opens 
room to recognise austerity’s complex and multiple effects. At the same time, it shows 
how experiences in the present are shaped by pre-existing markers of class and ‘race’, 
which are being exacerbated by austerity measures. Building upon these discussions, the 
following chapter argues that economic, cultural and social capitals not only affect how 
women were impacted by austerity, but also how they are able to navigate its effects. 
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Chapter 6 
 
Navigating through Austerity 
 
 
I appreciate that there are families who face considerable 
pressures. Those pressures are often the result of 
decisions that they have taken which mean they are not 
best able to manage their finances. We need to ensure 
that support is not just financial, and that the right 
decisions are made. 
 
(Michael Gove, Education Secretary, September 2013) 
 
When Olive was first born, I had roughly about £170 a 
month spare for food, nappies and clothes. Now we have 
about £80, which I’m struggling with. I don’t know how it 
goes so quick … I try and do everything, I have lists all over 
my kitchen, I must look crazy, everything that goes in, the 
day and exactly what comes out. I have all my direct 
debits set up perfectly but if one thing messes up, like, I 
didn’t know, my internet wasn’t coming out and I got a 
letter saying I owed £160 and I was like what? How? If 
anything is higher than it should be I’m like ‘oh my god’. 
But I get there, I do my shopping and it’s the same every 
week. I get massive boxes of nappies off Amazon and 
wipes and they last. I think I have it kind of covered for 
now but if anything else changes I have to redo my lists 
again (laughs).  
 
(Lucy, 21, working-class, white, on Income Support, Brighton, 
March, 2015) 
 
 
Extending the argument made in the previous chapter, which highlighted the 
multiple ways in which austerity, in part, as an economic policy, has materialised and 
manifested in young women’s lives, this chapter adds a further dimension to this 
argument. It draws attention to the various ways in which women are navigating through 
such a context and how such navigation strategies are impacted by differences of 
gender, class and ‘race’. This chapter therefore complicates the above statement from 
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Michael Gove by demonstrating how differences impact the ways in which young women 
respond to and navigate through the effects of austerity.  
 
In the context of austerity, what falls under the banner of neoliberalism represents a 
series of profound social, political, cultural and economic shifts, which has resulted in the 
intensification of social regulation to protect the deregulation of the economic (Goldberg 
and Giroux, 2014). As was highlighted in Chapter 4, such shifts have come along with 
ideological discourses of personal entrepreneurship, individual competition, 
meritocracy, innovation, flexibilisation and commercial enterprise (Bourdieu, 1999), 
which place the individual’s misfortunes into their own hands, denying that the existing 
social structures produce inequalities. Such social regulation becomes even more evident 
during a crisis, when people are, to quote Gove, ‘facing considerable pressure’. Gove, in 
stating that he appreciates the pressure being placed on families, makes implicit 
reference to macro socio-economic problems, and the fact that we are ‘all in this 
together’. He then frames the pressures on families as being the result of individual 
decisions. The crux of his argument is that families should make the ‘right decisions’ and 
not rely on financial support. According to Gove, those who are unable to ‘manage their 
finances’, are suffering because of their own bad decision-making. In this framework, 
differences of class, gender, and ‘race’ are no longer relevant to the individual’s 
condition. The social issues are denied and ‘buried alive’ (Goldberg and Giroux, 2014) 
under the language of individualism and responsibility. As during previous times of crisis 
(see Chapter 4), such language decontextualises and naturalises these so-called 
‘pressures’ by placing sole responsibility onto the individual’s will and action. This 
therefore dismisses not only the structural context of austerity and its processes, but also 
the individual’s attributes, resources and capitals, which allow them to manage their 
finances better than others. 
 
This chapter is divided into four sections, each of which explore the different ways in 
which young women are navigating through austerity. It is important to note that such 
‘navigation strategies’ have not emerged within the context of UK austerity. As was 
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noted in Chapter 3 and 4, there is a depth of literature documenting how those living 
precarious lives ‘manage’ and ‘navigate’ through contexts of insecurity (Ehrenreich, 
2001; Johnson, 2002; Tirado, 2014). Empirical work on the lived experiences of austerity 
(Shildrick, et al., 2012; O’Hara, 2014; Patrick, 2014; Pemberton et al., 2014; Deville, 2015; 
Vacchelli, Kathrecha and Gyte, 2015; Hitchen, 2015, 2016; Garthwaite, 2016a; Hall, 2016) 
has extended such findings, discussing the different ways in which people at the ‘sharp 
end of the cuts’ are ‘managing’ or ‘coping’ within the landscape of austerity and how such 
tactics have been further compromised by external factors, such as cuts to services, 
reduction in benefits, rise in the cost of living and the scarcity of credit. Taking such work 
into account, this chapter highlights that it is not only those living ‘precarious lives’ that 
have to ‘navigate’ through the context of precarity and insecurity. Austerity’s impacts are 
complex, messy and multiple. However, like the analysis made in the previous chapter, 
the ways in which the young women I interviewed can respond to and navigate through 
such precarity, is dependent on the volume and composition of their capital and 
resources, as well as their trajectory (Bourdieu, 1979, 1986, 1989, 1991). It is these three 
axes which produce differentiated positions in the social space and therefore open up or 
close down the space or horizon of possibilities (Bourdieu, 1983, 2014) that young are 
able to navigate within/through.  
 
Reskilling and Changing Sectors  
 
One of the ways in which women navigate through the impacts of austerity was 
by making changes to their employment prospects through changing sectors or 
reskilling. This was in an attempt to ensure better job security in an increasingly uncertain 
environment. As was highlighted in Chapters 4 and 5, the growing trend towards 
casualisation (TUC, 2015) has resulted in the normalisation of less secure, part-time 
work, of which the majority of those impacted by such a growing trend, are women. 
Sarah, a 25-year-old, middle-class, white woman living in Leeds, working as an 
occupational therapist, experienced this trend. To navigate this uncertainty, she 
undertook further qualifications (accruing cultural capital in the form of a master’s 
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degree) in the hope of entering a more secure profession. Originally from Fife, Scotland, 
Sarah graduated with a BA in Social Policy from the University of Glasgow in 2009. 
Graduating in the midst of the crisis, with few graduate level jobs available, she decided 
to pursue a master’s degree in Occupational Therapy at the University of Leeds, for which 
she received a bursary (£360 per month) and had her fees paid for by the NHS. With the 
ageing population in the UK, Sarah thought that this would be an extremely secure 
profession to go into. However, since finishing her master’s degree in 2012 and working 
in the sector as a full-time member of staff for one year, she told me that despite enjoying 
her job, she had several issues with the sector. Sarah explained that the first job that she 
was offered after graduating was a ‘zero-hour’ contract: 
 
At first I was offered a temporary zero-hour contract. It was weird, I was covering 
maternity and they said, look you will get your five days 8:30-4:30, but it wasn’t 
written on paper, they did tell me when it was going to end – but again it wasn’t 
on paper and I felt really uneasy about that. This type of contract also doesn’t pay 
for training and in that role, I was supposed to do a five-day course and another 
six or seven days of training. 
 
Having rejected the job offer, Sarah was then offered a 27-month contract. Nevertheless, 
she still felt uncomfortable about taking that contract since she would have to look for 
another job in two years’ time. Seeing ‘jobs being cut all over the place’, she applied for 
jobs only with permanent contracts because she knew that without this, it would be more 
difficult to apply for a mortgage and she would feel ‘uneasy’ and ‘unsettled’ in her post.  
 
Like Sarah, Nina, a 27-year-old, white, middle-class primary school teacher living in 
Brighton, also discussed the necessity of gaining further qualifications (cultural capital) 
in an attempt to increase her job security. Now a teacher, Nina originally thought about 
working in digital marketing, having graduated from Sussex University in 2008 with a 
degree in Media and Culture. Interning at an agency whilst also working in the hospitality 
sector, she became unhappy with the insecure, low-paid work. Explaining this is more 
detail, she said that she felt that they ‘waved this carrot with “there might be a job at the 
end of it or there might not”’. Unable to continue working within such a precarious and 
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insecure environment, Nina decided to retrain as a teacher and qualified in 2012. 
Discussing teaching she told me:  
 
The workload is tough but there is huge job security. I know from other colleagues 
that I have an incredible pension and if, for some horrible reason, something 
happened to me, my family would get a massive pay out. When I have children in 
the future, my maternity package is one of the best I could wish for, and in terms 
of job progression, I think it is somewhere that I could go quite far quite quickly in 
so … that for me is good.  
 
Nina then said, had it not been for the recession, she would have possibly come to the 
teaching profession later in life and pursued digital marketing further. However, in such 
an insecure context, the need for this stability outweighed her passion to pursue an 
alternative profession. It should be noted here that both Nina and Sarah were able to 
obtain grants or bursaries, which enabled them to retrain or reskill, gain further 
qualifications, and accrue additional cultural capital to pursue more ‘secure’ professions 
within these various sectors. If they had taken each course a few years later, they would 
both have had to pay university fees of £9,000 per year to acquire these qualifications. 
For those who do not possess the economic capital to undertake such a shift in career 
and salary to gain further qualifications (cultural capital), their capability to feel ‘more 
secure’ in employment terms therefore becomes significantly harder.  
 
In contrast, having been employed in the public sector in teaching, Nadia, a 32-year-old, 
mixed other, middle-class woman living in Leeds working as a teacher, reskilled and 
gained further qualifications (cultural capital) in an attempt to move out of the teaching 
profession. This was in order to move into another profession that would guarantee her 
a higher income. Undertaking a master’s degree in Psychological Research, Nadia hoped 
this would lead her into the consulting sector. She explained that it was her increasingly 
negative experience of working in the public sector that made her rethink her career and 
pursue a post-graduate degree. She told me:  
 
I’m leaving it because of the fact, as well as all the other reasons, that I can’t trust 
it, I can’t trust it, not like those who are leaving it now can or have over the years. 
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Things are changing so much, if I continue being amongst the hundreds of 
thousands of dissatisfied teachers who are bumbling along, then I’ll regret it in 
years to come. 
 
Explaining that she might be in ‘trouble’ financially if she stays in the teaching profession, 
she went on to say, ‘I have to invest in me now, for the future, so I don’t need to rely on 
pensions, for instance’. This investment was in the form of going part-time as a teacher 
whilst paying £9,000 in fees over two years. Speaking to Nadia again the following year, 
she told me that she had since quit her teaching job due to the demands of the master’s 
degree, and had moved in with her partner due to financial issues. Had she not had the 
possibility of living with her partner, Nadia would have had to choose between pursuing 
her master’s degree and taking out a loan to cover her expenses, or returning to teaching 
full-time. Her investment was therefore aided by her social capital in the form of 
protection and security from her partner.  
 
For others, gaining further cultural capital through education and reskilling was seen as 
an important investment. However, the current climate and their current position either 
rendered this impossible, or they thought that it would not make a difference to their 
situation. Marie, a 28-year-old, black, working-class woman living in London, who was 
working part-time as a waitress in a library café, discussed how changing her career 
might allow her to become more financially stable. Having heard rumours from her 
colleagues that the library might lose its funding and that her hours might reduce due to 
cuts, Marie worried about her job security. Having done a diploma in Business 
Management whilst being pregnant with her son, Marie wanted to take her qualification 
further and accrue more cultural capital to be able to get a better paying job with more 
stability. However, as a single mother who was solely responsible for the household 
income, she felt that it was a gamble to take on further study. She explained:  
 
I can do teaching if I keep studying but it’s a lot of work. I’ve considered it, but I’m 
working now I have to pay for everything as well, can I afford to do another added 
thing to make me better off? I know people say it’s an investment but there is no 
room for that at the moment. You know, I guess I’m comfortable … I only get one 
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day off in the week and my son needs me. Maybe it’s small minded of me but … I 
don’t know.  
 
Unlike the middle-class women described above, Marie could not make an investment 
to acquire further cultural capital, and she had no security through a partner to offset 
economic losses during the transition period. Nadia, Nina and Sarah (who were able to 
use their higher volumes and types of capital to reskill) were hoping that this would 
confer more security and a better standard of living in years to come, thus expanding 
their horizon and space of possibilities. Marie’s lower volume of capital meant that the 
time and financial costs of reskilling outweighed any potential future investment. As 
Bourdieu notes, because cultural capital is embodied, its acquisition requires an 
investment of time (1984: 244). Marie’s investment of time was through halting 
economic losses and investing in caring for her son, rather than investing in herself. This, 
as Skeggs has argued, prevents women focusing on themselves (1997: 161).  
 
Therefore, this section demonstrates that the insecurity of the job market (in both the 
private and public sectors) has resulted in young women thinking about the necessity of 
accruing further cultural capital in order to try and increase their level of security in a 
progressively uncertain context. However, as was shown above, undertaking such 
strategies is possible for some more than others. Nina, Sarah and Nadia, on the one 
hand, albeit in different ways and due to different circumstances, could use their various 
amounts and types of capital to reskill, investing in gaining additional forms of 
qualifications for more ‘secure’ or higher paying professions. For Maria, on the other 
hand, despite knowing that further qualifications would help her to find more secure and 
better paying employment, such a form of investment was not possible – time was spent 
trying to maintain her lifestyle and care for her son in a context of insecurity and 
precarity. Accruing further capital brought with it too much potential insecurity which 
could result in losses, since the types of capital that she needed to facilitate her 
investment (outside help and income and savings) were lacking. Therefore, the ability to 
open one’s horizon of possibilities and navigate through the current context, is impacted 
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by the type of cultural capital women possess, as well as the volume of, and the trajectory 
of their capital.  
 
Cutting Back and Living Cheap: Sacrificing Luxuries, Sacrificing Essentials 
  
As discussed in Chapter 5, increases in the prices of essential everyday goods 
(food, products and fuel) has put more strain on women’s budgets, whether they were in 
work or not. The cost of fuel and electricity had more than doubled since 2000 (O’Hara, 
2014), and had steadily made it harder for people to heat their homes adequately. The 
rising cost of food has also affected the cost of living. A common strategy for navigating 
through the effects of austerity was by ‘cutting back’ and/or ‘living cheap’.  
 
Many women said that they had changed their shopping habits over the last few years, 
by frequenting low-cost supermarkets, and not doing ‘big shops’. However, they had not 
completely abandoned their favoured ‘mainstream’ supermarket or wholefoods store, 
and still favoured organic over value products. Many women noted that they only bought 
‘essentials’ and not ‘luxuries’ and that they were ‘cutting back’ or ‘living cheap’. However, 
what might be essential by one person’s standards could also be a luxury for another. 
Equally, ‘living cheap’ and ‘cutting back’ can mean two very different things. For 
example, most women said they had ‘cut back’ to a certain degree. Emma, a 25-year-old, 
white, middle-class woman, was living at her parent’s house in south London and was 
unemployed, having had her contract at a charity organisation come to an end the 
previous month. She said her family had ‘cut back’. When I asked her to elaborate, she 
told me, ‘I mean, we don’t have Sky any more’. In comparison, both Anna, a 27-year-old, 
white, middle-class, physiotherapist living in London and Lucy, a 21-year-old, white, 
working-class single mother reliant on welfare living in Brighton, told me that they had 
stopped buying luxuries. I asked them both to explain this further. They said that they 
had become ‘more careful’. Anna said, ‘I mean I’m not extravagant, so for example, I try 
to not eat out all the time and I won’t go buy a dress because I think it’s nice, if it was on 
sale maybe, but things are a bit more expensive now and living in London and working in 
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the NHS I don’t think I can live an extravagant lifestyle’. I asked Anna to tell me the last 
thing she can remember that she bought for herself. ‘Maybe booking flights to go away 
or a jacket, I can’t remember’. In comparison, Lucy also said that she had been ‘cutting 
back’. When I asked her the last thing she had bought herself, she paused, ‘if I have a 
spare fiver I might buy myself a coffee, that’s the nicest thing I do, that’s my treat, my 
little luxury’. Thinking about her answer, she then went on to say, ‘if you think about it, 
that’s not really a treat is it … going for a coffee?’  
 
Continuing, she told me that she had £80 per month to spend on food, nappies, and 
clothes. Describing herself as ‘struggling’ but ‘getting by,’ she spoke about her shopping 
habits. ‘I’m good with knowing where to go to get food at certain times and things like 
that, for example, on Sunday, pretty much every supermarket has discounts’. Discount 
shopping in bulk with her mother, Lucy explained to me that they froze the food so they 
could ‘have an alright meal’ every night of the week. She also shopped online to bulk-buy 
nappies and wipes. ‘Living cheap’ she noted, took up a substantial amount of labour 
power, time and effort. Like Lucy, other women discussed similar shopping habits. Marie 
described herself as a ‘very much a shop-around type of girl’:  
 
I go a lot of places seeing things thinking do I need it, do I not? What I do is I try to 
buy so I don’t need to buy it again for the next month, like washing powder and 
things like that, I go to the butchers, you get more for your money, it’s a bit 
cheaper than supermarkets, but I just shop around. Things for his [her son’s] 
packed lunch, I get from the pound shop. 
 
Such tactics have also been discussed by Patrick (2014; also, see Atkinson, 2013; Hitchen 
2015) who notes the ‘very hard work’ of getting by on benefits: with time-intensive tight 
budgeting practices and activities (like Lucy and Marie above), hand-washing clothes, 
skipping meals, deciding to ‘heat or eat,’ as well as scavenging supermarket bins for 
waste food. Women with children also talked about having to cut back on goods and 
practices such as children’s costly social activities, lengthy Christmas and birthday lists 
and day trips away. 
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Like Patrick’s findings, some women who were dependent upon state support said that 
they sacrificed essentials or skipped meals, and often had to decide between buying food 
and heating their homes (‘heat or eat’) (also see Lambie-Mumford and Snell, 2015). Rita, 
a 35-year-old, white, working-class woman who was receiving state benefit and lived 
alone in Leeds, had not eaten for two days at the time of the interview, as she could not 
afford to pay her heating bill of £180 and feed herself at the same time. With her gas on 
a meter, it was considerably more costly for her to heat her home; however, being in 
rented accommodation, she was unable to change the system. Aware of the costly 
nature of her meter, she said that she rarely put the heating on and was often cold. She 
had suffered from pneumonia a few months earlier. Similarly, Scarlett, a 23-year-old, 
white, working-class single mother of two, on Income Support in Leeds, told me, ‘last 
week I had to take out of my mouth to put uniforms on my kids’. She noted that this 
practice had become increasingly recurrent in the last year. For those struggling in the 
current context of austerity, lists were often discussed as a way to keep track of their 
finances. Lucy’s discussion is illustrative of this when she said, ‘I have lists all over my 
kitchen, I must look crazy, everything that goes in, the day and that comes out and I have 
all my direct debits set up perfectly’. However, many spoke of how unexpected 
‘essentials’ such as children’s clothing and high utility bills would disrupt their careful 
financial management and would leave them unable to manage all their outgoings.  
 
Discussing the tactics and pitfalls of living cheap, – or as she calls it ‘a benefit mind-set’ – 
Elaine, a 27-year-old, white, middle-class woman living in Brighton who was registered 
disabled, reliant on DLA but also worked part time at a school as a welfare support officer 
in Brighton, made a very interesting point. She asked, ‘we all live cheap because we have 
to, but where do we get the knowledge to live cheap?’ Telling me that her father had 
previously worked as a social worker helping people with budgeting, she explained that 
she had been educated in financial management and felt that her situation was different 
from those who might not have had access to such information. She went on to say:  
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I had the knowledge of how to do that. It was important for me to pay my bills by 
direct debit, I didn’t have to worry about running up a meter that would cost more 
and wouldn’t have to worry that if I used the hob it would knock out the power. 
And I knew about contacting all the energy and utility companies and saying 
about tariffs. I’d saved as much as I could when I was a student from my student 
loan, tried to put £100 away each month knowing that I wouldn’t have that to rely 
on after I graduated. I was told by my parents to avoid payday loans and just given 
general financial education, which I think a lot of people don’t get. Schools 
certainly don’t do anything about the realities of budgeting. For example, you 
hear about “the woman said how cheaply she made her porridge,” but she isn’t 
taking into account you are going to have to use your hob and if you are on a 
meter that’s going to use up your electricity for the rest of the week, whereas a 
cereal bar, it’s instant.  
 
Elaine’s ability to navigate austerity was therefore easier due to her cultural and social 
capitals. Educated her in financial management, Elaine could save money more easily, 
since she knew the best ways to do so. Without such knowledge, navigating these 
challenges would have been a lot harder.   
 
Therefore, what this section demonstrates is that, once again, women are navigating the 
current context and trying to preserve economic capital through cutting back and trying 
to live cheaper – sacrificing luxuries and, in some cases, essentials. For some women, this 
meant cutting back on clothes and frequenting low-cost supermarkets while not 
completely abandoning their previous shopping habits. For others, who had always had 
to manage their finances, it meant spending a considerable amount of effort on discount 
shopping and buying in bulk. In some cases (most often those women who were fully 
reliant on state support), women had to choose between ‘heating or eating,’ or between 
feeding themselves and feeding their children, as they could not afford both. This was 
despite careful implementation of financial management on a daily basis. Those with a 
higher volume and types of capitals could use fewer tactics and less effort as they were a 
lot further from necessity. Women who were close to necessity (through the devaluation 
of economic capital and cuts in welfare expenditure), found it much harder, despite the 
considerable effort that went into trying to make the best decisions.  
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Alternative Lifelines/ Alternative Options  
 
Family Support/Partner Protection  
 
Some women use their relationships as ‘alternative lifelines’ when navigating the 
changes brought about by austerity and their decreasing ‘space of possibilities’ 
(Bourdieu, 1983, 2014), but the extent and necessity of help differs between women. 
Most had received help from their families in one form or another. For some, this was in 
the form of a contribution towards a house deposit, to help them get onto the property 
ladder. Bourdieu calls this a ‘reproduction strategy’, a practice designed (and mediated) 
to maintain and improve one’s positions (1984: 125). Without this financial boost from 
their parents, it would have likely taken the women much longer to get a mortgage. This 
inheritance reinforced their stability in their position within the social space. For others, 
it was being able to live at home with their parents, either when they could not rent 
because of low income and rising rents (especially in London and Brighton), or when they 
wanted to save money to secure a mortgage of their own. Most of the women who lived 
with their parents were either not asked for a financial contribution towards living costs, 
or they were only asked for a token amount (considerably less than what they would be 
paying whilst renting). This allowed some women to take unpaid internships or low-
paying graduate jobs, without needing to be financially independent.  
 
Alice, a 23-year-old, white, middle-class woman lived at home with her parents in south 
London and did not pay rent. Having graduated from Cambridge University that 
summer, Alice was looking for full-time employment. Alice had applied for jobs within 
the charity sector, but had been rejected so took on an unpaid internship to gain relevant 
experience. Her ability to live with her parents, who owned their home and who were in 
stable occupations (a GP and a teacher) during this time, allowed Alice to gain the 
requisite experience. She told me that she was also looking for a part-time job that she 
would do whilst interning. However, this additional work was to permit her to have an 
income to spend on socialising with friends. Deciding to go abroad for a year or so, Alice 
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hoped this would not only give her time to figure out what she would like to do with her 
life, but also give her a chance to earn money (economic capital), learn another language 
(cultural capital) and ‘sit out’ the ‘painful job market for a while’. Knowing that she could 
always move back home without having to contribute to the household finances 
generated a sense of security.   
 
Hannah, a 23-year-old, white, working-class woman, moved back in with her parents 
after graduating from Cardiff University (Cardiff). She was unable to find a job and could 
not afford to rent with friends. However, her parents’ precarious financial situation 
(working as a hotel cleaner and a lorry driver and renting in south London) meant that 
Hannah’s presence put a considerable strain on their resources. Therefore, Hannah 
began doing concession work at a football stadium and stewarding at various music 
venues in London on a zero-hour contract, to bring money into the household. Like Alice, 
she had applied for graduate jobs and had been rejected. Unlike Alice, her living situation 
did not allow her take time to volunteer or undertake an internship. Although parents 
could help their daughters in the current context, the degree of help depended on the 
amount of capitals available to both the women and their parents. This altered how the 
women perceived and navigated the possibilities and constraints. The differing 
trajectories therefore opened or closed their horizon of possibilities, providing degrees 
of stability and protection, and the ability to accrue further resources and capital. 
However, for others, time was spent halting losses and therefore their ability to navigate 
through the context was limited by their lower amounts of capital and their family 
trajectory.  
 
For young women with children, family support became paramount for their ability to 
navigate austerity. Nicola, for example, a 34-year-old, white, middle-class woman, also 
lived with her parents in their 4-bedroom house in Brighton. As a currently unemployed 
single mother with a four-year-old daughter, Nicola received very little help from the 
state in the form of Income Support, because she was not actively seeking work (she had 
health problems) and had a small amount of savings from her previous jobs in teaching. 
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Living rent-free, she was not asked to contribute to the household finances. Her parents 
also helped financially in relation to her daughter. Nicola described finding the situation 
humiliating, but said that living with her parents meant that her daughter didn’t ‘go 
without’. She said, ‘luckily, my parents are very helpful and understanding and they are 
supportive and don’t want my daughter to suffer with me not being able to look after her 
financially and not have the same lifestyle that I grew up with’. Her family’s support 
meant that her current financial situation had not affected or changed her daughter’s 
middle-class lifestyle. Nicola’s trajectory therefore enforced stability and prevented any 
downgrade or change to her middle-class trajectory. However, for many women, moving 
in with their families was not an available option because of overcrowding or strict 
housing rules (as discussed in Chapter 5).  
 
For other single mothers that I interviewed, help was given in different ways. Frequently, 
friends and family gave small monetary contributions. Borrowing money from family 
members was common when money was tight. Scarlett, as discussed above, often spoke 
of borrowing ‘a tenner’ off her mum to help pay for essential utilities. Similarly, Faye, a 
23-year-old, white, working-class single mother of one on Income Support from Leeds, 
‘borrowed the odd fiver’ from her dad every few days, which was a lifeline when money 
was tight, ‘if it wasn’t for my dad helping me, I would have been, I don’t know, I don’t 
know what I would have done. My dad helps me a lot, he gives me money when he can’. 
Aside from monetary assistance, help with childcare from friends and family enabled 
women to attend meetings at the Jobcentre, or helped them to avoid benefit sanctions 
by allowing them to attend mandatory work placements. Family support prevented 
them getting into debt or losing benefits through sanctioning. This had a critical impact 
on their day-to-day lives.  
 
Support and protection of partners also made a huge difference in young women’s ability 
to navigate austerity, especially for those who relied on welfare. For instance, Elaine was 
registered disabled and received benefits, worked part time and lived with her partner: 
 
 181 
I’m ok now but that’s only because I live with my partner who works full time. So, 
if I didn’t live with him I’d have to take tax credits. I was back on the benefits, I 
think … it would be in fact harder because the benefits have changed more and 
more often and going back to it, Universal Credit is coming in, the premiums are 
going, so yes it would be a big struggle. And if I had to move, if I had to go back 
to private rental I wouldn’t be able to afford it, I would find myself in arrears really 
quickly. You will easily wait two years on the list for a council house in Brighton.  
 
The protection of her partner made a vast difference to Elaine’s circumstances. As she 
said, if she was on her own, ‘it would be a big struggle’ and she might find herself ‘in 
arrears very quickly’. However, at the same time, said that she had come across a lot of 
women with disabilities who were worried about getting into a relationship because of 
this issue. Depending on the type of benefit and amount received, partner protection 
could in fact, become a problem and could foster dependency, due to the difficulty in 
applying for social housing once again. Many of Elaine’s friends who relied on this type 
of support, felt that it might become too risky to ‘choose to spend their life with a 
partner’. As Elaine explained: ’if your benefits stop and this guy turns out to be the wrong 
choice, you’re tied in, you could be waiting month to get a flat, and during that time, 
what do you do. So, it’s going to trap women in bad relationships and it’s just not worth 
waiting to see If it happens’. 
 
Agencies and Organisations 
 
Not everyone was able to borrow informally – different life histories and 
trajectories rendered this type of strategy impossible. Those who did not have a large 
support network or couple protection often used outside agencies. Eleven of the women 
interviewed told me that they had frequently relied on housing organisations, 
unemployment centres, debt advice centres and women’s support services in the last few 
years. Scarlett, Faye (discussed above) and Adele, a 23-year-old, white, working-class 
woman, were all single mothers with young children on Income Support. They had all 
been attending a support service in Leeds for the last two years, for housing, debt and 
benefits advice. This organisation allowed them to use the phone to discuss issues they 
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were having with their benefits. Faye told me, ‘if it wasn’t for the organisation, I wouldn’t 
be able to ring about my tax credits or ring the Jobcentre, I wouldn’t be able to do any of 
that if it wasn’t for them’. Since Jobcentres no longer offer a free telephone service on 
the premises, this affects those who do not have access to a phone, or cannot afford to 
call from their own. Similarly, Lauren, a 33-year-old, white, working-class woman, 
receiving JSA, who attended the same support centre, said that the organisation had 
helped her when she had been sanctioned, and had assisted her to coordinate a payment 
plan when she fell into arrears. She told me:  
 
When I got a letter from the social saying that they had overpaid my Working Tax 
Credit, I’ve took it all up there and they sorted it out for me. They’ve been 
amazing. And when I got a letter from the Social Fund saying they were going to 
try take money off me when I had been sanctioned, they managed to get my 
payments down from £20 a week to £9 a week. 
 
Despite the importance of these organisations to the young women’s lives, they are 
persistently underfunded. Rebecca, a 28-year-old, white, middle-class woman living in 
Brighton, who worked as a debt and benefit adviser, described the increased need 
coupled with the reduction of services as a ‘double edged sword’. Explaining further she 
said: ‘they are expecting advice services to run on a shoestring and everyone is frazzled 
because they have so much work to do and nowhere to send people to’. She then went 
on to say that with the increased pressure to do ‘more and more work with less and less 
money and resources’, she felt that these services ‘can only go on for so long’.  
 
These organisations did not only provide benefits advice and support, but also helped 
the women in other ways. Marta for instance, a 35-year-old white, working-class woman 
from Romania, who looked after her daughter full-time, began attending a Brighton-
based community centre, because she felt isolated (her and her partner’s family lived 
abroad and she had very few friends in the area). At the centre, Marta’s daughter could 
stay in the crèche and interact with other children, which Marta felt was extremely 
important to her socialisation. Marta had also begun volunteering in the crèche. She 
additionally received help with clothes, shoes, toys, and books for her daughter. Ila, a 35-
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year-old, Bangladeshi, working-class, single mother, currently unemployed and in 
receipt of JSA attended a BAME women’s centre in South Leeds, told me how the 
organisation had helped her. It ran a befriending scheme, which brought women 
together in the area for both skills sessions and day trips with their children. Ila had felt 
the squeeze on her finances, and she often felt guilty about not being able to provide her 
children with what they wanted. The day trips helped Ila to keep the children happy and 
entertained. Others who attend similar organisations in London and Brighton also 
discussed this sense of community that organisations provide. Priya, a 35-year-old, 
middle-class, Pakistani woman currently in receipt of DLA, attended a BAME counselling 
service at a women’s centre in Brighton. She said the centre not only made her feel safer 
than other services that she has attended in the past, but also she felt that they 
understood her needs more fully. Yet, many such organisations in Brighton have recently 
closed, and Priya worried for the future of this service. As for other at-risk services, 
women worried about what they would do if the support services were closed. This is not 
an unfounded worry, since findings from the Rosa Fund report (Pratten, 2014; Vacchelli, 
Kathrecha and Gyte, 2015) show that that sixty per cent of women’s sector organisations 
have struggled to maintain their income over the last five years, with nearly five per cent 
being forced to close support services altogether due to lack of funds. Smaller specialist 
organisations, such as BAME support services, are disproportionately affected. The 
women using these organisations, who already had a smaller horizon of possibilities to 
navigate within, are left with even fewer resources to weather the storm of austerity.  
 
Food Banks  
 
The use of food banks was another way which helped women to navigate within 
the context of austerity. Fifty-four women discussed the use of food banks generally. 
Four young women had tried to get food bank vouchers but, as they were in low-paid 
employment, they did not qualify. As discussed in Chapter 2, I visited two food banks 
during my fieldwork. Like Garthwaite’s observations during her ethnographic research in 
a Trussell Trust food bank in Stockton-On-Tees titled Hunger Pains (2016a), most of 
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those whom I observed and spoke to during my time at the food banks and of the women 
that I interviewed who had used the service (five in total) did so due to mounting 
pressures on household finances. These were caused by, among other things, job cuts, 
wage stagnation, spiralling utility and shopping bills, and an array of austerity-driven 
benefits changes including the application of sanctions. As argued by O’Hara (2014), food 
banks unquestionably have become one of the most visible symbols on the austerity 
landscape. Despite the controversial statements by some government ministers – which 
have tended to overshadow more pressing concerns about food poverty and increased 
need in the UK, attributing the rise of food banks with supply and demand – figures show 
a 200 per cent increase in the number of people receiving help from food banks in the 
year 2013-2014 (Trussell Trust, 2014). This was during the three months that immediately 
followed significant benefits cuts and social security reforms. The most recent report 
from the Trussell Trust (2017) has shown that foodbanks in areas of full Universal Credit 
rollout to single people, couples and families, have seen a 16.85 per cent average increase 
in referrals for emergency food, more than double the national average of 6.64 per cent. 
 
To access food banks, people must obtain a referral voucher from a frontline care 
professional or ‘voucher holder’ (such as a doctor, health visitor, schools and social 
workers). The voucher holder identifies people in crisis and issues a red voucher to those 
who they think are in need (also see Garthwaite, 2016a: 43). Marta, Lauren (both 
discussed above) and Heather were all referred to food banks via charitable organisations 
or schools. Heather, a 26-year-old, black, working-class woman, receiving Income 
Support, living in London for instance, was given a ‘red voucher’ from a woman who 
worked in family services at her daughter’s school. She told me:  
 
I was pregnant and she [family service officer] was asking me about the baby and 
how I’m finding it and I was like ‘it’s really hard’…she said she had something if I 
was interested in it, but to come to a meeting with her. So, I went and you see it 
in films like, with people going to the food bank, I never thought that they existed 
(laughs) and she was like yeah we have that to help you over the Christmas period 
if you want and she said she would give me a voucher for the food bank and then 
I could go and see what I thought and if it was ok and I wanted to go again she 
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would give me another voucher. I think we got about four vouchers under this 
scheme. It’s better than nothing.  
 
Likewise, Lauren and Marta also received ‘red vouchers’ from organisations they were in 
contact with. Lauren had been sanctioned one-month prior and having been in contact 
with a housing organisation she had been given three vouchers to use during that time 
period. Similarly, Marta and her family were struggling to live only on her partner’s sole 
income and a health visitor had issued her with some vouchers. 
 
When these women attend the food bank they are met by volunteers, told to take a seat, 
offered tea/coffee and biscuits or baked goods such as muffins and pastries, and asked 
what food they would like from the list of items available (a choice of, for example, pasta 
or rice, tea or coffee). This list is then taken to the ‘warehouse’ or ‘store room.’ The food 
is packed by volunteers and then handed to these women. A parcel might include cereal, 
juice, soup, tea or coffee, tinned tomatoes, pasta sauces, sugar, tinned vegetables, 
tinned fruit, rice/pasta, tinned fish, tinned meat, biscuits, long-life milk, sugar, and extra 
treats (when available) of jam, chocolate, and sauces (Trussell Trust, 2017). At times, 
bakeries donate fresh baked goods, which are added to the parcel. The food bank in 
North London also provides people with toilet rolls, nappies, and hygiene products such 
as deodorant, toothpaste and sanitary towels. The parcel is intended to last a household 
for three days; however, all three of these women told me that they stretched the food 
out as far as possible so that these vouchers would last longer. These ‘strategies within 
strategies’ allowed the young women to navigate such precarity for a longer period of 
time.  
 
Unlike Heather, Marta and Lauren, Cherry, a 35-year-old, black woman originally from 
Sierra Leone was not in contact with a referral agency but came to hear about the food 
bank from the council. As Garthwaite notes (2016a: 45), it is a common misconception 
that anyone can turn up at the food bank and get free food and there is a risk that some 
of the most vulnerable will not be able to access support as a result. When I met Cherry, 
she had moved to London from Chicago (US) following a relationship breakdown seven 
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months before, and, with her four daughters had been going to the food bank on and off 
for the last few months. She had previously lived in France and had European citizenship. 
Cherry was accustomed to a ‘middle-class lifestyle’, having previously owned hair and 
beauty businesses. However, in London, she had no current income or savings and was 
not eligible for state support due to problems with her papers and her children’s 
passports. Cherry had therefore been sleeping in a bus stop and a garage for four months 
and was now living in temporary accommodation with nine other families. Working at 
Tesco’s part-time and earning £400 per month, she explained her situation to me: 
 
When I came here, for four months we were sleeping on the ground, my children 
suffered, they became very ill, I’d have to wash them every night with very hot 
water and use a very warm towel, they said everywhere hurts; sometimes we 
didn’t have bread to eat. Now we are staying in a house where I’m not sleeping at 
all at night because a man lives close to us, smoking the whole night, coming out 
of the house, every time he comes back in he bangs the door. The house is full of 
nine different families; it is awful (cries). It’s now seven months on and I am still 
waiting for my benefits, they haven’t given them to me. I couldn’t afford to eat, 
buy my children’s school uniform, nothing! I don’t have Child Benefit, Child Tax 
Credit or Income Support. I don’t have anything. I work at Tesco’s part-time but 
it’s not enough. I’ve been to the council week after week asking for help, but they 
said there isn’t any. I even asked them to help pay for my children’s school 
uniform because school was starting and I couldn’t afford the uniform, but they 
said they couldn’t help me. So one day when I went to the council again, they gave 
me the number of a food bank that might be able to help me…so I went there one 
day, I was really broken and Martin [the director of the food bank] asked me what 
the problem was, so I told him about my children’s uniform. He said ‘I can pay it’. 
That same day he gave me someone to drive me to get the uniforms from the 
shop. Martin paid for my children’s uniforms!!! Sometimes I have to run to Martin 
for him to pay my transport, he will call the council and they will reject him but he 
will still pay it for me. (Crying) it is too much, we have been going there for a long 
time now, I want to stop going, it’s like always Martin, I’m always going there … I 
want to stop, like the last time I didn’t go there for three weeks and the past three 
weeks we were struggling.  
 
Like Heather and Lauren, Cherry also stretched the food parcels as far as possible, and 
‘struggled’ between each visit. For some, this quotation could be seen as supporting the 
notion that food banks foster dependency. Government ministers, MPs and councillors 
have made this argument. However, I maintain that this narrative illustrates the 
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importance of such organisations. For example, Cherry, discussing her income and 
outgoings, said, ‘I get £400 from Tesco. I have a bill from T-Mobile £500, because my 
daughter was going to the internet, she didn’t realise that it costs, so now I am paying 
£95 for that and my telephone £68, transport £80 and what will remain…nothing’. With 
such deductions, Cherry had £39.25 per week to live on. Food parcels were extremely 
important for Cherry to be able to navigate her extremely precarious situation. 
Therefore, what the above discussions demonstrate is the importance of these 
organisations to young women’s lives. Despite not being fully adequate to their needs, 
in which women were having to adopt what I call ‘strategies within strategies’ to navigate 
such precarity, without such a network of support, feeding themselves and their family 
would have become even more difficult.  
 
Despite the importance of these organisations to some young women’s lives, women 
often felt reluctant or embarrassed about receiving vouchers or attending food banks. 
Heather for example, after discussing her experience at the food bank, told me: ‘I feel like 
if people find out I’m going to the food bank they are going to think that…you know…I 
can’t afford food, it’s got nothing to do with that, it’s just sometimes it’s hard, you know’. 
Worried that people would find out she was using a food bank, Heather stated that she 
was using the food bank since ‘it’s hard’ but not because she ‘can’t afford food’. Similarly, 
Cherry said, ‘this is for poor people, not for me’. In such discussions, both Heather and 
Cherry distance themselves from those who are seen as ‘typically’ using food banks 
(‘poor people’) and themselves (those who sometimes ‘find it hard’). Such a distancing 
move is not surprising (and will be discussed further in Chapter 7) since mothers have 
long held the main responsibility for maintaining respectability in which being able ‘to 
make ends meet’ is a visible marker of being ‘a good mother’ (Skeggs, 1997; Shildrick and 
MacDonald, 2013). In the current context, as Garthwaite (2016a, 2016b) has argued, 
feelings of stigma and embarrassment may have been aggravated by representations in 
‘poverty porn’ RTV shows, and by political and public discourse which ‘question the 
lifestyles and personal attitudes of people using the food bank, branding them 
“undeserving of support”’ (2016a: 136). As with Garthwaite’s observations, such a moral 
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discourse, coupled with pre-existing notions of respectability, may cause these young 
women to experience feelings of stigma, shame and embarrassment when using food 
banks, despite their growing normalisation. 
 
Have Now, Pay Later: Loan Sharks and Pay-day Lending  
 
Johnna Montgomerie (2015) has argued that ‘deepening austerity measures in 
the UK ensure that households will continue to pay down the public debt by taking on 
more private debt, be they student loans for the young, home equity loans for pensioners 
and small businesses, and every other kind of loan for the rest’ (no pagination). For 
instance, the Office of Budget Responsibility predictions following the March 2015 
budget showed wages only nudging upward while household debt levels rocket up from 
150 per cent debt-to-GDP in 2015 to over 170 per cent by 2019. Personal debt has 
therefore become a symbol of how some households have had to make ends meet in an 
atmosphere of severe austerity.  
 
Four young women discussed how they used personal loans and credit cards as a way to 
navigate within the current context of austerity. In addition, five other women discussed 
friends or relatives who had also taken out such loans due to necessity. These women 
were all single mothers who relied on government support. These experiences took place 
against the backdrop of the government’s removal of the emergency loans and grants 
that had previously helped to tide people over: Community Care Grants (non-repayable 
grants to help people to live independently in the community, or to ease exceptional 
pressures on families) and Crisis Loans, both of which were administered by Jobcentre 
Plus.  
 
Scarlett, as discussed above, told me that she first went to a ‘loan shark’ (a moneylender 
who charges extremely high rates of interest, typically under illegal conditions) two years 
ago when she was struggling with various debts:  
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My first one [loan] was £100 and I managed because I paid a lot of debts off with 
that, I had the money to pay it back. Then he [loan shark] came to me and said 
would you like a bigger one [loan], so I’m like you know what, yeah, he [her ex-
partner] was knocking ten bottles of shite out of me and we had no money, so he 
[loan shark] said right your next one is £250, you have to pay £450 back, so 
because I needed it, I took it. I didn’t listen to the repayments and I ended up 
taking out another loan to pay everything back. 
 
With two loans still to be repaid, Scarlett told me how she managed the repayments; 
 
Now they both come knocking at my door asking for more money, sometimes 
they give me a few weeks, sometimes they don’t. One will text me before saying, 
‘is there any point coming?’ and I’ll say no, please, and he’ll say, ‘right, love, do 
not worry about me’, but my other one, no, he’s just at me all the time. I have to 
give him £35 per week, and because I haven’t been giving it recently, he’s been 
getting short tongued with me, but this morning he was really short tongued with 
me and I thought, you know what, I’ve been through hell and back, and the reason 
I am in this mess is because you come advertising these loans door-to-door, so 
who in their right mind isn’t going to take it? I’m sorry, but if you’re in the situation 
you’re going to aren’t you? I’m trying to get out of it but when you get your money 
stopped or when you hear on the news they’re going to take this much off you, 
you’re going to. 
 
Similarly, Heather, was in debt using credit cards. She told me: 
 
I go through £10 carton of milk every five days, kids’ uniforms, trips here, wow, 
it’s not enough.  I have five credit cards. Five. And even with them, it’s bloody 
hard. Like people saying ‘oh you shouldn’t have done it’, but, because of having 
so many houses and getting them empty, I’ve had to buy cookers, and get carpets 
and stuff like that. Where am I going to get that type of money? You don’t get 
any housing grants anymore. So I’ve had to get credit cards. Obviously stupid 
companies give them to me, and you end up digging yourself into a bigger hole. 
I’m spending it on the house that my kids come home to, so they have a bed and 
heating and something to eat and it can be clean. They can go in and it’s clean. If 
I don’t have money to go out at least I know everything is there, and that’s when 
I say when it snows and stuff, all we have to do is get the rations in and shut the 
curtains and that’s us, we are all right.  
 
Having to move numerous times in the past few years to unfurnished flats, Heather 
needed to buy ‘cookers, and get carpets and stuff like that’. With no other option but to 
pay for furniture using a credit card, Heather had got herself heavily into debt. She then 
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went on to say: ‘you have to do something. Money isn’t going to fall out the sky. So what 
can I do? Turn to crime, just so you can get money to make us comfortable? I’d prefer to 
just pay interest’. All four of the women who were in debt through the used of loans or 
credit cards worried about how they were going to pay back the money. Yet, as far as 
they were concerned, they needed to care for their families in the short term, which was 
more important to them than being debt free. Without the necessary capital, which 
would allow them to avoid such financial pitfalls, these young women continued to 
accumulate interest. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, this chapter has revealed how young women are navigating 
through/within the context of austerity. Unlike previous work, this chapter has 
highlighted both the commonalities of a diverse group of young women’s navigation 
strategies, and also where and how these diverge within this complex and messy social 
reality. Young women had used a variety of strategies, including reskilling and gaining 
further qualifications, cutting back, discount shopping and receiving help from family 
and partners. However, there were complexities within these different practices. The 
degree to which such strategies were needed and could be implemented depended on 
the volume, composition and trajectory of their capitals and resources (Bourdieu, 1979, 
1986, 1989, 1991). For instance, the strategy of reskilling or borrowing money from 
family to get on the property ladder and gain further security was only possible for 
women who had the time, social, cultural and economic capital to make such 
investments. The amount and types of capital they (or their family or partners) possessed 
allowed them to not only navigate austerity more easily, but even accrue capital whist 
riding the storm. For those women who had experienced a change in their trajectory 
(illness or migration meant that various types of capital did not translate or were lost), 
social and cultural capital also became extremely important. Being able to learn from, 
live with or have the support of, family and partner made the difference between being 
able to keep their lifestyle and shield themselves (and their children) to a degree from 
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economic necessity, or experience a downgrade and become proximate to the effects of 
austerity. Such ‘reproduction strategies’, can be seen here as being ‘designed (and 
mediated) to maintain and improve one’s positions’ (Bourdieu, 1984: 125).  
 
There was a radical divergence in the use of strategies such as ‘heating or eating’, use of 
foodbanks, organisations, informal lending, pay-day loans and sacrificing food and 
‘doing without’ to give to their children. Those with larger amounts of capital did, for 
example, ‘cut back,’ but did not need to employ any other strategies. For those women 
with lower amounts and types of capital (typically white and BAME working-class 
women), they employed multiple strategies to help navigate within the current context. 
This was since these women were closer to necessity, and had a much smaller 
horizon/space of possibilities. Yet, some strategies resulted in further insecurity and 
material instability (such as the use of credit). 
 
In addition, this chapter has demonstrated that for those on a low-income; with the 
increased pressure of the current context, their lives are far more complex (and busy) 
than suggested by political discourse. This argument is recycled from previous legacies 
and times of crisis, which negate the relevance of social conditions and the structural 
context, and place everything on the individual’s will and action. Navigating austerity 
requires significant time, energy and emotional strain. Therefore, complicating the 
current political discourse, which depicts hardship as being the result of individual 
decisions, these narratives thus challenge the discourses circulating within the current 
socio-political register. The following chapter focuses more specifically on the symbolic 
violence borne of the austerity discourses. In it, I explore how young women, who are 
affected to different degrees and in different ways, talk to and against the political 
discourse.	
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Chapter 7 
Austerity Talk 
 
 
Sonia: Now rich people are getting richer and poor 
people are getting poorer. 
 
Layla: Yeah, you’re right … it’s also depressing to hear 
that the government has a lot of money to spend to buy 
weapons, so why they causing wars when they could be 
helping people? 
 
Ila: But some people don’t want to be helped and they 
don’t want to work neither. They take what they can 
get, so I think some of what’s happening needs to 
happen, because why should they not work when other 
people do? 
 
Sonia: What I don’t understand is that there must be 
jobs, if people can come from abroad to come here, 
why can’t British born apply for it, employers are taking 
advantage that they can get cheaper labour. 
 
Layla: But I think communities blame each other, there 
is a lot of migration going on so if there’s one pot of 
money and everyone wants some of that then you get 
blame…people say British born are given less priority 
and others are given more, but it’s not the case. People 
think that people who are newly arrived get more 
money and it causes problems. When you have cuts, it 
brings out all sorts of negative outcomes. 
 
(Group discussion, with Sonia, 35, working-class, 
Bangladeshi, volunteer, Layla, 35, middle-class, 
Bangladeshi, charity project coordinator and Ila, 35, 
working-class, Bangladeshi, on JSA in Leeds, 
September 2014). 
 
 
To continue analysing the lived experience of young women in the context of 
austerity, in this chapter, I examine how women are speaking about austerity. Drawing 
on the discussion in Chapters 1, 3 and 4, I argue that such an analysis is importance, since, 
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austerity is not only economic, but a moral-political project, and a cultural tool (Jensen, 
2013b; 2014) which draws on specific (gendered, classed and racialised) binaries 
(‘striver’/’skiver’) to produce and legitimise consensus for austerity measures and welfare 
rollback. These binaries, which build on a previous history (see Chapter 4), are used to 
blame those most affected by austerity measures for stagnant social mobility and the 
conditions of poverty and worklessness.  
 
This chapter explores how different groups speak to and against such austerity discourse. 
As demonstrated through the discussion above with Sonia, Layla and Ila, this chapter 
shows how women are dialoguing with this discourse in different ways, reproducing, 
reinforcing, questioning and talking back to moralistic narratives of hard work, fairness 
and responsibility. Divided into three sections, the first section of this chapter discusses 
middle-class women’s opinions of and attitudes towards austerity. The second section 
then explores how women who are devalued and made abject through dominant anti-
welfare discourse discuss reasons for the crisis, as well as how they talk back and dialogue 
with such stereotypes and representations. In the final section of this chapter, I illustrate 
additional complexities in young women’s narratives – how they question the austerity 
discourse by critically reflecting on structural constraints and current stereotypes. 
 
Questioning and Challenging the Austerity Discourse: The ‘Undeserving Rich’   
 
Discussing the crisis and implementation of austerity measures, twenty-two out 
of thirty-one middle-class women questioned and criticised this discourse. Of these 
twenty-two women, three worked in the private sector, thirteen in the public sector, two 
were full-time students and three were reliant on state support48. The financial sector, 
the government and the ‘wealthy’/’privileged’ were addressed in negative terms. 
Discussions were not always in relation to detailed or technical explanations about the 
                                                
48Of those nine who did not question or criticise the government discourse, five worked in the private 
sector, two worked in the public sector and two were full-time students. 
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origins of the crisis. However, considerations carried with them expressions of blame 
(directly or indirectly), feelings of anger and unfairness. Nadia, a 32-year-old, mixed 
other, middle-class part-time teacher from Leeds, when speaking about the crisis said 
that she felt that certain proportions of the population had benefited from the crisis. I 
asked her to elaborate, ‘the ones who benefit out of all of this [the crisis] are the 
corporations, the politicians and the money-making machines’. The ‘undeserving rich’ 
(bankers and politicians) were therefore stigmatised, seen as unjust recipients of state 
redistribution who took more from the public purse than they gave. This stigmatisation 
of the ‘undeserving rich’ is present in other research conducted with ‘taxpayers’ (see 
Stanley, 2014). These groups were often labelled by middle-class women as ‘greedy’, ‘tax 
dodging’, ‘privileged,’ and ‘out of touch’.  
Some young women questioned the dominant narrative, which framed the out-of-
control welfare system as the reason for the crisis of capitalism. Trisha and Emma, for 
instance, both questioned why the deficit had not been reduced in other ways. Emma, a 
25-year-old, white, middle-class woman who was unemployed, but until recently been 
working in the charity sector in London, asked, ‘tax avoidance from the rich would fund 
benefits for everyone, why aren’t they doing that as well?’ Women would also point out 
the tactics and scapegoats used by the government to dissipate the real reasons for the 
crisis. Trisha, a 34-year-old, white, middle-class woman who worked part-time as an 
advocacy support worker in Brighton, discussed the fixation that the government had on 
the spending habits of those reliant on welfare. She said, ‘it’s not David Cameron’s 
business how people spend their money is it? I just think it’s really vile politics actually 
and it’s a distraction of what’s happening’. She then went on to say, ‘it’s interesting how 
we are now forced to look outside at other things, so it covers up what is happening here’. 
For Trisha, ‘vile politics’ were being covered up by smoke screens, redirecting the 
population’s attention away from domestic issues to trivial news stories.  
Despite some young women agreeing with austerity measures more than others (as will 
be discussed below), there was an awareness by some that certain proportions of the 
population were suffering because of the austerity measures, whilst others were not. For 
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instance, when speaking about the implementation of austerity measures by the 
government, Madeline, a 24-year-old, white, middle-class woman working as a 
complaints mediation officer at a charity in Brighton, said, ‘find a middle ground. We 
don’t have to be at the point where people are really struggling’. Examples were often 
provided of certain policies the government had implemented which had affected people 
in negative ways. The ‘bedroom tax’, which was frequently in the news at the time of the 
interviews was often discussed. Nicola, a 34-year-old, white, middle-class woman from 
Brighton receiving Income Support, pointed out, ‘if you are going to have a bedroom tax, 
levy it on everyone, if you have a mansion then they should be paying the bedroom tax 
as well’. Unfairness therefore figured in the narratives of these young women – they 
acknowledged (directly or indirectly) that small proportions of the population did not 
experience austerity in the same way, to the same degree, or at all. As with Stanley’s 
‘taxpaying’ participants, some also contested the ‘moral abstract order’ and the 
‘stereotype of the scrounger’ (2014: 397), highlighting the structural impediments facing 
the unemployed. Those women who were more proximate to the effects of austerity, 
who worked with service users, in charity organisations, or who had experience of the 
welfare system, would often talk at length about the injustices people faced. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, Rebecca, a 28-year-old, white, middle-class woman who worked 
as a debt and benefit adviser in Brighton and had herself been reliant on state support, 
spoke about the realities of a life on benefits, and the desperation that service users 
faced. She noted:  
 
People on benefits can’t afford to live, it’s not possible, so you get people that are 
just living from day-to-day with no food, no gas, electric, let alone anything as 
luxurious as having the internet or being able to go to the pub, nothing. People 
are just existing. And for the long-term sick there is no prospect of that improving. 
I can’t even imagine what that would feel like, to look at your life and think this 
existence is my life forever, no wonder people are killing themselves, Jesus.  
 
Women also used people’s reliance on food banks to demonstrate the injustices of the 
austerity programme, resisting and arguing against the popular rhetoric. Trisha, for 
instance said, ‘people are in poverty, food banks cropping up all over the place … I don’t 
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believe all the bollocks you hear about “you create them and they will come”. People 
have dignity and self-respect, yes David Cameron, even the working-class have dignity 
and self-respect not just everyone else, you don’t go unless you need to’.  
 
Young middle-class women therefore questioned and talked back to the dominant 
austerity discourse, expressing disaffection and distrust towards those in positions of 
privilege and power. They also asserted values such as empathy for those affected by the 
changes within the current context. As was shown, cynicism manifested itself in different 
ways, drawing on different evidence and examples, which provoked different responses. 
However, there was an explicit understanding that ‘we are not all in this together,’ and 
that some were not in it at all. 
 
Reinforcing the Austerity Programme: the ‘Undeserving Poor’ and the Hard-
Working Taxpayer 
 
 
People in the banking system lost the money in the first place but the spongers, 
scroungers … those on benefits aren’t without fault. 
 
(Anna, 27, white, middle-class, physiotherapist, London) 
 
Anna’s comment above is crucial to analyse when discussing attitudes towards 
austerity and the ways in which young middle-class women dialogue with austerity 
discourse. Despite, Anna, like the women above, arguing that ‘people in the banking 
system lost the money in the first place’, Anna, also directed her narrative of blame and 
unfairness towards another figure by saying: ‘but the spongers, scroungers … those on 
benefits aren’t without fault’. Although young middle-class women contest and resist 
aspects of state discourse and the actions of the ‘privileged’, at the same time, they also 
reproduce the dominant narrative circulating within the socio-political register by 
blaming ‘the spongers, scroungers … those on benefits’.  
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In general, the welfare state was thought to be problematic, costly, and in crisis. Women 
would often make distinctions between ‘the early welfare state’ and its current condition. 
Tiffany, a 27-year-old, white, middle-class, marketing manager from Leeds, argued that 
the welfare state, ‘was set up as a safety net for needy individuals’, but was ‘not being 
used in the way it should be’. Expanding on her points, Tiffany, echoing political 
discourse said, ‘I do think that when the benefits system was set up it was for people in 
need. Now it is being too generous’. As Jensen (2014: 4.1) notes, such an understanding 
of the 'generosity of the welfare state is highly contestable’ (also see Wacquant, 2009; 
Dorling, 2010; Shildrick et al., 2012; Atkinson et al., 2013).  The greater conditionality of 
welfare payment (and more punitive sanctions) and cuts in various benefits (as shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6) seriously trouble Tiffany’s understanding.  
 
The assumed ‘generosity’ of the welfare state led into discussions about who used the 
welfare system and if in fact, they should be eligible for (and needed) such support. Mia, 
a 27-year-old, Anglo-Indian, middle-class GP from London, after discussing the welfare 
system and state of the NHS, said, ‘there are people who are entitled. I would gladly give 
my tax money to those who need it’. By using the words ‘entitled’ and ‘those who need 
it’, the underlying suggestion within Mia’s narrative is that there are people receiving 
benefits who are in fact the opposite: ‘not entitled’ and who ‘do not need it’. Therefore, 
making the connection between the welfare state and her ‘tax money’, enables, as Simon 
Winlow and Steve Hall (2013) note, ‘an ideological pitting of the abstracted hard-working 
taxpayers against the “benefits claimant”’ (in Jensen and Tyler, 2015: 483). Mia then went 
onto explain that she felt that ‘the people who are taking the piss and abusing the system’ 
were not ‘entitled’ to welfare. Those who were referenced as ‘undeserving’, ‘taking the 
piss’ or ‘abusing the system’ extended into many different groups: the unemployed, the 
single mother, the immigrant and the sick and disabled. These stereotypes have a long 
history, and as discussed previously (Chapters 1, 3 and 4), have been employed in 
previous times of crisis to generate consensuses for the introduction of punitive 
economic and social policies (see Hall et al., 1978; Federici, 2004; Hancock, 2004; Tyler, 
2008; Todd, 2014).  
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Therefore, this initial discussion highlights the ways in which the symbolic campaign of 
austerity, ’ruthlessly employed to divide people along a vampiric axis of blame for 
diminishing social resources’ (Tyler, 2015: 506) is being reproduced within middle-class 
women’s narrative. Not only was there processes of othering and blame towards those 
who are thought of as ‘undeserving’ of help from the welfare state, but middle-class 
women also distanced and distinguished themselves (the hard-working taxpayer) from 
the ‘undeserving skivers’. The sections below further unpack such explorations, 
highlighting the different ways in which middle-class women blame and vilify the figure 
of the ‘skiver’, reinforcing the austerity discourse, but also, in the process, distance and 
distinguishing themselves from these figures. 
 
 Boundary-Making and Blame: The Spirit of Hard Work  
 
As discussed above, women often described those on benefits as ‘abusing the 
system’, ‘being lazy’, ‘work-shy’ and ‘getting something for nothing’. This imagined 
construct was then compared to those who did not rely on benefits and ‘worked hard’. 
For example, Anna said: 
There are a lot of people on benefits who aren't actively looking for work … who 
may be gaining more in benefits than if they would if they were working. I don't 
think that’s right. I think that there needs to be a more stringent process in 
evaluating the benefits that people are on and ensuring that they are doing 
everything that they can to get work. There are a lot of people in society who 
work hard for their wages, so it seems unfair when people are working and other 
people are getting more money for doing nothing.  
 
Reproducing the binary of ‘work’ and ‘workless’, ’striver’ and ‘skiver,’ Anna felt there were 
people on benefits who were not ‘looking for work’ and ‘getting more money for doing 
nothing’. Anna described this as being ‘unfair,’ in contrast to other people who ‘work hard 
for their wages’. Working in the NHS, Anna told me that she had been subject to a pay 
freeze since 2011 (no rise in line with inflation) and in recent years had had to make do 
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with less. Despite Anna not specifically naming those she described in the binary terms 
of ‘skiver’/’striver’, she reproduces the understanding that there are two types of citizens, 
which, as Jensen (2014: 2.5) notes, ‘are held in static, essentialist terms; those who work 
hard and those who don’t, with different morals, objectives and ideas’. In addition, her 
experience of ‘working hard’ and having a pay freeze provoked a sense of anger and 
resentment. This was directed towards those who take advantage of the hard work and 
everyday scarifies of the majority, who are having to make do with less.  
Work was therefore central to these young women’s narratives. Many young women 
claimed that work was plentiful, despite some acknowledging that some jobs might be 
low paid. These jobs were seen as ‘better than nothing,’ and therefore, it was thought 
that people who were reliant on welfare must be ‘turning their noses up at certain jobs’. 
Kiran, a 28-year-old, Indian, middle-class woman, living in London and working in 
training operations, said ‘there are jobs … it’s just that these people choose not to take 
the job …I don’t think anybody can sit there and say I can’t find suitable work’. These 
attitudes show a lack of fit with the everyday lived experiences of those looking for paid 
employment. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, young women who wanted to return to 
paid employment often experienced repeated setbacks, rejections and a lack of suitable 
employment to suit their needs (also see Shildrick et al., 2012; Patrick, 2014), especially 
those with caring responsibilities (this will be discussed in more detail below).  
Yet some middle-class women argued that ‘people should want to work and be able to 
contribute’. The spirit of hard work is enacted here – ‘contribution’, ‘value’ and 
‘productivity’ are characterised in economic terms. Alternative value, such as non-paid 
care work was not discussed as relevant to societal contribution. Employment took on a 
morally weighted rhetoric, mirroring the political view that all citizens should help the 
nation recover through being autonomous, individualised and economically productive. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the use of such rhetoric to justify economic behaviour is 
nothing new. For instance, Max Weber notably made the case in The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism (1905) that the development of capitalism in Northern Europe had 
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been influenced by the Protestant values of prudence and frugality, where idleness was 
regarded as a sin. As Skeggs notes, during this period, ‘idle’ persons were held up by the 
state and gentry as the constitutive limit to propriety (2014b). Such an understanding, as 
was showed in Chapter 4 has been repeated and recycled, especially during times of crisis 
and subsequent periods of cuts (see Haylett, 2001; Atkinson 2013; Tyler, 2013a; Todd, 
2014) to draw divisions between citizens who help the nation and those who do not, 
regardless of structural conditions. The young women’s narratives thus reinforced and 
helped to further reproduce these divisions.  
When I asked the young women if they knew anyone who matched their description of 
those who in the words of Kiran ‘choose not to take the job’ and ‘showed no value’ their 
understanding was driven by examples from tabloid and social media and political 
discussions. As Hall et al. (1978) discussed, ‘the hardening of public opinion into consent 
relies upon the repetition and accumulation of expressions and beliefs “on the street”, in 
conversations between neighbours, discussion on street corners or in the pub, rumour, 
gossip, speculation’ (129 in Tyler, 2013a: 211). Tyler notes that in twentieth century 
Britain, ‘the street’ can in fact ‘include the formal technologies of social media’ (2013a: 
211-212). In addition, examples from RTV (largely in relation to Benefits Street) were also 
provided to back up their arguments that those receiving welfare were ‘tricking the 
system’. Mia used the example of Benefits Street to support her point that some people 
were making up certain conditions to get sick pay. Despite acknowledging the 
controversy surrounding the show, which she called ‘skewed’, she said: 
It started with a girl walking down the street saying this person doesn’t work, 
here’s a job opportunity for this man called Fungi and he’s not taking his job 
opportunity because he’s on opiate substitutes. There’s no reason why he can’t 
work, it’s because of the fear of working and not being used to it and an element 
of laziness. I think it’s the laziness that’s most aggravating. If people think other 
people aren’t doing it because of laziness then the situation is obviously … it’s 
probably rarely just laziness, yeah, it might be fear of going back to work, anxiety 
about it fear of not being able to keep the job, failure, avoiding something that 
might make them feel like a failure … but that particular guy who declined that 
job opportunity, it’s probably badly paid, but still a job. A job that will reflect good 
on him and his children, who, he most desperately wants to see, who aren’t 
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allowed to see him. Surely that’s the right way forward and he probably knows it. 
I don’t know but … yeah so this guy would work hard on the street to make 
money. He would sell magazines, which is probably a nine-to-five job for him. So, 
if he’s working that hard, he’s not lazy, but maybe he’s more motivated doing that 
and can make more money doing that. But that’s not a good enough reason to 
receive benefits. There will be plenty more people like that doing the same thing. 
 
Mia makes her point by focusing on the character ‘Fungi’. Despite carefully considering 
and reflecting upon his situation and the structural constraints he is facing, she concludes 
that ‘Fungi’ does not have a ‘good enough reason to receive benefits’. Although she 
described the jobs that he declined as ‘probably badly paid,’ she reasoned that ‘it’s a job 
that will reflect good on him and his children,’ which she felt is ‘the right way forward’. 
Mia is therefore not only minimising the effects of structural constraints, but by arguing 
that it is ‘the right way forward, and he probably knows it’ supplants such a discussion 
with moral rhetoric of conduct and behaviour.  Although she recognised that the show is 
‘skewed,’ her understanding of people on welfare is sustained and produced through this 
cultural mechanism, since she ends by saying; ‘there will be plenty more people like that 
doing the same thing.’ In this example, Fungi, acts, as Jensen and Tyler (2015) argue, as 
a figure of welfare disgust. This figure helps to ‘manage precariat populations (as 
technologies of control) but also as technologies of consent’ (2015: 475) since ‘Fungi’ 
provides Mia with evidence that such people are not working and are tricking the system, 
reinforcing anti-welfare common-sense.  
This cultural mechanism has a history. As noted by feminist scholars (see Skeggs and 
Wood, 2012), there has been a concerted campaign since the 1970s49, via TV and media, 
to represent the ‘undeserving’ as entertainment. This once again draws on much older 
legacies of the divisions between the respectable and the ‘abject’. In the current context, 
‘poverty porn’ (as Jensen terms it, see 2014) functions to reinforce and recycle forms of 
‘common sense’ about welfare, worklessness and moral value (see Allen, Tyler and De 
Benedictis, 2014 for a discussion on classed and gendered shaming in RTV). RTV can be 
                                                
49For example, the genre began with the programme ‘The Family’ (1974).  
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seen in these examples to help to gain consent for welfare retrenchment, since it 
reinforces conservative social norms circulating within the current socio-political register 
about ‘work’ and ‘worklessness' which are understood in moral terms. This therefore 
strengthens the division between groups, and the feeling that some do not work when 
they should.  
Women also drew on heroic individual stories to further argue that ‘worklessness’ was a 
choice. Erica, a 25-year-old, black, middle-class, account manager from London had used 
the benefit system previously when looking for a job. Yet, she labelled most of those 
using welfare as ‘not having the right attitude’, even though she acknowledged that her 
cultural capital (degree and previous work experience) had helped her in her quest for 
suitable employment. She used the example of her mother to reinforce her point: that 
being on welfare was a ‘choice’ rather than an imposition: 
 
My mum was seventeen when she had me. My nan was ill, in and out of hospital 
all the time, and my mum still went to uni and got her degree. A lot of people in 
that situation would go, ‘oh you know I’m seventeen and I’m pregnant and it’s 
really hard, I need to sign on right now’. But she never once took handouts. If she 
can do it, anyone can. 
 
Likewise, Tiffany, speaking about her niece, reproduced the same discourse: 
 
My niece could be not working and on them [benefits] but she chooses not to. 
She had a baby at nineteen and she had to stop her beauty course. But she works 
from home doing hair. She’d rather do that then claim anything. 
 
Contrasting her mother with ‘a lot of people in that situation’, Erica gestured that the 
reason her mother did not ‘take handouts’ was because her strength of character helped 
her to cope even though her mother was young (seventeen) and her ‘nan was ill’. 
Similarly, Tiffany explained that her niece’s character was the reason that she ‘could be 
not working and on them [benefits] but she chooses not to’. Proximate to the privileges 
of governmentality, these speech acts reinforce the neoliberal ‘do it yourself rhetoric’; 
Erica’s mother and Tiffany’s niece (the heroic individuals) worked hard, received their 
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qualifications and stood on their own two feet. However, neither Erica nor Tiffany 
acknowledged the different contexts in which they are referring to, the context of 
unemployment and crisis in the present, as opposed to the context in which Tiffany’s 
niece and Erica’s mother could navigate within. Neither do these women mention social 
markers, which might impact certain individuals’ circumstances. Since these women had 
seen examples of ‘heroic’ individuals ‘doing it for themselves,’ or had their own unique 
experience of the Jobcentre, they were more likely to blame unemployed individuals for 
their own situation.  
 
 Boundary Making and Blame: Morality and Lifestyle  
 
Mirroring austerity discourse, young women asserted that failure to be 
‘independent’, ‘economically productive’ and ‘successful’ was also due to morality: bad 
conduct, attitude and taste. For these middle-class women, there were acceptable and 
non-acceptable ways of behaving, consuming and living and it was argued that those on 
welfare were not living accordingly. As discussed in Chapter 4, such an understanding is 
tied up with pre-existing notions of negative value, that have been attributed to working-
class women, historically marked through incivility, animalistic commentary (Rooke and 
Gidley, 2010), fecundity (Tyler, 2008), excess, dirt, and space (Skeggs, 2004). In the 
context of austerity, such notions are being recycled, used here by middle-class women 
to create distance and draw boundaries between themselves and ‘Others’. The extract 
below, which involves a conversation with Mia is demonstrative of this. Mia made a 
statement that she could identify a working-class women/a woman on welfare by her 
nails. Asking her to elaborate on this comment, Mia said: 
The long talons, nail art, jewellery and that kind of thing. It’s a very specific type 
of nail. So much focus and money is in that nail (laughs). It means they aren’t 
practical and they pay too much attention to non-essential things. It’s a sign of 
being lower class. I would never have those nails. How can you have those nails 
and not be lazy? I’d rather spend money on something else, more long standing 
like education. You shouldn’t waste money on nails. I think it more when I see, I 
mean if you are really poor, and you have a very small income, you aren’t going 
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to spend it on big things like wanting a property or saving up for your children’s 
education. If you have a small income and those things aren’t on your radar, you 
are more likely to spend money on non-essential things. Whereas my parents, 
when they were saving money, they didn’t buy a broom. They used a dustpan and 
brush. My mum would make my brother’s nappies because they dreamed bigger. 
So if that’s not on your radar, then you’re more likely to spend money on the here 
and now and on things that don’t matter. That, to me, suggests a lack of will and 
a lack of wanting to better yourself and your situation. They have a lack of 
foresight and forward planning and future ambition. Like the money they put into 
those nails could be put into advancing themselves.  
 
VD: So, by saving money, these women would be able to have similar 
opportunities to you?  
 
Maybe, well not their generation, but their kids. It’s about yourself and children 
and if you can save and try to get a stable home and aren’t reliant of anyone else 
giving you income then they could buy text books for their children and 
encourage them to work. Obviously, it’s hard. It is hard, but my friend’s mum did 
it. She had nothing and she worked three jobs and put all the money into her two 
children. 
 
VD: And what did she do about childcare? 
 
Well I think she was with her husband. And yeah in that sense the cuts wouldn’t 
have affected her getting a job years back and earning money. But, either way 
people just live in the here and now, they don’t try.  
 
This extract is indicative of many other conversations I had with middle-class women: 
connecting class position, aesthetics and morality. Firstly, Mia described ‘long talons, nail 
art, jewellery and that kind of thing’ as a sign of being ‘lower class’. She then drew a 
distinction between herself and working-class women (those who have those types of 
nails and those who do not). For Bourdieu (1984), dominant groups often legitimise their 
own culture and ways (lifestyles/tastes) as superior to those of the lower classes, 
producing class distinction through taste. Such a distinction is evident here. Mia then 
continued asking: ‘how can you have those nails and not be lazy?’ In this logic, ‘aesthetics 
are translated into morality’, since those taken as lacking ‘taste’ are also represented as 
morally lacking (Lawler, 2005: 441). To Mia, such a form of ‘taste’ therefore signifies 
being ‘lazy’, having a ‘lack of will’ and a ‘lack of foresight’. This carried with it an 
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assumption that income was spent on excess and frivolity: ‘non-essential items’. It is 
therefore through the body, as Bourdieu (1984) shows, that a whole way of life can be 
classified as admirable or repulsive and disgusting.  
 
Mia suggested that these women should use better financial management to ‘better 
themselves’ and become responsible. For Mia, this would involve generations of ‘thrift’, 
drawing on the example of her parents using ‘a dustpan and brush’ and ‘making her 
brother’s nappies’. Although she acknowledged the difference in context, she still felt 
that women should deal with their situation individually. She laboured the point of ‘living 
in the here and now’ or ’not trying’, placing the onus onto the women themselves. It was 
their lack of effort, responsibility, spending habits, and moral conduct – not their lack of 
income or wider structural issues – which would mean these women would be unable to 
have the same opportunities as she did. The ideas of learning how to be ‘thrifty’, 
disciplined and restrained can be traced back to Samuel Smiles’ books Self-Help (1859) 
and Thrift (1875) which promoted such practices and claimed that poverty was caused 
largely by irresponsible habits. As shown in Chapter 4, such ideas have been used 
throughout history to reinforce (especially gendered) class and ‘racial’ boundaries. For 
example, during the Victorian era, when the conflict between the classes was remade as 
a problem of morality, middle-class women (as a source of ‘moral authority’ (Skeggs, 
2014b)) both taught and scrutinised working-class women on the importance of 
restraint, responsibility, thrift and respectability in order to ‘civilise them’ (Skeggs, 1997; 
David, 1980) (see as an example, Octavia Hill founder of social work and the ‘School for 
Mothers’). ‘Thrift’ and responsibility have therefore been encouraged and strongly 
promoted in different moments of history (targeted mainly at women); the inter-war 
period and Thatcherism, through the return to 'Victorian values' (of the Samuel Smiles 
self-help variety).  
 
Mia’s narrative shows how ‘thrift’ has once again been revived as a source of cultural 
value and a trait of distinction (Bourdieu, 1984 in Jensen, 2014: 4.6). Jensen argues that 
‘thrift’ is ‘certainly about taste and taste cultures’ (4.7). She goes on to note that ‘new 
 206 
thrift' culture produces and circulates fantasies of the classed Others against whom 
austerity is positioned as necessary, and who need to re-learn the lessons of frugality’ 
(ibid). From Mia’s narrative, ‘thrift’ can been seen as site where classed ‘Others’ are 
produced and symbolically shamed for not being austere enough: specifically, in the 
sense of paying for goods that women ‘waste money on’ and don’t ‘need’. 
 
Despite discussions from these women above not operating within a vacuum, through 
an emphasis of individual responsibility, hard work and morality, middle-class women 
blame, distance and draw boundaries between themselves and ‘Others’ (the rich and 
poor). Those ‘Others’ are subject to change depending on context. Yet, this 
differentiation is more apparent when young middle-class women make distinctions 
between themselves and ‘Others’ who use welfare – those who are already 
disadvantaged. In such discussions, women tend to reproduce and reinforce symbolic 
violence. Their discussions implicitly suggest consent for austerity measures and the 
dismantling of state provisions. There narratives also clearly reproduce austerity 
discourse, labelling some figures as ‘underserving’, since they are not responsible, thrifty 
or hard-working. 
 
(Un)deserving of Welfare Cuts 
 
As discussed above, although many middle-class young women directed anger 
towards the ‘privileged’ in society, talking back to public discourse, stigma and blame 
coalesced more fully around the figure of the ‘skiver’ evoking a distinction between such 
a figure and that of the ‘hard-working citizen’. In this section, I explore how women who 
are devalued and made abject through dominant anti-welfare discourse are discussing 
reasons for the crisis as well as how they are dialoguing with such stereotypes, though 
mechanisms of distancing and blame. I briefly show how those women talk back to the 
government discourse. I then demonstrate how the devaluing of those on welfare has 
led to a range of negative impacts, such as increased racism, fear, high levels of anxiety, 
and concerns about the growing mistreatment from the general public. 
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Despite such experiences, this does not necessary mean these young women’s narratives 
are straightforward. On the contrary, their discussions are narrated through 
contradictory dialogues of negotiation and distancing towards and away from the figures 
of the ‘good’ and ‘bad’ citizen, which are achieved through utilizing the	same language 
the middle-class women use above. However, rather than assuming that such 
distinctions reflect the prevalence and internalisation of anti-welfare messages and 
austerity discourse, this section argues that the tendency of these women to make such 
distinctions between the ‘skiver’ (undeserving) and ‘striver’ (deserving) is a central 
feature of their own bid for recognition and legitimacy. Yet, as shown below, the ways in 
which these young women try to value themselves are dependent on and specific to the 
immediate context, as well as to the resources and capital that they have available to be 
mobilised.  
 
Blaming ‘The Greedy Beggars Who Walk Around in Posh Suits’ 
 
Rita, a 35-year-old, white, working-class woman receiving state benefit, living in 
Leeds, spoke angrily about the current state of the country, blaming the ‘greedy’ 
government for the recession. During a group discussion with other working-class 
women, Rita said, ‘we’ve got idiots who put us into a world recession because of greed’. 
The banking sector was also described in these terms. In the same group, Scarlett, a 23-
year-old, white, working-class woman receiving Income Support, questioned why the 
banking crisis happened, saying jovially, ‘me and you could run a bank, if money’s coming 
in and you invest what you’ve got … you get interest … so I don’t know how they all got 
it so bloody wrong … it’s just greed!’ Most women directed their anger at the government 
and politicians, who, they argued, did not have their priorities in the right place. 
 
For those who had been most affected by welfare cuts, discussions were met with raw 
expressions of anger. These women felt that the government did not care about their 
lives. Jaya, a 24-year-old, Bangladeshi, working-class woman from Leeds, who at the 
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time of the interview, was looking for full-time work whilst receiving JSA said, ‘they 
[government] don’t see it from our point of view, they just say “we’re doing this” and 
“we’re doing that” and its ok. But they don’t see that we’re struggling; they don’t take 
that into account’. Many women felt their voices were unimportant and that there was a 
lack of dialogue between those in power and ‘everyone else’. David Cameron bore the 
brunt of the anger. Women described him as ‘a greedy beggar who walks around in a 
posh suit’ (Scarlett), or they detested him; ‘I hate him, I hate him’ (Rita). These women 
also felt that they were unfairly stereotyped within the current context, and were blamed 
for the decisions taken by the government. Scarlett said, ‘we get looked down at, I get 
looked down at all the time for being a single mum at twenty-three on my own, with two 
children … as if this [cuts] is all because of me needing help’. Women also felt that 
politicians did not understand their day-to-day lives, as they had ‘never lived on benefits’ 
and had ‘no idea what it’s like’ (Scarlett). Talking back to the austerity discourse, Scarlett 
went on to say: 
 
I see politicians on the news saying ‘we want to help change this world.’ Well you 
don’t, you want money to line your own pockets while everyone else is suffering. 
And I’m sorry, if I ever met you (God help you) I swear I wouldn’t be able to keep 
my cool. I’d be like, what makes you think you have the authority to keep doing 
this? You are sat here doing it to us and blaming us for it. How can you blame us 
for something they are putting in place for the things they are doing, we can’t say 
well we’re stopping that and we’ll do this, we can’t do that, you’re the ones doing 
it, so you’re to blame for the mess we are in. You can’t blame someone else for 
the rules you’re putting in place. We don’t have the authority to go make these 
rules. All the politicians out everywhere and around Leeds need to face 
themselves and the difficulties that everyone else is having. Maybe then they 
might be able to put something decent in place ... I don’t think my opinions are 
too strong, and I think they should come and face it just like other people. 
 
Woven throughout Scarlett’s narrative is the issue of blame and authority. For Scarlett, 
it is apparent that people who lack the authority to make decisions are being blamed for 
the results of these decisions. Infused with anger and feelings of unfairness, Scarlett 
mentions many times how blame is manifested unjustly and that those in power ‘need 
to face the difficulties that everyone else is having’. Dialoguing directly with the 
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dominant government rhetoric, young women would then speak back to the idea of their 
choosing benefits as a lifestyle choice. It was often asked, ‘who would choose this?’ This 
was then followed up with, ‘we don’t do it for the love of it.’ As Scarlett put it:  
 
They think I’m sat back and enjoying it … enjoy what? I don’t have two pennies to 
rub together after my bills, shopping and whatever else. What am I enjoying out 
of that? I had to take out of my mouth to put trainers on my kids last week … what 
am I benefiting out of that?  
 
Legitimising Hard Work and Morality: Drawing Distance from ‘Bad Citizens’ 
  
Despite the discussions above, for young women who are closer to the 
stigmatised representation of the ‘bad citizen’ (single mothers, migrants, and those 
reliant on welfare), these women have to dialogue with such representations. As Bridget 
Anderson (2013: 9) has argued, it is those whose citizenship is merely tolerated, and must 
struggle to gain acceptance into the community of value, who are most expected to act 
as ‘guardians of good citizenship’. In the first instance, such a dialogue was made through 
the use of distancing. Young women spoke of the negative experiences that they had 
encountered from the general public in recent years. These discussions were emotionally 
charged, and there were multiple references to fear and to concerns about the growing 
hatred of and lack of empathy towards them. Due to such experiences, women tried to 
distance themselves from the figure of the ‘bad citizen’, using the resources and capitals 
that were available to them. Marta, a 35-year-old, white, working-class, Romanian 
migrant living in Brighton with her husband and young daughter, who volunteered at a 
local charity, discussed the increased hostility she had experienced towards Romanians 
in recent years. Although she had lived in the UK since 2008, she felt more and more 
uncomfortable when speaking Romanian on the street. She said that this was because of 
the increased stigma surrounding certain migrants (especially those from Romania) 
expressed in political rhetoric, and tabloid and television media. For instance, research 
undertaken by Bianca-Florentine Cheregi (2015) on the role of images in framing the 
theme of Romanian people migrating to the UK, found that British television media 
mostly use economic (images of pauper Romanian villages), political (images of 
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politicians talking about the Romanian migrants), and national security (images of 
homeless Romanians rough sleeping) frames in the coverage of Romanian immigration 
which thus infers the polarisation between ‘us’ (the British citizen) and ‘them’ (the 
Romanian migrant) (also see Cheregi and Adi, 2015). Marta therefore actively negotiated 
such hostility by now speaking only English in public spaces. She explained:  
 
I’m afraid to talk on the street in my own language with my daughter. She knows 
English and Romanian. I mean, I heard in some towns it’s like that, if they hear 
you talking a different language they (long pause), I would like to speak my 
language to my daughter; she knows better my language than English, but we 
are more and more afraid, we just speak English. 
 
It is clear that Marta was aware of the negativity directed towards immigrants when she 
says ‘I mean, I heard in some towns it is like that, if they hear you talking a different 
language they (long pause)’. The long pause here indicates Marta is thinking about 
something that is known but cannot be named. Xenophobic attacks have increased in 
recent years, which have exacerbated in the UK post-Brexit (Gheorghe, 2016). Therefore, 
citing being ‘afraid’ to speak Romanian to her daughter, her decision to speak only 
English aims to avoid any conflict in the future. 
 
Elaine, a 27-year-old, middle-class, white woman living in Brighton who is registered 
disabled and in receipt of DLA, discussed how the increasing negativity towards disabled 
people had affected her. Speaking about her everyday experiences, she described the 
visible hostility towards disability. As argued above, groups formerly regarded as 
‘deserving’ (Alcock, 2006) and ‘off-limits’ (Garthwaite, 2011: 370) – because of ill health 
or disability, for example – are now prime suspects in the tabloid and wider socio-political 
debate about austerity. Such discourses are not without consequences. Leading charities 
have warned that the government’s focus on alleged fraud and over-claiming to justify 
cuts in disability benefits, has caused an increase in resentment, abuse and record levels 
of ‘hate crime’ against people with disabilities (Riley-Smith, 2012). Recalling how such 
discourses had affected her day-to-day life Elaine said: 
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It got to the point, particularly around 2011 and 2012, when they were bringing in 
the first wave of changes and it was in the media, constantly, always stories, look 
at this person who gets, I don’t know £30,000 a year and goes on holiday, some 
people get BMWs and all sorts of nonsense stories and it would coincide when 
there was a wave of those stories with getting more abuse in the streets just from 
strangers coming up and saying ‘scrounger’ or ‘why don’t you get a job’… The 
worst one was when people would come up to me and say ‘people like you should 
be put down to save tax money’ and I was like wow, pretty hostile, when I was just 
waiting for a bus. And yeah, what I noticed was, which was interesting, that at my 
current job I have a staff lanyard, if I wear that whilst I am travelling on a bus 
everything is a lot smoother, I don’t get any comments or whispers or people 
coming up and asking ‘what’s wrong with you?’, ‘Are you going to get better?’, 
‘Do you work?’ interrogating me, but they let it go. When I was working in 
permitted work, I was on my way to work and the bus ramp was not working 
properly as they often don’t, so it took a while for the driver to get it working and 
the man waiting to get on the bus said ‘all this fuss and you spend our tax money’ 
and I was literally on my way to work at a charity with vulnerable teenagers. I 
don’t know, you can’t stop and say hang on a minute, let’s talk about this, you 
need to be like, ok, let’s not raise this confrontation. When I started wearing my 
staff lanyard around all of that went away. So now I will just put it on and tuck it 
into my jumper and there we go, people will think I’m on my way to work and 
won’t bother me.   
 
For Elaine, these negative experiences of hostility that she experienced led her to wear 
her staff lanyard to avoid confrontation, despite not actually being in work on those days. 
Negotiating her position as disabled and as a ‘worker’ who was not ‘spending tax money’ 
was a way for Elaine to not be drawn into the figure of the ‘bad citizen’. This resulted in 
people ‘not bothering’ her, unlike on previous occasions without her lanyard, which 
would result in instances of verbal abuse and relentless questioning.  
Those who were ‘proximate’ to the class borders as Bourdieu (1986) argues, were most 
insistent when highlighting their distance from the ‘bad citizen’. Priya, Marie, and Lucy, 
for example, marked their difference through recourse to narratives of work ethic and/or 
morality. In Marie’s discussion below, she emphasises her work ethic, values, social 
contribution and economic productivity: 
 
I do get help but I’m working. I just get help with the rent and stuff like that. But I 
do pay my way. I’m out there, sweating to get to work, sweating to get home … 
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everyone’s way of thinking is different, but mine was to go out and work, to stand 
on my own two feet. I’ve got major values.  
 
For Marie, a 28-year-old, black, working-class single mother, who worked part-time as a 
waitress in a Library café in London, it was important to emphasise that despite receiving 
state help, she also worked for a living and has ‘major values’. Having left the UK as a 
teenager, moving to Barbados to live with her grandparents and complete her education, 
Marie said that she felt she was different from her siblings and friends who had stayed in 
the UK. Living in a foreign country had allowed her to acquired more experiences (in the 
form of cultural and social capital) and a better standard of education (cultural capital). 
When she moved back to London at eighteen, Marie began working in a high-street store 
‘whilst she found her feet’ – since the capitals that she acquired did not translate 
themselves easily to a UK context – and fell pregnant with her son shortly after. Now a 
single mother, working part-time and receiving state support, Marie was adamant that 
she could ‘stand on her own two feet’ and ‘pay her way’ because of her values and 
attitude. In this way, she tries to distant herself from the idea of welfare as a ‘lifestyle 
choice’ and its connection to the ‘bad citizen’ who did not have the same work ethic and 
values as she did. 
 
For others, legitimising themselves had to take a different form; as they could not use 
employment to display their position as a ‘good citizen’. For example, Lucy, a 21-year-
old, white, working-class, single mother on Income Support from Brighton, said that she 
possessed ‘individual responsibility’ and ‘good parenting skills’. Having previously lived 
abroad in Italy and Belgium working as an au pair, Lucy returned to Brighton after getting 
pregnant in 2012. Despite returning with her partner, due to the ‘hard working 
conditions’ in the UK, her partner returned to Belgium after a few months. Lucy was now 
a single mother reliant on welfare, but was adamant that her ‘outlook’ and ‘mentality’ 
differentiated her from those who also received state support: 
 
I’m just different with it [benefits]. Others are just stupid with it. They think 
they’re not getting enough to survive … I still … I think my mum brought me up 
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well, no matter how little money I have, I don’t eat shit. Like I hate eating shit, like 
‘oh let’s go to MacDonald’s’, no! It’s disgusting, no way! I just, well it’s personal 
how you handle it … Olive [her daughter] never goes without, I always get her 
what she needs. It’s just personal how you handle it. 
 
Unable to narrate her position using economic terms, in this particular moment, her 
‘class positioning (alongside the other social positions) was the omnipresent 
underpinning which informed and circumscribed her ability to be’ (Skeggs, 1997: 74). 
Thus, the way she was able to distance herself from the stigmatised representation of 
the welfare claimant was by focusing on her values and lifestyle. Even though she said 
she received state support, ‘she is different with it’ because she had a different mind-set 
and values. However, by doing this, she further reproduces such a narrative by making 
the connection between welfare and individual choice and behaviour. 
 
Priya, a 35-year-old, Pakistani, middle-class woman living in Brighton, was on DLA at the 
time of the interview, and therefore also unable to narrate her position using economic 
terms. Like Lucy, she also focused on her morality. Despite acknowledging that she 
received help, again, like Lucy, Priya also reproduced the negative connotations 
attached to the figure of the welfare claimant: 
 
I just take one benefit. I could go through all of them, but I don’t want to. I see 
some of my peers on benefits, and I hate the way they are. They think they are 
getting paid. I don’t see them doing what I do, going and getting therapy, I’m very 
active, I’m on benefits to get better, not to stay at this level. I pay for my own 
therapies as I get hardly anything on the NHS. I found this women’s centre so I 
can get low-cost treatments and save waiting so I don’t have to be on benefits 
even longer. I’m hard on myself and this is why I’m getting treatment myself. I 
don’t want to get comfortable. I’m quite intelligent and I do know myself and if I 
wasn’t uncomfortable, I’d get complacent like some of them. And I’m getting 
better. I don’t belong in the working world yet, but I don’t belong with my peers. 
I’m an honourable person and none of this that I’m on benefits for is my fault. 
 
Highlighting that she ‘takes one benefit’, Priya then used moral judgments to discuss 
others who also received state benefit. By saying ‘I hate the way they are,’ she argued 
that ‘they think they are getting paid’ and characterises them as being ‘complacent’. 
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Priya indirectly draws distinctions and distance between herself and ‘the bad subject of 
value.’ She does this by saying she ‘doesn’t belong to that world’ since she is ‘active’, 
‘hard on herself’, ‘not comfortable’, ‘quite intelligent’ and ‘honourable’. Her peers are 
therefore by comparison figured as ‘belong to that world’, are ‘inactive’, ‘unintelligent’ 
and ‘comfortable’. Although she cannot distinguish herself by highlighting her economic 
productivity, Priya, like Lucy above, differentiates herself through values, intelligence 
and honour. She again reproduces the dominant narrative, connecting welfare, 
individual choice and behaviour. 
 
Worklessness and Immorality: Blaming the Bad Feckless Subject 
 
Blame was another means by which young women positively constructed 
themselves in contrast to ‘Others’ who were believed, variously, to be work-shy, to claim 
benefits illegitimately and to be unable to ‘manage’50. It was them upon whom the 
stigma of being ‘undeserving’ was cast (Shildrick et al., 2012). As Ruth Lister discussed, 
‘Othering has been largely understood as a discursive practice which shapes how the 
‘non-poor’ think and talk about and act towards ‘the poor’ (2004: 103). However, as 
Shildrick and MacDonald note, ideological discourses about the ‘undeserving poor’ are 
not simply a ‘top-down’ rhetoric of the powerful (or the ‘non-poor’) but are shared and 
enacted by those at the bottom, skewed downwards towards others, objectively, like 
them’ (2013: 299-300). Like MacDonald and Marsh (2005) have previous claimed, some 
of the most vociferous critics of those using benefits are themselves unemployed. 
Interviews were heavily loaded with moral assessments. Young women distanced 
themselves from others who were blamed particularly for their unwillingness ‘to work’ or 
‘to manage’. For example, Scarlett, discussed those around her area of Leeds, equating 
                                                
50It is important to note that self-blame was not a feature within the interviews. This contrasts with other 
works on young people, neoliberalism and crisis. For more on such discussions see the work of Silva (2013) 
and Whitehead and Crawshaw (2012). 
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welfare with being ‘work-shy’. She said: 
Some people are lazy and don’t want to work. I’ve lived around here all my life 
and I know some sorts. I know they genuinely sit on their backsides coz they know 
they can. They know the more they breed children, the more income that comes. 
Thinking the government’s their second husband. I’m sorry but it’s true. And 
some women won’t spend on them [their children], they’ll look all one million 
dollars and their kids are sat there in dirty clothes and holes in their shoes. That’s 
the people who need punishing, people that don’t want to do anything, want to 
sit on their backsides and take, take, take. If I ran this country, believe me, they 
wouldn’t be taking from me.  
 
Having talked about those who did not want to work and ‘take, take, take’, Scarlett’s 
narrative followed with a discussion of the immorality and failings of others in terms of 
provision and consumption. As argued in Chapter 4, mothers have long held the main 
responsibility for maintaining respectability in working-class communities. Adhering to 
high standards of household cleanliness, and being able ‘to make ends meet’, is as 
Skeggs (1997, 2005) notes, a visible marker of being ‘a good mother’ (also see Shildrick 
and MacDonald, 2013). Kathy Hamilton (2012), for instance, has shown how the ‘stigma 
management’ by low-income mothers required coping strategies through which to 
protect social identity. Hamilton explained how castigation of the ‘undeserving’ by her 
participants often focused on the perceived unwillingness of mothers to maintain 
standards and make sacrifices for the sake of the children and their inability to maintain 
standards.  
During interviews, there was no shortage of disparagement of the allegedly disabled 
‘undeserving poor’, even by those receiving sickness and disability benefits. Rita claimed 
Incapacity Benefit and described how she felt about some others who did the same; ‘I 
think to myself you’ve never worked or earned money, they say wages, I think, you don’t 
work for your wages, you work for a wage! This is supposed to help people in difficulties 
and I know they don’t need it, none of them’. Here Rita reproduces the dominant 
austerity discourse by saying ‘you’ve never worked or earnt money’, comparing benefit 
payments to wages. Here she indirectly reinforces the ‘undeserving’ narrative of those 
who are disabled as being ‘scroungers’ by referring to the fact that ‘this is supposed to 
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help people in difficulties and I know they don’t need it I know they don’t need it’.  
Although most women had emphasised their ability to ‘get by’ with limited resources 
(see Chapter 6; also, see Shildrick et al., 2012; Shildrick and MacDonald, 2013), they 
compared their situation to those who were ‘getting something for nothing’, or who were 
‘entitled to something they were not’. This reinforces division and blame between and 
within groups who were reliant on welfare. Those caught between low-paid jobs and 
unemployment referred to as ‘the working poor’ were the ones who became most 
enraged by those they perceived to be ‘living it up at their expense’ or ‘receiving 
something they could not’. For instance, both Marie as discussed above and Fiona (a 23-
year-old, white, working-class single mother, working part-time at a nursery and getting 
state benefit) directed anger towards those who were receiving food bank vouchers and 
who were eligible for social housing. Both these women had tried on different occasions 
to access food banks, but as Marie said, ‘I’m not entitled to it because I work’. They were 
also on waiting lists (in band D51) for social housing. Anger and frustration had therefore 
turned towards those who were eligible for such help and resources. For Fiona (who 
described herself as white), this was in relation to the ‘non-whites’, whom she said were 
more likely to receive resources because they had ‘bigger families, more children and 
more mouths to feed’. For Marie (who described herself as Black), this was in relation to 
‘immigrants’ who were described in exactly the same terms.  
Those who expressed difficulty in finding employment also drew attention towards 
groups who were seen to be unfairly taking jobs and resources – often those who were 
‘non British born’. For south Asian women, these were ‘non British-born’ people, and for 
white women, ‘non-white immigrants’. ‘Immigrants’ were berated both for ‘coming here 
and taking all the jobs’ and, paradoxically, for ‘being a drain on the welfare state’ because 
                                                
51When applying for social housing an assessment is made that allocates the applicant to a certain priority 
band and bedroom category. Using the banding scheme to allocate properties gives those with the 
greatest need highest priority. The bandings are as follows: Band A – for households with an urgent need 
to move. Band B – for households with a high priority to move. Band C – for households with an identified 
housing need. Band D – for households with no other housing need but interested in affordable social 
housing and Homebuy. 	
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they ‘did not want to work’. Such contradictions can be seen with the two quotes below 
from Heather and Faye: 
They love England, thank you London, and thank you Britain because they can 
send it to their country and sit on their backside all day doing nothing. Come to 
the UK and drain us, get benefits, buy clothes, get a car and a house given. But 
then the person born here isn’t entitled because they’ve taken it all. (Heather) 
 
If we didn’t have so many people coming over and they’re not meant to be coming 
over then there would be a lot more jobs left for people to get and we wouldn’t 
need cuts, I know it might sound harsh but I’ve always said there would be a lot 
more jobs if that wasn’t happening, a lot more jobs. (Faye) 
 
 
These extracts therefore show that despite the contradictory narratives that circulate, 
the figure of the ‘immigrant’ was blamed for the lack of resources and employment 
available. This narrative is similar to findings from previous times of crisis. As discussed 
in Chapter 4, in the climate of Thatcherism, anti-immigrant rhetoric was used as a 
scapegoat for high unemployment and recession. The working-class became divided on 
racial grounds – the white working-class was encouraged to direct its frustrations 
towards the black working-class for ‘taking’ their jobs, housing, and public services. What 
can be seen from the women’s narratives above is the black and white-working class 
directing their frustrations towards ‘immigrants’ for taking their jobs and housing, and 
‘draining’ their public services (also see Dhaliwal and Forkert, 2015). Thus reproducing 
current austerity discourse. 
 
What becomes evident in the discussion about blaming the ‘poor’ and migrants within 
my research is the idea of investment, placing investment into those who have invested 
into something and those who have not. Although these descriptions were often met 
with nameless examples, like the middle-class woman above, RTV’s genre of ‘poverty 
porn’ (Jensen, 2014) once again served to reinforce their understanding and legitimation 
of blame and distancing towards certain groups. For instance, Scarlett said, ‘there are 
people who are ruining it out there, who literally laugh when they walk out the Jobcentre, 
did you not watch that programme on Channel 4? It was disgusting, it was about us as 
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well as people coming into the country. There was a man, he was at the bank at 12 o’clock 
and I thought, you disgust me’.  
This noticeable lack of resources generated an absence of empathy towards those 
suffering within the current context. For instance, Marie said:  
I don’t know why but certain people don’t pay council tax. This woman she got 
evicted, she might be homeless now because of certain things like arrears, but 
she didn’t have to pay council tax. How come she doesn’t and I do? How is that 
fair that they don’t have to pay it? I have to pay it.  
 
For Marie, anger is directed towards those who do not have to pay council tax, in which 
she questions ‘how come she doesn’t and I do?’ Such questioning generates a lack of 
acknowledgment towards eviction and homelessness. This shows how attention is 
directed towards specific individuals and groups and not towards wider structural issues. 
Groups in close proximity are therefore battling for resources and income, and so this 
gives them less room to question the wider issue of why they are battling for them.  
 
What these interviews exposed is the deflection of blame onto others in an attempt to 
distance themselves from the stigma and the shame of ‘welfare dependence’. However, 
within this process of dialoguing with the stigma, these young women create multiple 
layers of differentiation which vary according to the resources and capitals available to 
be mobilised (for instance, through the use of work, parenting skills, nationality, ‘race’ 
and so on) and to the specific contexts to try and legitimise themselves as distinct from 
the ‘Other’/abject figure being blamed for the crisis. Such processes, through dialoguing 
with the austerity discourse, reinforce and re-produce divisions between and across 
different groups, setting groups against each other. 
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Critically Reflecting on Austerity Talk 
 
 
In this final section, I draw on instances of critical reflection to present tensions 
and fractures within discussions in the sections above. As Skeggs reminds us, ‘capital 
does not necessarily commandeer all social relations, and, even where it does, it 
produces its own contradictions’ (2014a: 15). Although emerging in different ways and 
dependent upon their position within the context of austerity, some young women 
reached for as Skeggs notes ‘values beyond (exchange) value’ (ibid), bringing to the fore 
the effects of class and ‘raced’ prejudice, as well as making fractures within the well-worn 
austerity discourse. 
 
Despite having discussed at length issues with the welfare system, this did not mean that 
young women would not reflect on the discourses circulating with the current socio-
political context and the ‘taken for granted assumptions’ people have about welfare 
claimants. For instance, despite Tiffany’s negativity towards welfare claimants, she 
problematised the discussion of welfare spending, saying: ‘if you look on a wider 
spending perspective of the government the actual segment that benefits takes up is so 
small it really is nothing’. Similarly, Mia, who had talked at length about the problems of 
welfare, then said, ‘I’d be interested to work all the stuff about people who are on 
benefits, I think fraud is actually a smaller figure than we all think’. Young women 
acknowledged that the media and government often homogenised groups, labelling 
people in certain ways despite their needs and experiences being different. For example, 
in spite of the grouping of individuals by women within each of these sections, there was 
an acknowledgment that differences did exist and affect one’s experience. On occasion, 
middle-class women would show awareness of their own status, as Anna said, ‘it’s easy 
for me to say in my position’. Such reflexivity demonstrates that these women are aware 
of their own privileged position. Andrew Sayer (2005) suggests that this is part of a 
middle-class disposition. 
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In other cases, women reflected upon structural dimensions when thinking about ‘hard 
work’ within the context of austerity. Rita and Scarlett discussed their space of 
possibilities in the current context: 
 
Rita: The point is in our country, if I wanted to be Prime Minister, if I had worked 
hard enough, I could have been. You can do anything you want to. 
 
Scarlett: Do you think you can do that? 
 
Rita: I can’t, no. 
 
Scarlett: No, I can’t either. 
 
Rita: I can’t afford to send my daughter to university, but you can’t get anywhere 
without going to university, point is you need tools to do it. 
 
Scarlett: Yeah, I wouldn’t have been able to go. I love and embrace university but 
I think them poor people that spend all that money getting their self to the end of 
it to have nothing at the end of it, and I’ve seen people on the telly crying saying I 
can’t believe I’ve worked my backside off and been penniless, living in a student 
flat on nothing to get through and then to be told, well all those qualifications 
count for nothing, because there’s no work for you. I feel sorry for them as well 
because every penny they’ve got has gone into building themselves a life and they 
can’t even do it then. 
 
Rita and Scarlett’s reflexive account is important for several reasons. First, they 
acknowledge that they could not become the Prime Minster if they worked hard enough, 
which breaks with the meritocratic view circulating that the ‘good citizen’ works hard and 
succeeds. Secondly, by emphasising that their space of possibility is dependent on 
economic means (‘I can’t afford to send my daughter to university’), Rita and Scarlett ‘un-
burying’ class differences and how these differences affect their space of possibilities, 
especially in the current context. Discussing how those with university degrees are also 
struggling to find work within the current context, both Scarlett and Rita complicate the 
common-sense understanding that austerity’s causalities are suffering because of 
individual failure and pathological deviance. This idea was also reinforced later by Rita 
who said ‘there are also people that do go to work, I know them, and there’s no money 
left, they still need to use food banks’.  
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Others complicated the ‘anti-immigration’ and ‘anti-welfare rhetoric’, discussing the 
ways in which communities and groups were pitted against each other. Scarlett said: 
‘crime’s gone up, depression’s gone up, everything like that is up because the world itself 
is not surviving, because people are fighting in lumps. Groups are fighting for the same 
things, thinking they have it better, but literally everyone is depressed in themselves’. 
She points out that ‘the world is not surviving because people are fighting in lumps’. She 
then goes on to say that ‘groups are fighting for the same things’, alluding to the 
discussion above that some groups are benefiting or gaining more resources from the 
state than others. However, Scarlett then says that these groups are ‘thinking they have 
it better, but literally everyone is depressed’. In a similar vein, when discussing ‘anti-
immigration’ rhetoric during a group discussion with other Bangladeshi women, Layla, a 
35-year-old, British Bengali, middle-class, charity project coordinator, said: 
 
Communities blame each other, there is a lot of migration going on so if there’s 
one pot of money and everyone wants some of that then you get blame … People 
say British born are given less priority and others are given more, but it’s not the 
case. People think that people who are newly arrived get more money and it 
causes problems. When you have cuts, it brings out all sorts of negative 
outcomes, my niece is at university and she can’t get a decent job, her surname is 
Islam, and because of the media hype about the religion Islam, it got to a point 
where she was thinking I can’t get a job and there are people less qualified that 
were applying for the same job and the careers officer changed her surname and 
it helped her. That’s not due to migration; it’s bigger than that. 
 
In the first instance, Layla acknowledges that ‘communities blame each other’ because 
there is ‘one pot of money and everyone wants some of that’. Reflecting upon the claim 
that British-born people are given less priority than non-British-born people, she instead 
says that the cuts themselves produce negative outcomes, which lead to blame and 
resentment. Using the example of her niece who could not find a job, she complicates 
the understanding that migration was to blame for struggle for suitable employment. 
 
 222 
Conclusion 
 
Overall, this chapter has shown how young women talk to and against the 
austerity discourse. The discussions were layered with contradictions and intricacies 
through which they not only legitimised and reproduced the austerity agenda, but, also 
at times, fractured and ruptured the ideals of the ‘good austere’ citizen and a country 
that is implementing austerity for the good for the nation. Middle-class women who have 
been less affected by austerity, through an emphasis on individual responsibility, hard 
work, and morality, blamed and drew boundaries between themselves and the 
‘undeserving poor’, focusing on their perceived ‘moral failings’ and ‘worklessness’. These 
discussions reinforced the austerity discourse, fostering consent for welfare reform, 
since poverty and insecurity were understood to be the fault of the individual. Like 
previous historical legacies, these categorisations therefore enabled, legitimated, and 
were mapped onto material inequality. 
 
For those women who were devalued through dominant anti-welfare discourse, I 
explained how their mechanisms of dialoguing with such stereotypes (distancing and 
blame) depended on the resources and capitals they could mobilise. Young women 
would distinguish themselves from others seen to be less ‘deserving’ of the right to 
receive help from the state. As with other times of economic crisis, socially conservative 
codes of respectability were mobilised to express disgust towards other social groups 
who were blamed for the lack employment and resources. Yet, some women challenged 
the established anti-welfare discourses, resisting the imperative for groups to pit 
themselves against each other based on their nationality, ‘race’ and class. Some young 
women produced values that counter the predominance of moralistic narratives of 
economic productivity and aspiration, and by reflecting on how structural constraints 
such as income may complicate the ideas of individualism and meritocracy. Although 
drawing heavily on the dominant rhetoric, they also considered structural constraints 
that affected them and limited their ability to become ‘austere good citizens’. 
Discussions present in this chapter are further explored in the follow chapter. I argue that 
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feminism is a productive site through which to examine austerity discourse and practices, 
and further understand austerity as a moral project.  
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Chapter 8 
 
 ‘Austerity–bourgeois feminism’: Legitimising Austerity’s Moral Project 
 
 
Yes, I’m a feminist … my main view of feminism is equal 
opportunities and that you can do whatever you want to 
do … I think feminism is important, but some [women] 
need it more than others. Some cultures are already 
three quarters of the way there, like ours and the people 
we know, our contemporaries … those who have been 
brought up white, middle-class, generally will be quite, I 
guess, educated and feminist as a result. But there are 
other cultures and classes, so Middle Eastern, Asian 
where education isn’t that widespread and old belief 
systems are in power and have a huge influence on how 
society runs. I guess yeah, those groups, they need 
feminism more.  
 
(Mia, 27, middle-class, Anglo-Indian, GP, London, February 
2014) 
 
 
The previous chapter centred on understanding how young women speak about 
austerity. I argued that, despite young women’s speech being layered with 
contradictions and intricacies, women often reproduced the austerity discourse of the 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ austere citizen. Middle-class women specifically legitimised the 
austerity programme, by drawing divisions and distinctions, constructing a moral 
hierarchy between themselves (‘the good citizen’) and others (‘the bad citizen’). This 
chapter builds on that discussion by arguing that feminism is a productive site to further 
examine austerity’s moral landscape. Focusing on young middle-class women, this 
chapter explores what they say about feminism – how they identify with it, what they 
understand it to be, and for whom they think it is necessary. By analysing these 
discussions, I argue that there has been a convergence between feminism and certain 
austerity current discourses and practices. I term this form of feminism ‘austerity–
bourgeois feminism’.  
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This chapter shows how this specific feminist subject has become a way of reinforcing 
specific political values, discourses and sensibilities. ‘Austerity–bourgeois feminism’, I 
argue, serves to reinforce distance and distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ gendered 
subjects, and silence the inequality of the austerity agenda through a position of 
‘indifference’. ‘Austerity–bourgeois feminism’ has various connections with both 
‘neoliberal’ and ‘bourgeois feminism’. Emerging from the middle-class drawing rooms of 
Victorian England, ‘bourgeois feminism’ focused its efforts on reforming aspects of the 
female condition rather than specifically arguing for equality between the sexes 
(Walkowitz, 1980, 1992; Hall, 1992, 2002; Rendall, 1994; McDermid, 2013). This form of 
feminism became a civilising mission for middle-class women to spread middle-class 
Western morality to non-Europeans (Hall, McClelland and Rendall, 2000) and working-
class women (Walkowitz, 1980, 1992; Rendall, 1994). This enabled the legitimisation of 
the dominant moral discourse of the time: self-discipline, earnestness, control and 
restraint. With the tendency of middle-class women to look down on working-class/non-
European women as having low morals and bad housekeeping skills (in line with 
Victorian ideals of femininity and domesticity), despite the sympathy middle-class 
women might have had for their working-class/non-European counterparts, and 
however much they claimed to speak on their behalf, feminist campaigns were based on 
the assumption of class and ‘racial’ division, and moral hierarchy. For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 4, with middle-class women’s belief in their own domestic morality, 
when visiting working-class areas in the attempt to help the ‘poor’, support was given to 
those who were deemed as being morally worthy and/or ‘deserving’ of help as oppose to 
those who were seen as ‘undeserving’ (Gidley, 2000).  
 
I therefore use the term ‘bourgeois’ in this sense, and drawing on its classed, racialised 
and moral aspects, argue that such characteristics are being re-signified within the 
context of austerity. Similar to the Victorian ‘bourgeois feminism’, I contend that 
‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’ reproduces and legitimises austerity discourse and 
principles. This is done by creating distance, and classed and racialised distinctions, from 
those suffering in the current context, labelled as failures of self-governance or victims 
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of culture. I argue that this distancing is crucial to the maintenance of the austerity 
project, since, instead of helping to put an end to gender inequality, this form of 
feminism aids the legitimation of hierarchical relationships and gendered socio-
economic inequalities. This is produced via a form of indifference towards the ‘bad 
subject,’ who is seen as unable to manage and who is thus undeserving of help. 
However, ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’ is distinctive in the sense that it also draws on 
elements of ‘neoliberal feminism’. Feminist scholars have argued that the dominant 
modalities of feminism in contemporary political and cultural discourse should be 
understood as neoliberal variants of feminism, informed by market rationality 
(McRobbie, 2013, 2015a; Rottenberg, 2014; Foster, 2016). This ‘neoliberal feminism’ it 
has been argued, ‘seems perfectly in sync with the evolving neoliberal order’ 
(Rottenberg, 2014: 419), helping to produce a particular kind of feminist subject, not 
defined by a collective gender affiliation, but rather by individual or personal challenges 
(Rottenberg, 2014 also see Fraser, 2013; Evans, 2015, 2016, 2017; Foster, 2016).  
I argue that certain aspects of ‘neoliberal feminism’ can also be seen within ‘austerity–
bourgeois feminism’. For the middle-class women that I interviewed, in line with the 
values of ‘late modernity’ (Giddens, 1990, 1991; Beck, 1992; Sennett, 1998, 2006; 
Bauman, 2000), feminism is spoken through an individualised lifestyle discourse: 
characterised by individualism, independence, self-love and self-care. Like ‘neoliberal 
feminism’, there is an emphasis on the need for self-responsibility to deal with forms of 
inequality. Going forward, this chapter demonstrates how ‘austerity–bourgeois 
feminism’ connects with both ‘neoliberal’ and ‘bourgeois feminism’ in various ways. It 
also highlights how it is also distinctive, producing, in certain ways, a different feminist 
subject than its foremothers. The coining of the term is therefore meant to draw 
attention to how feminism is formulated and configured within this current context. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section of the chapter, I introduce 
discussions on feminism, drawing attention to previous forms of feminism that have 
converged with wider social, economic and political contexts. Then, drawing on 
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empirical data, the next three sections explore what middle-class women say about 
feminism. These sections show how a new form of feminism is coalescing within the 
current context, and describe its distinctive traits. I conclude by suggesting how we 
might raise questions to comprehend the limits as well as the emancipatory potential of 
such a type of feminism.  
 
It is important to note here that the embedding of this form of feminism within such a 
process of austerity does not mean that feminism is ‘dead’. Such an argument, as Lisa 
Adkins (2004) has previously argued, would be premised upon an assumption of what 
the proper objects of feminism should be. Instead, this chapter demonstrates that it is 
important to analyse the discourses and practices around the term ‘austerity–bourgeois 
feminism’ within the current context. Reinforcing the point above, by focusing on the 
discussion of ‘austerity-bourgeois feminism’, this chapter therefore does not dismiss the 
fact that many young women engage with feminism in different ways, nor does it assert 
that only middle-class women hold such values. Additionally, it also does not state that 
women have no empathy for those most affected by the austerity agenda (also see 
Chapter 7). This distinct feminist position can be held in tandem with concern for women 
as a group more widely. The argument that I make here can occur with more affirmative 
accounts of feminism in the context of austerity.  
 
Neoliberalism, Austerity and Feminism  
 
With a large body of knowledge documenting women’s multi-faceted and 
contradictory relationship with feminism, researchers have highlighted women’s 
opinions of, views about, and relationship to the term and/or movement. Although it is 
beyond the scope of this chapter to provide an in-depth review on young women’s 
engagements/disengagements with feminism (for a more detailed account see Scharff, 
2012), it is nevertheless important to be aware of, and briefly unpack, this complex 
terrain. Met with ambivalence, disinterest, repudiation, identification or engagement, it 
has been argued by feminist researchers that factors such as heterosexual conventions, 
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neoliberalism, post-feminism and difference facilitate women’s 
engagements/disengagements with feminism. It has been widely documented that 
feminism is an unpopular term for many young women, in which reasons for this either 
fall within an understanding of fierce repudiation or that of irrelevance (Scharff, 2012). 
Some researchers have argued that generational differences inhibit young women from 
identifying as feminists (Pilcher, 1998; Kehily, 2008), whilst several feminist academics 
and journalists stress how negative media representations and stereotypes of feminist 
figures impact on the popularity of the movement (Bulbeck, 1997; Press; 2011). Others 
suggest that young women see the movement as ‘anachronistic’ (Read, 2000; Budgeon, 
2001; Jowett, 2004). For instance, Sinkka Aapola, Marnina Gonick and Anita Harris 
assert, ‘young women are not especially interested in feminism as a label or a movement 
anymore’ (2005: 195). Similarly, Madeline Jowett’s (2004) research on young women’s 
attitudes to feminism in Britain found that feminism was ‘something that had 
contributed to female progress in the past, but (was) no longer seen as relevant’ 
(2004:94), as equality was now understood to be the ‘norm’.  
 
Furthering this understanding, McRobbie argues that there has been a shift in young 
women's relationship with feminism (2004; also see Gill, 2007). While, as the above 
literature shows, such a relationship was marked by a ‘distance from feminism’, 
McRobbie argues that we have now entered the ‘cultural space of post-feminism’ (2004b: 
257) characterised by an ‘active, sustained, and repetitive repudiation or repression of 
feminism’ (2004a: 6). This shift can be understood within the context of neoliberalism 
and individualisation, in which women are seen as champions of their own success. In line 
with broader sociological arguments about individualisation (Giddens, 1991; Beck, 1992; 
Beck and Beck-Gernsheim, 1995) and more critical gendered perspectives on processes 
of individualisation, post-feminism produces a set of contradictions that involve 
declaring ‘the [feminist] movement (predictably if illogically) dead, victorious and 
ultimately failed’ (Walters, 1991: 106). 
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McRobbie sums this passing of feminism as being ‘instrumentalised’, in which feminism 
‘is brought forward and claimed by Western governments, as a signal to the rest of the 
world that this is a key part of what freedom now means’ (2009:1). She goes on to note, 
‘drawing on a vocabulary that includes words like “empowerment” and “choice”, these 
elements are then converted into a much more individualistic discourse, and they are 
deployed in this new guise, particularly in media and popular culture, but also by agencies 
of the state, as a kind of substitute for feminism. These new and seemingly “modern” 
ideas about women, and especially young women, are then disseminated more 
aggressively, to ensure that a new women’s movement will not re-emerge’ (2009:1). 
Empirical research on young women (Misra, 1997; Budgeon, 2001; Hughes, 2005; Rich, 
2005; Scharff, 2012) has demonstrated how young women draw on a post-feminist, un-
gendered, individualistic discourse to suggest that feminism is redundant, with no 
identification with the idea of a collective feminist movement.  
 
In the current context, it has been argued that feminism has (in various forms) re-entered 
political culture and civil society (McRobbie, 2015a)52. This can be seen in representations 
of feminism entering popular culture (Tasker and Negra, 2007; Munford and Waters, 
2013), the increased presence of feminism on social media (Keller, 2o15), and the rise in 
feminist activism (MacKay, 2011; Franzway and Fonow, 2011; Cradock, 2017). However, 
despite examining the linkage between this so called ‘new feminism’ and notions of 
autonomy, authenticity and radicalism (Scharff, 2012), the celebratory and optimistic 
framing of feminism has been contested and contradicted. Scholars interested in the re-
emergence of feminism in these different avenues have questioned how it has taken on, 
and is compatible with, wider cultural, political and economic frames. Discussing the 
increased complexity of feminism, McRobbie (2013) describes the endorsement of this 
                                                52Current cuts to welfare by the government have added energy to feminist politics and campaigning. For 
example, the Fawcett Society made a legal challenge to the emergency budget in 2011. There have also 
been other online campaigns by smaller grassroots feminist groups such as Focus E15, Black Activists 
Against the Cuts and Feminist Fight back, which are headed by working-class, BAME women and anti-
capitalist feminist collectives. 
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‘new feminism’ as a way of providing ‘the centre right and centre left with a more up-to-
date way of engaging with women’s issues whilst simultaneously expunging from 
popular memory the values of the social democratic tradition which had forged such a 
close connection with feminism through the pursuit of genuine equality and collective 
good’ (2012: 135, also see Farris, 2017).  
As Evans notes, ‘in some important ways [feminism] may assist the various forms of 
social inequality that support and sustain gender inequality’ (2017: 76). For example, 
‘bourgeois feminism’ (Hall, 1992, 2002; Rendall, 1994; McDermid, 2013), ‘commodity 
feminism’ (Goldsman, Heath and Smith, 1991) and ‘consumer feminism’ (McRobbie, 
2009) have converged with wider cultural, political, and economic frames and contexts 
where women struggle for equality within existing social systems. As discussed above, 
some feminist scholars understand the dominant modalities of feminism in 
contemporary political and cultural discourse to be neoliberal variants of feminism, 
informed by market rationality. This ‘neoliberal feminism,’ scholars argue, helps to 
produce a particular kind of feminist subject, not defined by collective gender affiliation, 
but rather by individual or personal challenges, which reflect the discourse and values of 
the neoliberal context53 (Rottenberg, 2014; also see Fraser, 2013; McRobbie, 2015a; 
Evans, 2015, 2016, 2017; Foster, 2016; Gill, 2016). Catherine Rottenberg, for instance, 
argues that this feminist subject accepts full responsibility for her own well-being and 
self-care, which is increasingly predicated on crafting a felicitous work–family balance 
based on a cost-benefit calculus. In a similar vein, McRobbie (2015a) states that feminism 
has been made compatible with an individualising project and is also made to fit with the 
                                                
53It is important to stress here that some feminist scholars use the terms accommodation and 
appropriation to differentiate their arguments from what other feminist writers have seen as ‘complicity’ 
(Fraser 2009; Yeatman 2014). McRobbie (2015a) for instance, argues that ‘to use the word complicity is 
somewhat accusatory and implies that certain kinds of feminists have allowed themselves to become 
aligned with the forces of conservatism and of the Right. In common sense terms, this is correct and one 
could look to Sandberg again in this regard. But one senses that writers such as Fraser (2009) have other 
more academically engaged feminists in mind, not the transparently corporate feminism of the ‘lean-
inners’. Complicity does not seem helpful when what one is discussing is the cultural appropriation of 
feminism such that it becomes part of everyday governmentality’ (13-14, also see Rottenberg, 2014).  	
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idea of competition. She argues that, with competition as a key component of 
contemporary neoliberalism, the focus on self-regulation in the form of the ‘perfect’ acts 
to stifle the possibility of an expansive feminist movement. In the current context of 
austerity, feminist scholars have noted how the figure of the ‘cupcake feminist,’ for 
example, fits with the ideals of the austerity agenda, doing significant cultural work for a 
government who advocate ‘thriftiness’, nostalgia and gendered entrepreneurial 
domesticity whilst cutting public spending (Allen et al., 2015; Jensen, 2012, 2013a; Biressi 
and Nunn, 2013; Negra, 2013). 
In this chapter, despite being mindful that feminism and feminist frameworks take many 
forms, building on the discussion above, I explore the convergence of feminism within 
wider discourses and values, which is taking place within the current context of austerity.  
 
Middle-class Feminism in the Context of Austerity 
 
The data described in this chapter arose from various stages of the interviews, in 
which issues of feminism and equality were voiced. It is important to note, that these 
topics were not discussed in every single interview (thirty-nine out of sixty-one). During 
these interviews, some topics were explicitly addressed: the participants’ opinions on 
gender roles and the state of gender inequality in the current context, and attitudes 
towards, and feelings about, feminism. Thirty women self-identified with the term 
‘feminist’54, six dis-identified with the term55 and three avoided or were unsure about the 
label56. In this chapter, I focus on interviews with seventeen women who identified with 
feminism, and who adopted the ‘austerity–bourgeois feminist’ subject-position. These 
women were all middle-class. Fourteen of these women were white, one Anglo-Indian, 
                                                
54Four of these women were working-class (two white and two black) and twenty-six were middle-class 
(twenty-one white, two Indian, one Anglo-Indian, one Pakistani and one mixed other). 
  
55Four of these women were middle-class (white) and two working-class (white). 
 
56One of these women was white working-class, one Indian middle-class and one black middle-class. 
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one Indian and one mixed other. Ten of these women worked in the public sector, five in 
the private sector and two were full-time students. These women had been affected to a 
lesser degree than others by austerity measures and had high volumes of, and different 
types of capital.  
 
In an era often described as ‘post-feminist’ – all seventeen of the middle-class women 
interviewed self-identified with the term feminist. As Susan, a 30-year-old, white, 
middle-class woman, who worked as an account manager in Brighton, said, ‘yeah! Of 
course, I am [a feminist]’. Similarly, Pippa, a 27-year-old, white, middle-class content 
producer from London, noted: ‘yes! I’m a feminist. We should all be feminists!’ 
Identifying positively with the label, being a feminist was, for these women, synonymous 
with gender equality and women’s rights. Discussing what feminism signified for her, 
Julie, 34-year-old, white, middle-class events assistant living in London, said, ‘feminism, 
for me, represents women’s rights, and women’s equality, to ensure things are fair 
between men and women, giving women opportunities in society’. Likewise, Polly, a 27-
year-old, white, middle-class occupational therapist from Leeds, explained, ‘I guess my 
main view of feminism is equal opportunities, behaving the same as men, that’s what 
feminism is’. This idea of equality and opportunity resonated through all discussions with 
these women, and feminism was discussed as important for, and relevant to, their lives. 
 
Yet feminist identification was also marked by contestations and ambiguities. Many 
answers had caveats: feminism should ‘not go over the top,’ should not try to make 
women ‘be better than men’, or should ‘not be too radical or extreme’. Susan made a 
comparison between what she called ‘new’ feminism and ‘serious, staunch’ feminism. ‘I 
think it’s a new feminism … it doesn’t have to be serious, staunch, it’s not man-hating, 
it’s just self-loving’. She then characterised this ‘new feminism’ as having more of an 
‘edge’ and being ‘fun’. Similarly, Francesca, a 28-year-old, Indian, middle-class 
accountant living in Leeds, also described her feminism by contrasting it to another form 
of feminism that she did not want to embody:  
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We [feminists now] have our choices and beliefs, which we incorporate into our 
lives, but we aren’t actively fighting, burning bras, shouting and stuff … we have 
beliefs, which we incorporate into society and our lives. Some of the things older 
feminists say are quite out-dated.  
 
Contrarily, as shown by Susan and Francesca, feminist values of independence, choice, 
individualism, self-love and self-care were manifestly valued and deemed appropriate 
characteristics to take up and embody. Serious, staunch, actively fighting, bra-burning 
feminism was, on the other hand, not. Therefore, two ‘types’ of feminism were 
identified, which can be seen to be in direct conflict with each other - the ‘old’ - appearing 
to produce hostility and rejection - and the ‘new’- which is valued and seen as necessary. 
Although the identification with feminism by these middle-class women above 
complicates the common finding that young women no longer identify with the term, as 
with previous forms of feminist identification, the desirable aspects of feminism are 
affirmed via a disavowal of more radical positions (also see Dean, 2010, 2012). As Gill and 
Scharff point out, an ‘endorsement of “feminist” doesn’t necessarily mean that forms of 
repudiation fail to take place, raising questions about the new feminisms’ critical and 
emancipatory potential’ (2011: 265). 
 
In contrast to other studies on young women and feminism, which have argued that 
feminism is repudiated since it no longer fits with the values of the young women’s 
generation (McRobbie, 2009), for the large majority of women who self-identified as this 
‘new’ type of feminist, feminism/feminist was articulated through such neoliberal/post-
feminist values (choice, success, individuality). As Polly said, ‘it’s a bit of an approach, I 
don’t think you have to sign up and become a member and come to this meeting and 
work for this society and be down in London. For me, it’s an approach to life, or the way 
that you are and the way that you think. I share what they think and what they believe 
in’. Similarly, Madeline, a 24-year-old, white, middle-class complaints mediation officer 
living in Brighton, explained, ‘I’m not actively [feminist] but yes, I am a feminist, pro-
women, equality, it’s part of my lifestyle, it’s part of who I am as an individual’. Her choice 
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of words, ‘individual’, ‘approach’, and ‘lifestyle’, show that feminism, for her, is a way of 
life – incorporating ideas of individualism and choice rather than collective action. 
 
An earlier section of this chapter revealed how feminism has been actively incorporated 
into neoliberal cultural, political, and economic frames. One way this has been done is 
via consumer advertising and promotion (Douglas, 2010), with the characteristics of 
being independent and having choice being re-signified and appropriated by ‘market 
logic’. This form of feminism has been reinforced and promoted across the media, and 
numerous cultural and political platforms, for the last few decades (Winship, 1985). 
Therefore, it is not surprising that young women today identify with this form of 
feminism – this is the feminism available to them. ‘Popular feminism’ (Skeggs, 1997), 
‘DIY feminism’ (Bail, 1996), or ‘neoliberal feminism’ (Fraser, 2013; Rottenberg, 2014) all 
describe a form of feminism whereby women do not define themselves by some 
collective gender affiliation, but rather by individual or personal challenges. Skeggs 
(1997) argues that in so doing, feminism is detached from the social and the systematic, 
and reduced to the individual. In this sense, feminism is no longer a political and 
collective movement demanding social change.  
 
This detachment from the social and the systematic was evidenced when participants 
discussed current patterns of gender inequality in the workplace, which had resulted 
from changes made by current policies of austerity. For example, an increase in 
precarious and casualised employment and an increased number of redundancies, were 
met with individual solutions and personal challenges. Individual traits, such as 
assertiveness, confidence, and ambition, were described as essential for women’s 
progression, rather than other more collective forms of action. Polly emphasised the 
need for women to be ‘strong,’ not ‘a pathetic, weak woman’. A ‘strong’ woman had 
certain attributes: she would speak up, and would ask for pay rises at work. For instance, 
Francesca, when discussing the pay gap between men and women said, ‘there is a [pay] 
gap but how many [women] ask for a pay rise or promotion themselves? I’d ask! 
Sometimes I think it just comes down to being proactive and assertive’. Asking for more 
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and being proactive, as Evans notes (2016: 444) echoes the ‘exhortations from highly 
paid female employees in the corporations of the United States who believe that 
individual woman have only to ask and they will be given’. Sheryl Sandberg, the chief 
operating offer of Facebook (2008 – present), in her book Lean In (2013), urges women 
to be more assertive in their work place. These examples demonstrate how ‘doing’ and 
‘asking’ are understood as individualised, rather than collective, exercises.  
 
As these quotations in this section illustrate, despite discussing the importance of 
feminism and gender equality, the interviews were laced with individualised discourses 
about the importance of agency, self-management and personal responsibility. In the 
case of such middle-class feminism, in line with the neo-liberal emphasis on self-
improvement which obscures the grammar of exploitation with the use of a language of 
individual psychology (Walkerdine, 2003), solutions are proposed via the individual. 
Within the values and discourses circulating in the current context and wider neoliberal 
age – such as the challenges and effects brought about by welfare reform which are 
recoded as private matters to be managed individually - individualist, and individualising 
discourse shuns feminism’s commitment to social solidarity, care and interdependence 
(see the work of Larner, 2000; Brown, 2005). The self is seen as the only solution to 
gender inequality in the current austerity context, burying classed, gendered, and 
racialised power differentials. 
 
‘Austerity–bourgeois feminism’: Creating and Reinforcing Distance and Distinctions 
 
Until this point, I have explored how these middle-class women identify with 
feminism. I have highlighted how ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’ prizes individualisation 
and self-responsibility. Yet, as I signalled in an earlier section of this chapter, such a type 
of feminism should not be characterised as ‘neoliberal feminism’, since it fails to 
encompass the entirety of the current sensibility of feminist identification that these 
middle-class women are embracing. For the young middle-class women described in this 
chapter, their feminism also resulted in a form of indifference towards those women who 
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are suffering within the current context, labelled as failures of self-governance. This is 
achieved in part by creating distance between the ‘good/proper’ feminists and those ‘in 
need’ of said feminist values. This specifically classed and racialised ‘austerity-bourgeois 
feminism’, therefore produces a different, but complimentary feminist subject to its 
‘neoliberal feminist’ foremother. One that reproduces austerity’s moral project based on 
legitimating a disregard for others, who are seen as unable to manage.  
 
As discussed in Chapter 7, when considering other women’s experiences of austerity, 
young women did show empathy towards their situations. For example, out of the 
seventeen women, fourteen of them noted that they felt women (especially mothers) 
had been most affected by austerity measures. However, when discussing this in more 
detail, they resumed the feminist narrative of self-care and self-management. Mia, a 27-
year-old, Anglo-Indian, middle-class GP from London, said, ‘obviously, it’s hard [for 
women] at the moment, it really is, but, I think when people are faced with a challenge 
they give up too easily’. Mia begins by acknowledging that ‘it’s hard at the moment, it 
really is’. However, her use of the word ‘challenge’ shows that she sees the difficulties as 
being a test of someone’s ability, resilience or strength. If they are unable to succeed in 
such a ‘challenge’, they have ‘given up too easily’. This framing makes it hard to consider 
the complexity of structural processes, in line with the discourse of austerity and how 
right wing/Conservative politics tend to operate more generally. Similarly, when 
discussing the disproportionate impact that austerity has on women, Francesca followed 
the same logic. 
 
I definitely think that you know, women have a legitimate reason to be affected, 
fair do’s, but personally for me, financial crisis or not, like if you’re struggling or if 
inflation’s gone up, pay’s been lowered, you’ve been made redundant, you have 
to tailor your living accordingly … I’m sure that’s just a factor of life that you 
change your lifestyle in accordance to what you’re earning and different factors 
that happen to you. 
 
For Francesca, even though women were seen to have a legitimate reason to be affected 
by austerity due to her acknowledgment of redundancies, the rise in inflation and pay 
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cuts, the way women should deal with their situation was re-organised in individualised 
terms. She laboured the point that women should ‘live accordingly’ or in ‘accordance to 
what you are earning,’ placing the onus onto the women themselves. This discussion 
mirrors the narratives of financial management and thrift from Chapter 7. She believed 
that women were struggling not because of their lack of income, but because of their 
lack of good management of their finances. It is important to remember that ‘living 
within your means’ is how austerity has been framed in government discourse – at both 
a national and individual level. Therefore, like ‘neoliberal feminism’, responsibility was 
placed entirely with the individual. Gender (in)equality was acknowledged in terms of 
austerity’s impact, but women who were affected were also seen as not behaving in the 
right way to make their situations better. ‘Austerity–bourgeois feminism’ becomes 
distinctive here – it creates distance between those who ‘tailor their needs accordingly’ 
through financial management, and those who don’t. It therefore produces a feminist 
subject who not only disregards the experience of those women suffering, but also 
blames those women for their situation.  
 
When discussing redundancies (a common occurrence within austerity Britain), some 
women described them in solely individual terms, instead of being a result of wider 
structural issues. Pippa, a content producer, noted that she had seen many redundancies 
in her firm during the early period of austerity (2009). Most of those who were made 
redundant were female middle managers. Pippa however, placed the blame onto the 
shoulders of individual women:  
 
I can imagine women who were affected by the recession, who lost their jobs 
going into reflection mode, thinking, “what can I do?” To move them out of the 
hole they are in, they need to think outside the box, think about how to transfer 
skills. I use the term dwellers, I don’t mean that unkindly, but individuals who 
cannot see past an obstacle, who just make do. 
 
 
Pippa recognised that these women have been ‘placed’ in a ‘hole’ through no fault of 
their own, and understood that such changes were beyond their control. Nevertheless, 
 238 
she felt that to ‘move out of the hole that they were placed in,’ these women should have 
become more responsible, resilient and entrepreneurial. They should have created 
individual solutions and relied on themselves. Resilience, as De Benedictis and Gill (2016) 
have noted, has become neoliberal trait par excellence for surviving austerity. As Mark 
Neocleous (2013) explains, ‘good subjects will survive and thrive in any situation … they 
just bounce back from whatever life throws, whether it be cuts to benefits, wage freezes 
or global economic meltdown’ (in De Benedictis and Gill, 2016: no pagination). Pippa 
labelled those who were not able to successfully adapt and ‘bounce back’ as ‘just making 
do’, or ‘dwelling’, unable to construct and/or transform themselves into the good, flexible 
austere subject. Noticeably, her account shows a lack of appreciation of differences that 
might make some women unable to adopt these actions. Given the life experiences, 
trajectories, and resources available within the current context of austerity, as shown in 
Chapters 5 and 6, such changes are easier for some than for others.  
 
‘Austerity–bourgeois feminism’ converges here with the political rhetoric surrounding 
austerity. The figures of speech regarding those who ‘just make do’ (‘the dweller’) is 
interesting – it mirrors that of the ‘skiver’ or ‘shirker’ (discussed above and in Chapters 1, 
4 and 7). Theoretically, those who ‘make do’ are simply not able to adopt the necessary 
creative, resilient, entrepreneurial solution to their problem, because they lack morals, 
aspirations and values. Pippa continued, ‘opportunities are there for everyone, it 
depends whether you are the kind of person and you have a … glimmer of get up and go 
that will push you’. Pippa saw success (or the lack of it) as a product of self-responsibility, 
self-management, enterprise and risk-taking. Her understanding that ‘opportunities are 
there for everyone’ is narrowly defined and individualising and negates the broader 
inequalities that characterise the contemporary climate and shape the labour market 
(Allen et al., 2015). Not investing in aspiration, or in Pippa’s words, those who do not have 
the ‘glimmer of get up and go’ are understood through the lens of individual pathologies 
and deficits - laziness, lack of motivation and poor choices - rather than the result of 
structural changes effected by austerity (Tyler, 2013a, 2013b).  
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As argued above, women who accept responsibility for their own well-being and self-
care (appropriate ‘productive’ feminist values) possess the tools necessary to ‘weather 
the storm’ of austerity. By accepting full responsibility for their own well-being and self-
care, ‘austerity-bourgeois feminism’ is thus mobilised to convert continued gender 
inequality from a structural problem into an individual affair. ‘Like ‘neoliberal feminism’, 
it helps to silence the language of inequality and unfairness within the context of 
austerity under an equalities umbrella. Gender, class and ‘race’ inequalities are thus 
‘buried alive’ (Goldberg and Giroux, 2014; also, see Eng, 2010) in the neoliberal discourse. 
Therefore, the emotional sub-text of these interviews was - despite initially having 
empathy for their situation, if women could not re-model and upgrade their position –  a 
lack of empathy. The particularity of ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’ can therefore be 
seen here – situation’s outside women’s control become seen as a consequence of 
personal characteristics, rather than an outcome of structural inequalities and uneven 
wealth distribution. 
 
Who Needs Feminism?  
 
In line the discourses of the austerity project, ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’ as 
discussed above, also works as a moral project based on legitimating disregard for 
others. This is achieved in part by creating distance between the ‘good/proper’ feminist 
and undesirable subject positions – the ‘working-class woman’ or the ‘non-Western 
woman/’Muslim woman’ ‘in need’ of said feminist values.  
 
Class and Feminism: ‘Working-class Women’ 
 
Working-class women were perceived to need feminism to help release them 
from the dependency of their traditional lifestyle. They needed to learn skills that would 
be necessary in order to become independent and, by association, successful. Anna, a 
27-year-old, white, middle-class physiotherapist living in London, explained: 
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I think it might be helpful for them [working-class women], it might encourage 
them, the girls, to do more at school, work harder and have a goal, instead of 
thinking ‘I don't need to do this as I am just going to bring up a family or whatever’. 
 
Here Anna drew distance between the traditional and the modern – ‘them’, those who 
will just bring up a family and ‘her’, who already possessed and embodied all these 
feminist characteristics. The neoliberal self is often constructed in opposition to an 
allegedly powerless ‘other’ (see for example Scharff, 2012; Williams, 2014). Such a form 
of othering becomes explicit in ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’, for example, when Anna 
explained why the working-classes needed feminism.  
 
I see a lot of working-class men and women as uneducated, a lot don’t know what 
feminism is, and I think if they are brought up into a life where they are going to 
claim benefits or they are going to have kids and stay at home and not work, they 
don’t strive for anything different and I think that’s why they don’t, I just think 
they wouldn’t have much of an understanding of feminism and kind of care about 
it because they will think that’s what’s my life’s going to be like. 
 
This extract exemplifies how the idea that working-class women need feminism due to 
their lack of education and opportunities and thus their ability to help themselves is 
weaved into narratives from middle-class women. This ‘need of feminism’ is connected 
to a discourse of the devalued lifestyle of the working-class. As Anna asserted, they 
‘claim benefits’, ‘have kids’, ‘don’t work and stay at home’. Skeggs (1997, 2004) has 
argued that definitions of class often entwine ideas of a person's moral as well as 
economic value, linking the working-class with a non-modern, degenerate lifestyle. In 
this case, these middle-class narratives support this claim. The ‘inferior’, ‘uneducated’, 
‘traditional’, ‘dependent’, working-class woman needs feminism to release her from the 
dependency of her ‘traditional’ lifestyle, and to enable her to overcome her struggle 
independently.  
 
Middle-class women drew on the attributes of ‘drive’, ‘education’ and ‘ambition’ to 
define and defend their own position as knowing about and, thinking that they need 
feminism less than other women. As Anna said, ‘maybe we don’t need it as much; we 
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already have the drive and ambition to do what we want to do’. For Anna, drive and 
ambition are characteristics of feminism that she already had, which allowed her to be 
able to do ‘what she wants to do’. This statement reasserts her class position, in which 
she distanced herself from the uneducated traditional women who needs feminism. As 
Stephanie Lawler (2005) argues, ‘to distinguish oneself from the working-class is crucial 
to middle-class identity’ (429). The idea of ‘needing feminism’ is a way of building such 
class boundaries amongst women. Moreover, as Skeggs (2004) argues, ‘middle-
classness’ is about what is good, normal, appropriate and proper. Middle-classness in the 
context of austerity encompasses those ‘hard-working’ people’ who as Evans (2015: 148) 
notes ‘have properly understood the ideal relationship of the citizen to the state.’ It 
describes the citizen who provides for themselves and works hard. 
 
Feminism or gender equality is something that Anna thinks working-class women would 
not ‘care about’: ‘austerity-bourgeois feminism’ is thus understood and framed as 
middle-class. This framing resonates with the often-implicit framing of feminism more 
widely. As Rhian E Jones has noted, class is an endemic problem in contemporary 
feminism. She writes:  
 
There remains a tendency for working-class women to appear in feminist 
discourse as objects to be seen rather than heard, expected to rely on middle-
class activists to articulate demands in their behalf but considered too inarticulate 
or otherwise rough to be directly engaged with. (in Foster, 2016: 68) 
 
However, empirical examples show that this understanding does not encompass the 
entirety of feminist identification, affiliation and activity in the current context. Working-
class women do identify with the feminist label and are active in the fight for equality. As 
discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, the crisis has caused a political resurgence 
amongst different communities, in which working-class feminism is alive and well. For 
instance, Focus E15 was established in 2013 by a small group of single mothers in 
Newham, East London. This group campaigns for affordable and permanent social 
housing for everyone in the UK. Discussions with self-identifying working-class women 
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also points to the contradictory nature of the discussions of middle-class women. Some 
working-class women that I interviewed not only identified as feminists, but had also 
previously been active in community groups within their areas. For instance, Lucy, a 21-
year-old, white, working-class woman receiving Income Support, had previously been 
involved in her local community group in Brighton and called herself a feminist. Her 
identification was not without contradictions (see Brenner and Ramas, 1984; Skeggs, 
1997; Hunter and Seller, 1998; Denner, 2001; Aronson, 2003 for a more detailed analysis 
of the ambiguities in working-class women’s dis/identification with feminism), but Lucy 
felt that the focus of feminism within the current context was unhelpful. She explained, 
‘some of the feminist stuff I see online now on social media, the self-help stuff and 
checking your privilege stuff, I’m not sure it’s the most important thing, I’m more into ... 
more kind of slut shaming and stuff like that, abuse and things’.  
 
Despite the empirical example from Lucy above, distinctions are drawn between 
different types of women – those who are feminist and those in ‘need’ of feminism. 
Distance is created between those who are morally worthy and those who are dismissed 
as failures of self-governance. The indifference of the ‘good/productive’ feminist towards 
such ‘failures’ is constitutive of this feminist position. 
 
 Culture and Feminism: Non-Western Women/ ‘Other’ Cultures  
 
Previous research has documented how feminist disarticulation has been 
intertwined with the othering of Muslim women (Scharff, 2011, 2012). Scharff argued 
that when young women talked about feminism, the powerless and dominated (Muslim) 
woman represented not only a marginalised figure for them, but was also contrasted 
against their self-presentation as ‘emancipated’ and ‘free’. Dissolving the cultural 
constraints in the West (via their un-gendered and individualised discourse) enabled 
women to push the need for feminism away from themselves onto ‘other’ parts of society 
and the rest of the world (2011, 2012). Scharff uses a neo-colonial framework to argue 
that young women are reinstating colonial modes of talking about, and knowing about, 
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the other (also see Mahmood, 2005). Like Scharff’s findings, middle-class women in my 
study pointed to other cultures and parts of the world that they thought were in need of 
feminism. Yet, in contrast to Scharff, I argue that my middle-class participants used this 
comparison in order to cement their position as self-responsible, individualised 
feminists, rather than as a means of disarticulation. ‘Culture’, like ‘class’, was used as a 
means to dismiss these women as ‘victims of culture’, who need feminism. 
 
Feminists from Mary Wollstonecraft onwards have drawn upon histories of ‘civilisation’, 
which frame the progressive history of women and the family in the West at their centre 
and their idealised and domesticated role as characterising the modern commercial 
societies of the West (also see Chapter 4). Such progress was indicated through 
comparisons with the harems and polygamy of an undifferentiated Orient, and the 
burdened and labouring women of ‘savage’ populations. By the 1860s, British feminism 
was informed both by a consciousness of superior civilisation, and national identity, by a 
mission to civilise. Such a movement, though in opposition to the dominant politics, 
could, through its language and practices, embody relations of power and subordination. 
As Mary Carpenter wrote on her return from India, in 1868, addressing her fellow British 
women on their civilising mission: 
 
Let them throw their hearts and souls into the work, and determine never to rest 
until they have raised their Eastern sisters to their own level; and then may the 
women of India at last attain a position honourable to themselves and to England, 
instead of, as is now so generally the case, filling one which can only be 
contemplated with feelings of shame and sorrow (Ware, 1992: 130). 
 
Like the mission to ‘civilise’ from bourgeois feminists in the quote above, also drawing a 
distinction between themselves and their ‘Eastern sisters’, ‘austerity-bourgeois feminist’ 
stressed that feminism was needed to help women in other countries, rather than to help 
with any kind of collective struggle at ‘home’. The ‘Middle East’ and ‘Muslim women’ 
were identified as areas and groups that needed to be ‘raised to their [‘austerity-
bourgeois feminist’] own level’ of equality that they were experiencing in the UK.  
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As Heidi Mirza (2012) has discussed, Muslim women are often seen as being in need of 
‘saving’ by the enlightened ‘west’ (also see Abu-Lughod 2002; Zahedi 2011). This 
understanding, McRobbie (2009) argues, ‘has become more sustained since the 9/11 
attacks,’ ‘pre-empting the formation of critical solidarities amongst women from a range 
of backgrounds and displacing possible post-colonial criticism of the construction of the 
west as progressive’ (in Scharff, 2012: 62). Mia, for example, told me that she was happy 
to live in the UK, having seen the treatment of ‘Muslim women’ abroad on the news. She 
said that she felt ‘lucky to be born here,’ and described the treatment of ‘Muslim women’ 
abroad as ‘horrendous’. Mia can be seen to be drawing on the construction of the West 
as progressive and liberated and the Rest as oppressive and traditional (Khan, 2005; 
Butler, 2008; Pedwell, 2010; Scharff, 2012) when she makes the link between being 
‘happy and lucky’ to be born and live in the UK against the ‘horrendous’ treatment of 
Muslim women in other parts of the world. 
In order to reinforce their understanding of non-western women as oppressed subjects 
in need of feminism, cultural practices such as female genital mutilation (FGM) and 
forced marriage were discussed. It is important to note that such practices have been 
prevalent in media campaigns and recent government policy in recent years, especially 
during the time that interviews with participants were taking place57. When talking about 
FGM, Mia said, ‘it’s horrible, I mean it’s atrocious, these poor women having to go 
through that over there, it’s just awful, we need to help them’. FGM was also brought up 
by Anna, ‘FGM, genital cutting, it’s part of the culture there but it’s so damaging, the 
women don’t know how bad it is, I mean can you imagine doing that here, I know it is 
practised, I’m sure it is … it shouldn’t be allowed’. Both Mia and Anna point to the 
                                                
57For example, in 2013 four funders announced a three-year £1.6million initiative to tackle FGM in the UK. 
In addition, to mark the International Day of the Girl (11 October 2014), £330,000 of funding was 
committed by the Government to help tackle FGM and forced marriage. The funding was used to extend 
several projects that provided expertise and support services to help eradicate the practice. This furthered 
the commitment made by the Prime Minister in July 2014 to galvanise international efforts to combat FGM 
and forced marriage. This was followed by many documentaries on the practice, one such example of this 
is the Chanel 4 documentary ‘The Cruel Cut’ presented by FGM campaigner Leyla Hussein.	
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inferiority of the non-Western cultures by describing their customs and practices as 
‘awful’, ‘damaging’ and that they those ‘shouldn’t be allowed’ – reinforcing the 
dichotomy between the west/Western culture and the rest/other cultures. 
Despite, on occasion, the dichotomous relationship being complicated and questioned, 
such an understanding is further reproduced. Sarah, a 25-year-old, white, middle-class 
woman who was working as an occupational therapist in Leeds, had worked in Dubai 
during a university placement five years earlier. When discussing gender equality, Sarah 
drew on such an experience:  
 
Some cultures have a traditional role; I think it is different across different 
cultures, for example, in the Middle East it’s like this, but then … I don’t know, I 
guess it’s about personally what someone wants. I spoke to the lady in Dubai that 
I was working with about some of the restrictions, like she couldn’t walk to the 
cinema with us, she had to be escorted there with a member of her family, but 
that wasn’t something that she didn’t want, but there would be things that she 
would say “oh, I could never do that”, but then seemed to feel a lot of comfort. 
And there were ways about her living that maybe I would judge and say, “my god 
that’s awful”, but to her it wasn’t, so it’s about kind of perceiving it for that person, 
but if you’ve not experienced, well if you haven’t experienced freedoms or had 
the opportunities to do other things, then actually you’d be so terrified of being 
kind of unleashed, so you wouldn’t want it. 
 
Sarah begins her discussion by reinforcing the dichotomy between ‘traditional’ and 
‘modern’ by saying ‘some cultures have a traditional role; I think it is different across 
different cultures’. However, realising this, Sarah problematises such a narrative by 
drawing on her experience with a colleague in Dubai. Although she mentions personal 
choice and circumstance, she manages to reproduce that which she has being trying to 
problematise and draw attention to. She assumes that her colleague is happy because 
she hasn’t ‘experienced freedoms or had opportunities to do other things’ – in Sarah’s 
view, her colleague knows no better. Fear of being ‘unleashed’ (a connotation of being 
imprisoned or held against her will) was assumed as a reason for her happiness and of her 
not ‘wanting it’ (to be free). This narrative, although unintentional, further reproduces 
the construction of the west and the rest – Muslim women need ‘saving’ by the 
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enlightened ‘west’ (see Abu-Lughod 2002; Zahedi 2011). This asymmetry between the 
representation of Western and non-Western women produces the image of what 
Chandra Mohanty calls ‘the average third world woman’: 
 
This average third world woman leads an essentially truncated life based on her 
feminine gender (read: sexually constrained) and her being ‘third world’ (read: 
ignorant, poor, uneducated, tradition-bound, domestic, family-oriented, 
victimized, etc.). This, I suggest, is in contrast to the (implicit) self-representation 
of Western women as educated, as modern, as having control over their own 
bodies and sexualities, and the freedom to take their own decisions. (1991:56) 
 
Within these statements, the rationalised European woman therefore becomes seen as 
‘the standard against which to measure women from elsewhere’ (Farris, 2012: 186; also 
see Farris, 2017). Drawing on the work of Edward Said (1985), these representations 
contribute to the Western orientalist construction of the racialised ‘Others’ barbaric 
customs and cultures. As Scharff has argued, ‘statements that claim and thereby 
produce knowledge about the other are implicated in the reproduction of Western 
authority because they construct knowledge exclusively from a Western point of view’ 
(2012:63). This therefore becomes problematic, since it produces the Western subject as 
the ‘knower’ and the non-Western woman as being ‘oppressed’.  
 
This theme of women’s oppression in other parts of the world establishes, as Scharff has 
argued, ‘a static model of homogenous entities’. She argues that this fails to allow ‘for 
differences and hierarchies both within the west and those countries designed as other’ 
(2012: 64). Hierarchies and differences of class and ‘race’ within these middle-class 
women’s narratives are therefore ignored and/or disregarded. ‘Culture’, as shown 
through Sarah’s narrative, thus becomes a structuring force; which homogeneously 
determines the behaviour of those who share it (see Brah, 1996). ‘Culture’, as Claire 
Alexander (1996) has argued, is conceptualised as fixed and essential, which fails to 
account for its constant creation and revision.  
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My interviewees extended this construction of cultural difference and depictions of 
‘Other’ women as oppressed victims of patriarchy to ‘other’ women in the UK. They 
contrasted such women with their self-representation as responsible, individualised 
feminists. For example, when discussing gender equality in the current context, Anna 
drew a distinction between herself (being brought up in white British family) and a 
Muslim family. She said, ‘I think all my doors have been opened for me as far as they can 
be. Maybe if I was brought up in a Muslim family I might not find myself in a similar 
situation’. She continued: 
 
I think each culture is very … different … so I work a lot with the Bengali Muslim 
culture at work and they don't have feminism at all, they are the complete 
opposite, you know, women must cover up, cook, clean, look after the kids, a 
male must be present when they are with another male, like it’s the completely 
opposite way … and I think it’s about getting that middle ground. I don’t know, I 
think as a society we are split because we have so many different cultures and it’s 
kind of more than a cultural thing maybe.  
 
‘Culture’ was therefore used as the explanation for why Bengali Muslim women ‘don’t 
have feminism at all’ and ‘must cover up, cook, clean and look after the kids’. Stressing 
that ‘it’s the opposite way’, Anna described these practices as being far removed from 
her understanding of how things should be, reinforcing the juxtaposition between 
cultures that are depicted as ‘traditional’ and ‘progressive’. Mia, who identified as Anglo-
Indian, also presented this distinction when talking about the differences between Indian 
and Muslim ‘culture’: 
 
I also think ethnic minorities like Indians, although, well I don’t know because 
generally Indians want their children to be successful, they want girls to have jobs 
but they do put pressure on them to have babies and get married, and I think the 
boys have more leeway in what they want to do. A lot of Muslim communities 
have a lot of inequality: the covering up and lack of freedom and education. 
 
The level of education was used to distinguish between Indian culture and Muslim 
culture, employing the ‘traditional/progressive’ dichotomy. Indians were held up as being 
less ‘traditional’ as they ‘want their children to be successful, they want girls to have jobs’, 
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whereas Muslim culture was described as having a lot of inequality as they ‘have a lack of 
freedom and education’ as well as ‘the covering up’. Education was also picked up on by 
Anna when describing Muslim women: 
 
I think a lot of the Muslim women, not in a nasty way, but are so uneducated, they 
are probably happy with what they've got and that’s because they don't know 
anything different and that’s the way they have been brought up, that’s what they 
think is normal, that’s what all their friends do, that’s what their family does. So 
actually, they are like a society within a society. 
 
Within these narratives, the image of Western culture as flexible and educated is 
contrasted against the image of other cultures as deterministic and traditional (Fekete, 
2006). When interviewees described changes in these cultures, they do so using a 
neoliberal rhetoric – Mia framed Indian success in neoliberal terms. To unpack these 
narratives, it is useful to use Wendy Brown’s (2006) analysis of the contrasting views on 
culture in liberal democracies and ‘other’ supposedly repressive regimes. Brown notes 
that ‘we have culture while they are a culture’ (2006: 151 in Scharff, 2011: 131). Supporting 
this view, Scharff says that ‘while liberal subjects are able to step in and out of culture, to 
‘have’ culture, others are governed by culture’ (2011: 131). Just as for the working-class 
woman discussed above, the traditional, uneducated, dependent Muslim woman also 
needs feminism to help to release her from the dependency of her traditional culture, 
and to overcome her struggle independently. The ‘austerity–bourgeois feminist’ 
contrasts herself with the ‘other’ woman and creates boundaries and distinctions. 
Inequality is explained through culture – the solution is therefore to ‘step out of culture’ 
(Scharff, 2011), and appropriate white, middle-class feminism. Instead of as Spivak 
(1994: 93) notes, ‘white men saving brown women from brown men’, brown women can 
now save themselves, using feminism. 
 
Empirical examples show that this understanding does not encompass the entirety of 
feminist identification, affiliation and activity in the current context. Minority ethnic 
women do identify with the label and are active in the fight for equality. For example, 
organisations such as Black Activists Rising Against the Cuts (BARAC) and Southall Black 
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Sisters (SBS) have been active both before and during the crisis and research has 
explored BAME women’s feminist activism within the context of austerity (see Bassel 
and Emejulu, 2015, 2017). Self-identifying BAME women in my study held views that 
contradicted those of middle-class women. Uzma, a 27-year-old middle-class woman, 
originally from Pakistan, who was working as a recruitment consultant in London at the 
time of the interview described herself as a feminist, spoke at length about the 
representation of Muslim women and feminism. She said:  
 
My sister’s a feminist and she’s a hijabi. She feels comfortable wearing it. I don’t 
wear it, I wasn’t forced to wear it, so some people might look at her and think she 
was forced to wear the hijab but it’s a choice that she makes. She said now she’s 
wearing a scarf, men respect her a lot more. I think it’s women’s fault as well. I 
was at work and I was having a similar conversation with my colleagues that I’m 
having now, about feminism and I said that I don’t show my legs. This woman said 
that was inequality because women should be able to do what they want. Why 
does she think that’s inequality when it’s my choice of life? I said to my colleague, 
my sister wears the hijab and I don’t, so if we were to go on norms I should be 
wearing it. She does loads of things, she skates. She’s a hijabi and she skates, 
listens to music, goes out with friends, she does everything that I do and my 
colleague does, but with a scarf on. 
 
Discussing feminism, her own experience and the experience of her sister, ‘a hijabi’, 
Uzma complicates the arguments made by both her work colleague and the women 
above. She unpacks the argument about equality, wearing a hijab, and being a feminist, 
by moving away from the essentialising argument that positions the headscarf and 
feminism in opposition. She notes that her sister ‘does everything that I do and my 
colleague does, but with a scarf on’. As with the case of class above, ‘culture’ is used to 
draw distance and distinction between different types of women – those who are 
feminists and those in ‘need’ of feminism. Distance is made between those who are 
understood to be free and progressive feminists and those who, by contrast, are 
understood to be ‘victims of culture’. Therefore, if those women are unequal, it is due to 
their ‘backward’ culture, and not structural inequalities borne of the austerity 
programme. This indifference from the ‘good/productive’ feminist towards such ‘victims’ 
is once again constitutive of this feminist position. 
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Conclusion 
 
In conclusion, this chapter has argued that a certain type of middle-class 
feminism has converged with austerity policies and discourses. This convergence has 
helped to legitimate austerity measures, which reproduce inequality. An analysis of 
middle-class young women’s understandings of, affiliations with, and positioning within, 
feminism has illustrated how this convergence takes place via narratives of morality, 
culture, distance, distinction and blame. Like ‘neoliberal feminism’, the ‘austerity–
bourgeois feminism’ that I have identified paradoxically acknowledges inequality –
between men and woman, and among women, only to disavow it. Framing aspiration 
and success as within reach if women try hard enough ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’ 
helps to displace the current social, cultural and economic forces producing inequality – 
especially in relation to gender, classed and ‘racial’ differences – by placing an individual’s 
misfortunes into their own hands. Class and ‘race’ are denied and ‘buried alive’ (Goldberg 
and Giroux, 2014) under the language of individualism and responsibility. Despite 
showing empathy for women’s experiences, this language de-contextualises and 
naturalises women’s experiences by placing everything on the individual women’s will 
and action alone.  
Crucially, unlike ‘neoliberal feminism’, ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’ blames and vilifies 
those who cannot ‘manage’ such changes. In line with the language of resilience, hard 
work and responsibility used by the current Conservative and the previous Coalition 
government, building from a previous history, ‘austerity-bourgeois feminism’ becomes 
an active force field to reinforce these political values and discourses, helping to mute 
the language of inequality and unfairness under an ‘equalities umbrella’. Thus, ‘austerity–
bourgeois feminism’, like ‘bourgeois feminism,’ not only serves to create and reinforce 
distance and distinctions between those suffering within the current context, but also to 
blame them. It distinguishes between those deemed to be uneducated, traditional, and 
dependent, and those who are educated, modern and independent. It suggests that 
 251 
those who are suffering should learn how to be (a particular kind of) feminist in order to 
cope. This precludes any kind of solidarity across gender, class or ‘race’. 
 
The convergence of ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’ and austerity’s moral project is 
crucial to understand how contemporary forms of inequality are produced and justified 
through ‘good’, ‘bad’ and as a result ‘indifferent’ (gendered) subject positions and 
sensibilities. However, it is also important to note its implications for wider issues of 
feminist identification. While it might be tempting to see ‘austerity-bourgeois feminism’ 
as undermining previous feminist goals of collective change, the task for feminism in this 
current context is to remember that the convergence of feminism that I have outlined 
here into a programme of austerity does not mean that feminism is ‘dead’ (Adkins, 2004). 
Instead, it is important to see how feminism has evolved into different forms whereby in 
the context of austerity, the configuration of ‘austerity-bourgeois feminism’, can be seen 
as another austerity discourse, since it reproduces and legitimises its principles. It is by 
understanding these processes of affiliations, within such a context, that we can raise 
questions to comprehend the limits as well as the emancipatory potential of feminism. 
The next chapter will draw on arguments made here and in previous empirical chapters 
(5, 6 and 7) to explore the relationship between women’s material and symbolic 
experiences of austerity and their discussions of the future.  
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Chapter 9 
 
Austerity Future(s) 
 
 
I think the world is my oyster. I’m of the mind-set that I can 
do whatever I want if I set my mind to it. No I’m not worried 
at all [about the future]. 
    
  (Celia, 27, white, middle-class, HR manager, London, 
December 2014) 
 
I am worried [about the future] to a certain extent, but I 
think everybody is … I’m anxious about where I am going to 
be in ten years time and how that’s going to affect things in 
the long-term. Am I going to be able to buy a house? Or will 
I be renting forever? And also there’s the general worries: 
will we be with the person that we want; will we have a 
family; will we feel secure in this scary world?  
 
(Rose, 26, white, middle-class, university student, 
Brighton, May 2015) 
 
Sometimes I just sit there thinking what does the future 
hold for me? What am I going to do with my life? ... I can’t 
see it being a good one. It’s bad now, I’m sure it's going to 
get a lot worse in years to come. Everybody wants a good 
future, but I just don’t know if it’s possible.  
 
(Scarlett, 23, white, working-class, receiving Income 
Support, Leeds, August 2014) 
 
 
Whilst previous chapters have focused on how austerity is made present through 
the lived experiences of young women, this final empirical chapter pays particular 
attention to how young women’s future imaginaries are felt in the present. This chapter 
explores how austerity affects these imaginaries and asks which types of futures have 
young women begun to imagine in the context of austerity. Young women’s future 
imaginings are multiple and, as this chapter shows, are affected particularly by class 
positioning. This chapter argues that inequality is produced and reinforced through 
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young women’s different kinds of imagined and ‘real’ futures (Coleman, 2014a, 2014b).  
 
Economic, political, technological and social changes, which began in the 1970s and 
intensified in the following decades, delivered new and different expectations for the 
future (Lewis and Hughes, 1998; Martins Jr, 2014). Many authors (Lasch, 1990; Sennett, 
1998; Beck, 2000; Bauman, 2005; Ehrenreich, 2005) have explored how such changes 
have resulted in a situation where people no longer work with the possibility of long-term 
planning and without consideration for the directed construction of a future (Martins Jr, 
2014: 143). This is reflected by the formation of a contemporary moral code that is linked 
to the increase of individualism, the laxity of social bonds, the creation of a culture of 
narcissism, the prospect of a society of uncertainty, extreme competition and the 
dismantlement of the guarantees of stability. This moment has therefore been marked 
by the idea that people are living in the ‘permanent present’ (Bauman, 2001).  
 
The 2008 global financial crisis provides fertile ground to further examine the discussion 
of the ‘permanent present’ since scholars have emphasised the impact of austerity on 
the future. In this sense, concern has been directed to the futures that austerity has 
begun to install: in which there has been a focus on ‘both the material constrains that 
fiscal tightening grants the future and the ways in which people living with austerity have 
begun to imagine their own and others’ futures’ (Bramall, 2016a: 1). Bruce Bennett and 
Imogen Tyler (2013) note, for instance, that there is an understanding that austerity ‘will 
effectively mark the end of the [post-war] social contract’ (no pagination), and as a result, 
also mark the end of the better future that the social contract delivered. In a similar vein, 
Lauren Berlant (2011) states that despite the limitations of the fantasy of the ‘good life’, 
the idea, made possible by the post-war social contract, no longer seems possible or 
sustainable. This fantasy, she argues, is ‘fraying’ (2011: 3), since the promise of upward 
mobility has been replaced with an on-going sense of crisis – a ‘precarious present’ (3). 
Therefore, as Berlant suggests, ‘as the possibility of the good life at a social, cultural, 
economic and political level seems to become more distant, the fantasy as a collectively 
invested form of life has become more fantasmatic’ (2011: 11 in Coleman, 2012: 2). 
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However, it is important to unpack, as Skeggs (2012b) has argued, the classed 
assumptions of the argument that the fantasies of the ‘good life’ are ‘fraying’ and the 
‘possibility of the good life is becoming more distant’. Skeggs highlights that, for 
working-class people, the fantasy has always been unstable (as demonstrated 
throughout Chapter 4). It is therefore, middle-class people, she notes, who are currently 
most affected by the destabilising of social mobility and aspiration (also see Coleman, 
2012: 147). 
 
Scholars have begun to focus on the austerity-induced unravelling of promises for the 
future, and the new expectations that have been offered and embraced in their place 
(Newman, 2015; Bramall, 2016a; Forkert, 2016; Pitcher, 2016). Yet, insecurities, risks and 
uncertainties of the ‘permanent present’ have not been equally felt (Bourdieu, 2000; 
Atkinson, 2013; Adkins, 2015) and therefore differentially affect how people (can) 
imagine their future (Coleman, 2012, 2016b; Roberts and Evans, 2013; Bradley and 
Ingram, 2013; Hitchen, 2016; Allen, 2016). As can be seen from the introductory quotes 
above from Celia, Rose and Scarlett, young women discuss their futures in different 
ways. This is since, my data shows, discussions of the future are dependent upon 
differences of class and ‘race’, which not only affect the diversity of women’s lived 
experiences and the ways in which austerity manifests and materialises itself in their lives 
(discussed in Chapter 5, 6 and 7), but, also affects their ability to imagine and plan their 
futures.  
 
Since theoretical discussions about the interaction of class and ‘race’ in shaping young 
women's experiences of austerity has already been made throughout this thesis, this 
chapter focuses upon interview quotes to illustrate how these social markers interact 
with discussions of the future. I present in this chapter a nuanced analysis of how young 
women’s diverse capital – economic, cultural, social and symbolic – differently shape the 
ways in which they can imagine but also plan their future. To attend to the points raised 
above, this chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section, focusing on empirical 
data, I demonstrate how class differently shapes how young women (can) imagine their 
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futures – focusing on the themes of retirement and pensions; employment and housing; 
the day-to-day and the figure of the child. In the second section, I discuss the ways in 
which these young women anticipate and pre-empt the future58. 
 
Austerity Shaping the Future 
 
In this section, I use my empirical data to demonstrate the different ways in which 
young women are imagining and speaking about their futures. I argue that the level of 
material and symbolic constraint that austerity produces in young women’s lives 
(previously discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8) shapes their future imaginings. It is 
therefore important to recognise that the different types, volumes and the overall 
trajectory of capital and resources these young women possess, which are tied to forms 
of domination and power, differently construct the topics around which their anxiety is 
framed (pensions, property, employment, welfare and debt). At the same time, their 
capital and resources also impact on the time frames that the future can be built around: 
the long-term future, the permanent present, or, as Lisa Adkins notes, ‘a time in which 
presents, pasts and futures, and crucially their relations to each other, are open to a 
constant state of revision: they may be drawn and redrawn, assembled and 
disassembled, set and reset’ (2017: 11-12). 
 
                                                
58Anticipation and pre-emption are two specific modes of orienting towards the future. Anticipation is 
where the future is anticipated and worked towards. Pre-emption is where the future is brought into the 
present to prevent or forestall an action happening (Coleman, 2016b). Both modes, identified and 
discussed in recent social, cultural and feminist theory, are important for understanding contemporary 
temporalities and power relations. Vincanne Adams, Michelle Murphy and Adele E. Clarke (2007: 247) 
argue that anticipation involves the present being directed towards a ‘contingent’ and ‘ever-changing’ 
future. While what may happen in the future is a potentiality, it ‘must be acted on’. Therefore, events that 
may or may not happen in the future come to shape the present. Despite their connections, anticipatory 
and pre-emptive regimes can helpfully be understood in terms of whether temporality is conceived as 
linear, in which anticipation often operates through prevention. As Brian Massumi notes, prevention is 
underpinned by a linear temporality; it is rooted in the present and seeks to prevent an event happening in 
the future (2005: 8). In contrast, linear temporality is disturbed or disrupted through pre-emption. For 
Massumi (2005) the present is not concerned with preventing an event in the future, but rather the future 
is brought into the present by pre-emptive measures. 
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Retirement and Pensions 
 
 
For some middle-class women, the future and the idea of the ‘good life’ were 
easily imagined. Celia, a 27-year-old, white, middle-class woman who worked full-time 
in an architecture firm as a HR manager, voiced optimism about her future with little 
consideration of possible hardships ahead. As discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, Celia 
possessed a high volume, and different types, of capital and resources, and noted that 
the austerity programme had barely affected her. Having recently moved onto the 
property ladder by buying a flat with her partner in North London (Zone 2), Celia felt even 
more stable in her career and her personal life. Summing up she said, ‘I think the world is 
my oyster. I’m of the mindset that I can do whatever I want if I set my mind to it. No, I’m 
not worried at all at the future’. Kiran, a 28-year-old, Indian, middle-class woman, who 
worked and owned a property in London (Zone 4), also said she felt extremely optimistic 
about her long-term future. Elaborating, she said she felt secure in her job (in the 
construction industry) and had recently invested in a property in London, so had 
increased stability. She joked that her only future concern was a lack of available 
midwives in the NHS. Laughing, she said, ‘yeah, hopefully there are still midwives happy 
to work when it’s my turn [to have a baby]. Likewise, Pippa, a 27-year-old, white, middle-
class woman, who also owned a house in South London (Zone 2) and who worked in 
publishing, described the future in positive terms: 
Senior management has told me that I’m one of the special ones. I’m being 
medium tracked up. My goal is to head up a business unit or something … make 
the big bucks, just move up in the corporation … yeah, I don’t know, just use my 
brains and get somewhere, maybe write a book, my company benefits are 
amazing, my pension packet is incredible, so as long as they keep me, I will stay. 
I’ve had three approaches in the last year but I don’t see the point in leaving. 
Babies, all that side, I’m fine. 
 
Having been told she was one of ‘the special ones’ who was being tracked up the 
management ladder, Pippa discussed her future in terms of her long-term career goals. 
Describing the company benefits and pension packet as ‘amazing’, she hoped to remain 
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in her current job in the private sector. Following this, Pippa did discuss the potential 
problems she might face when reaching a certain stage of her career, and spoke about 
the possibility of redundancy when entering a mid-tier management level if the situation 
in her industry did not improve. However, she felt she would be able to overcome 
obstacles if these were thrown at her – she knew that having a property (economic 
capital), qualifications (cultural capital), a large social network (social capital), and many 
years of experience would stand her in good stead for any such changes. In the words of 
Bourdieu (1983: 317), the variety and volume of her capital made her a desired 
professional and therefore provided her with a great ‘space of possibilities’ to act within 
in the field. 
 
Despite Pippa’s discussion of her ‘incredible pension packet’, retirement was a bone of 
contention for other middle-class young women. Worry surrounding the future 
manifested itself around the issue of pensions and retirement. For instance, Tiffany, a 27-
year-old white, middle-class marketing manager, who owned a house with her partner 
in an affluent area of Leeds, commented that despite feeling general calmness about her 
future, retirement was, as she put it, ‘the only thing I am really worried about at the 
moment’. She went on to explain: 
 
The idea of working until I’m seventy-five terrifies me and I’m willing to accept 
that there won’t be a state pension by the time I retire. I can accept that right now. 
We will be expected as individuals to support ourselves and as much as they [the 
government] wouldn’t admit that right now, that’s exactly the way it’s going ... 
Eventually there won’t be such a thing as a retirement age. This really worries me. 
 
Similar to other young middle-class women’s discussions, with the assumption that there 
would be no ‘such a thing as a retirement age’ and ‘no state pension by the time I retire’, 
Tiffany discussed the expectation that individuals will have to support themselves 
without any help or incentives from the state - a prospect which was worrying for her. 
For Tiffany and other middle-class women who discussed pensions as the main worry for 
their future, despite eliciting apprehension, the future was described through a linear 
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model of time (decades that inevitably follow on from each other). In such discussions, 
they looked to their retirement, forty years in advance, as something that was necessary 
to plan for. Therefore, what can be seen here is a distinct classed relationship to time, 
built around a long-term future.  
 
Employment and Housing 
 
 
Despite Tiffany’s anxiety surrounding the future being attached to her pension 
and retirement, for other women, this was in addition to more pressing concerns, such 
as employment issues. The increasing trend towards casualisation (discussed in Chapter 
5 and 6) caused some young women to imagine their futures in increasingly negative 
terms. For instance, Ruth, a white, middle-class, 23-year-old, PhD student studying in 
Brighton, (discussed in Chapter 5), had less capital than the women above. Ruth was 
currently renting and in the process of completing her doctorate, living on a university 
stipend (£1,100 per month). She did not have a secure job, access to company benefits, 
or a pension packet, unlike the women in the previous section. When discussing her 
worries about the future, Ruth spoke of her career mobility and promotional prospects. 
She was apprehensive that she would not be able to progress past an early career post to 
eventually become a Professor, because of the changing nature of Higher Education. She 
said: 
I’m not worried in terms of not being able to pay my rent. I will be OK in terms of 
everyday things and I will manage to get a job somewhere. But maybe in this field 
I won’t be able to get past early career and work my way up the ladder. I’m afraid 
of getting stuck somewhere, or not being able to keep being in Academia and just 
having to do something else, which is the position most of the people who I did 
my Master’s degree with have faced. They are doing admin work and everyone is 
miserable and waiting for the next thing to happen. I’m not worried in terms of 
not being able to pay my rent, I will manage to get a job but I won’t be passionate 
about it. It will just be a job, not something I really want to do and am passionate 
about.  
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Despite Ruth’s arguments about the precarious present, in which she describes her 
friends as ‘miserable and waiting for the next thing to happen’, Ruth has a sense of 
confidence about her situation. This is narrated through her discussion she will be able 
to maintain her standard of living and pay her rent – ‘I will be OK with the everyday 
things’. Her concerns and worries are instead directed towards the future. In the first 
instance, this is manifested in the short-term future, she fears that she ‘won’t be able to 
get past early career and not be able to work my way up the ladder’. These fears then 
affect how she imagines her long-term future. She worries that she might have to work 
in ‘a job’ that she isn’t passionate about. She compares her situation to that of her father, 
who is a Professor at a UK university, and notes how the inheritance of precarity in the 
labour market, and the insecure education-to-work transition, has had an effect on her 
future career prospects. 
 
The casualisation of the labour market affected young women’s imagined futures in a 
different way: in terms of their ability to get onto the property market. Especially those 
women who were working in the public sector (discussed in Chapter 5 and 6) since 
contracts were given on a short-term rather than a permanent basis, the ability to be 
eligible to buy a property was diminished. Rebecca, a 28-year-old white, middle-class 
woman, who was working in debt advice in Brighton, said:  
 
I can’t ever conceive to be able to own my own home really, particularly given the 
industry I’m in, it’s all short-term contracts. I’ve just been offered a year’s contract 
which is the holy grail of contracts, but a lot of people are existing on month-to-
month, or three-month contracts and you can’t make commitments with that. It's 
very difficult to plan for the future when you have no idea where you going to be 
in nine months.  
 
This type of short-term contract is becoming the norm in certain industries where 
contracts are based on project funding. This situation affects employees – they are not 
able to plan for the future. As discussed in Chapter 5, Rebecca told me that her lack of a 
permanent contract would count against her, even if she had a deposit for a mortgage. 
She felt she was being made to live ‘project by project’ which impacted her ability make 
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long term decisions in other aspects of her life. Knowing this, she said, ‘I’m certainly not 
going to be able to have one of those Saga-holiday-type retirements, where you swan 
off on holiday every six months’. 
 
Similarly, Emma, a 25-year-old, white, middle-class woman who had recently been made 
redundant from her job in the charity sector in London, discussed her future in terms of 
her ability to get on the property market. She said, ‘I do worry that I will be renting, well 
the immediate fear, the terror is I am going to be living with my parents until I’m forty 
(laughs) … I don’t think I’m going to be able to buy a house, I’m not going to be in the 
same position as my parents were at forty’. She compared herself to her parents, who, 
at her age, owned their own home. She described how her transition to adulthood had 
been affected by her current situation. The ‘good life’ was not materialising for her as it 
had done for her parents. This, she argued, had affected the sort of future she could 
envisage and her ability to plan for a long-term future had become more difficult. Unlike 
Tiffany in the section above, whose anxiety was built around her pension and retirement 
age, Rebecca, Ruth and Emma had less stability in their sectors, which made it harder for 
them to look forty years ahead.  
 
Despite current constraints, some young middle-class women were able to look further 
ahead. Emma, for instance, after stating that it would be hard for her to get on the 
property ladder due to the sector she was in, said: 
 
I had a similar conversation with my mum the other day and I was like, ‘I’m never 
going to be able to buy a house, never. I just want to buy a house. I want to have 
that security’. But my mum calmed me down and said, ‘it’s ok, don’t worry about 
it, you will’. She said, ‘all of us in this family, we buy houses, all of your aunts and 
uncles, they all own their houses, we don’t have the culture of renting’. So, she 
said ‘don’t worry, you will have a house, it will be ok, we have money to help you, 
don’t worry’. 
 
For Emma, her family’s economic support (in the form of inheritance) and her cultural 
capital allow her to be able to look to the longer-term future, even without present job 
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security. Although her future imagining is being closed down by her experience in the 
present, she is still able to look towards her long-term future, since she has the ‘cushions’ 
(social and economic capital) to do so. In contrast, Rebecca said that she would not be in 
a position to get help from her family. Her parents had lost their business and home ten 
years ago, moved to social housing and now had ‘less material security’ than when she 
was a child. She knew that her parents wouldn’t be able to ‘help their children onto the 
property ladder’. She continued, ‘if I was homeless and I needed to move home to live 
with my parents, of course I could. But help with getting a house, it’s just not possible for 
them because they don’t have financial security themselves’. Without the ‘cushion’ of 
financial family support, her likelihood of getting on the property market in the near 
future was reduced because of her short-term contracts. Her parents could offer some 
form of protection (if she were in material necessity), but could not help her to 
accumulate economic capital. For Rebecca, Ruth, and Emma, their experiences of the 
unstable present (job and economic insecurity) affect their expectations of what the 
future holds in terms of their career trajectory and home ownership. Even in similar 
sectors, with similar experiences, some women could better navigate expectations 
because of the trajectory of their social and economic capital.  
 
Living in the Moment 
 
For those who were yet to enter the labour market having recently finished Higher 
Education, the future was discussed in ‘anxious’ terms. Young women described 
themselves as having to ‘just live in the moment’ or not being able to think ‘too far 
ahead’. For instance, Hannah, a white, working-class, 23-year-old woman living in 
London, had graduated from Cardiff University in the summer of 2014 and had been 
looking for a full-time job with no success. As discussed in previous Chapters (5 and 6), 
she was now working three zero-hour contract jobs and living back home with her 
parents. Trying to describe her future, she said, ‘I don’t know, I’m not one that looks to 
the future, I’m one that takes it as it comes, that’s all I can do’. She continued, ‘since 
finishing uni, it’s the only thing that I can do because you never know, you never know 
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what’s going to happen’. For Hannah, the anxious future she had described had 
shortened her ability to imagine it and made her ‘live in the moment’. Likewise, Alice, a 
white, middle-class, 23-year-old woman from London, had graduated from university at 
the same time and was also unable to find permanent work. She said, ‘it makes me 
anxious to think about the immediate future’. For these young women, the future was 
closed down and discussed in terms of a ‘precarious present’ (Berlant, 2011). However, 
Alice, unlike Hannah, was able to look towards the long-term future, as she had 
economic capital in the form of inheritance. She said: 
 
I am able to be in a position where I’m not worried about if I will have a house or 
whatever, because I have inheritance, so I can think that I don’t want to have a 
house or settle down now and not be worried about it, which actually is a really 
great thing to be able to say (laughs) … I think, I guess I take it for granted that it's 
going to work out … So I guess I don’t think about it in the long term, but the short 
term, yeah that worries me.  
 
Alice could comfortably imagine the long-term future, as she would use her inheritance 
to buy a house and have an increased level of security. However, she found it difficult to 
imagine her short-term future. Hannah, in comparison, found it difficult to imagine 
either. As discussed in Chapter 5 and 6, Hannah was partly responsible for the family’s 
finances – her parent’s jobs were low-paid, making it difficult to pay the rent and utilities 
each month. Due to her ‘cushions’, Alice spoke of the short-term with a level of anxiety – 
‘it makes me anxious to think about the immediate future’ – but also with excitement, ‘I 
suppose you just need to think of it as being a bit exciting not knowing what will happen’. 
In contrast, Hannah’s concept of ‘having to live in the moment’ was ‘all she could do’. On 
the surface, both women describe their ‘anxiety’ of the short-term future, in which they 
cannot ‘look far ahead’. However, the ‘unknown’ is very different for those with less 
resources and types, volumes, and trajectory of capital. As a result, the present and 
future figure differently.  
 
Therefore, as these discussions above suggest, and as argued by Bourdieu (1983, 1986), 
the greater amount of capital that these young women possess and their differing 
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distance from economic necessity provide these women with differing degrees of 
security to navigate the impacts of austerity. Their social, cultural and economic capital 
provides them with differing abilities to be able to take for granted what they have in the 
present, and use it as a base for projecting themselves further into the future. The 
precarious present is therefore ongoing for those will lower volumes of capital, whereas 
for others with higher volumes capital, such a precarious present becomes only a 
temporary state.  
 
The Day-to-Day 
 
For those women who were heavily reliant on the welfare system, owning a 
property was not seen as possible nor an expectation that the future was built around. 
For instance, Heather, a 26-year-old, black, working-class single mother from London, 
said:  
 
Listen we aren’t going to get our own house, there’s no way, I’m going to have to 
die and come back again to do that (laughs), unless I win the lottery, but I don’t 
play. Unless somebody leaves me a fortune, that isn’t on my radar (laughs).  
 
Similarly, Leoni, a 26-year-old black, working-class single mother living in London, and 
solely reliant on state support, described owning a property as ‘a wish’. She said, ‘I wish I 
could say that I had money to buy a house but it’s never going to happen’. Instead 
imagining the future through properties, employment and pensions, these young 
women’s futures were built upon the constant changes to welfare reform. Lucy a 21-year-
old, white, working-class single mother living in Brighton, relying on Income Support, 
spoke of her constant worry about the impact of the changes on her life. She described 
this in terms of ‘the brown envelope coming through the door’ every few months, telling 
her that her claim had been reassessed. Elaine, a 27-year-old, white, middle-class woman 
from Brighton, who was registered as disabled, and reliant on receiving DLA, also spoke 
of the ‘brown letter’:  
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You always worry about that brown letter … it keeps you in a very unsafe feeling, 
the perpetual feeling that everything is about to come crashing down around you 
because somebody, some faceless person can just take away your support 
systems, it’s very stressful.  
 
Elaine associated the ‘brown letter’ with ‘the perpetual feeling that everything is about 
to come crashing down around you.’ Elaine’s future imagining was shaped around 
anticipating for these (supposed) changes affecting her support systems. Likewise, 
Louise, a 35-year-old, working class woman, also reliant on DLA, noted that the changes 
to the NHS and the reassessment of her claim made her feel ‘stuck in limbo’. Joe Deville’s 
article on consumer credit default and collections (2014, also see Deville, 2015) discussed 
the panic and state of alertness that debt collection letters generate – a parallel with 
these brown letters. Drawing on an extract from one of his interviewees who is struggling 
with debt repayments, he discusses how a diffuse, embodied sense of worry coalesces 
into a moment of attention, through the materiality of the ‘letter’. The panic elicited by 
the letter, he argues, is not necessarily ‘as a result of the precise contents of the particular 
letter in hand, but in anticipation […] of a yet to be unveiled future’ (16). For Elaine, Louise 
and Lucy, it is therefore not only the anticipation of the letter from the DWP, but also its 
arrival and materiality, that elicits ‘anticipation of a yet to be unveiled future’.  
 
Enmeshed within systems that perpetuate instability, these young women live their lives 
in the day-to-day, with no guarantees in their immediate futures. The ‘stress’ Elaine feels 
reinforces the idea of seeing the future as not something far away, in the long-term, but 
rather reduces it to a short period directly in front of her. Elaine went on to say: ‘I need 
the NHS because of my health, and the changes affect me because my whole existence 
is around that, so yeah, my future is kind of dependent on these cuts’. This dependence 
therefore forecloses the privilege to imagine a long-term future. For Elaine, Louise and 
Lucy, the future was ‘not able to be spoken about’, or it had to be ‘put off’. When I asked 
Lucy about her future, she replied, ‘ask me in two years and see where I am, I can’t think 
too far ahead’. Similarly, Louise said; ‘I don’t know about tomorrow or next week. Just a 
day at a time is enough for me’. Their attention is thus trapped in the present. 
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For Scarlett, a 23-year-old white, working-class single mother, the future was even less 
uncertain – she was solely reliant on welfare and heavily in debt. As Joe Deville and 
Gregory Seigworth note, in the current context ‘debt has been seen as a generalised 
phenomenon, with the power to seep into “everywhere” and affect “everyone”’ 
(2015:619). Continuing they argue that this ‘occludes not just a plethora of quite distinct 
financial circumstances and cultural/national regulatory practices and proclivities, but 
also the innumerable ways in which different financial instruments are organised, 
encountered and come to resonate with daily life’ (ibid). The normalisation of 
indebtedness has affected some social groups more than others, and has affected the 
ways in which they encounter credit or experience debt (Pitcher, 2015; Coleman, 2016b). 
One such group consists of women reliant on state support. Scarlett described how she 
had got into debt (as also explained in Chapter 5):  
 
I went to a loan shark, and my first one was £100 … then he [loan shark] come to 
me and said would you like a bigger one [loan] so I’m like you know what, yeah … 
so he said right your next one is £250, you have to pay £450 back, so because I 
needed it, I took it. I didn’t listen to the repayments so I ended up taking out 
another loan to pay him everything back. Now they both come knocking at my 
door asking for more money, sometimes they give me a few weeks, sometimes 
they don’t.  
 
Being in debt made Scarlett feel unsure of whether she was ‘coming or going’, as 
everything was constantly changing. She explained, ‘I don’t know whether I’m coming or 
going … I can’t keep up with them [debt collectors], I don’t know what I’m paying or 
when, plans keep changing, it’s a mess’. Scarlett’s discussion demonstrates how she lives 
day-to-day, and that being in debt means that her future does not ‘unfold from the 
present, but the present is remediated by futures which have not yet – and may never – 
arrive’ (Adkins, 2017: 9).  For example, being in debt makes Scarlett feel unsure whether 
she is ‘coming or going’ since her payment plans ‘keep changing’, ‘sometimes they give 
me a week, sometimes they don’t’, resulting in increasing interest. She describes her 
experience of debt as a ‘mess’. Both her present and future are ‘being drawn and 
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redrawn, assembled and disassembled, set and reset’ (Adkins, 2017: 11-12). Scarlett’s 
‘present, past and future (and their relations to each other) are open to a constant state 
of revision’ (Adkins, 2014, in Coleman, 2016b: 94). These discussions suggest that 
women with fewer amounts of capital and resources, who are closer to economic 
necessity, experience differing degrees of insecurity. Women who rely on support 
systems that perpetuate instability may not be able to project themselves in the long-
term future – their present and immediate future is unstable, precarious or in a constant 
state of revision. Much of these young women’s thinking was framed through the 
present, since their experiences of austerity ‘trap’ their attention on the present. 
 
The Figure of the Child 
 
Regardless of how women worried about the future for themselves, when 
mothers spoke about their children, they spoke about the long-term. Women without 
children also discussed how the future would be ‘when they have kids’. They often felt 
that the future would be ‘harder’, using illustrating examples, the rise in university fees, 
the lack of graduate jobs and the rise in the cost of living. Heather, a 26-year-old, black, 
working-class single mother from London, directed much of her attention at the present, 
but thought about the long-term in the context of her children. She said:  
 
Can you imagine when my kids go to get a bag of chips when they’re older? A can 
of coke used to be 30p, now it's 99p … chips will be a fiver. Remember when a Big 
Mac used to be a Big Mac? (Laughs). A Big Mac used to be big, now it’s like a 
cheeseburger with an extra bit of bread (laughs). Can you imagine the size of a 
Big Mac when my kids get older?  
 
She framed her discussion around everyday consumption practices, about the foods that 
she and her children consume. Heather describes the shrinking size of the Big Mac and 
the increasing cost of a bag of chips, indirectly suggesting a tougher future. Other 
women shared this view – they expected their children’s future to be ‘hard’. Ila, a 34-year-
old, Bangladeshi, working-class woman from Leeds, anticipated financial hardship, ‘for 
our children when they grow up, I think their life is going to be harder. We have all these 
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things that have got easier, like we don’t have to wash nappies anymore and stuff like 
that, but their life is going to be harder financially’. Similarly, Trisha, a 35-year-old white, 
middle-class woman working and living in Brighton, called her son’s trajectory and future 
a ‘shame’. She explained, ‘it’s a shame, because I think his experience of his twenties will 
be different from others before him. It’s getting a lot harder, even to move in with his 
mates and experience growing up in that way. What a brilliant thing to leave home and 
live with a bunch of mates and grow up’. Marie, a 28-year-old, black, working-class 
woman working part-time at a library café, described how she felt ‘a bit scared’ for her 
son’s future. She said, ‘I sit down and I think to myself what’s it going to be like in ten 
years for him? How is he going to be living? I couldn’t bear to bring up another child, I’m 
actually scared for their future, and it feels like it's getting worse and worse every year’.  
 
For Heather, Marie, Ila and Trisha, despite their children’s futures being discussed 
through different objects, they all described their futures in negative ways: through 
being ‘worried’, ‘a bit scared’ or ‘it being a shame’. However, this uncertainty was 
tempered with better hopes and expectations. Ila, Heather and Leoni (lower volumes and 
types of capital), while ‘worried’ or ‘a bit scared’ about their children’s future, also 
described their hopes for their children – often focused on education. Leoni, discussing 
her hopes for her son’s future said, ‘when my son leaves school, I hope he goes to college 
and university, that’s what I hope. I’m going to try give him the best future I can’. In a 
similar vein, Marie said: 
 
I hope my son will go university, but I hope I will be able to help him as well. I have 
no savings for him at the moment. I don’t want him to end up a bit like me. I never 
had anyone to put money in the bank for me but I would like to do that for him. I 
would hope so; I hope he can be that little bit better than I was. I would love him 
to go to university and socialise and meet new different people. I hope the future 
will be better for him but with the whole spending on tuition fees and stuff … 
yeah, I hope it will work out for him. 
 
Marie’s narrative contains the word ‘hope’ six times. She ‘hopes’ that her son will not only 
go to university, but that she will be able to help him, that he will ‘be a little bit better 
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that she was’, that he will have a ‘better future’ and that it will ‘work out for him’. The 
future is therefore discussed through the ‘hopes’ that her son’s future will entail. As 
Coleman states, drawing on the ‘Family Matters’ research project undertaken by Ipsos 
Mori (2013), for women significantly affected by austerity ‘the future does not become 
irrelevant or wiped out […] but rather the future was regarded more in hope than 
expectation’ (2016b: 101). The use of ‘hope’ in Marie’s narrative therefore demonstrates 
that the way in which the future can and is spoken about, is figured differently.   
 
Trisha describes her son’s future in a different way, not through hope, but rather, 
expectation: 
 
I do think about that a lot [his future], I don’t know that he will go to uni at this 
point. He might go a bit later, or not at all. When he was younger and uni fees 
came in, that did worry me. I didn’t want him to not have that opportunity and 
obviously as I don’t earn a lot of money, I’m still paying my own student loan and 
I’m on my own, it’s more difficult. But it’s again a shame because you kind of 
expect that your children will get a degree, get the same qualifications that I did, 
but it seems these expectations are changing a lot. If he wants to go, he will, but 
it’s funny how you need to be prepared for things like this these days. It’s not a 
given. 
 
Unlike the women above, Trisha used the words ‘expect’ and ‘expectation’ when 
discussing the future of her son. Other middle-class women also reflected on the 
changing nature of these middle-class expectations and the effects this would have on 
their children or younger relatives. Trisha did not expect a great future for her son; but 
the words she used demonstrated a clear difference from the women above. Trisha’s 
initial expectation that her son would ‘get the same qualification as I did’ is uncertain 
because of the increase in university fees. She felt that ‘these expectations are changing 
a lot,’ suggesting that the middle-class lifestyle and the option of the ‘good life’ is in flux 
and is ‘not a given’. However, she says that ‘if he wants to go, he will’ (alluding to her 
possessing the differing amounts of capital that will allow for/ help such a decision), but 
she also comments that ‘it is funny that you need to be prepared for things like this these 
days’. Her expectations for her son are changing in the current context – demonstrating 
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there are cracks in the idea of generational improvement and mobility.  
 
The relationship between capital, hope and expectation is important when thinking 
about futures within the context of austerity. On the one hand, women with a high 
volume and different types of capital can still discuss their expectations for their 
children’s futures, despite the inherent difficulties and closing down of certain 
possibilities. Women like Marie, Heather and Ila, who have less capital and who are closer 
to material necessity on the other hand, do not have the luxury of expectation – they can 
only hope. Thus, when young women are discussing their futures, their imaginings are 
shaped by the level of constraint of austerity on their lives. In this sense, anxieties, 
entitlements and expectations are being changed. Different types of capital and 
resources affect how young women frame anxiety about their futures (around pensions, 
property, employment, welfare, debt). They also affect the temporality of the future 
itself (the long-term future, the precarious present, the permanent present, or the past, 
present and future in a state of constant revision). Austerity therefore shapes the future 
for different women in different ways and thus, affects their ability to navigate their 
futures in such a context. 
 
Adapting to the Imagined Future  
 
As the above demonstrates, ‘austerity is an apparatus that can be understood to 
work on the future’ (Bramall, 2016a: 9). I have argued that it both shapes and organises 
the present and the future. In this section, drawing on the above discussion, I argue that 
the varied amount of capital also impacts the ways in which young women plan the 
future, and differently conditions present everyday practices. In this sense, borrowing 
from Bourdieu (2000), my data shows how ‘the real ambition to control the future varies 
with the real power to control that future’ (221). The ways in which young women 
imagine and (attempt to) plan their future depend upon the resources that they possess 
to do so. 
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 Responding to the Imagined Future   
 
Just as young women use strategies to try to navigate the present (see Chapter 
6), they also use strategies to circumnavigate the future. As Coleman argues, drawing on 
the work of Adkins, ‘in the context of a concern with the gendering of debt, the relations 
between past, present and future are in constant revision, which require women to be 
alert in and to the present’ (2016b: 100). However, this ‘alertness’ differs depending on 
their imaginations of the future and the types and amounts of capital they possess.  
 
Pippa, a 27-year-old, middle-class, white woman living in London, as discussed above, 
described her ‘pension packet’ as ‘incredible’, but she also discussed how she was ‘driven 
by making her own pension’. She said: 
 
I’m quite driven by making my own pension and not relying on, say, working in a 
company to rely on retiring and having an income of £12,000 a year. So I’m very 
much in the mind-set of I go out and I make it for myself, so I’m quite driven in 
that respect and I’m not going to sit and wait for someone to give it to me. That’s 
how I feel about the end of my career and I honestly don’t think I am the kind of 
person who, at retirement age I don’t think I would stop doing things. I’ve got a 
passion for development property, turn properties over, renovate them, that 
would keep my brains cells ticking I think. 
 
‘Not relying on working in a company to rely on retiring’, Pippa described herself as being 
in the mind-set of ‘making it for herself’. This, she voiced, would be materialised through 
‘property development’ in which she would ‘turn properties over and renovate them’. 
Not explicitly stating that her ‘passion for property development’ would be necessary to 
undertake when reaching retirement age, using a neoliberal individualised outlook, she 
reasoned that she ‘wouldn’t sit and wait for someone to give it [pension] to me’ and 
therefore wanted to remain ‘active’ and ‘keep her brain cells ticking over’. However, she 
thought she might need an additional income for her retirement, because ‘many things 
were changing’. This changing context can be seen to make Pippa more ‘alert’ to the fact 
that she might need that ‘additional income’ when she reaches her retirement age. 
Property development therefore becomes as strategy for not only ‘keeping her brain 
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cells ticking over’ but also providing an ‘additional income’ which she states will be 
‘needed’. 
 
Nadia showed this ‘alertness’ to the present in a different way. A 32-year-old, middle-
class, mixed other, high-school teacher from Leeds, Nadia, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
was worried about her future in education having witnessed cuts to support staff roles 
and had had her pay frozen for several years. Nadia became worried about the state of 
her pension when she came to retire. She said, ‘I have to invest in me now for the future 
so I don’t need to rely on pensions when I get to that stage’. She was anxious about not 
having a ‘good enough pension’, so was undertaking a master’s degree in a different 
field. This was to enable her to make more money in the future and either become self-
employed, or work for a company in the private sector. In a similar vein, Nina, a 28-year-
old, white, middle-class teacher living in Brighton, navigated her future by moving to 
London, so that her pay would accelerate and she would be able to save for a property. 
She said, ‘if I stay in Brighton, my pay accelerates at like £1000 a year, but for a job in 
London, we are talking £8000 more’. She continued, ‘the rent in London and Brighton 
are pretty much the same, so to even think about home ownership in the future, I need 
to move’.  
 
Women who were yet to enter the job market navigated their immediate future using 
short-term solutions of further study or travel. Alice, a 22-year-old, middle-class woman, 
discussed above, had graduated from university and lived at home with her parents while 
looking for full-time employment. In the current context, she was struggling to find 
suitable employment. She had decided to bypass the current context by either 
continuing in further Higher Education in the form of a master’s degree, in the hope that 
‘by the time I finish things will be a bit better’, or by going abroad to work as a nanny or 
to travel and learn a language. Travel and further study represent what David Cairns 
(2014) calls a ‘respite from austerity’. There is an acknowledgment that things would ‘get 
better’ once acquiring additional capital.  
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As Coleman (2012) notes, pre-emption of the future is, in part, a gendered process, so 
that the future is felt by women who are responsible for others (especially children), 
and/or whose presents are difficult and who aspire to change. Therefore, for those 
mothers who described their futures in more precarious terms, some of these women 
invested in their children’s futures, with the use of savings accounts and paying into life 
insurance policies in anticipation for their children’s future. Although it is important to 
note that this is not something brought about by austerity, of those who discussed such 
tactics, they described how the current context made them feel the increased need to 
take such action. Leoni, a 26-year-old, black, working-class, single mother living in 
London said:  
 
I’ve had life insurance for the last five years. I think I need it with all this stuff going 
on, so if anything does happen to me there will be something left for them. It’s 
like £10 a month for the next forty years I get like £80,000 pay out for them. So, 
I’m lucky it's an old one because the new ones it isn’t good now, I’ve been paying 
it for five years, I’m quite happy but it's so I know they have something because 
they will be left with nothing, do you know what I mean? I just hope they have the 
best. 
 
For Leoni, taking out life insurance was necessary ‘with all this stuff going on’. She used 
her small amount of economic capital to pay £10 per month into a life insurance bond to 
invest money for her children and their futures. Likewise, Lucy a 21-year-old, white, 
working-class single mother living in Brighton, had opened a savings account for her 
daughter. She said, ‘I got Olive [her daughter] a savings account … so if I have anything 
spare, like other people, I put it in there, but let's just hope it doesn’t change again for 
now anyway because I won’t be able to put anything away … it’s quite scary actually isn’t 
it’. Leoni and Lucy are reliant on systems that perpetuate their instability, but still try to 
save for their children’s long-term future. For these women to be able to think and 
prepare for a longer future, either their immediate future and the present had to either 
stay the same, or they needed ‘cushions’ to protect them from the changes. Although 
austerity made some young women ‘alert’ in the present through different strategies 
(savings, change of jobs, learning a language or returning to higher education), their 
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ability to plan and pre-empt the future was dependent upon the present and the 
‘cushions’ (capital, specifically inheritance) that they possessed.  
 
Living through the Precarious Permanent Present  
 
While some women are animated by, alert to, or mobilised by their fears or worries 
for the future, others have futures eclipsed or overshadowed by problems in the present. 
Helga Nowotny (1994) calls this ‘the extended present’, in which, she argues: ‘mapped 
out in linear terms’, the future ‘draws dangerously close to the present’ (49-50): 
 
[The future] is increasingly overshadowed by the problems which are opening up 
in the present. The future no longer offers that projection space into which all 
desires, hopes and fears could be projected without many inhibitions, because it 
seemed sufficiently remote to be able to absorb everything which had no place or 
was unwelcome in the present. The future has become more realistic, not least 
because the horizon of planning has been extended (50).   
 
Yet, young women’s narrative demonstrate that instead of thinking of the future as 
drawing ‘dangerously close to the present’, it is the need for women to plan in, or for the 
present, that actually discourages or even halts certain women’s plans for the future. This 
was the case for middle-class women who had recently entered the job market, earned 
less than the average graduate salary59 and lived independently. For instance, Madeline, 
a 25-year-old middle-class woman, who was working in the charity sector in Brighton, 
had just entered the job market after finishing her master’s degree in 2014. She struggled 
monthly because her salary was less than the average graduate salary and she had to pay 
off her student loan60, live independently and pay into her pension. She had decided to 
opt out of her pension to be able to afford to live in the present. She told me that, left 
with the choice of ‘living in the present or saving for the future’, she needed to ‘live in the 
present’. Emma also described the choice between ‘living in the present or saving for the 
                                                
59The average graduate starting salary is between £19,000 to £22,000 according to graduatejob.com 
 
60For graduates earning £17,495 per year or above, repayments of the student loan are 9 percent of 
£17,495 before tax per year.	
 274 
future’. Explaining how one of her colleagues had decided to opt out of her pension, she 
said: 
 
Pensions, I mean, I had a pension at my last job, I don’t know what’s in it, and I 
was talking to my colleague and she was like … I think she cancelled it, she opted 
out of it, she’s twenty-nine, she was like, the thing is, we are going to be working 
until we drop dead, like we aren’t going to enjoy our pension, there is no point, I 
might as well have that money now so I can pay off my credit card, it’s just 
something that’s so far away and the retirement age keeps creeping up and 
unless you are loaded, which not many people are, you’re just not going to be able 
to do it.  
 
 
Emma felt that a pension was unnecessary, because retirement age was ‘so far away’ and 
‘keeps creeping up’. Similarly, Rebecca discussed how the implementation of a 
mandatory pension by the government, which would theoretically help those on 
precarious contracts, would affect her in the short term. She said: 
 
At the moment, we don’t get a pension but the government is bringing that thing 
in where they have to at least offer you a pension. And I was looking at it and 
thinking well how much is that going to take out of what I am getting already 
because already a big bit is going out from my student loan and tax and national 
insurance … it is hard because you are living, just getting by on the money that 
you have and now there might be some more money coming out, which you need 
to think about but if you're not getting enough in the first place it doesn’t seem 
worth it to think and prepare for your future if you can't afford things now. 
 
Rebecca felt that paying into a pension at this stage of her career would hinder rather 
than help her. It would merely add to the ‘big bit going out’ for her student loan, tax and 
national insurance. Rebecca thought that, as ‘there might be more money coming out’ it 
‘doesn’t seem worth it to think and prepare for your future if you can’t afford things now’. 
These narratives show is that it is not only the future that is uncertain, but also the 
precarious present. This discourages, or even halts, certain plans for the future. Austerity 
closes down certain possibilities to invest or navigate the future – the present becomes 
equally as unstable and necessary to navigate through. This experience contrasts with 
that of other middle-class women who have more stability (in the form of properties), 
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more established careers and higher incomes. 
 
This section demonstrates that the varied amount of capital that allows young women 
to imagine their future differently also affects how they plan for, anticipate or pre-empt 
the future, and therefore differently conditions their present everyday practices. Some 
can invest in the future, some have to invest in the present, and others are trapped in the 
present.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has analysed how class affects women’s ability to access different 
kinds of imagined and real futures (Coleman, 2014a, 2014b) in the context of austerity. 
Class plays an important role in how futures are imagined, the time frames in which the 
future is spoken about, and the abilities of young women to adapt and plan for the future. 
In this sense, there is a classed relationship to time. Some have more space to be able to 
think about and plan their future, while, for others, the scope of future is often 
circumscribed to a short time scale. Typically, those with great amounts of and types of 
capital, generally imagine their futures through longer-term frameworks. They can look 
ahead and have the ability to plan for any issues that they might encounter. For those 
with a lower amount of, and fewer types of, capital, their experience of imagining the 
future is different. Their future imaginings are more related to everyday basic needs. The 
future imaginings are reduced or halted in the present. Adapting and planning for the 
future becomes increasingly hard, or even impossible. For those who have always lived 
with such precarity and insecurity constraining their futures, their futures are now further 
restricted in a context of austerity. 
 
Yet, as shown above, this relationship to time is not straightforward. It is overly simplistic 
to say that only middle-class young women can imagine their futures, while working-
class women only live in the permanent present. My data showed a much more complex 
situation. The possibility of thinking and investing in the future is different in terms of 
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class, but this has also differently affected women within class fractions. The way in 
which the middle-class think of, and plan for, their futures, is differently shaped by the 
ways in which they are able to play with their capital according to their circumstance and 
trajectory. The analysis shows that insecurity is penetrating the lives of women, in areas 
which, pre-crisis, might not have created such apprehension (such as employment and 
access to property). However, despite varying levels of anxiety, for some women, this is 
‘cushioned’ by their access to different forms of capital. Their ability and expectation of 
living ‘the good life’ is therefore easier to imagine. For others, their expectations become 
harder without the access to these ‘cushions’.  
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Chapter 10 
 
In Conclusion: The State We Are Now In 
 
 
Britain is weary after seven years of hard slog repairing the 
damage of the great recession … but [the government] will 
remain committed to the fiscal rules set out at the Autumn 
Statement which will guide us, via interim targets in 2020, to a 
balanced budget by the middle of the next decade.  
 
(Phillip Hammond, Chancellor of the Exchequer, June 2017, 
italics my emphasis) 
 
What’s happening now is shit, sorry, but it’s too much, it really 
is too much. How can we keep going on like this? That’s why 
everyone’s voice needs to be heard. Everyone has a story to 
tell. We need to share our stories and hear other people’s 
stories. What did you think when you heard my story? No one 
ever hears a story like mine, from my view.  
 
(Scarlett, 23, white, working-class, on Income Support, 
Leeds, 2014) 
 
 
As I write this conclusion, in September 2017, there has been approximately 
£90.8bn of cuts made to public spending since the implementation of austerity in 2010 
(Cracknel and Keen, 2016). A further 3bn of cuts to public spending are in the pipeline, 
with a new autumn budget on its way.  Phillip Hammond describes this period of 
austerity as ‘seven years of hard slog’, which will continue into ‘the middle of the next 
decade’. This ‘hard slog’ has caused increased homelessness (Bloomer, 2017), food 
poverty (Garthwaite, 2016a; Oxfam, 2015), mental illness (Broomfield, 2017), and, in 
some cases, has even death (Daily Mirror Inquest, 2012). Alongside this, through the 
political justification for austerity policies, there has been the targeting, vilification, 
humiliation and scapegoating of certain groups (‘national abjects’ (Tyler, 2015)), unfairly 
blamed for the crisis of financial capitalism. Women, this thesis has shown, are one 
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particular group that have both been affected by, and blamed for, the ‘seven years of 
hard slog’.  
 
Through a careful analysis, this thesis has attempted to understand the symbiotic 
relationship between austerity, as a gendered state project, and its gendered social 
effects. I have unpacked the multiple ways in which austerity is produced and legitimised 
by the state, and situated austerity within its historical context. This approach was crucial 
to understand the nuances of the gendered austerity project, and the way in which it 
(re)produces economic and symbolic violence. Supplementing this understanding with 
an empirical analysis with sixty-one young women from different class and ‘racial’ 
backgrounds, in Leeds, London, and Brighton during 2014 and 2015, I then explored how 
austerity was experienced and articulated in women’s everyday lives. This empirical 
analysis allowed for a deeper understanding of the multifarious ways in which difference 
affects how young women navigate, negotiate, speak about, question, reproduce, and 
resist the austerity programme. By studying austerity as a gendered state project that 
has gendered social effects, I was able to provide an overall understanding of the 
particular configurations of gender, class and ‘race’ relations which are being produced 
in this current period of UK austerity. 
 
In this concluding chapter, I gather the main themes and arguments of my research in 
relation to my original research questions, and outline the empirical findings of the study. 
I then point to some pathways for future research, before reaching an overall conclusion. 
 
 
Understanding the Role of the State in Shaping Young Women’s Experiences of 
Austerity  
  
 
Chapter 2 described how I had to shape, restructure and adjust my research 
methodology because of the complexity of austerity, and the multiple ways in which it 
affects women’s everyday lives. Despite the messy and untidy process, I argued that this 
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did not impinge on the research, and indeed became necessary to effectively research 
austerity and its impacts. Throughout this process, I remained mindful that knowledge-
making through research is not only tied to earlier histories of ‘telling the self’, but also 
the creation of the categories and representations that I wanted to avoid and disarm. By 
listening to, interpreting and describing women’s experiences with care and caution, I 
hope to have provided diverse, yet fragmented stories that highlight women’s different 
experience of austerity, and which work against, and trouble the representations and 
discourses circulating within the socio-political arena. 
Chapter 4 focussed on the historical legacies underpinning the present context of 
austerity. I argued that austerity, as a gendered state project, builds on histories which 
(re)produce and legitimate inequality and material and symbolic violence. This chapter 
gave a detailed analysis of the ways in which austerity is produced and legitimised by the 
state in the present. I demonstrated that state discourses justify changes to the welfare 
system and produce and reinforce gendered, classed and ‘racial’ relations/divisions 
within the population. It is partly these discourses that make austerity present in the lives 
of young women, and have implications for how austerity is differently lived and felt in 
everyday life. It was thus crucial to situate austerity within its historical context to 
understand the production and legitimisation of austerity in the present, and how and 
why difference comes to matter in women’s experiences. 
 
This understanding made it possible to empirically analyse the social effects of austerity 
on young women’s lives. Chapter 5 examined the effects of austerity on a material level 
through general living standards and employment. Alert in the knowledge that different 
social markers shape women’s experience and intensify and extend existing social and 
economic inequalities, I used Bourdieu’s (1979, 1986, 1989, 1991) metaphors of capital to 
examine how difference and processes of differentiation interact with, and further shape 
these experiences. The chapter revealed that austerity is materialised in young women’s 
everyday lives in different ways, and to differing degrees. However, the degree to which 
these changes impact women’s lives were experienced as minimal, significant or 
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extreme. This, I argued, depended on the volume, composition and trajectory of 
women’s capitals and resources. Women with a higher volume of capital and resources 
for example, had relative distance from material necessary, since they possessed 
multiple forms of legitimate capital that enabled protection, security and distance from 
such effects. In some cases, young women could accrue capital because of their various 
amounts and types of economic, cultural and social capital. The trend to casualisation, 
changes to ‘back to work’ policies, and the rise in living costs had a greater effect on 
BAME and white working-class women – these women possessed less capital, or found 
it harder to legitimise or convert their capital. These women’s experiences of the material 
effects of austerity were therefore more significant, which placed them closer to 
necessity and economic dispossession. With a lack of protection, security and legitimate 
capital and resources, for women who were solely reliant on state support and who had 
dependent children, their experiences of austerity were the most extreme. 
Building on this argument, Chapter 6 then revealed that such differences also affect how 
young women respond to and navigate through the effects of austerity. Unlike previous 
empirical research that has largely focused on how specific groups ‘weather the storm’, 
this chapter highlighted the commonalities in women’s navigation strategies between 
different groups, but also where and how these approaches diverged. Women used a 
variety of strategies, including reskilling, gaining further qualifications, cutting back, 
discount shopping and receiving help from family, partners and outside agencies. 
However, there were complexities within these different practices. As explained within 
the chapter, the act of ‘cutting back’ or buying ‘essentials’ had a different meaning 
depending on women’s experiences of austerity. For some, ‘cutting back’ meant making 
the effort to drive further to frequent a low-cost supermarket. For others, ‘cutting back’ 
meant discount shopping in the reduced aisle, buying in bulk or skipping meals.  
 
There were also divergences in women’s navigation strategies. Re-skilling and travelling 
abroad, for example, were strategies undertaken by those with a high volume and 
composition of capital and resources, typically cultural and social capital. Women who 
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used foodbanks, charity organisations and payday loans were usually largely or solely 
dependent on state support and had dependent children. These women had a lower 
volume and composition of capital and resources. I argued that the type of strategies 
that could be used depended on the volume, composition and trajectory of women’s 
capitals and resources. 
 
My thesis also unpacked the symbolic campaign of austerity, showing the contradictory 
ways in which young women talk to and against dominant austerity discourse. In Chapter 
7, I highlighted that women’s discussions were layered with contradictions, intricacies, 
and complexities. I argued that women not only legitimised and reproduced the austerity 
agenda, but also, at times, fractured and ruptured the discourse. In this sense, when 
dialoguing with austerity discourse, women often reproduced moral narratives aimed at 
creating divisions within the population. The ‘undeserving rich’ and ‘undeserving poor’ 
were held up as ‘bad citizens’. Yet, when demonstrating their own moral worth, women 
were more likely to distance themselves from the ‘undeserving poor’. For middle-class 
women, this was through the discussion of ‘worklessness’ and ‘moral failing’, which 
fostered consent for welfare reform by blaming the individual for their own poverty and 
insecurity. Women who were closer to the stigmatised position of the ‘bad citizen’ 
(working-class, sick or disabled, single mothers, and BAME women), dialogued with such 
representations. Their dialogue depended on the resources and capitals they had 
available to mobilise (economic productivity, morality, motherhood). These women 
distinguished themselves from others seen to be less deserving of the right to receive 
help from the state, reinforcing divisions within these groups. Women did, however, 
draw on values that countered the predominant moralistic narratives of economic 
productivity and aspiration, such as care and empathy. These values complicated the 
ideas of individualism and meritocracy.  
Chapter 8 highlighted another key contribution of this thesis. Feminism appeared a 
productive site to further understand austerity’s moral project and the formation of 
gendered, classed and ‘race’ relations. I highlighted how a certain type of middle-class 
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feminism, which I termed ‘austerity–bourgeois feminism’, converged with austerity 
policies, discourses and sensibilities. I argued that this convergence helped to legitimate 
austerity measures and further reproduce inequality. I analysed how seventeen middle-
class women understood, affiliated with and positioned themselves within feminism, 
and used this to illustrate how their narratives of morality, culture, distance, distinction 
and blame converged. Connected in various way to ‘neoliberal’ and ‘bourgeois feminism’, 
‘austerity–bourgeois feminists’ used the neoliberal language of individualism, 
independence, self-love, and self-care to characterise their identification. They 
emphasised the need for self-responsibility to deal with forms of inequality and labelled 
those who were suffering within the current crisis as failures of self-governance or victims 
of culture. Their labelling thus reinforced classed and racialised distinctions between 
themselves (the ‘good citizen’) and others (the ‘bad citizen’), through a position of 
‘indifference’. This distancing, I argued, is crucial to the maintenance of the austerity 
project. Instead of helping to put an end to gender inequality, this form of feminism 
legitimises hierarchical relationships and gendered socio-economic inequalities. It 
therefore precludes any kind of solidarity across gender, class, or ‘race’.  
 
Chapter 9 revealed the ways in which austerity affects young women’s access to different 
kinds of imagined and real futures (Coleman, 2014a, 2014b). This chapter highlighted 
how the majority of women imagined an increasingly insecure and precarious future. 
However, once again, class positioning affected how they imagined their future, the 
timescales that they thought about, and how they could actually adapt and plan for the 
future. The volume, composition, and trajectory of capital affected women’s abilities to 
think about and plan for their future. Typically, those with larger amounts and types of 
capital imagined their futures through topics that were further away. They could afford 
to look ahead as they had the ability to try to plan for different future scenarios. This 
allowed their expectations for the future to remain intact. For those with a lower amount 
and different types of capital, their experience of imagining the future was different. It 
was more related to everyday basic needs. The future was therefore more likely to be 
reduced or halted in the present and, adapting and planning for the future became 
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increasing more difficult.  
 
The above gave an overview of the important contributions that each specific chapter 
has made to this study. In what follows, I detail the overarching key themes that have 
emerged from the study, and highlight potential pathways for future research. 
 
Living Historical Legacies with Vengeance  
 
This thesis explored how the particular configurations of gender, ‘race’ and class 
relations are being produced in the specific context of UK austerity. Austerity reproduces 
difference and inequality – it does not exist in a vacuum, and neither do the 
configurations that it produces. Rather, they build on a previous history. This thesis 
traced this history through the mutual crafting and shaping of the categories of gender, 
‘race’, and class in different times of crisis and state formations. These relations have 
been configured and reconfigured by the state to suit the needs of the particular 
moment. Categorisations and representations change and shift, doing different work at 
different times. However, certain central features remain. Particular inscriptions and 
labels circulate and repeat over time and space. 
This thesis has shown that both black and white working-class women have been 
interchangeably used (seen as the solution), and/or blamed (labelled as the problem), in 
the interests of the state and capitalism. Used as the solution to social order, working-
class women have been put to use by being moved into the home, educated to ‘civilise’, 
made to shoulder the impact of austerity and government reform, or take on the dual 
role of an ‘active citizen worker’ and ‘good mother’ by juggling paid employment and 
childcare, as state services are withdrawn. The same working-class figure has also been 
repeatedly blamed and shamed for the lack of social order and problems of the nation 
through a politics of difference. These women have come to be recognised through 
morality as carriers of immorality, degeneracy, and danger, as witches, as the 
‘undeserving poor’, the ‘anti-citizen’, and as the black and/or (dirty) white welfare 
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mother. In all these configurations, they come to be known as figures which deplete, or 
are undeserving of, national resources (welfare), and which are in need of confinement, 
regulation, or moral reform. In different forms, at different times, and through particular 
configurations, the state has not only controlled and penalised women for the things that 
they have ‘done’, but also has used and mobilised them in the interests of capital. 
These historical legacies survive, reproduce, and live with vengeance in the current 
context. These configurations have been invested in by people with power and access to 
the dominant symbolic ‘to claim the moral high ground and legitimate their privilege in 
a world of blatant inequality’ (Skeggs, 2014b: no pagination). In the absence and 
silencing of alternative knowledge in the context of austerity, it is these inscriptions and 
representations that are reused and violently played out by the state, as a way to blame 
and shame black and white working-class women for the crisis of capitalism, and 
legitimise their unequal punishment, through subsequent punitive policies of welfare 
reform. These representations are subsequently used to vilify and condemn those 
women, who, due to the material deprivation and moral stigmatisation exacerbated by 
austerity, find it impossible to ‘successfully’ navigate through the context in the preferred 
way of the government. It is this long history that makes these current configurations so 
powerful, and equally, so toxic. 
 
Moral Condemnation through an Accident of Birth 
 
 
Austerity has had the greatest effect on the lives of white and BAME working-
class women. This is because conditions of existence have not been undermined, but 
‘exacerbated in the current context, reconﬁguring the value of one’s capital, the range of 
possibilities open and, ultimately, the degree to which economic necessity presses on 
the senses’ (Atkinson, 2013: 14). The lower volume, composition, and trajectory of 
working-class women’s capitals and resources (Bourdieu, 1979, 1986, 1989, 1991) thus 
decreases their ‘space of possibilities’ (Bourdieu, 2014) and draws them closer to 
necessity. Austerity makes it harder for these women to navigate within the context and 
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to accumulate, convert, and legitimise their already meagre capitals. This is in spite of 
the multiple strategies employed, and the hard work and time taken to keep their heads 
above water.  
Yet, the disavowal of the continuing structuring force of the configurations of gender, 
class, and ‘race’ makes it difficult for women to discuss how these differences and 
processes of inequality continue to be reproduced. The moral project of austerity both 
decontextualises and individualises the conditions of deepening poverty and inequality. 
Morality and lifestyle are also used to produce, legitimate, and sustain the austerity 
programme and the rollback of welfare through the enactment of the binaries of 
‘work’/‘workless’, ‘striver’/‘skiver’, ‘good citizen’/‘bad citizen’. These binaries are 
‘polarising, designed to censure, accuse and condemn’ (Jensen, 2013b: no pagination) 
specific groups for taking advantage of the hard work of the majority. The ‘skiving 
welfare mother’ is constructed as the antithesis of ‘the hard-working family’, and is 
represented as morally lacking. Their differing experiences of austerity is due to their 
different morals and values, instead of the inequality execrated by austerity. It is because 
of this accident of birth that working-class women are morally condemned and blamed 
for the crisis of capitalism and/or for not being able to weather the storm correctly. Thus, 
lifestyle and morality work as important markers in reproducing solidarity, and division 
through symbolic violence.  
These discourses have therefore resulted in the reinforcement and production of social 
divisions, processes of discrimination, stigmatisation, prejudice, exclusion, and blame in 
the everyday. The blaming of particular people for the crisis, for instance, has a 
consequence – women draw classed and ‘racialised’ divisions, between, and within 
groups. This does not mean, as my thesis has shown, that women do not resist or contest 
these valuations. Yet, such moral condemnation strongly constrains their space of 
possibilities, in the ways in which they are able to live and construct their lives. Often this 
condemnation results in processes of differentiation, through blame and distancing 
towards others who are also morally condemned. Such processes reinforce the notion 
that inequality is the result of moral values, instead of unequal austerity policies. 
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Drawing Differences through Feminism 
 
 
Despite gender inequality being further entrenched by the austerity programme, 
feminism, this thesis has argued, has become a key site through which austerity 
discourse is legitimised and a way through which these moral classed, gendered, and 
racialised differences have been further reproduced. Feminism, can therefore assist 
forms of ‘social inequality that support and sustain gender inequality’ (Evans, 2017: 76). 
‘Austerity–bourgeois feminism’, does just that. Previous forms of feminism have 
converged with wider cultural, political, and economic frames and contexts – this one is 
no different. This feminist subject becomes an active force field to reinforce current 
political values and discourses, since resilience, hard work, and responsibility are framed 
as necessary feminist traits. Austerity–bourgeois feminism has connections to previous 
forms of feminism, but also has distinctive qualities. This feminist position helps to 
displace the current social, cultural and economic forces producing inequality – especially 
in relation to gender, classed and ‘racial’ differences – by placing an individual’s 
misfortunes into their own hands.  
Yet it is not just its focus on individualism and responsibility, but the production of the 
feminist through a moral hierarchy, which makes this form of feminism particularly 
dangerous. The ‘proper/good feminist’ and the ‘woman in need of feminism’ become the 
binaries through which classed and racialised differences are drawn. Narratives of 
morality and culture thereby reproduce and reinforce inequality – it is women’s morals 
and culture (their lack of education, traditions, values), not their experiences of the 
austerity programme, which limit their ability to cope and be an individuated, 
responsible feminist. Adoption of this form of feminism is a way to obvert inequality. 
These feminists blame and vilify those who cannot ‘manage’ such changes, becoming 
indifferent their situation, which precludes any kind of solidarity across gender, class or 
‘race’. This form of feminism becomes a means through which inequality is exacerbated, 
not reduced. 
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Pathways for Future Research 
 
 
My research developed a specific case study to understand the experiences of a 
particular group of women in the context of UK austerity. Yet it provides some important 
insights for the study of austerity more broadly, and illuminates several potential areas 
for research in a wider context. In the section below, I outline some of the ways in which 
the insights from my study could be taken further.  
 
Whilst my research gave an understanding into the discursive production and 
legitimisation of austerity, as well as how it is lived in everyday life, the particularity of 
the research cannot be ignored. My data is specific to young women from particular 
cities, analysing the impact of the traditional classifications of class and ‘race’ on their 
experiences. As illustrated throughout this research, young women do not experience 
austerity in the same way – the uneven distribution of spending cuts means that it is lived 
and felt differently. During my fieldwork, I found that markers of documental status and 
disability intersected with traditional classifications – these may explain some of the 
variability. These social markers deserve further in-depth research and analysis, to 
further illuminate the multiple impacts of the vulnerable. 
 
This research has focused upon austerity in Britain (specifically three cities), yet austerity 
has been used throughout Northern Europe and the United States following the 2008 
financial crisis. Many young women in different countries will have had different 
experiences. Austerity may also be produced and legitimised in distinctive ways. 
Therefore, a cross-national study of austerity would expand the understanding of how 
austerity varies across different countries and impacts the lives of young women at both 
a symbolic and material level.  
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In Conclusion  
 
 
The state we are in is therefore a punishing state. It unfairly targets the most 
vulnerable and disregards inherited positions that leave social positions firmly 
entrenched. The state we are in determines ‘the value of life adjudicating on who is 
expendable and who is of worth’ (Tyler, 2013a: 46). If you have no value for capital, the 
state makes it harder for you to live. It is not surprising then, that we hear so little about 
the amounts of corporate welfare61 payments that go to private companies. Yet, at the 
same time, we are exposed to multiple reports on the ‘vast’ amounts lavished on the 
‘skivers’ or ‘undeserving poor’. As Kevin Farnsworth (2015: no pagination) notes, 
‘unemployed citizens on benefits are told they have “no rights without responsibilities” 
and face financial and other penalties if they deviate from their contract with the state 
whereas corporations, in contrast, are provided with financial support without strings’. 
Corporate profit, in this present context, seems to be more valuable than that of human 
life.  
 
Those of us who have access to the bigger picture and comprehend the workings of 
capitalism in its cunning forms (Skeggs, 2014b) need to question, challenge, and resist 
the delegitimisation of those who have no value for capital. This thesis has therefore 
attempted to do just that: delegitimise the ‘legitimate’, unpack how alternatives are 
silenced, reveal how unjust policies are produced and legitimised, and expose how 
women are used and/or blamed. I also hope to have laid bare the ways in which women 
are navigating through this punishing, punitive context, highlighting the divergence with 
which austerity affects and shapes women’s lives.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
61Corporate welfare is made up of the various benefits and services that are provided by governments in 
order to service the needs and/or interests of private businesses (Farnsworth, 2015). 	
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Appendix A 
 
Short biography of interviews in London (October 2014 – March 2015) 
Name  Age  Class 
Background  
‘Race’/Ethnic 
background   
Nationality  Occupation   Children  
Molly 26 Middle-class    Black  Nigerian Payroll Trainer  No  
Anna 27 Middle-class White  British  Physiotherapist  No 
Mia 27 Middle-class Anglo-Indian  British  General 
Practitioner 
(GP) 
No 
Erica  25 Middle-class Black  British  Account 
Manager  
No 
Uzma 27 Middle-class  Pakistani Pakistan Recruitment 
Consultant   
No 
Cherry 35 Middle-class    Black Sierra 
Leone  
Part-time Shop 
Assistant  
Single 
parent 4 
children 
Jane 31 Working-
class 
Black  British On Income 
Support  
Single 
parent 2 
children 
Pippa 27 Middle-class White  British  Content 
Producer  
No  
Celia  27 Middle-class White  British HR Manager  No 
Kiran 28 Middle-class Indian British  Head of 
Training 
Operations  
No  
Emma 25 Middle-class White  British  Unemployed – 
No State 
Support  
No  
Alice  23 Middle-class White  British Unemployed – 
No State 
Support  
No  
Marie 28 Working-
class 
Black  British Part-time 
Waitress/ 
Receives State 
Benefit 
Single 
parent 1 
child 
Heather  26 Working-
class 
Black  British On Income 
Support  
Single 
parent 4 
children 
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Dominique 32 Working-
class    
Black  Benin Cleaner  Single 
parent 2 
children 
Hannah  23 Working-
class  
White  British Stewardess  No 
Fiona  23 Working-
class  
White  British Part-time 
Nursery Nurse 
(currently on 
Maternity 
Leave)/ State 
Benefit 
Single 
parent 
with 
child 
Julie 34 Middle-class White  British Events 
Assistant  
No 
Leoni  26 Working-
class  
Black  British  On Income 
Support  
Yes 
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Short biography of interviews in Leeds (June – October 2014) 
 
 
Name  Age  Class 
background  
‘Race’/Ethnic 
Background 
Nationality  Occupation  Children  
Polly 27 Middle-class White  British Occupational 
Therapist  
No 
Tiffany 27 Middle-class White  British Marketing 
Manager  
No 
Kate 30 Middle-class White  British Teacher 
(High 
School) 
No 
Nadia 32 Middle-class Mixed other  British  Part-time 
teacher 
(High school) 
/ part-time 
MA Student  
No 
Ivy  20 Middle-class White  British BA Student  No 
Sophie 25 Middle-class White  British Marketing 
Officer for 
the NHS  
No 
Sarah 25 Middle-class White  British Occupational 
Therapist  
No 
Amira  25 Working-class    Black-African  Ethiopia  Factory 
Worker 
No 
Adele  23 Working-class  White  British On Income 
Support  
Single 
mother 
with 1 child 
Faye  23 Working-class  White  British On Income 
Support  
Single 
mother 
with 2 
children 
Lauren 33 Working-class  White  British On JSA Single 
mother 
with 1 child 
Louise 35 Working-class  White  British On DLA No 
Natalie 18 Working-class  Black  British BA Student   No 
Francesca  28 Middle-class Indian  British  Accountant  No  
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Short biography of interviews in Brighton (January – May 2015) 
 
 
Name  Age  Class 
Background 
‘Race’/Ethnic 
background  
Nationality  Occupation  Children 
Nicola  34 Middle-class White  British  On Income 
Support  
Single 
mother 
with 1 
child 
Lucy 21 Working-
class 
White  British On Income 
Support  
Single 
mother 
with 1 
child 
Elaine  27 Middle-class   White  British Part-time 
Welfare 
Support 
Officer at a 
High School 
/ DLA  
No 
Madeline  24 Middle-class White  British Complaints 
Mediation 
Officer in 
Charity 
Sector 
No 
Nina 27 Middle-class White  British Teacher 
(Primary 
School) 
No 
Ruth 25 Middle-class White  British PhD at 
University of 
Sussex (fully-
funded) 
No 
Rebecca  28 Middle-class White  British Debt and 
Benefit 
Advisor  
No 
Priya  35 Middle-class Pakistani  British On DLA  1 child 
Trisha 34 Middle-class White  British Part-time 
Advocacy 
Support 
Worker 
/Part-time 
Dog Walker 
Single 
mother 
1 child 
Marta  35 Working-
class  
White  Romanian Volunteer  1 child 
with 
husband 
Carla  24 Middle-class White British Teacher 
(High 
School)  
No 
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Susan  30 Middle-class White British Account 
Manager  
No 
Jill  33 Middle-class White British Doctor  No 
Rose 26 Middle-class  White British BA Student   No 
Daniella  22 Working-
class  
White British  BA Student  No 
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Short biography of focus group 1 participants in Leeds (August 2014) 
 
 
Name  Age (all 
aged 
above 
18) 
Class 
background  
‘Race’/Ethnic 
background 
Nationality  Occupation  Children 
Sonia  35  Working-class Bangladeshi British  Volunteer  2 children 
with 
husband 
Jaya 24 Working-class Bangladeshi  British  On JSA/ 
Volunteer   
No 
Zareen 34 Working-class Bangladeshi British  On JSA/ 
Volunteer  
No 
Ava 28 Working-class  Bangladeshi British   On Income 
Support/ 
Volunteer  
Didn’t say  
Layla 35 Middle-class   Bangladeshi  British  Project 
Coordinator 
at a Charity  
2 children 
with 
husband 
Ila 35 Working-class Bangladeshi  British  On JSA/ 
Volunteer  
Single 
parent 2 
children 
 
 
Short biography of focus group 2 participants in Leeds (September 2014) 
 
 
Name  Age Class 
background  
‘Race’/Ethnic 
background  
Nationality  Occupation  Children  
Rita  35 Working-class White  British Receives 
State 
Benefits   
2 
independent 
children  
Scarlett 23 Working-class White  British On Income 
Support  
Single 
mother 2 
children 
Lydia Early 
20’s 
Working-class White  British On JSA No 
Charlotte 20’s Working-class White  British On Income 
Support   
Single 
mother 1 
child 
Shannon 20’s Working-class White   British On Income 
Support  
1  
Morgan  21  Working-class White   British  On JSA 1 child  
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Appendix B 
 
Consent form 
Thank you very much for agreeing to take part in this project about young women's lived 
experiences of austerity. The study is conducted in the context of my PhD research and 
is supported by Goldsmiths College, University of London. The project aims to explore 
young women’s views about austerity measures and welfare reform in both Leeds, 
London and Brighton and how this in turn affects their understanding of justice, equality 
and fairness. 
The interview you are about to take part in is concerned to explore a variety of aspects of 
your experience, organised around the following themes: 
1. Background  
2. Current situation  
3. Future aspirations  
4. Views on the impact of the cuts  
5. Personal lived experience of the cuts  
6. Ideas surrounding injustice/inequality and unfairness  
 
Participation: The participation in the study is entirely voluntary and you can withdraw 
from it at any time during the course of the research. There will be no adverse 
consequences if you decide not to participate. If you have any queries or problems after 
the interview, you can contact me via email (vdabrowski@live.co.uk).  
Confidentiality: Everything you say in the interview will be treated with strictest 
confidence. I will be the only person who has direct access to the transcript of the 
interview and all research materials will be stored in a secure environment. My academic 
supervisors are the only people I would allow to look at the interview transcript. In any 
written reports arising from the research, steps will be taken to protect your anonymity, 
including using pseudonyms, and altering information that might potentially identify you 
to others (expect where you make it explicit that you have no objection to this being 
known). 
Thank you again for your time and valuable input to the research.  
Please sign below to give your consent to being interviewed for this study.  
Name: 
 
Signature:  
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